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A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY
OF THE
HUMAN MIND

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A Philosophical Study of the Human Mind

BY
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To
My dear wife and collaborator
BETH BARRELL

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PREFACE

A preface, it would seem, is the place for matter which does not form part of an introduction to a book, but which is nevertheless relevant and necessary to the same.

As regards this book, there is one fact which is not introductory, but which is relevant to the pages that follow. This is the fact that the book has been more than twenty years in the making.

There are many disadvantages to such lengthy composition. In the first place, it is hardly possible over such a span of years to follow with complete regularity a unified plan of composition. Some sections, even some chapters, will inevitably depart from the main stem, contributing to the thought of the volume as a whole, but not carrying on the development of the central portion. Again, the earlier parts of such a book will undoubtedly show a certain inferiority in comparison with the later portions, it being inevitable that in the course of twenty years a writer should pick up some skill in the presentation of his material. Finally, it is unavoidable that if one waits so long to publish his ideas, not a few of these will have been anticipated.

This third and last objection, however, is surely the least important. To live is to perceive that one has been anticipated. Often one's most "original" ideas turn out to have been held by the Greeks more than two thousand years ago. Frequently the verdict of history is that only the synthesis of a man's work is new. Thus Liebig pointed out that Lavoisier's great work in chemistry was largely a fresh organization of old materials,* and we now perceive that the intellectual structure of Darwin's *Origin of Species* is mostly built of secondhand bricks. The natural-selection brick was manufactured by Malthus; and as for the small-variations brick, which Darwin himself fashioned, although now restored, this was once rejected by most evolutionists. Yet the building remains, perhaps the most imposing of nineteenth-century thought. One would be content to do work one-half as successful.

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* Justus Liebig, *Chemische Briefe,* Heidelberg, 1851, pp. 31-33.

But the episodic nature of a twenty-year book, as well as the lesser competence of the earlier portions, are objections that are more serious. However, a book that has grown over the years not infrequently has a certain vitality which a more perfectly constructed book sometimes lacks. Furthermore the earlier portions of this particular book were all based upon an abundant experience, which at the time of composition had a three-dimensional, even vibrant, reality that is no longer present to assist in a revision. Hence it has seemed best to leave the earlier portions with their imperfections and their possible virtues rather than to recast or to eliminate them. Besides, they can still serve as an introduction, which was their original purpose.

To the many friends and former students who, over the years, acted as his interlocutors, the writer can give only his general thanks. If he were to mention them by name he would be certain to forget one or two. A few friends, however, must be singled out. The late Wayland Wells Williams of New Haven, Connecticut, supplied the diagram and thought of Chapter 7, section 7, just as they now stand. Dr. K. R. Morgan of Fairfield, Connecticut, supplied the first draft of part of Chapter 8, section 5. To Mr. Henry J. Meinke, to Mrs. H. B. Rockwell, and to Mr. Owen Verne Shaffer the author owes his particular thanks for the diagrams.

J. B.

Beloit, Wisconsin

A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY
OF THE
HUMAN MIND

1

THE PRIMITIVE AND ABSTRACT MINDS

A favorite quotation of William James from Shakespeare is the remark of Touchstone in *As You Like It,* "Hast any philosophy in thee, shepherd?" The quotation appears in James's 1876 letter to the *Nation,* at the beginning of his career. It occurs on the fifth or sixth page of his posthumous *Some Problems of Philosophy,* upon which he was at work when he died.

It is entirely characteristic that Touchstone's remark should have appealed to James. James was always skeptical of philosophy that came from the classroom, always ready to take his philosophy from a shepherd or from a wagon driver in the mountains of North Carolina.[1] In James's estimation, whatever else it meant, philosophy also meant the wisdom that a shepherd or a wagon driver can possess, and can then pass on to another human being.

Now that is what philosophy is going to mean in this book. It will mean the wisdom possessed by one human being which can be communicated to another. In particular, it will mean wisdom about the human mind—wisdom possessed, for the most part, by psychologists, but capable, nonetheless, of leaving the bounds of psychology and becoming the property of men and women who are not psychologists.

---

[1] The reference is to James's essay, "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings."

But will not such wisdom result merely in another book on psychology, of which there are already a great number on the market? Not exactly. For the collecting of such wisdom is really a philosophical rather than a psychological enterprise.

Strictly speaking, such wisdom no more needs a psychologist to do the collecting than the wisdom of a shepherd needs a shepherd, or the wisdom of a wagon driver another wagon driver. As a matter of fact it can be argued that the wisdom is *best* collected by an outsider. In the present state of psychology the outsider alone will have a sufficiently impersonal point of view. Nowadays nearly every psychologist is the protagonist of some school or another, a messenger of this gospel or of that. Configurationists, behaviorists, functionalists, experimentalists; Freudians, Jungians, Adlerians; their findings represent, respectively, but portions of the knowledge that may be passed on to the human race. And if it happens that the psychologist is an eclectic and not a partisan, his point of view may still be too technical and specialized. If the wisdom of psychology is to become the property of men and women who are not psychologists, it must consist of generalizations that reach beyond psychology. It is the outsider who will be most apt to pick up those conclusions that are sufficiently free of technicalities for common use. He, rather than the specialist, will be likely to perceive the generalizations suited for philosophic communication. He also, being less close to the subject, will see it in broader terms, less narrowly conceived in the language of a specialized vocabulary.

Yet a study of the human mind that pretends to be philosophic will do more than merely collect the various truths to be gleaned from the different schools of psychology. If it is genuinely philosophic, such a study will present a certain amalgamation of the truths so gleaned. The various truths will be selected so as to be consistent with one another. The valuable doctrine of the conditioned response will be borrowed from behaviorism without the denial of consciousness that would invalidate borrowings from other schools. The Freudian theory of development will be taken over without the background of neurosis, which would have but limited value in a study that must extend to the normal as well as to the abnormal mind. The amalgamation will also represent the philosopher's point of view—in this case, the pragmatic, or utilitarian, point of view. The amalgamation in this particular case will have to work. The unified, consistent theory will have to be of demonstrable use.

It is this pragmatic aspect that will release the present study from the charge of mere "armchair" speculation. Armchair speculation it may well be—up to the point of the pragmatic test. But not beyond. For if the speculator gets up from his armchair when his speculation is completed, if he attempts to apply his theory, if he rejects all conclusions that are not of real, demonstrable use, then he emerges with a practical philosophy, even if he made himself comfortable while working it out.

Finally, if such a study of the human mind applies, if it works, it will be not only philosophic but psychologic as well. It will return to its source with something new to add, with a contribution all of its own. The synthesis of old materials, not only by the fact of the synthesis, but by its representation of the synthesizer's point of view, will inevitably produce new psychologic knowledge, which can then be used for further philosophical studies, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Such, then, is the purpose and the scope of this book.

In addition to a statement of aims, however, it is necessary to define terms and present concepts. This is especially true when the subject matter is such an old one as that of the human mind, when its concepts are as venerable as human thought, and when its terms have had a long history of various, and even contradictory, meanings. For one cannot reject the old terms and concepts. Psychology will bear fruit for the average man or woman only if it builds upon and embraces the psychologic wisdom of the past, which is all phrased in the old words—the words that take for granted the existence of a mind and of such things as thoughts and feelings and hopes and determinations.

The ways, however, of proverbial wisdom and of a modern, philosophical approach to psychology will, in one respect, be different. The modern approach will begin with a new beginning. Its premises will be freshly taken. The result will be like a building composed in part of old materials, but laid upon a new foundation. It will be possible to use nearly all the old materials, but they will be employed in the upper portions and the building laid upon new stone. Indeed, a study of the human mind of the sort here envisioned will much resemble a structure of ideas, and the basic conception upon which it will rest will be the notion of the relation that exists between man and the world that is his home.

For the notion that is fundamental to the modern view of the human mind is the notion that the world was here before us, that it is we who must give an account of ourselves, not the universe. We have come to feel that if we are to be happy, if we are even to survive, it is for us to meet the world's exactions, not the world to submit to ours. The acorn can grow only where it falls, perhaps in a fertile hollow, perhaps on a barren ledge. After it has sprouted, it is up to the acorn whether it survives and keeps its place, or perishes and makes room for another. We have come to see that it is but little different for men and women. The factors of time and place are the fixed ones, and human beings the variable ones that must mould themselves to fit the conditions of existence. Even man's amazing and cumulative ability to alter his environment is but an extension of his reply to the fixed conditions of time and space. He is born, and he changes himself or his environment to survive.

The notion has passed into the currents of common speech. It is no rarity to hear a person speak as if being in tune with the world was a measure of individual happiness, as if in the closeness of the harmony lay a gauge of the individual's success in the adventure of having been born. The idea so pervades modern thinking that it has found many phrasings to meet its many applications. The most general expression of the notion speaks of an individual's *adaptation* to his *environment*. But the idea can be narrowed down farther yet to speak of a personality's *reaction* to a *situation*—from the individual's life as a whole, one has turned to the episodes that make it up. Then the very moments of the episodes can be isolated, and the relationship spoken of simply as the *response* to *stimulus*. For a situation is but a complex of stimuli, and the individual's life may be regarded as a series of evolving situations. The discussion of this book will begin with the idea in its simplest form, with the *response* to *stimulus*.

This is the new beginning of the modern approach to the study of the human mind. The modern approach begins with the fundamental negation that is implied in man's life. Man is not what he is, but what he is aroused to be. No matter where one looks, it is a cooperation, humanly speaking, that produces almost everything. The least wise among us knows that it takes two to write a letter, the person who writes it and the person who calls it forth—that actors need an audience to produce a play, that without some outer spur very few of us would do very much. Even the sun, basically, is needed to wake us up, the night to put us to sleep. Nor is man's mind as an inherited thing, as a gift from his ancestors, any less a business of stimulus and response. Clearly man has a mind because of the eccentricities of geography and climate, because his "will to live" has had to express itself in the midst of this most fantastic of all worlds, where the axis is tipped, the orbit is an ellipse, and even the shape is not a perfect sphere. Clearly man's survival in a world where the only constant thing is change has depended upon his development of an organ to respond to the constancy of change.

But man senses the world and acts upon it with his body. His body is his go-between between the world and his mind —his means of receiving the world's fact and of making what changes he can in it for his greater comfort. The physical links between the mind and the world are not for a minute to be forgotten. Yet it is the mind that interests the psychologist, and the philosophical psychologist who comes after him; and it will be the *inner* bridging of bodily sensation and action that will constitute the province of this book. Its concern will be with the mind's reception of the world's messages rather than with the body's, with the mind's action rather than with the movements of hand or leg.

Somewhere there is a line. One can cut out a person's eye, or destroy his hearing, but one cannot cut out a piece of a person's perception. Deafness and lameness, which may be taken as typical defects, the one of organic sensation as the other of organic action, are facts of the body. They may be


EMOTION (the mental atmosphere)
Perception (noticing)
Intellection (thinking)
Volition (making up one's mind)
sensation
action
stimulus

THE RESPONSE TO STIMULUS

Plate 1

remedied by mechanical devices. But phobias and compulsions, which are defects of the mind, are not facts at all in the physical way but rather mental habits. They are to be remedied not by mechanical appliances, nor even by medication, but by suggestion on the physician's part, by recognition on the patient's part, by act of the patient's will. Malady and therapy are confined to a non-material sphere. One is obliged, in other words, to distinguish between the body and the mind if one has to do with the mind. Hence, in the accompanying diagram, the ellipse at the center is designed, less to suggest the brain, than to indicate the separation between the sensations and actions of the body and the sensations and actions of the mind. It marks the limits of the mental region, the boundaries of the mental atmosphere.

The diagram is a representation of the response to stimulus stripped to its essentials. The waved line at the left is the stimulus of the world, the irregular line cutting across its path, the outer limits of the body. The space between body and stimulus calls attention to the separation between the energy of the world and the energy of the living being. For it must be remembered that the reception of stimuli, the picking-up of the world's messages, is as much a business of the individual's own energy as is their transmutation into thought, or their expenditure in action.

The analogy from the physics laboratory is, of course, an old one, and it is certainly useful to think of sensations as leaving the sense organs like electric currents and traveling over the perceptive filaments (the afferent, or in-coming, nerves) until they reach the perception pole. Here the conducting metal comes to an end, and the current must leave the pole and voyage out over the atmosphere of the mind. Finally it reaches the volition pole, to travel down its length and over the volitive filaments (the efferent, or out-going, nerves) until it motivates the muscles to action and thus expends itself in outward change.[2]

To some, no doubt, the figure will appear too formidable, and one must indeed not push his analogies too far. It must be remembered, on the one hand, that the reactive process has been greatly generalized, and on the other, that the phenomenon of the electric arc has also been simplified. Like all figures, the present analogy must be played with, and coaxed and indulged. But the thing to do is to see how closely the diagram does correspond with what goes on in each individual human mind.

Pure, organic sensations, it will readily be granted, stop short of mental experience. Terrific sounds and blinding flashes of light remain just that—terrific sounds and blinding flashes of light. The mind is dazed, and the sensations come and go as sensations. For sensations to become perceptions they must be moderate enough to be recognized, they must be moderate enough to be thought about, if only the least little bit. Memories must go out to meet the sensations, and it is the meeting of the two that is perception. In the drawing the memories are indicated by blue ink.

However, it frequently happens that one cannot remember to have experienced the sensations before. One cannot recognize them. Then it is that something new must be imagined. In the drawing the imaginings are indicated by red ink.

So at the beginning of the mental process one finds both memories and imaginings—although mostly memories at first. Then as the mind advances to purer thinking the imaginings increase until there is a give and take, almost a balanced play, between the two. But the memories at last dwindle, and then the imaginings too, until finally there is but one imagining (or memory) left before the mind—indicated in the diagram by the final upturn in red. It is the emergence of this final image that is the moment of volition. Unless the body is defective, action follows upon the presence of the single idea.

---

[2] Readers of Hans Vaihinger's autobiographical sketch will recall that it was just this "bridging," instrumental doctrine of consciousness as found in Adolf Horwicz that inspired the youthful Vaihinger. The notion of the mental world as lying between the "poles of sensation and motion," "between the sensory and motor nerves," will be found in Vaihinger himself (*The Philosophy of 'As if,'* New York, 1925, p. 66).

The transmutation of sensation into action is thus a continuous process, in its mid-part being the passage of that psychic wave that is going to be of particular interest to this study. This wave of thought that passes between the perception and volition poles, through the mental atmosphere, may be spoken of as the "mental arc."

Nor is it without thought that the two terminals of the diagram have been called the "poles" of perception and volition rather than the moments of perception and volition themselves. For they are simply the places where the nervous currents are given over to the mind and picked up again from it. One does not have perception before the first upstroke of the psychic wave, and one has volition with the last. The organic entrance and emergence of the currents are of relatively less interest to a purely psychologic study.

Quite as interesting as the psychic wave, however, is the mental atmosphere, the medium of all this that goes on in the mind and a figurative expression for what is usually termed emotion. It surrounds the whole intellectual process; it buoys it up. There is mental atmosphere before there is perception; there is mental atmosphere after volition. There are atmospheres thick and resilient, and atmospheres rarefied and thin. The figure becomes almost concrete, and one thinks of the mind as filled with colored vapors, and traversed at intervals by minute, gleaming waves of thought.

But the analogy from the physics laboratory is of most use in representing the total reactive picture, in summing up the entire process that goes on between the stimulus that comes from the outer world and the change that is finally wrought in the outer world. It becomes of less use when the focus narrows upon the mental part of the process alone. Here a less ambitious diagram will be helpful, a diagram that will sum up perceptions and memories and imaginings and volitions and the mental atmosphere in some simple, graphic way. Perhaps a diagram like the following will be helpful, taking the suggestion from the four fingers of the hand, and letting each finger stand for one of the above "functions" of the mind. The third finger can then be divided into two halves, to represent the mnemonic[3] and imaginative aspects of thought:



Figure 1

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[3] The "mne-" of mnemonic should be pronounced as in "need."

The order of the functions will thus be *perception, emotion, intellection* (or thought), and *volition*—with intellection subdivided into memory and imagination. The variations that occur between these four or five functions of the mind, as well as between half a dozen others, will account for much of the ensuing matter of this book.

The diagram thus presents the four principal functions of the mind in a certain longitudinal order: perception, emotion, intellection, and volition—stood up on end, like the four fingers of the hand. It is, indeed, the order these faculties naturally take. Even as regards the division of intellection into memory and imagination, with memory first, it will be remembered that memory must precede imagination—not only because it is the living creature's instinct to recognize as old rather than to conceive as new, but because the imagination is dependent for its very substance upon the memories which the mind has kept stored for it in the unconscious. It may finally seem gratuitous to place emotion between perception and intellection when it has no part in the mental arc. Strictly speaking, the mental arc consists solely of perception, intellection, and volition—the beginning, the middle, and the end of it. A moment's thought, however, will make clear that if emotion is to be placed anywhere in the series of mental faculties it is here that it belongs—between perception and intellection. For although, as already pointed out, there is emotion, or mental atmosphere, before there is perception, the great stimulus of emotion is perception. In fact it is doubtful if the emotion present in the mind to begin with, before the passage of the psychic wave, should even be called emotion. It would, perhaps, be better to speak of it as mood, or perhaps merely as psychic tone.

In any event, the perception passes on to thinking and then to decision, all the time losing its power to stir the mental atmosphere, while the emotion occasioned by the original perception increases in strength and influence until, by the time the psychic wave has reached the middle of the arc, the mental atmosphere and the thought-wave are reciprocally active. The thinking is influencing the emotion, and the emotion the thinking. Nevertheless the equilibrium passes in a moment, and finally, when the thought-wave has attained the moment of decision, the final upstroke in red, the influence is all the other way. The psychic wave generated by the perception has lost its power to stir the mental atmosphere, while the emotion occasioned by the wave now determines the thought. It is emotion that causes a person to make up his mind, rather than the making up of his mind that gives him the emotion. In fact the emergence of a single image out of the mental debate comes about because the emotion generated by the psychic wave finally attaches itself to one image in preference to all others.

But this is in advance of the story. A pause must be made to consider a new, latitudinal division of the four primary functions—rather, not so much a new division, as a higher development. It is the difference between what may be called the primitive and abstract minds. For one of the most interesting things about the whole mental process is the fact that it can conduct itself on a purely primitive plane, that it can take place and have no word, or thought of a word, cross the mind. One can notice, one can remember and imagine, one can decide, with nothing but concrete images. Men are able to pursue the most amazing and complicated paths of action without a word sounding in their ears, or the thought of a word appearing in their minds.

Mr. E.L., whom the discussion calls to mind, would get up of a sudden upon seeing the clock, go to the head of the cellar stairs, and turn on the cellar lights. Then he would reach for his furnace gloves on the shelf above the stairs, clatter down the stairs, and pick his way across the cellar floor, taking care not to stub his toes on the screen doors and awnings placed there for over the winter. He would look at the fire, shake it, shovel on coal, regulate the drafts, turn to go away, clatter up the stairs again, put away his gloves, and go back to his reading without a word or the suggestion of a word ever entering his mind. Even the problem of the amount of shaking to give the furnace, of the amount of coal needed for the night, and of the regulation of the drafts (taking into consideration the weather outside) would be settled night after night with no recourse to abstract thought or words. No principle ever entered his mind. As a matter of fact, with his abstract mind, he went on thinking about the book he was reading.

And Mr. E.L. is not alone. Engine mechanics and other skilled workmen are able to carry out sequences of action many times more complicated than the above, and solve entirely new problems, without in their case, either, the least dependence upon abstract thought or words. A man may be a thinker in a very strict sense of the term and not be able to sign his own name.[4]

But of course the animals are able to think in this way too, and the thing that distinguishes man's mind is that he is able to do all this with another set of images. It is as if he were capable of thinking in the above concrete way and were also capable of thinking in another way—with symbols instead of with things. It is as if another sort of psychic wave were able to pass between the perception and volition poles, above the other wave, in a higher and more rarefied atmosphere. It is as if man had developed a second region of his mind in which to do a second order of thinking. This, as already suggested, may be spoken of as man's abstract mind, a mind that exists parallel, so to speak, with his primitive mind. It can be indicated in the diagram, as on the opposite page.

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[4] The present discussion may suggest to the student of the history of psychology the imageless-thought controversy of a generation ago. Now that the issue has become historical, one cannot help wondering that there should have been a controversy. Surely any schoolteacher whose experience has embraced several hundreds of pupils knows that his pupils range in conceptual ability from those eidetic individuals whose images have the verisimilitude of life to those "imageless" individuals so lacking in the power of concrete conception that they are sensitive only to abstractions. It would have been an interesting experiment to assign to one of the upholders of the theory of concrete thought the Sisyphean task of teaching the poetry of Wordsworth to one of the above imageless pupils.

To be sure, as the Gestaltists have taught us, the animals also can analyze the parts of things and even react to a relationship between them.[5] It is no longer possible to suppose that the "rational part" of man is what sets him off from the brutes. However, the rational, or abstract, part of man is certainly developed out of all proportion to its presence among the brutes, and there would seem to be little doubt that the unusual development of man's abstract mind is largely social in its origins. For the fact remains that man took to living in numbers when his mind was still in a very rudimentary state, that he evolved psychically with the evolution of his communal life. In the communal way of living must be sought the beginning of man's extensively developed power to do abstract thinking. The urging to abstract must have come from the need he felt to generalize, to make common property of his experience. With society, no matter how crude, came language, and with language

---

[5] The writer recalls a moving picture he once saw of a Seeing-Eye dog leading its blind master along the streets of a town in Switzerland. The picture had been taken in summer, and the shop-awnings were all extended in front of the shops, each at a different height from the sidewalk. Yet the dog unerringly led its master under the awnings that were high enough, around the awnings that were too low. The dog not only had abstracted the "height-quality" of its master, but was continually abstracting the height-quality of the awnings, and reacting to the relationship between the two.


EMOTION (the mental atmosphere)
Perception (noticing)
Intellection (thinking)
Volition (making up one's mind)
sensation
action
stimulus

THE RESPONSE TO STIMULUS

Plate 2

must have come this second order of thinking.[6]

For one must remember that words are themselves abstractions. Indeed, if man first abstracted because he wanted to make common property of what he had seen, he can have done so only by means of a word. They must have passed it around like a new tool in those primitive days. It stood for something they had all noticed. It wasn't the thing itself, it wasn't the entire perception of the man who had coined it. But it was the object's most important characteristic. It was a name. It was, in fact, the first abstraction.

However, for the benefit of those who are always dubious of evidence deduced from origins, there is a more instant demonstration of the abstractness of all words.

Let a person take an object. Let him call it every name of which he can think. Some part of it each time will escape. Each name, he finds, is but an abstracted quality, and when clung onto, allows the rest to fly out the window. He soon discovers that the only way in which to hold onto an object in its entirety is to put all words out of his mind and simply to perceive.

But to return to the story of man's psychical development, there came a time when he passed from the original qualities he had abstracted to qualities of qualities, to relations between qualities. He had drawn his first abstractions from abstractions, a process he has not discontinued to this day. The residue of this process is language, and one will not be much in error if he conceives of the difference between the abstract and primitive minds as largely the difference between words and things.

Most of us, probably, have an equal endowment of both capacities. But there exist many who seem to be almost without the one or the other faculty. There are people whose minds seem able to work only with concrete images; there are other people whose minds can work only with abstract ideas. Think of the persons who can remember faces but not names, and of those who remember names but never faces. Think of the people without a sense of place or direction, and of those who have never been without it.

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[6] The social origins of man's psychic life will be found well set forth in the first two chapters of Alfred Adler's *Understanding Human Nature* (New York, 1927).

Mr. B.R. is a striking example of a person whose abstract mind is without its primitive counterpart. A teacher of mathematics in a preparatory school, there can be no question either of his ability or of his personal attractiveness. Declaring that geometry is not a science but a mental habit he has secured the most enviable results with students of every type. But he is almost without a sense of the concrete things of life. His wardrobe, although an object of much concern and expense to him, frequently suggests, in its clash of color and style, the motley array of the gentleman of the cornfields. He himself would get lost if he ventured abroad alone in one; but in the city where there are signs and numbers everywhere, and a person need remember only the names of places, he is quite at home. Not that he has no liking for the country. He enjoys an outing as much as any one and frequently makes trips to the mountains; but he is wise enough always to go with a companion, and usually with one who has an aptitude for the undertaking. Upon moving into new quarters a short while ago he tried for a long time to adjust the furniture in his rooms. Perhaps if he had made measurements of floorspace and objects, drawn a diagram, and approached the problem as one of mathematics, he would have fared better. But the problem was not one of mathematics, but one of concrete taste and comfort, and he found himself incapable of shuffling about in his mind's eye the various articles of furniture so as to obtain a satisfactory combination. Finally he called in a friend.

The primitive mind without its abstract counterpart is, however, more common than the abstract mind without its primitive counterpart, and whether through a lack of "higher" education or because instinctively the more conservative sex, women seem to show it more commonly than men. Many a woman, incapable of saving a penny out of her abstract income, would have had no difficulty if living in a more primitive age. Although the despair of herself and of her husband as regards her bank account, she nevertheless prides herself upon the condition of her pantry and of her cold closet in the cellar. Indeed she enjoys the feeling that a flood or famine may be just around the corner and that she's prepared for it. She saves as instinctively as she lives. But she saves things. And if she were living a generation or two back, when bank accounts and their abstract figures were still the prerogative of clerks and merchants, and ordinary household life was still quite literally on a cash basis, neither she nor her husband would have any quarrel with her management of the household budget. As a matter of fact there would be an increment each week from that domestic budget to put in a stocking or a bag or a teapot somewhere.

Later on, when the time comes to set forth the scale of the eight personality-types, the occasion will arise to speak again of the abstract mind. Two of the eight types will be more or less characterized by it, and one of the types will take from the trait its name. With both types an unusual emphasis upon words will be observed. Yet although these types are not the commonest, one cannot help observing that the acquisition of an ability to do abstract thinking is apparently much easier than the acquisition of an ability for primitive thought. In fact the evidence would seem to show that the person who does not learn to work with images as a child will never learn to do so. As outdoors men say, one is either born with a knack for the woods or without it. Yet, as must also be admitted, there is always a chance for the child who has no head for books to get through secondary school and even college.

2

THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MINDS

IN addition to its breadth and height, the mind has depth. And to continue the analogical method of defining terms and presenting concepts, let the mind in this chapter be considered as resembling a pool in a not too swiftly moving stream of water.

The pool partakes both of the nature of still water and of flowing—there is pause and there is movement. Furthermore two kinds of matter may be detected in the pool—the water and dissolved substances leached from the ground, and the foreign matter fallen into the brook in the course of its journey. Bits of this foreign matter, such as leaves or twigs, may drop into the stream and remain submerged for days before rising to the surface. But whether borne into the pool on the surface, or rising from the depths in the quiet of its eddy, this matter always comes from the outside, from the winds and the air, from the surface of the ground—never from the ground itself, from that submerged water-table whence we are told nine-tenths of the water in our brooks and rivers comes. There is always this difference in the source of matter in the pool—the difference between above and below, between surface and depth, between what comes from within and what comes from without.

There is also another peculiarity to this pool. Owing to the shelving nature of the bank, or perhaps to the overhanging growth of bushes, one cannot look directly into it. One may look across it, and some individuals by rising to their knees may look a little beneath it on the opposite side, but direct inspection of its depths is impossible, Of its depths one may judge only from what rises to the surface. Of the unconscious, one may know only by putting two and two together.

The above analogy attempts to bring out two fundamental notions as regards the unconscious mind: in the first place, that its material is derived from two sources; in the second place, that one is denied a direct knowledge of its contents.

To take up the first point first, it is the position of this study as regards impulse and emotion, as regards drive and desire, that the source is inner—like the water that comes from the earth, and differs in color and chemical composition as the earth is different from which it comes. As regards image, it is the position of this study that the source is outer, and to be found in the messages that come to the individual from the external world in the course of his lifetime. The individual may possess multiplying powers a thousandfold, so that a rich fantasy may proceed from the barest and most commonplace of perceptions. He may dream the strangest dreams. Yet this study finds the elements of such dreams to be taken from the individual's own experience. It prefers not to consider that any image is inherited.

This position is simply a working hypothesis. The rejection of inherited image is not a denial of inherited image, but merely a statement that the notion of inherited image is not a profitable concept for the particular studies to be carried out in this book. Too much has been written on the subject of image in the collective unconscious, too many drawings have been made of the latter's imaginal contents, for the subject to be dismissed in a summary sentence or two. It is better to pose the opposite simply as a working rule.

Yet the notion of a strictly exterior source of the imaginal contents of the unconscious mind would seem to be supported by its application to psychotherapy. For if the wellspring of one sort of unconsciousness lies beyond our control, if we cannot turn it on or off, but can only guide its expression, there is still another kind of unconscious material that seems to be within our control at its source. By the closing of eyes and ears it veritably seems as if sight and sound could be withheld from the unconscious mind. With a part of its diet, it would appear that one may starve or feed the unconscious. In other words, although one may inherit the most evil of desires, perhaps, as the old proverb says in part, if one sees no evil and hears no evil he will speak no evil, and indeed do much less of it in the world.

To take up the second point—that the unconscious is incapable of direct inspection, that at the most we can penetrate into it but a ways and that on the far side—this explains the distrust of these pages for introspection, the substitution, throughout this work, of the notion of self-analysis for it. It is the position of this study that real self-knowledge comes from self-analysis—for the most part, self-muddling and self-deception from introspection. By an examination of one's acts over a sufficiently extended period of time, by putting two and two together, one may arrive at some knowledge of his talents and his limitations, of his hatreds and his wishes, indeed of his unconscious mind. The clearest and most recurrent of one's conscious desires, although a business of direct introspection, are undoubtedly also substance for self-analysis in the same way. Perhaps one may even regard the clearest of his recurrent dreams as a legitimate ground for self-analysis—those dreams of which one may perceive the meaning without setting sail upon the sea of symbolism. (And this would correspond to the individual's rising to his knees by the brookside to look as much as he is able into the unconscious. For dreams, one must remember, occur not in the deeps but in the shallows of the unconscious, which explains why the hours before waking are the commonest for their occurrence.) But the unconscious mind, except for inference and deduction, except for the putting of two and two together, seems largely to lie beyond our ken. It will be presupposed in this study. But it will not be very much used.

In other words this, the shortest chapter in the book, is intended to be apology as well as introduction. The concept of the unconscious, like the concept of evolution, is one of those integrating notions so useful in explaining facts that one wonders how people ever got along without it. The memories of our childhood that emerge when we are old, the negligences and purposeful slips of the tongue that Freud has pointed out, the unforeseen emotions that sweep over us, the unguessed-of irritations that prevent us from enjoying our job or vacation—how are these to be explained without the notion of the unconscious? One would as soon deny the doctrine of evolution as the concept of the unconscious. Nor does this study deny it. It simply rejects a depth-psychology in favor of a trait-psychology.

And here, of course, is to be perceived the intrusion of temperament. Since the time of William James's *Pragmatism* it has generally been conceded that one's system, whether of philosophy or psychology, is colored by one's temperament. And this writer, whose father was a scientist and who was himself at the age of thirteen embarked upon a full-fledged laboratory course in science, reveals in his rejection of the unconscious as a field of study simply his distrust of facts that do not have a wide measure of objectivity, his distrust of facts that cannot be corroborated by another person. For such facts as those of psychoanalysis, and even of analytical psychology, are primarily reported by the patient himself, and admittedly not until a rapport, or "transference," has been established between the patient and the physician—all of which is individual and private, and not open to confirmation by a third person.

Dream interpretation, as a field of psychological research, is rejected by this study in much the same manner. The patient may possess a remarkable memory for his dream experiences, and be unusually accurate in reporting them; nevertheless his report of them cannot be thoroughly objective since no one else can have access to them and present a similar or dissimilar account. Furthermore, although the analyst may be exceptional in his detachment, and prompt the patient's memories from no theoretical bias of his own, yet insofar as they are given to him and to him alone, just insofar are they unacceptable as a basis for a theory that seeks the universal rather than the individual.

Purely as a matter of temperament, the preference of this study is for such objective criteria as offered, for instance, by the furnishings and decoration of a person's house. Here is a criterion that comes close, in most cases, to being the expression of an individual's unconscious desires, yet a criterion that several persons may witness and take note of and check with one another afterward. Here one may notice *space* and *line* as definite "motifs"; or a loving and sensuous use of color. Here one may notice the play between *originality* and *convention,* and mark originality that is conventional, conventionality that is original. Here one may note the rigid exclusion of all possessions that are inharmonious, and here, the tendency to cluster all available possessions around one, as if in emulation of a hen settling a new nest.

Here also, to be sure, one impinges upon the domain of the normal, healthy consciousness. And perhaps no fact is more remarkable about much of the new psychology than that it is difficult to discuss it without employing the words "patient" and "physician." Indeed it is perfectly clear that the emphasis on the unconscious in much recent psychologic literature is owing to its preoccupation with the psychopathic. For the unconscious *is* of greater consequence to the psychically sick, and may in truth account for a large part of their behavior. But with the psychically well, one is often hard-pressed to define just how the unconscious mind differs from the conscious except by being unconscious.

In other words, whether as a reaction to fifty years of psychopathology, or whether again as a matter of pure temperament, this study's rejection of the unconscious as a field of research also reveals its partiality for the psychically normal. Its position may be defined as central. Whereas Freud and Adler and Jung, commencing on the fringe with the pathologic cases presented to them in their clinics or private practice, worked backward toward normality, this study, choosing rather to follow in the path of William James, will begin with the normal and work outward to the psychopathic.

For the negligible proportion of James's *Principles* taken up by the psychopathic is, in the light of the generation of psychologists that came after him, simply incredible. Probably an estimate would not run to more than three or four per cent—if that. In the "Briefer Course," which appeared just the year before the first chapter of Freud's *Studies in Hysteria,* there is but a page or two in reference to the then novel researches that the Frenchmen were making in the cases of double consciousness. Still, as every one knows, the researches of Janet and Azam and Bernheim and the rest were not an eddy in the current, but the beginning of a new stream.

This study does not slight the results of the last fifty years of psychopathology. These pages will show only too plainly what they owe to Adler, to Jung, and to Freud, as well as to Bleuler and Kretschmer and the other psychopathologists. There is good reason to suppose that the study of normal psychology had, with William James, gone as far as it could, and certainly one of the virtues of the *Principles* is that it summarizes the preceding psychology from the time of Locke and Berkeley. Certainly there was need for the infusion of a new element. This element the psychology of abnormality introduced, opening up new worlds of psychologic truth.[7] But the time has come when the psychology of abnormality, too, seems to have run its course. The truths it has established are many, but it has shown an apparent inability to turn back and explain the normal individual in his normality. The principles of the psychology of abnormality will not be thrown away, but they will be used independently in the creation of a new psychology of the normal. For people are not so basically sexual as Freud would have it, nor is their life story to be summed up by the presence or absence of Alderian inferiority feelings, or by the Jungian struggle between feeling and thought. The story of their lives is all this—and more. It is time for a new eclecticism in psychology. It is time to begin where William James left off, making use of the many discoveries that have been made since then.

It will thus be the purpose of this study to furnish a central, positive system of thought on which to range all normal personalities, the psychopathic and near-psychopathic being placed on the outer edges. The forces of distortion and maladjustment will be regarded as centrifugal in effect, holding the personality farther and farther from the human norm. The forces of adjustment, both primary and secondary, will be regarded as centripetal in character, bringing the personality nearer and nearer to the center the more they are in operation. This study will thus be inclined to reason from an "average" day of a personality's least distorted life-period. Much effort will be devoted to determining that month or week of purest vacation when the individual is most released from school and college and the preparation for exams, from wooing and winning and its similar tension between the present and the future, from job-seeking and employment and all keeping of the wolf from the door. On the basis of how the individual spends an average day of this period one should be able to arrive at certain conclusions about the individual's personality that will stand the test of a severe objective scrutiny. In diagnosing even the psychically sick, less time will be spent in observation of the actual illness than in reconstruction of what the individual's pre-psychopathic normality must have been, less time in present analysis than in advance construction of what the individual's post-psychopathic normality, or secondary adjustment, will have to be. For from the point of view of these pages, the question of the determination of mental illness is cut in half when once the type of personality is known. Accordingly, in these pages, "diagnosis" comes to mean the diagnosis of personality, which even with the psychotic is ascertained on the basis of health rather than on the basis of sickness.

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[7] The same can be said of the study of animal psychology which, beginning at very nearly the same time as the psychology of abnormality, has had a similar development and made a similar contribution.

And in all this, the concern is with the conscious mind rather than with the unconscious mind—with traits and outward acts, with personal letters and school-boy themes, with the unsolicited anecdotes of other people, with the surface rather than with the depth. For the surface is as broad and manifold as the individual's life, while the depths, one fears, are ultimately shrouded in mystery. Leastways, they furnish no certain ground for a broadly objective study of the human mind. Desiring such a study, these pages will turn from the unknown to the known. Perhaps the boundaries of the former will shrink most steadily by means of a resolute attention to the latter.

3

MOOD-CYCLE

ON the surface of it, there is hardly a question more difficult to answer than that asked by the person of independent means or livelihood who witnesses the individual next to him earning his living in the midst of a daily, human turmoil. "How does he keep going?" one hears. "What does he get out of life?" Perhaps the question is asked by an individual whose job brings with it not only independence but variety, and who wonders how the motorman on the streetcar can go back and forth over the same route, day in day out, year in year out. Perhaps he wonders how the clerk in the grocery store can keep handing out the same packages to the same people all the days of his life. The question is difficult to answer because one cannot explain the matter by reason of successful adjustment, or in terms of environmental influence, or because of training, or by an adequate philosophy of life, or by any other secondary notion. One can explain it only by innate aptitude, and by some kind of emotional aptitude at that. The clerk who thrives in the grocery store and the motorman whose eyes remain bright on the streetcar must receive some kind of emotional compensation from their jobs. Their very contentedness betrays some kind of satisfaction to their lives.

In fact there must be a basic difference in the *sort* of emotion that people have, a thing having nothing to do with emotional quantity or with emotional intensity, which are quite other matters and to be discussed on a later page. Emotion must differ in its *quality,* or *color*—as is perhaps the more common phrasing. One kind of emotion in its very fiber must be predominantly social, another kind much less social. Evidently one individual takes pleasure from mingling with the stream of humanity. Just as evidently the next individual prefers to observe the stream of humanity as it passes by him, deriving his satisfaction from events and relationships of a much more impersonal and independent character.

Still, it is not enough to label some emotion as social, other emotion as less social. It is necessary to determine the exact nature of that emotional endowment which enables one person to draw happiness from a walk in life that would bring nothing but misery to another. And to turn, as the logical starting point of such an enquiry, to those whose lot it is to do most of the work of the world, it would seem as if the basic emotional endowment of these individuals is a sort of swing between pleasant and unpleasant comradely feeling. This may be called the *anger-convivial* mood-cycle. The name, to be sure, is imperfect, as all names are imperfect. Certainly there will be variations in the anger, and certainly in the friendly or convivial emotions. But just as certainly some such mood-alternation is in general the basic emotional endowment of workers, whether of the blue-collar or of the white-collar class, and just as certainly it is necessary to call this basic endowment by some sort of name.

What miner, for example, has gone on shift in the morning and not received some small thrill from the hubbub of assembling men in the mine yard—from the blowing out of lamps and the banter and talking that always goes on? What miner, when accident intervened in the course of the day, has not had his comradely feelings of sympathy touched, or at night, has slogged out of the tunnel and not known some satisfaction from having been one of the group that day in his work? And what miner has not been angry when his work was obstructed by the uncooperative, or his safety and that of his fellows threatened by the stupid and the negligent? One could multiply instances from all departments of life. Where men work together they *must* have comradely, social feelings for the very accomplishment of their task. They *must* have anger for the tool thief. They *must* have anger for the saboteur who because of private ill will prevents his fellows from earning their daily bread.

The fact is no less true of those whose business it is to do the fighting of the world. Soldiers have again and again testified that the comradeship of the ranks is the one slight compensation for the horrors of war, and certainly anger is never more intense or more justified than among soldiers for the individual who puts his own comfort and safety ahead of that of his fellows.

Indeed it makes no difference whether one surveys the world as it is today or imagines an earlier, more primitive state of society where working and fighting were the only occupations of men. The development of such a cycle as is here presupposed is as necessary to assume for the continuance of human life as the very bone and brawn upon which that life rests. Without such a cycle men could never have worked and fought together at all, either as regards their individual satisfaction or as regards the impersonal success of their common endeavor. Some such emotional organization as is here assumed must have come early in our human, societal evolution.

To turn to women is to find an equal need for hypothesizing an emotional cycle of *hope and fear*. Once again, whether one examines the world as it is today or imagines a more primitive state of society, it has usually been the lot of women to remain at home while their menfolk did the working and fighting of the community. The province of women has nearly always been the hearth and the family where, as danger threatened, in their relative passivity, they could only fear, or as danger was removed, they could only hope. Theirs has seldom been the absorbing, outer activity when things go well, or the anger and military preparation when things are in peril. If occasionally communal, their tasks are nevertheless much less so than with men; and the emotions that carry them through the far less exciting chores of the household are essentially those of hope and fear: hope for the successful harvest or hunting, fear for the drought or famine that may be around the corner; hope that their children may inherit happier lives than theirs, fear lest they repeat the same mistakes; even hope and fear for themselves in their dependency upon others. For just as essentially as women are and have been dependent upon others, so is their emotional cycle one of hope and fear; even as, in proportion as the lives of men are active and independent, so is their cycle one of anger and conviviality.

Furthermore it is apparent that the "major" cycle of the one sex occurs also as the "minor" cycle of the other. Although never so truculent and convivial as a bachelor, it is the general experience of a man upon marriage to discover that he has a good deal of hope and fear for his wife and children. Teleologically speaking, it is to be supposed that men could only hope and fear for their loved ones while away in the fields or forests, or in the enemy's country. And women, who may hope and fear for their menfolk, nevertheless have a good deal of anger and conviviality when it comes to their own sex. One who has never witnessed a group of French peasant women washing their laundry in a village *lavanderie* has missed much in the way of social high spirits. And one thinks readily of the various women's organizations everywhere for work and for play. Furthermore it is clear that a woman's anger is reserved chiefly for her own sex. Words such as "hussy" and "minx" are women's words for women; just as words like "cad" and "rotter" are men's words for men. To make a long story short, it is clear that anger-conviviality is in general the cycle for one's own sex, hope-fear the cycle for the opposite sex and for one's loved ones. It is also clear that the two mood-cycles, in major and minor proportions, are usually present in the same individual.

So much for the first two cycles. It is time now to investigate the cycle that is less social. For indeed when it comes to emotion that is less social the cycle is but one, unlinked with any other as major or minor, and indifferent in its predilection for men or for women. This cycle may be spoken of as *joy-depression,* and it is this cycle which marks its individuals as persons apart. The larger the social gathering the more the joy-depressoid is apt to feel out of it; the greater the human hurly-burly connected with his job the more he suffers. The joy-depressoid is more likely to receive his upswing from a fine view or from the understanding of an idea than from the companionship of his fellows. It is the joy-depressoid who is apt to think of the motorman or grocery clerk with discouraged uncomprehension, to find his chief pleasure in a ramble with a friend. He may even choose to dispense with the friend and take his ramble alone. For if the emotion of the anger-convivial and hope-fearist comes from people, just as clearly the joy-depressoid's comes from his environment. His is the environmental type *par excellence*. It is the joy-depressoid who seeks to understand the universe, and for whom a lack of interpretation may result in unconquerable sorrow, just as it is he for whom the change in the seasons, the migrations of the birds, and the fall of the rain have unusual significance. The joy-depressoid, once specified, is not difficult to discern.

But let it not be supposed that the joy-depressoid, for all the lesser sociality of his mood-cycle, is unsocial by nature. Even less is he antisocial. Real unsociality, both when constitutional and when acquired, as well as antisociality, is to be equated with personality-type of the most particular sort, and as such is not in the province of this chapter. As a matter of fact it will be found that the antisocial is not joy-depressoid at all, but anger-convivial in his mood-cycle. No, the choice of words is exact when the cycle is spoken of simply as being "less social." The joy-depressoid more interested in human beings than in birds or bees is by no means rare. He may be so much interested in human beings that the study of history, even of literature, is not active and warm enough for him, and as an author or playwright he must tell his own tale of the human life that passes before him. Joy-depressoids, for instance, are often very fond of the theater where, as is impossible in the real world, they may sit and witness a brightly illumined square of the life they love, and yet be uninvolved. William James, greatest of psychologists, was almost certainly of a joy-depressoid temperament, yet few have had a more absorbing interest in human nature. Nevertheless it was of human nature *as he observed it,* it was of the human personality *in general,* it was of his human *environment,* that he was a student. For the above definition holds. The joy-depressoid is the environmental type. The further question as to whether his attention is focused more narrowly on the human, or more narrowly on the nonhuman, part of his environment is a matter of relatively less importance, the result of factors which cannot here be discussed.

Indeed it is to be hoped that in covering so vast a subject necessarily in so few words the present treatment is not accused of oversimplification. The present chapter, perhaps more than any other, is purely preparatory in intent. The concept of mood-cycle is here introduced, not for its own sake, but for its bearing upon the main development of theory in this book—in particular for its influence upon the weighting of inner and outer life, and for its role in the determination of thinking and feeling personalities.

For instance, it is clear that the normal person can be subject to any secondary, or experience-conditioned, emotion, and that many of the commonest emotions, such as love and hate, for still other reasons, do not fall within the category of mood-cycle at all. On the other hand, the concept of mood-cycle is one entirely of primary emotion, of the coloring that undifferentiated emotion takes, of the typical rather than the untypical mood, of the common denominator of the individual's emotional life. And just as the concept of mood-cycle is one of primary emotion, so it is clear that the cycles are linked with physique and thus constitutional in character. But whether the three cycles (i.e., those of anger-conviviality, hope-fear, and joy-depression) are to be equated with the athletic, pyknic, and asthenic physiques of Kretschmer, or whether (as seems more likely) they are simply to be correlated with masculine, feminine, and intersexual physiques—again, all this is beyond the scope of the immediate discussion. It must suffice that the matter is in some way connected with physique, and hence constitutional rather than acquired.

Furthermore it must be evident that, as in all life, the pure type does not hold exclusive sway, that hybrid types also occur. Joy-irritables are, apparently, particularly common, and hope-depressoids, joy-fearists, and convivial-depressoids are certainly to be found. Possibly there are still more complex variations, and certainly the opposed mood-swings of the hybrid types exert a compounding influence so that the joy-irritable, for instance, is more social than the straight joy-depressoid, yet less social than the undeviating anger-convivial. Although other factors enter in, a measure of this may be taken in the individual's "party" limit, so to speak. The individual will be found, for instance, who clearly relishes society in larger groups than the select friend or two of the pure joy-depressoid, but who as clearly seeks escape from the large reception or formal tea. But these again are side currents to the main development of theory in this book. Intriguing as they are, they must be placed as beyond the scope of the present chapter.

The influence of mood-cycle upon the determination of thinking and feeling personalities will be brought out in the chapter after next, where first the distinction of thinking and feeling personalities is introduced. The influence of mood-cycle upon the development of the inner and outer life of the individual is, however, a more important matter, and one not considered in any particular place, but referred to throughout this study. For this reason, it seems wise to conclude the present chapter with a discussion of this aspect of the theory of mood-cycle.

Perhaps it is obvious that if a person receives his chief emotional return from activity that consists in mingling with others, the net effect will be to give him a weighting toward others, a forgetfulness of himself, and a consciousness of his fellows. For to return to the teleology of the matter, the worker does not ordinarily have a personal tie with his associates. Occasionally he may work with his brother, or be employed by his father-in-law, but by and large his bond with his fellows is simply that of the common job, of the common end. He stands in equal relationship with them, and it would seem to be self-evident that of all the cycles anger-conviviality will have the greatest tendency to make an individual live outside of himself, to make him aware, not of himself, but of his companions and of their common concerns. To be sure, mood-cycle is only one of several factors tending to throw weight upon the self or away from the self. But other things being equal, one may certainly say that anger-conviviality is the least personal of the cycles, the most objective and the most removed.

To turn to the cycle of hope and fear, it should be no less apparent that this cycle divides the issue, being both inner and outer, both personal and removed. A woman's emotions of hope and fear are principally for others, and by so much are they likewise outer and objective in their weighting. Still, as pointed out above, these others are connected with the self, being primarily a woman's own kith and kin, and the cycle, for all it is essentially concerned with other people, is more personal than the masculine cycle of anger and conviviality. In comparison with the latter, the cycle of hope-fear must be set down as subjective in its nature and influence.

Yet hope-fear is less personal, less connected with the self, than is the cycle of joy-depression, and as this last cycle comes into view a real problem in terminology arises. For the cycle is not personal in the sense of the above. Joy-depressoid mothers, for instance, are notably detached from their children in comparison with mothers more usually feminine, and the observer is led again and again into speaking of the impersonality of this latter cycle, and of the consequent freedom for thought that it gives to the individual. Joy-depression is the cycle of detachment. Yet paradoxically, it is the cycle most connected with the self.[8]

The paradox, however, is a true one, in that the contradiction is only apparent and not real. For by "impersonality" and "detachment" (perhaps the two words most commonly used of the cycle) one means only that the personality is uninvolved with other personalities. The world of narrowly human horizons, the limited world of mutually involved, mutually preoccupied human beings, which is the only world for the majority of men and women—this world is impersonal to the joy-depressoid. But the larger world, whether human or nonhuman, is very personal indeed. It matters much to the joy-depressoid whether or not there is beauty and meaning in the universe; its absence

[8] The reader must be warned against falsely converting the proposition that joy-depression is the cycle of detachment. Although it is true that joy-depression implies detachment, it is not also true that detachment implies joy-depression.

Thus Thackeray, who in the books he wrote viewed his characters with an unusual detachment and who was also extremely fond of the theater, was apparently without a drop of joy-depression in his disposition. Not only will one search in vain in his writings for a joy-depressoid sensitivity to nature, but there was literally almost no limit to his convivial capacity. Only the small hours of the morning and the need for sleep would put an end to the day's interminable round of dinner parties and tavern gatherings, and if by chance these latter ended early in the evening, Thackeray would then hunt up a friend with whom to drink and smoke till both gave out.

Again, had Thackeray possessed any real tendency toward depression, the circumstances of his life must have led to melancholia or suicide. Not only did he quickly run through his patrimony of 20,000 pounds, but the loss of this independence led to one of the worst of Grub-Street existences as he tried to keep body and soul together and yet maintain the appearance of a gentleman. Furthermore the burlesques and parodies that he was forced to write not only brought him into difficulties with his friends but exposed him to retaliations on the part of other writers that were a sore trial to his sensitive ego. Nor was his marriage more fortunate. In four short years, after the death of one of his dearly beloved children, it ended in the attempted suicide and eventual commitment of his wife for insanity. It is hard to believe that a depressoid temperament could have sustained a life so filled with unhappy vicissitudes.

Although an examination of Thackeray's writings might lead to the initial impression of a joy-depressoid temperament, an examination of the facts of his life can only result in a conclusion that is far otherwise.

may make his own life not worth living. "There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy," said Hamlet to Horatio with respect to the supernatural world, and such in general is the reply of the joy-depressoid as he refuses to be circumscribed by anger-convivial concerns. He is detached only from what he considers a narrow order of things. He is impersonal only in the ordinary meaning of the term.

As a matter of fact the first cycle, that of anger-conviviality, is strictly speaking neither personal nor impersonal. It is simply objective, with no reference to the self. The anger-convivial undistorted by other influences has almost no consciousness of the self. He is active and outgoing. He merges himself with his work and with his fellows, and knows unpleasantness only when he is obstructed. With the cycle of hope and fear the self enters the picture. Although the emotions are for others, the others are connected with the self; for hope-fear, as explained, is primarily the cycle of one's loved ones. With joy-depression, however, the tie of particularity is at last broken, and essentially it is the relationship between the self and the universe that is the *emotionis causa.* Confidence and buoyance is its upswing, discouragement and self-doubt, its down phase—alternations that may become elation and despair where other factors participate to cause serious imbalance of personality.

In other words with the joy-depressoid, as a result of this severing of the mundane tie, the self receives a greater emphasis while the world as a whole is the recipient of that regard for particular human beings which is the chief concern of other persons. Later, the occasion will arise to develop those factors which serve to throw the joy-depressoid's attention to a greater degree upon the universe, or to a greater degree upon the self; for rarely will one find an individual with an equal regard for the inner and the outer, for the self and the non-self worlds. At present, however, the joy-depressoid must be left simply with this weighting: he is, on the one hand, more conscious of the world as a whole; he is, on the other, more conscious of himself and of his relationship with that world. Nevertheless, since it is with the removed rather than with the immediate world that the joy-depressoid is concerned, and since in any event the relationship with the self is a more immediate business than the vicissitudes even of one's kith and kin, the cycle in comparison with the others must be set down as the most subjective in its influence and working. Although the joy-depressoid's entire waking concern may be given to what is external and beyond him, this externality is a distant and intangible thing in comparison with the traffic with human beings, and the joy-depressoid to his fellows, although perhaps the purest of scientists, seems absent-minded and subjective—perhaps much more so than he really is. For there is, if not a fundamental contradiction to the joy-depressoid, at least a fundamental lacuna. The joy-depressoid's range of interest does not present an even progress from one end to the other, but a centering upon the two extremes, upon the wholly remote and the wholly near. No wonder, then, that there is sometimes a confusion on the part of the observer as to which end is really receiving the emphasis. And no wonder, either, that the joy-depressoid is the type that is of chief concern to the psychologist.

Finally, just as it is part of the original hypothesis that the cycles of anger-conviviality and hope-fear are societal in origin, so it must now be assumed that joy-depression indicates, either today or phylogenetically speaking, a state of society sufficiently advanced to permit the individual who is less social to survive. Perhaps there never was a society without the poet and the priest.[9] But one may be sure that the joy-depressoid never flourished in great numbers until society had some use for the contributions of impersonal thought, until society in the valleys of the Nile and Euphrates, or in the far East, had entered upon the stage of civilization.

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[9] It is with some misgiving that the priest is mentioned along with the poet as a possible early example of the joy-depressoid temperament. Although in primitive times the priest's chief role would seem to have been to connect his communicants with the forces of nature around him, today his role seems largely social, its province being, apparently, man's relationship with man, out of which springs man's relationship with God. Thus in the modern church there often seems to be a short-circuiting of the heavens, the moon and the stars—that work of God's fingers which so strongly impressed the ancient psalmist. Nowadays the tendency seems to be to go within doors, to seek God, not only by a collective effort, but in the human heart. As is needless to point out, the temperamental background of this is purely social and quite removed from the cycle of joy-depression.

4

EXTRAVERSION AND INTROVERSION

FOR some reason or other, Jung's great discovery of the difference between extraversion and introversion has fallen upon relatively sterile ground. One searches nearly in vain for an adequate handling of the distinction in the popular treatises,[10] and its influence upon every-day life seems to have stopped with the manufacture of two new terms—terms that are commonly not only misused but even misspelled.

Probably part of this is due to a certain intangibility inherent within the concepts themselves. The stream of the libido is itself highly figurative, and when the distinction depends upon the libido's trend, upon its turning outward or inward, the whole business is likely to be either misconceived or left to the esoteric uses of theoretical psychology. Some simpler phrasing, some simpler picturization, must be found if the notion of extraversion and introversion is to enter the daily lives of men and women and contribute to the general knowledge of mankind.

But before any advance in this direction can be made two very real giants must first be slain: the giant of inferiority-feelings and the giant of classification-fears. They are directly across the path, and must entirely be got rid of if the journey is to be made in safety and its objective to be gained in the end. They have badgered and impeded every attempt to create wisdom out of the discoveries of psychology, and in particular have well nigh ruined the possibilities for good that lie in the concepts at the head of this chapter.

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[10] *Your Personality—Introvert or Extravert?* by Virginia Case (New York, 1941) is a notable exception. The book is excellent.

For one can scarcely breathe the word "introvert" without some extravert's taking offense at the implied disparagement of him, nor may one hope to discuss the merits of extraversion without alienating the attention of some person who believes that his mind is introverted. Inferiority and superiority feelings color the efforts even of those who attempt to make use of the terms, and the whole matter is bedeviled from beginning to end by feelings of the one sort or the other. There is, indeed, one thing that must be stated as a manifesto at the beginning of this discussion, before definition or diagram of any sort is attempted, and that is that both types have advantages and disadvantages and that both have given distinguished men and women to the world. It can be shown that introverts are less dependent upon their environment and more capable of lifting themselves by their bootstraps; but on the other hand there can be little doubt that extraverts, on the whole, find less difficulty in adjusting themselves to that environment and in making the best out of a bad situation. The silliest thing in the world is that either type should arouse inferiority feelings in the other or preen itself upon its own superiority. Neither type can ever be like the other, and neither type can ever entirely acquire the other's excellences. The wise attitude is one of mutual admiration, and it can probably be demonstrated that among the many formulas for successful marriage none is more likely to succeed than the combination of extravert and introvert if, at the same time, there is a similarity between the individuals as regards tastes and temperament.

Then there is the last monster to be done away with, the bugbear of classification-fears. This is really the arch-enemy of those who desire to enlarge the store of human wisdom with the discoveries of modern, scientific psychology. That individual, acute in every other department of intellect, who nevertheless cries out to the psychologist, "You won't slam me into your drawer because I won't go," is all too frequent. To him the thinker about men and women who uses the least classification is only a cataloguer, listing and labeling specimens, a person who once he has done with his listing and labeling is finished with his specimens forever.

In reply to this charge, let it be stated, once and for all, that no two human beings ever were, or ever will be, alike. The psychologist is neither collecting nor labeling specimens. He is simply thinking, and when one thinks, whether it is as an economist or as a student of foreign affairs, one deals with the most important characteristic and lets the rest go. Thus when one terms a person an extravert or an introvert, it is just a way of saying that the person is on this side of the fence, that he is inclined in this direction rather than in the other. One uses the term knowing perfectly well that an individual's introversion may be only sixty per cent complete, but knowing equally well that life is too short to state so explicitly in every case. As a matter of fact many human beings are so evenly balanced that it is difficult to tell which tendency is dominant. In such cases only the trained and experienced thinker is capable of making a classification, and even then, unless his judgment is the result of matured opinion, he knows that very possibly he may be wrong.

Now it would seem, on the basis of a strictly empirical approach, that the distinction between extraversion and introversion can best be set forth by treating it, not as a difference in the movement of the stream of the libido, but as a difference in the relationships between the individual and the self and the world.[11] Whatever the fundamental nature of the distinction may be, it would certainly seem that introverts have a more immediate relationship with the self, extraverts, with the world.

But this is to be the theme of this chapter, and surely it is advisable to set forth at the beginning just where the individual stops and the self begins, just where the self stops and the world begins. Perhaps of these three provinces the self is the least well defined. Fortunately, it has been described for all time in one of those peculiarly felicitous passages in William James. James writes, "In its widest possible sense, a man's self is the sum total of all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down—not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all."[12]

To be sure, William James discriminates between the self as subject and the self as object, between the "pure" ego and the "empirical" ego—in short, between the "I" and the "me." The above description is of the self as object, and it is in this sense that the word *self* is usually employed and will be employed in the following pages. Thus a person's self is the "sum total of all that he can call his," while the world is what he cannot call his, the "not-me," as it has appropriately been termed. Finally, at the very center of individuality is the individual himself, the person who thinks and feels, the subject who views the me and the not-me. That the I becomes the me, that the knower of one moment is the known of the next, is matter of high metaphysical concern, but not critical as regards the present psychologic classification. At any given moment there is the I, the me, and the not-me, and for the purposes of this chapter such a threefold conception will be assumed. To conclude, there is the person who views and possesses, the self that is viewed and possessed, and the world that is distinct from either.

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[11] The simpler conception is suggested by Jung himself. He writes, "Quite generally, one could describe the introverted standpoint as one that under all circumstances sets the self . . . above the object and . . . gives the subject a higher value than the object. . . .The extraverted standpoint, on the contrary, sets the subject below the object, whereby the object receives the predominant value. . . . The one sees everything from the angle of his conception, the other from the view-point of the objective occurrence" (*Psychological Types,* New York, 1926, p. 12). The definition based upon libido-trend would seem to have become the chief one simply because of etymology—because the word *extravert* etymologically means "turn out," the word *introvert,* "turn in."

[12] *The Principles of Psychology,* New York, 1890, I, 291-292.

Accordingly, the introvert may be defined as he who is at the center of himself, the extravert, as he who is at the center of the world. Surrounding the introvert is his self, with which he is in direct relation and beyond which he perceives the world. Surrounding the extravert is the world, with which he is in direct relation and beyond which, or as a part of which, he perceives his self. No matter how the individual may vary within his type, if he can be typified at all, this definition will hold. The extravert, if he can be called an extravert, will perceive the world as a continuous whole, surrounding him in an unbroken circle; whereas his self, no matter how strong his sense of it may be, will never have the same integrity and the same immediacy to his consciousness. The introvert, if he can be called an introvert, will perceive his self as the continuous entity, surrounding him in an unbroken circle, and the world as something partial and to be perceived only beyond the bounds of his self.[13] The introvert is at the tingling center of himself but at the outskirts of the world; the extravert is at the center of the world but on the fringes of himself.

That is why, as on the opposite page, it is possible to represent these truths by a pair of concentric circles surrounding the individual at the center. The first of the circles is a barrier to the second, and the only one with which the individual is in immediate contact. No matter how neglected it may be, it is never found in segments; on the other hand, no matter how substantially the second ring develops, it never quite comes together. Indeed, these diagrammatic relationships will be found to be the counterparts of similar relationships in real life. The energy which the introvert devotes to the world is always *diminished* or *forced* in comparison with the energy which he devotes to himself. On the other hand, it is never his *first* vigor which the extravert turns to his studies and to preparing himself for a future career. Again, it will probably be found that a majority of the orderly people in the world are introverts, who take pains to keep the various parts of their selves in order so that they may be comprehended quickly; that a majority of the unorderly people are extraverts, who, never having quite the same sense of personal possessions, are never quite so likely to spend their time in arranging them and bringing them together.

Now if all introverts had a greater sense of themselves

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[13] This description of the partial and complete worlds of the introvert and extravert, like the whole chapter, was written in 1935. The same notion will be found in Virginia Case. She writes, "One type of mind focuses attention directly on external events which it therefore sees as an unbroken continuum; . . . the other type of mind, facing in the opposite direction, focuses attention directly on subjective impressions which it sees as an unbroken continuum. . . . Each type sees one context directly, that is, as a whole continuum, . . . the opposite context indirectly and only in part-segments" (*op. cit.*, pp. 71-74).


INTROVERT
EXTRAVERT
world
self
self
world
world
self
self
world
world
self
self
world

less usual,
objective type

less usual,
subjective type

median, unpronounced
personalities

classification
difficult

more usual,
subjective type

more usual,
objective type

Figure 2

than of the world, and all extraverts a greater sense of the world than of themselves, everything would be easy and a twofold classification would suffice. However, as indicated in the drawing, there exist persons, certainly extraverted, *yet for whom the sense of the self is greater than the sense of the world,* and persons certainly introverted, *yet for whom the sense of the world is greater than the sense of the self.* These individuals necessitate a fourfold classification, and can, for the time being, be spoken of as subjective extraverts and objective introverts.

On first sight the subjective extravert may seem like the more usual subjective introvert. Even on acquaintance he may be judged to be introverted, since sheer subjectivity (that is, a sense of the self) is all too often confused with introversion. But careful observation will always disclose something a little false to the extravert's subjectivity. To be sure no human being ever was, or ever will be, able to arrive at the Greek ideal of self-knowledge. Let alone the opinions of other persons, of which one can never be sure, there is always the romantic picture of oneself to color one's self-analysis no matter how determined he is to be honest. Yet between the self-knowledge of introverts and the self-knowledge of extraverts a gulf intervenes. The introvert's self-delivered dicta may be colored with self-esteem or self-abasement, or be biased by sheer ignorance; but it is doubtful if they will ever be downright ridiculous and absurd. The introvert (unless really mad) will scarcely be found like the legendary Frenchman, striding up and down his room, tearing out lock after lock of his hair, and crying, "I am perfectly tranquil! I am perfectly tranquil!"

Mrs. O.M.R., to introduce a case history at this point, is a subjective extravert of the most attractive sort. Vivacious and sensitive, in touch with every situation that life presents to her, she in turn adds much to every group of which she is a part. Her high spirits can arouse the most prosaic of gatherings, and her brimful sense of the abundance of life has made her loved by all who know her. A year or two ago, against the advice of many of her friends but with her own good sense, she had her first child. Her essential vitality carried her through the nine months without a moment's faltering. Indeed she was able to invest her bigness with a certain humor and sense of drama. She announced to one friend, when informing him of her pregnancy, that she was sure in a few months' time her belly like Cyrano's nose would be preceding her by a quarter of an hour, and it is certain that the months of pregnancy never became any woman more gracefully and that in consequence no woman was ever less deprived of companionship. Her delivery was easy and her delight at being a mother equal to her expectations. But two or three months later came the inevitable subsidence of the drama, her spirits began to fail, and with the vanishing excitement of being a prospective and then a real mother dwindled the excitement of all life. She declared to her husband upon one occasion that she had broken with all her friends, on another occasion that she had discovered she really didn't care for music, and on another, that she no longer liked people and had lost her interest in everything. She was acutely depressed for months.

Perhaps no statement was more absurd than that she had broken with all her friends. In point of fact she had simply been remiss in replying to two or three letters. Certainly her friends were conscious of no diminution of their regard for her, and one of them, upon coming to see her some months later, was so appalled by her condition that in the most exclamatory capitals he could muster he told her to stop such nonsense, to quit this silly introspection she had no talent for, and ended, finally, by dragging her out into the world she thought had lost its flavor. She was a trifle weak and dazed at first. But before long, life came rushing in with all its previous vigor, and her old, deep-seated conviction of its goodness returned—more securely now than before, since now she was wiser about herself. For her friend had shown her that the world was her birthright and not her self, that self-analysis (the objective study of one's acts) would in any event be difficult enough for her, but that this sitting down and thinking directly about one's feelings and abilities was, at least for her, like building a house upon a quicksand — building upon what she could not fathom, upon what was beyond her knowledge and control, upon what would engulf her structure before she had got to the first story. To be sure, the personal emphasis of Mrs. O.M.R.'s friend had not a little to do with the success of his arguments. Nevertheless he did make clear to her that her talents were for the world, that a great deal of her trouble came from the application of these talents to an alien sphere.

Indeed nothing is more characteristic of poorly adapted subjective extraverts than the tendency to confuse what is subjective with what is objective, than the tendency to render subjective judgments as if perfectly external and real. Who has not heard such a person stating purely personal preferences as if the matter could be measured by rule and calipers, as if, indeed, the matter were so obvious as to be beyond discussion. Frequently they add that telling phrase, "you know," when nothing is more certain than that you do not know. "There really is no place like Vermont, you know," they say. "Marjorie Hamilton is just the most wonderful creature in the world, you know." Thus Mrs. O.M.R. thought that because *she* had failed to write to her friends, they also had broken with her.

On the other hand the well-adapted subjective extravert, the subjective extravert who has learned or always known that the world is his birthright and not himself, is a very superior sort of person. He has all the extravert's closeness to life and is able to bring to that closeness a rare depth of feeling and understanding. Probably most of the great creators of human personality in literature have been of this type. For the introverted writer, nothing is more difficult than to create personalities divorced from his own. There is nearly always a common denominator to the characters of his writings, a common denominator based upon the self or upon the reactions of the self. It is the extraverted writer who can create characters with all the complexity of life, divorced from each other and divorced from himself, who can toss off the Hamlets and the Falstaffs, the Miss Bateses and the Mr. Collinses, the Micawbers and the Pecksniffs. If in addition this writer betrays a knowledge of the human heart and of its innermost secrets, one may be sure that he is subjective as well as extraverted.

The step from the subjective extravert to the objective introvert is more logical than perhaps might be anticipated. For much of what has been said or implied of the one is true, in reverse, of the other. If the subjective extravert is apt to find himself alone on the high seas of introspection without a compass, the objective introvert is no less apt to be without one on the uncharted ocean of the world. If the subjective extravert is prone to make mountains out of molehills in the subjective life, the objective introvert is no less liable to pursue single courses of action to the exclusion of all purpose in his own life or anybody else's. In fact nothing is more characteristic of the objective introvert than a general confusion of means with ends. What he sets out to accomplish as the means to something else all too frequently becomes the end in itself. Here are the preparationists, the people eternally getting ready for the great undertakings they never achieve. Mr. Casaubon, in George Eliot's *Middlemarch,* is one of these. With death in the offing and his life-work still a mass of materials, he goes on preparing, getting his notebooks ready for the literary executor who will come after him and accomplish, as he thinks, what he could not accomplish himself. Here are to be found those students who set out to learn a language with some other purpose in view, and become mired in the swamp of pure linguistic study. Here are those perfectionists whose equipment whether for camping or for the practice of gentleman-farming is in a ridiculous state of completeness and absorbs an altogether disproportionate amount of their time and energy. Here are those people who spend all their leisure moments making social "contacts" for that future occasion which will never arrive.

Mr. W.M., an objective introvert, is a New York lawyer approaching the age of forty if not already there. In college and law school he suffered noticeably from a dissipation of his energies. When he studied it was never for the purpose of equipping himself with a workable and dependable body of knowledge, never with a view to train himself in any way whatsoever, but solely to get through the various tests and examinations that punctuated the six years of his career at college. To tell the truth, he never had any particular purpose in life and chose the law through no enthusiasm for the profession but simply from the necessity of deciding upon some means of making a living. Weekends and social engagements in general absorbed most of his time and thought as a student, and each term-end saw him studying with an equal lack of proportion to recoup himself for the negligence of the preceding weeks. This he always succeeded in doing and in due time received his baccalaureate and legal degrees, and, taking his bar examinations immediately thereafter, was admitted to the practice of a profession which, in spite of a college record clear of failures, he was neither particularly well qualified nor particularly well prepared to follow. The next ten years saw him working in New York, in the course of which he was employed by two or three different firms.

Here he was always worth his hire, but never much more. The old habit of preparing only for the immediate instead of for the permanent survived, and he never went much beyond the particular briefs assigned to him. These on the whole he did well enough and in the course of the ten years gained in practical experience; but he gained neither in ability nor in capacity for legal work. Weekend engagements and evening parties, quite as at college, constituted his chief interest if no longer actually his chief occupation, and it can be stated that he never slept on a case.

About this time it became apparent to him that men who had entered the profession later than he were advancing ahead of him, and that there was slight possibility for him of a career in a firm. As a consequence, he went in for himself. But the time had passed when he could be thought of as counsel in difficult cases, in cases involving questions either of principle or of court appeal, and his practice as a private lawyer soon showed a tendency to become more and more monopolized by cases in divorce. Here he drew upon his social acquaintance; and here to be assured of a continued practice he feels it increasingly necessary to entertain and be entertained in the "fast set" where such business most frequently occurs. He gives parties noted for being on the border line, if not beyond the border line, of respectability. He is an industrious weekender, drinking as if from purpose, playing cards with intensity and for proportionately high stakes, and entertaining the company with a "line" of ironic and cynical witticism never varying in tone. From his talk one would think it impossible even for a householder to live in New York City without making an allotment in his budget for bribery. Furthermore he would persuade you that this is a peculiarly intelligent and satisfactory state of affairs.

It is interesting to note that he himself failed in matrimony, his wife going to Reno after a year or so of married life. In spite of his sophisticated assurances to the contrary, he is neither a contented nor a successful man. He is certainly never relaxed. The physical resilience of youth is gone and with it, for him, all resilience whatsoever. His personality seems dried out, and with advancing years it will not become more attractive. In time, even his law practice will dwindle. He started out on the wrong foot.

Mr. W.M.'s initial mistake leads right to the heart of the matter. The cultivating powers of introvert and extravert alike should be expended upon the regions of their own natural right. When the introvert is devoting his energies to world-cultivation instead of to self-cultivation one need never look far to see the familiar lack of cohesion, the familiar signs of disruption that characterize any undue emphasis upon the outer circle of personality. The various activities of the objective introvert never quite come together. The essential subjectivity, the unity of thought and of action that for the introvert by diagram and by definition is internal, will, through the misplaced emphasis upon outer things, be missing, and the same sterility of life, the same fatigue of endeavor, will be evident whether the introvert is a lawyer, a scholar, or a broker. To be sure, the lack of essential subjectivity may be more difficult to mark when the introvert's pursuits are those of the recluse, when his emphasis is thus apparently placed within the subjective realm. Yet the essential unity can be as lacking from the scholar's research, no matter how subjective it may seem, as from the activity of the introvert more obviously at loose ends in the world of affairs. The introverted scholar who goes about collecting data for the theory that will dawn, for the book that will be conceived when he is sufficiently well prepared, will, in all probability, go on collecting forever. For the introvert, it is mandatory from the nature of his own personality that the theory, the conception, must come first. If the theory is clear, the data will come of their own accord. If the conception is already imaged, the book will write itself.

For the introvert, whether scholar or business man, there is but one avenue of success and that is the avenue of personal synthesis. The cohesion which means growth can come only from the mind itself. Not all the data in the universe can give it to the introverted scholar. Not all the experience in the world will bring it to the introverted business man. The essential unity for both is not to be found in the world but in the self; it is not world-born but self-born. For the introvert, without the self-born principle the accumulated knowledge of a lifetime will lie like ashes in a bin. For the introvert, without the unity supplied by the self, there can be no real accomplishment on the surface of the earth.

Thus for introverted business man and scholar alike, the aim in life must be to excel not in capacity but in ability for work. Neither will ever be able on any account to match in output the extravert of equal talents; but both can make themselves more valuable men and in this way compensate for the extravert's greater performance. As they work they can entertain their private theory, establishing it or disproving it as they go along. As they work, they can build their private synthesis, connecting one bit of knowledge with another, each new idea with the last, and in the end have an *understanding* of their work as original as it is subjective, which will in very truth be the measure of their worth.

That this is the process for the introverted scholar is too obvious to need elaboration. The introverted scientist, for example, who does not even as a student work theory-in-view will never be more than a rule-of-thumb man. But the process does not essentially differ for the introvert in any walk of life. The introverted business executive whose essential business experience has not been a series of evolving conceptions will indeed never have become a business executive but have remained long since a hackneyed and fatigued white-collar laborer. If he has become the man to whom all turn for the new coordination of business enterprise, to whom all look for the new departure in business policy, he no less than the scientist will have worked theory-in-view. To be sure, his theory may have evolved after the event rather than before it. But the theory keeps pace with the experience, and indeed receives the greater emphasis. For the introvert, the principal thing is not fact but idea.[14]

[14] Nevertheless it must be pointed out that the distinction between idealist and empiricist is not the same as the distinction between introvert and extravert. John Locke, father of the English empirical philosophy, is the very type and stock-example of what this book understands by introversion, and the same could be said of John Stuart Mill, perhaps the leading empiricist of the nineteenth century.

Yet in fundamental importance the two distinctions are clearly comparable. Thus Friedrich Schlegel is supposed to have said that a man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, and a hundred years later William James drew the same distinction when he stated that he construed his distinction between the tender- and the tough-minded as the difference between the idealist and the empirical tempers of mind (*Pragmatism,* pp. 9-12).

Although full discussion must be left to a later page, it can be conjectured here that the distinction is one of subjectivity and objectivity rather than one of introversion and extraversion. In the diagram accompanying this chapter, the more usual type of introvert is shown with the self-ring but slightly larger than the world-ring. This diagram would admirably fit such empirical thinkers as Locke and Mill. Although the self receives the chief emphasis of the personality and is, indeed, the principal source of the thinking that makes such individuals illustrious, the world nevertheless supplies the broad basis of fact upon which that thinking rests.

Similarly the idealist temper of mind, whether introverted or extraverted, The extravert on the other hand does not find the integrating principle within himself. Unity is for him to be found only in the outside world, which is a more subtle thing to perceive than that the integrating principle of the introvert comes from within. That the introvert's use of experience is for the development of a personal synthesis, that without this synthesis his life is in fragments—these are things relatively apparent. But that substance and binding principle must both, for the extravert, exist in the external world requires a greater flight of the imagination to apprehend. Yet no less than this is so.

The extraverted writer without an external unifying scheme is very apt immediately to flounder. An original point of view, an individualistic philosophy of life, shrewd and interesting observations—nothing of the sort, apparently, will serve the turn. Take Defoe, extravert among the extraverts, both for the turbulence of his life and for his enormous capacity for work. In *Robinson Crusoe, Captain Singleton,* and *Moll Flanders,* his best known novels, he has a simple chronological scheme in each case to go by—the history, whether partial or complete, of an individual human life. The result is that the wealth of detail is carried evenly, without becoming repetitious or getting lost in itself. Yet in the *Journal of the Plague Year,* which many think for brilliance of detail to be the chief of all his works, but which nevertheless lacks a chronological pattern —in the *Journal of the Plague Year* Defoe repeats and repeats himself, traces his steps over and over again. So in

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would be equated with a personality whose self-ring is even larger in proportion to the world-ring than it is with the more usual type of introvert. Here the individual thinks about the significance of ideas rather than about the significance of facts. To the normal subjectivity of process characteristic of a Locke or a Mill has been added a subjectivity of content. Clearly, however, this is not to be attributed to introversion, but rather to those other factors, whatever they may be, which increase the degree of subjectivity of an introvert, or determine even that an extravert shall be predominantly subjective.

Life on the Mississippi. While Mark Twain has the outline of his own early years on the river to follow all is well. But when these personal experiences come to their inevitable conclusion with the outbreak of the Civil War and the author thereupon undertakes to create the rest of the book from miscellaneous material, he flounders sadly in the attempt and the book declines unbelievably in interest.

If writers seem too special a case in point, let the reader take any extravert in any walk of life whatsoever and he will find the result to be the same. The extraverted scholar seldom, in any strict sense, works theory-in-view. If an historian, "trends" much more than "causes" will be his concern. If a scientist, he will be the inductive rather than the deductive worker, and more often than not will show a bent toward the practical, applied side of his science. Even if a "pure" scientist and so great an expounder of theory as Darwin, that theory will nevertheless have been world-born rather than self-born, will have appeared to him in the light of many facts rather than have been conceived by him in the light of his own mind. If the extravert is an engineer, it will be the achievement rather than the conception of the design that informs and binds together his activities; if an industrialist, the operation of his plant rather than the theory and planning upon which it rests.

That is why retirement presents a much greater problem to the extravert than to the introvert. The extravert is less able, when released from outward responsibility, to turn to interests of the mind. When outward activity is taken away from him he is far less likely to have an inward activity ready and waiting to take its place. Here is the retired business man who, relieved from the actual direction of business affairs, sets up a sham office somewhere, receives quantities of circular mail, and goes through the forms of his erstwhile occupation. Here is the mother who, when her children are grown up and have no more real need of her, simply cannot, to the detriment of all, relinquish her care of them.

At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that as regards introversion and extraversion there can be no superiority or inferiority, and it is clear that if one type enjoys the advantage on one occasion, the other is sure to enjoy it on the next. If at one period in life adjustment is easier for the extravert, in the next it will surely be easier for the introvert.

And so it is with retirement. Here, to be sure, the introvert usually has the advantage on his side. If anything, he is apt to be the sort of person who looks forward to retirement, to being able at long last to do the things he has always wanted to do and never found time for. This is the introvert's compensation for the advantage which the extravert has in the discharge of life's ordinary obligations before retirement. For although the introvert may acquire a real knack for his job, a real responsiveness to its details of personnel and equipment, it never comes quite so easily to him, his reply to its demands is never quite so spontaneous, as with the extravert. If the introvert possesses a greater resilience in the face of retirement, the extravert is nevertheless more adaptive to the lesser changes that precede retirement.

And yet, if the extravert is more adaptive to the everyday shifts in his environment he is also more dependent upon that environment. The introvert may adjust himself with greater difficulty to life's ordinary problems and crises, but then he is more independent of them to begin with—which is but another way of stating the original antithesis all over again. Taking advantage of one's opportunities, in other words, is much more apt to be the extravert's than the introvert's secret of success; persisting in one's ambition, much more likely to be characteristic of introverted than of extraverted accomplishment. To repeat, lifting oneself by one's bootstraps will be found to be pretty much the possession of introverts alone. This the introvert can do to see what is going on if neither naturally tall nor placed in the front rank. The extravert, on the other hand, must mind his chances of a place of vantage if not already in one. Queen Elizabeth, if circumstances had not brought her to the queenship, would have remained only an obscure princess. Without the great and general popularity of the theater in his day Shakespeare might not now be a name, for even the poems and sonnets, in all probability, follow in the wake of his dramatic career rather than anticipate it. On the other hand, rustication in Ireland interfered little with Spenser's life work, and as every one knows, neither the collapse of all he stood for, nor blindness, nor insecurity of life and limb, could prevent Milton from accomplishing what had always been his life's ambition to achieve.

The question of the individual's dependence upon, or independence of, the environment is so important that before the end of the chapter a little more space must be given to it. Needless to say, the distinction is a relative and not an absolute one. As a matter of fact when the difference between the self-knowledge of introverts and the self-knowledge of extraverts was brought out, it was made clear that there can be no self-knowledge unbiased by the romantic picture of oneself.[15] Similarly there can be no absolute independence of one's environment, but only a difference in the relative dependence. In other words, the statement in Chapter 1 that everybody in the last analysis is what he is aroused to be[16] is a truth simply more true of extraverts than of introverts. The ancient Cynics, for example, as if determined to be unadulterated introverts, tried to emancipate themselves from their environment. But when they had withdrawn from life in order to think, then they discovered that they had nothing to think about! Nothing but the self-portrait remained, and that was so hollow and hungry that it gave them the lean look and truculent self-righteousness for which they were noted in antiquity.

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[15] See above, p. 48.

[16] See above, p. 5.

No, the matter is one only of degree. Take the widow, deprived at the same time so often both of income and of the opportunity for social intercourse that having a husband inevitably means. The woman of extraverted personality suffers the more noticeably from her widowhood; but it would be ridiculous to say that the introverted widow for all her greater dependence upon the resources of her mind does not also feel the constriction of her horizons. Both suffer from the blow, the widow with less self-dependence only the more so. And yet, let one guard against even the appearance of giving the palm to introversion. The wife of extraverted personality whose husband dies may indeed suffer the more from the narrowing of her circumstances and be the more dependent upon remarriage for any future fullness of life. But widowhood is not the most common phenomenon of marriage, and the minor changes of place or of income which marriage more frequently entails will, in their turn, disturb the wife of extraverted personality less than the wife of introverted personality.

The minor disturbances of life are in general more numerous than the cataclysms, and any honest attention to the whole of the picture will find the balance of introversion and extraversion riding with an almost even arm. Let one look both wisely and closely and the tally stands nearly even. And furthermore, let each personality but develop itself in accordance with the limitations and possibilities of its own framework, compensating for its limitations and cultivating its possibilities—let each personality but adjust itself to the self and to the world, and the closer yet will the approximation of the two types be. In other words, no matter how divergent the elements, no matter how variegated the picture in its totality, the movement of life is apparently always toward the center.

5

THINKING AND FEELING PERSONALITIES

1. Introduction

EXTRAVERSION and introversion, the birthright of the world and the birthright of the self—these, as the word "birthright" suggests, are what the individual is born to, what he inherits, what is constitutional to him.

But the individual is the product of environmental as well as of constitutional factors. Irrespective of discrepancies of endowment, men and women differ widely in their way of life, in their customs and beliefs, in the very language that they speak, which are surely matters of environmental origin. The American-born son of foreign parents, although of unmixed alien ancestry, becomes an American in word and deed in the short years of his youth. It is not different in the realm of personality. Here there are broad distinctions, common to extravert and introvert alike, which can by no means be looked upon as constitutional. In particular, it is apparent that the preference for the values of reason and common sense (which may be termed "thinkingness") as opposed to the values of the human heart (which may be called "feelingness") is a business, not of inherent disposition, but of psychic habit, picked up by the child from his human environment. As thus defined, both thinkingness and feelingness are clearly casts of personality, habits of thought and expression, which the child while still young adopts from the mature personalities that surround him. Thinking and feeling personalities in the above sense are not born. They are made.

It is especially clear, for instance, that thinkingness (which is the less usual development) is passed on from parent to child through any number of generations like a torch. When one looks into the childhood of an adult thinking personality, he nearly always finds an influential thinking aunt or uncle if not a thinking parent. And if one looks into the childhood of a feeling personality whose parents are nevertheless thinkers, he will be pretty sure to find a separation from the parents during the critical years and usually the presence of a nurse or other custodian who took the parents' place and was a feeling personality. Not only is the matter seen upon direct inspection to be one of values and of psychic habit (and thus of far greater externality than the business of introversion and extraversion), but upon an investigation of its origins, there is nearly always found to be some simple explanation of any unusual development. The character trait, one way or the other, is acquired and not inherited.

2. The Two Languages

Before going further, however, it would be well to look more closely into the origins of this distinction of personalities.

To examine the family, then, the nucleus from which the individual springs, it is apparent that the surroundings of children differ in one respect according to the coin that is chiefly current among them. In some families it is clear that from infancy upward the child is surrounded by words rather than by deeds, that talk rather than action is the medium of exchange, and that this talk, if not intellectual in the strict sense, is at least idea-ed. Ideas are in the air, even if borrowed rather than originally conceived. There is an excitement about them whether they are entertained for their own sake or for what they propose. Action, in other words, comes second. For although the whole family may set out on the execution of some delightful scheme, this is only after consultation, and even in the course of carrying out the project, the communication between member and member is still largely by means of words. Thinking families primarily exchange ideas. Their communication is composed chiefly of talk.

In other families there is no such impersonal exchange, and the lingua franca is distinctly one of acts. These are the families in which anniversaries have a great deal of significance, in which they are not only remembered but created. The impromptu, unpremeditated actions of daily life are even more important. Sickness, instead of being looked upon as a bore and an inconvenience, is often in these families regarded as a heaven-sent opportunity. Then there is a real chance to do things for one another, to demonstrate the feelings by the indubitable testimony of action. A sprained ankle allows brothers and sisters to lend a helping hand, to run for a cane, to do the other's tasks. A sick headache permits the children to be quieter than usual and to show, even by this inverse action, that they care. This is the language of the heart as distinguished from the language of the head, the language of feeling families as opposed to that of thinking families.

As a result of their environments and of the languages they learn or do not learn, the thinkingness or feelingness of children is often manifest by the fourth or fifth year. Whether extraverted or introverted, thinking children are very apt to give words their full due. One hears the "v" in five dollars, the "bi" in combination. Perhaps this is due in large part to their parents' effort, but in any event the words of thinking children are apt to be correctly syllabled, the last farthing's worth of consonant fully extracted. Thinking children often give value even to syllables meant to be slurred, so that hyphens should be used correctly to transliterate their speech. The thinking child will tell you he comes from "Dor-set, Ver-mont"; he will pronounce over to himself a word like "sen-ti-men-tal." Thinking children, especially when extraverted, are fond of using adult, polysyllabic words with little or no idea of their meaning—a trait that becomes a distinct pedagogic problem when they grow older and still put the sound of words before their sense. The truth is that words as words have value to the thinking child, and that the extraverted thinking child differs from the introverted thinking child in this respect only in his greater predilection for the sheer sound of the words and in his being a little more prone to talk before he is quite ready. It is the introverted thinking child who is apt to suggest Minerva stepping full-made from the head of Jove, who begins to speak not only with completely articulated, but often with completely thought-out, sentences.

Feeling children, on the other hand, have a tendency to slur over their words. Their parents are not likely to care a great deal about the matter, and with the children there is usually a desire for emotional expression that entirely passes over the possibility of words as ends in themselves. Even when highly intelligent they will often say "ocalate" for inoculate, and "pointment" for appointment. Thinking children, on the other hand, show little affinity for baby talk. Thinking parents are not the ones in any event to teach it or to perpetuate it, and amusing situations often occur when a thinking child is confronted by a mature feeling personality not aware of the distinction of types at so early an age. The writer recalls one small thinking child of not yet four, who was introduced to a bosomy old lady of the old school. The latter proceeded to ingratiate herself with the small boy by the means that had evidently worked with her own children, and cooed some meaningless phrases to him. Her reward was simply the flat-footed statement, "Mrs. M——, I think you talk nonsense."

Feeling children, as a matter of fact, not only slur over words but avoid certain words. Once again, whether or not owing to conscious effort on the parents' part, the child betrays the adult characteristic. In feeling families there are certain words that are not said, and amusing (and sometimes embarrassing) situations arise when thinking children use the words that pass current in their families with children of the opposite persuasion. For following their general belief in the independence, and therefore the impersonality, of words, thinking parents on the whole fail to see that certain words carry with them an endowment of original sin. Words are words, and to many thinking personalities it seems irrational to use the longer expression in place of the shorter. This is all very well in the bosom of the thinking family, and is never suspected by the feeling family living next door. It only brings comment when the children of the one environment do not perceive the psychologic line that divides them from their neighbors. Needless to say, however, the wiser thinking families give their children to understand that certain words are meant for home, that not all the world is cut in their image.

So much for the languages of the head and heart, and for the words that are said and not said. They are useful criteria, but surely not absolute ones. The moment one attempts to use them in a definitive way he is certain to come across a feeling personality, for example, who is reacting to his own feeling environment and who outdoes any thinking personality that ever lived in his violent addiction to words *per se,* and to their Anglo-Saxon, vulgar representatives. But reactionists aside, the criteria are useful, and are certainly to be borne in mind.

3. The Two Worlds

But children at last grow up, and as they grow older they lose their elementary differences. Sooner or later the feeling child becomes articulate with words, learning to express his feelings by speech as well as by action. Sooner or later the thinking child learns to express his ideas by action as well as by talk. Although retaining their original preference, most mature personalities have both languages to some extent at their command. Only where there is an isolating factor, such as the loss of a parent or the impairment of a bodily organ, are children found, and then adults, who are really inarticulate, without the language either of the head or heart. These individuals, however, belong to the domain of individual personality study, and are not matter for present consideration. Thus one is faced with the problem that eventually the languages lose their significance, that mature thinking and feeling personalities are distinguished, rather, by means of their values, by means of what they care about, by means of the different worlds in which they live.

For in spite of the surface adjustment that thinking and feeling personalities must make to one another, their worlds are poles apart. As mature persons they are more separated than when as children mere idiom was what chiefly distinguished them. Cloak it as much as they may, thinking and feeling personalities care about entirely different things. Feeling personalities care about the feelings, their own and other people's, and thinking personalities do not. This fact the latter may attempt to disguise. For feeling personalities are in the majority in this workaday world, and unless the thinking personality is fortunate enough to be more or less independent in his way of life, sooner or later he has to learn that the feelings of human beings must be taken into account as well as the ends that he and they are working toward. The view of the mature thinking personality who has had to learn this lesson is well summed up by Parnesius in *The Winged Hats,* Kipling's story of the Roman Wall. Parnesius says, "Now *I* saw so strongly what things were needed to be done, that I forgot things are only accomplished by means of men. That was a mistake."

In their heart of hearts, however, thinking personalities do not believe in this. It is a concession extorted from them by the requirements of a feeling world. By dint of much and repeated human experience thinking personalities may acquire a good deal of tact, and even become noted for it. But let them grow eager about an outcome, or be hampered to an unusual degree by feeling obstructions, and their real impatience at any mixture of the feelings with concrete results is sure to come to the surface. There is nearly always an element of the rough-shod in the dealings of thinking personalities, an element most likely to be detected by the oversensitive among the feeling personalities with whom they are thrown in contact.

Thinking extraverts, for instance, are apt to make as poor foremen as they make good executives. They possess a talent for the details as well as for the ends of a business, but when it comes to the labor upon which that business rests they will have, if they are wise, a feeling personality to come between them and the men who carry out their schemes.

Mr. F.S. is such a feeling personality, as a matter of fact a feeling extravert, and the foreman and personnel manager of a thriving factory. It is he who adjusts the leaves and holidays and comings and goings of the help, and one day —in fact upon a New Year's Eve—it was his unpleasant task to tell one of the boilermen that because of sickness among the other employees he must postpone his long-awaited night-off until a later time. The disappointment was too much for the boilerman, and for a while, in addition to the most abusive of language, it seemed as if he might finish off the foreman with his shovel or with a lump of coal. But Mr. F.S. remained calm, said nothing, and deferred the whole matter until the morrow when the boilerman should have recovered himself. The boilerman did recover himself, and the next morning the matter was amicably settled. In all probability, however, this would not have happened if Mr. F.S. had been a thinking personality. Either he would summarily have discharged the man, or recognizing the impossibility of this, would have endured the eruption of temperament, but slightly concealing his boredom and irritation at the unreasonableness of human behavior. Nor would the boilerman have recovered himself by the morning. He recovered because he knew that his emotional explosion had not been in vain. There had been an understanding of his feelings, indeed one might almost say a silent absorption of them. And since his feelings had received their due the boilerman was ready the next day to be accommodating. With a thinking personality, even if the latter had restrained himself and not been explosive in his turn, the boilerman would have received no emotional discharge and would, in all probability, have sulked for a week while his mood slowly expended itself. For the feeling personality, even when silent, can act as an absorbent to the feelings of others. The thinking personality, however, who does not value and has little interest in the feelings, cannot act in this capacity.

The essential unconcern of thinking personalities for the human feelings is evident in the upbringing of their children. Thinking personalities will sit up nights in conference over their children's good, they will worry and lose sleep over each difficulty into which their children fall; but their concern is not for the state of their children's feelings. It is for their children's future in a most objective sense. Not that this makes them any the less fond of their children, or any the less loved in their turn, but that somehow they manage to bring their children up without an appeal to the affections and without getting emotionally involved themselves. They take the greatest safeguards for their children's health, they give them the best educational advantages they can afford, they give them of their own time freely and generously, reading aloud to them by the hour and getting up all sorts of trips and excursions. Yet they are not deterred in their discipline by tears in their children's eyes, nor are they apt to do things purely for their children's pleasure. There will be profit as well as pleasure, or pleasure both for parent and child. Feeling parents, on the other hand, will often buy anything and do anything simply for the pleasure it gives to their children, and many a feeling parent will admit that his best disciplinary efforts have failed upon the first tremble of his child's lower lip.

Thus, although so many things enter into the growth and development of a child that it is a hazardous business to generalize upon the results of the one or the other environment, it is probably true that thinking children are, on the whole, better disciplined than feeling children. Certainly there are far fewer spoiled thinking children. To be sure, thinking parents, especially when extraverted, have a tendency to "projectize" their children, overplanning their holidays and overexposing them to salubrious educational influences. But they do not soften their children by overvaluing their children's emotions or their own. Their day is not made or unmade by their children's remembrance or neglect of an anniversary. Nor does the child's pain at the necessary and inevitable lessons of life provoke sufferings of their own, the whole forming a vicious spiral that circumvents the lessons and procrastinates the child's adjustment to the world. True, few parents, thinking or feeling, have any reasoned philosophy of child-rearing. But the thinking parent in his detachment unwittingly abets the general tendency of life. His children inevitably confront reality earlier. Life's lessons come sooner and therefore easier.

In the different upbringings they gave to their children, Mrs. A.R.L. and Mrs. B.G. afford an example of this. A feeling extravert and a thinking extravert respectively, Mrs. A.R.L. and Mrs. B.G. were born, as it happens, in the same year and were both widowed in their early forties. Each was left with an only son of about five years of age. It was improbable that either Mrs. A.R.L. or Mrs. B.G. would marry again, and in any event their childbearing days were nearly over. Each knew that her child was all she was likely ever to have, and each knew the difficulty she faced in attempting to bring the child up without the help of a husband. In fact Mrs. B.G., the thinking personality, recognized within a year or two of her husband's death that her son was in danger of becoming spoiled and that she must get him away from her and from the sister who lived with her for much of the year. Thus she sent him to boarding school when the boy was eight, and there she kept him, strictly limiting her visits during term time and not being undone by the inevitable loneliness and homesickness that came over the child during his first year away from home. On the other hand, Mrs. A.R.L., the feeling personality, never considered parting with her son. But by his eleventh or twelfth year she, too, had come to the conclusion that something ought to be done, and accordingly sent him to a summer camp. The boy was miserable and wrote the most heart-rending of letters, and after a mere two weeks of it Mrs. A.R.L. took him home, never to repeat the experiment. For this she was taken to task by her brother, but let it be said in her defense that she admitted the truth. She replied quite honestly to her brother that she had taken the boy away because *she* could not stand it any longer.

To be sure, this is not the whole story. Mrs. B.G.'s son never entirely had a mother. Taking the father's responsibility in large part, and keeping her son to his lessons, Mrs. B.G. could not at the same time be solely his mother. The boy never had a person who was purely his friend and confidant, the believer in his future. In his lack of self-confidence Mrs. B.G.'s son bore traces of his orphanage. But he was not ill-disciplined, and duly entered and graduated from Harvard, his father's college. The other boy grew up with the normal complement of self-assurance, but soft and unable to bring himself to do tedious or disagreeable tasks. The subjects he liked in school he studied, and those he didn't he didn't. In spite of private tutors and two extra years of preparation he was unable to matriculate at Yale, the college of his father, and made his way to a smaller college of laxer standards. Even here he was able to graduate only a year late, and then found difficulty in adjusting himself to the working world.

All this may seem to give the palm to the thinking parent as a bringer-up of children. In the long run, however, feeling and thinking parents even out. As far as straight discipline goes, the thinking parent undoubtedly has the advantage. But if the feeling parent has the weakness here, he yet has many allies. Moderateness of means and the presence of brothers and sisters are always disciplining factors, and more important, the feeling parent commands the feeling loyalty of his children. For his children are feeling personalities, too, and instinctively valuing the feelings of their parents, they desire to please them and wish not to wound them. Family loyalty in a strict, unqualified sense is a characteristic not of thinking but of feeling families.

To the thinking personality there must be some reasonable cause for his loyalty. The old adage that blood is thicker than water seems, on the whole, quite silly to him.[17] He will admit the truth of it only if the blood is good blood. In particular, the loyalty of a thinking family is usually to some tradition or other. Father and grandfather have been eminent physicians, or there is a saying in the family that every member of it has published a book before he was thirty. Occasionally the tradition is of politics and public service, and again it is of banking or the law. But the traditions of thinking families are always articulate and specific. The children know what they are loyal to. It is not merely a feeling, warmer and stronger for the members of the family circle.

The family circle is, in fact, the shrine and fount of those feeling values which may be regarded as the chief differentia of mature feeling personalities. The feeling personality who can bring himself to discuss the members of his family with detachment is indeed rare. He does not see how he can be loyal to them and at the same time appraise their virtues and their shortcomings. The thinking personality, however, sees no necessary connection between his affection for the members of his family and a frank consideration of their characteristics. As a matter of fact he usually finds that he gets along better with them, and that his affections for them are less trammeled, when he has taken their short-

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17. Cecil Rhodes is a good example of this. Across the claim of his brother Arthur for reparations after the Matabele uprising (a claim, in the last analysis, for profits that *might* have accrued if the uprising had *not* taken place), Rhodes wrote, "This is the most impudent claim that has yet been submitted." Again, of his brother Bernard he said, "Ah, yes, Bernard is a charming fellow. He rides, shoots, and fishes. In fact, he is a loafer." On another occasion he said to one of his secretaries, "I have four brothers, each in a different branch of the British Army, and not one of them could take a company through Hyde Park Gate" (Sarah Gertrude Millin, *Rhodes,* London, 1933, p. 5).

comings into the open air, discussed them, and come to understand them. Then he can make allowances for their failings and dismiss them. Feeling personalities, on the other hand, shroud the members at least of their immediate family with a veil. Here is the center of all that they value and hold dear. And they cannot bear to be casual about it.

From the family, it is not a great step to the individuals who make up the rest of the world. Feeling personalities have little tendency to be analytical about other personalities, to predicate qualities and characteristics of human beings. Their own feelings lie close to the surface, and they assume the same of others. Hence when it comes to human affairs their inclination is to deal in euphemism and periphrasis. The frankness that thinking personalities love and is natural to them, is not frankness to feeling personalities but callousness and even brutality. A thing may be true, but if it is a human truth they would rather have it left unsaid. On the other hand, a trait of many thinking personalities is an apparent indifference to the bluntest of truths—even about themselves. Tell them they are egoists, tell them they have no friends, tell them they are colossal bores, and likely enough they will reply, "Hmm, there may be some truth in that." As regards the majority of thinking personalities, there is apparently a complete separation between what may be true or false and what they may feel about themselves or other human beings. For it is not that they are without feelings (as many suppose), but that their feelings lie in a stratum unconnected with their intellect. Their ways are different, not their hearts.

4. Feeling Values in Particular

The tendency of thinking children to give words their just and full due has been mentioned. Feeling personalities in much the same way wish the feelings not to be treated lightly. This is true not only when the feelings are those connected with the nucleus of all the feelings, the home, but also when tidings of an emotional nature are to be imparted. News of an emotional nature is necessarily of short order. Some one is dead or some one has recovered, some one has succeeded or some one has failed, a stroke of good fortune has come to pass, or an unlucky chance. One cannot very well be verbose in the communication of such information. For this reason, if for no other, feeling personalities are apt to wish the tidings not to be delivered until due preparation has been made, and not to be received without due recognition of the feeling values concerned. One thinks of the many such occasions in Victorian literature—of the time when it was necessary for the youthful Oliver Twist to journey from London to the Midlands, amid an air of feverish excitement and expectancy, simply to learn the identity of his deceased parents. The news could have been told to him as well in London, in fact a good deal better. But the occasion would have been robbed of half its feeling value. In *Nicholas Nickleby* one thinks of the special meeting arranged to inform Ralph that the dead Smike was his son. On each of these occasions the stage was set as if for the last act of a great drama. When feeling personalities have important news to tell, they are inclined to invite you for a set hour and a set place. Thinking personalities are more apt to communicate their news to you on the street—if they happen to meet you there, and if their news happens to occur to them at the time.

The nineteenth century was in general the great age of feeling values. Particularly is this true of the Victorian period, when the values of the feelings were enshrined and codified by Queen and Prince Consort, if not by Parliament and the Congress of the United States. Publicly to have preferred a different set of values in those days would have been to brand oneself an outcast from the haunts of men, and few were hardy enough to run the risk. In literature, thinking personality and feeling personality alike accepted the values of the feelings, and worked with these values. No writer of the period brings them out more clearly than Thackeray in his *Vanity Fair.* This he does in all probability because he was himself a thinking personality and could not help making explicit, even as he criticized, the values he accepted but could not entirely believe.

At any rate, in Amelia Sedley and Rebecca Sharp, the two heroines of this novel "without a hero," one has by way of protagonist and antagonist a perfect representation of the Victorian way of looking at things. True, the novel takes place during the Regency, and is not historically laid in that Victorian Age in which the author lived. But in throwing back the time of his novel only thirty years, Thackeray could not attain the historicity he achieved in *Henry Esmond,* where he had the help of plotting his story in a time one hundred and thirty years removed from his own. *Vanity Fair* is in reality based upon the Victorian *mores.* Amelia Sedley is more representative of Thackeray's own age than of the preceding.

Brought up in middle-class comfort and security, Amelia imbibed the Victorian philosophy with her earliest perceptions. This was a philosophy of duty. For a woman, it was a philosophy of duty not to a cause or principle but to a certain number of particular and specified individuals. As the Victorians saw it, these individuals ranged themselves in a sacred and immutable order. First in the hierarchy came a woman's husband—and when the Victorians spoke of a woman's duty to her husband they lowered their voices, and unconsciously a hush would come over the room. After a woman's husband came her children, then her own family (mother, father, brothers, and sisters), and finally her girlhood friends. Amelia, as can be imagined, does not exemplify this philosophy in part, but entirely. Until the very end of the novel she does not waver in her devotion to the fact, and then to the memory, of her worthless husband. Her child, little George, is able to take his father's place only because by the time he came along his father was dead, and because in any event he was his father's image. Eventually poverty forces Amelia to part with the child, but then she devotes herself to those parents who came third in the Victorian scale of feminine loyalties. Although the one was bitterly jealous of her and the other had ruined her and indeed occasioned the loss of her child, Amelia tends them until the end of their days. Her lover, Dobbin, who in the end rescues her from her poverty, is less real to her than the shibboleths in which she has been taught to believe. Finally old Mr. Sedley dies, and Dobbin, Amelia, her brother, and her son set out for a holiday in Germany.

Here comes a last confirmation of the Victorian scale of feeling values. In Germany, Amelia is seen to place her loyalty to an old friend ahead of the very sensible advice of her lover. Although Amelia knows that Becky has been a poor friend to her, and although she has sufficient reason to doubt whether Becky has been either a good wife or a good mother, the claim of an old, school-girl friendship (coupled with that of a disinherited mother) is too strong to be gainsaid, and Becky is able to triumph over all suspicions and enter Amelia's home. Dobbin leaves, unable to overset Amelia's philosophy because although not subject to its absurdities he nevertheless believes in its core.

It is reserved for Rebecca to disabuse Amelia. Born the daughter of a French émigrée and a penniless artist, and brought up by her father in the school of hard knocks and main chances, Rebecca is a thinking personality—a thinking personality, like Thackeray, in the midst of a feeling world. But since she is a thinking personality, this means that no veil of the feelings separates her from the reality of human beings, and in one of the best passages in the book (and this at the very end), Becky tells Amelia that her adored husband, in spite of her devotion to his memory, was no more than a low-bred cockney dandy, a padded booby, and had, as a matter of fact, proposed flight to her at the Duchess of Richmond's ball. Rebecca shows the note to Amelia, and at last—indeed at long last—exposes the unreality of Amelia's system of emotional values.

That Amelia is perhaps overdrawn, that Thackeray makes clear she took the letter of the law for the spirit, does not detract from the accuracy of the portrayal. There were hundreds of Amelias in Victorian times, thousands of near-Amelias. There are plenty of them still alive. In fact, as has been mentioned already, there is nothing more difficult for a feeling personality than to tear down the veil of emotion surrounding the members of his immediate family. Feeling personalities cannot endure criticism from their "nearest and dearest" (to use their own phrase), nor, as already remarked, can they bear to offer criticism in their turn. The feeling personality whose worthless husband is lying upstairs drunk of a Monday morning will tell the neighbors that "poor John is laid up with a bad headache." When her son is expelled from school for gambling, she declares that a change in schools was advisable because of educational reasons. When her brother is in bonds for theft, the matter is one of a misunderstood loan. Some feeling personalities, it is true, emancipate themselves from the more rigid bonds of family feeling, and learn to look upon their families with a degree of real detachment. But the way is never easy, and is always long. Although to look upon the members of one's family dispassionately may lie in the path of wisdom for everybody, it cuts across the core of the feeling personality's being. Feeling and the family ties come first to the feeling personality, the world and thoughts of the world to the thinking personality.[18]

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[18] If the reader objects that this whole section is as overdrawn as Thackeray's portrait of Amelia, he is, of course, dead right. The trouble is that it is difficult to describe the feeling values at all, let alone the feeling values as embodied in the Victorian Age, without overdrawing the portrayal.

As will be explained in a later section, the feeling values are essentially internal. Being internal and only half guessed-at, they represent areas of warmth and coldness rather than entities that can be discussed as if they were objects. The values connected with the family nucleus, warmer than most, because of their very vagueness, give the individual a free hand even as they guide his actions. However, as soon as the feeling values are rendered conscious and particular (as they were in the Victorian Age), they become, not feeling values, but sentimental values. Indeed, even to discuss them is to render the half guessed-at fully guessed-at, to give them a rigidity and exaggeration that they do not possess in their true internal state. This section might better have been called "Sentimental Values in Particular" than "Feeling Values in Particular."

Yet the two are much alike, and one must remember that magnification is an old expository device. In *The Republic,* Socrates, for instance, makes use of the device to explain the psychology of the individual. Observing the advantage for the short-sighted of first reading a sign in large letters, he studies the individual by means of the state he gives rise to. And so here. Exaggerated as the above description may be, it must yet bring out certain characteristics that would have been difficult to portray if the feeling values had been left as the internal, half-conscious things that they really are.

5. The Swing of the Centuries

But if the nineteenth century was an age of feeling values, the eighteenth century was no less an age of thinking values. To think of Washington and Jefferson, of Voltaire and Hume, of Fielding and Pope, is to perceive that reason and common sense were, on the whole, in the eighteenth century, in the ascendancy over sentiment and the human feelings. But then when one thinks of Richardson and Rousseau, and of the rediscovery in that century of the inner life, it is also clear that the problem is not so simple as a straight, back-and-forth swing between thinkingness and feelingness. It is clear, for instance, that at least in English Literature there has always been a major and a minor, that if a *Tom Jones* is published there will be a *Clarissa,* if a *David Copperfield,* also a *Vanity Fair.*[19] And with the lives of Rousseau and Kant so closely succeeding those of Voltaire and Hume, it is evident that even in the domain of philosophy (where a relationship of major and minor is not so apparent) the problem is more subtle than on first sight would seem. It would seem that literature follows in the wake of science and philosophical thought, that the one type of literature reaches its heyday some fifty years after the similar type of science or philosophy, and that, off-hand, it would be reasonable to place the culmination of feeling literature around 1850, the culmination of feeling philosophy around 1800, and so on, back through the centuries.

Accordingly, with many apologies, a graph of such a succession of thinking and feeling ages is presented on the opposite page. The apologies are in order, not only because

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[19] *Tom Jones* was published in 1749, *Clarissa* in 1747-48; *David Copperfield* was published in 1849-50, *Vanity Fair* in 1847-48.



The Graph of The Centuries

Plate 3

the graph is greatly generalized, but because it would be impossible for a psychological study to be accurate in so many details of history and biography. The graph, indeed, might better be drawn by a historian with some knowledge of psychology than by a psychologist with a smattering of history. Furthermore even the historian, in the greater and greater absence of intimate biographical data, would find his evidence less and less sure the farther he receded from the eighteenth century. However, the diagram does not pretend to detailed accuracy but only to the presentation of an idea that in its general purport must be true. No matter how the exact periods fall, or how many individuals have been misplaced in this particular graph, that there has been some such alternation of thinking and feeling periods would be difficult to deny.

So much for the graph of the centuries. It must explain itself without further comment. It is beyond the principal concerns of this chapter, and if worthy of greater attention must be left to those more capable of dealing with it.

6. The Adoption of Children

To return, then, to more homely concerns, an interesting application of these theories is suggested by the child and the family. For the thinkingness or feelingness of a family must be taken into account in the adoption of children. A thinking child will not respond in a feeling way to feeling parents, and more to the point, a feeling child will be lost in a thinking environment. In the latter situation, it will seem at times to the feeling child as if his entire nature is different from that of his foster parents. He has his private feelings, the private days and objects that he holds dear, and the family as a whole will seem to care nothing about such things. They cannot understand his desire for personal possessions. They are unable to perceive that sometimes he wishes to do things alone, to keep his memories to himself. Thinking families are apt to have no secrets from one another, or from the world at large. They discuss family problems in family conclave, and tell the results (in strictest confidence) to all the neighbors the next day. And when their adopted child desires to keep some part of his life to himself, and they find he has had experiences they know nothing of, likely enough they will term his desire for privacy, not a desire for privacy, but secretiveness.

The problem is, in fact, chiefly one from the point of view of the thinking family. Thinking families, as explained, are apt to be free from the clan feeling, and surveying their kin with detachment, can usually count the black sheep by the score. The result is that one frequently encounters thinking personalities, especially thinking extraverts, who maintain that an adopted offspring will have as good a chance of endowment as one of their own. Some will even go so far as to say that the whole business is one of environment anyway, and hence a matter within their control. On the other hand, there are many childless feeling couples who clearly prefer, if they can have no children of their own, to have no child at all. Thus the problem is really one of the perils that confront a thinking family if it does not conduct some slight psychologic analysis before taking the fateful step of adopting a child.

Undoubtedly there have been feeling families that have adopted thinking children. But the empirical investigation upon which this study rests is without an example. And from observation of the closest parallel, that is, the long-range visiting of feeling aunts or uncles, grandmothers or grandfathers, by thinking children, the situation would seem to be not so difficult as the reverse. Thinking children are no great comfort to feeling guardians, nor is the best brought out in them in their turn. But they are less subject to alien influences, and develop more naturally, if not to the full extent of their powers.

The adoption of feeling children by thinking parents, however, of which this study has many instances, never ends so simply. There is not merely a lack of comfort to the thinking parents, but usually real distress and disappointment. Frequently there are struggles and outbursts, occasionally scenes with the juvenile court, and in one instance that this study records, the heartbreaking return of a child, taken on trial, after the two thinking sisters to whom the boy was supposed to have been a brother were in a state of nervous collapse.

It will be profitable to look at a case in greater detail. Mr. and Mrs. E.W.H. are both thinking extraverts, physically and temperamentally well matched, equally well educated, and when they married, it seemed as if few young persons had ever married with better prospects of many and successful years, or of many and successful children—which indeed they desired and planned on having. But by one of those freaks, clear enough to the gynecologist but certainly not to the layman, in bearing her first child Mrs. E.W.H. nearly died. Mother and daughter recovered, but it was the opinion of physicians and husband alike that Mrs. E.W.H. should bear no more children. Scarcely were mother and child at home, however, before this sensible couple decided to adopt another child, preferably a boy, that their daughter might not be brought up alone. This they wished to do as intelligently as possible, and since they could not very well adopt a child younger than their own, and to adopt one much older would be to lose the point of the adoption, they set about looking for a boy of around two years old. As is the case so often with thinking extraverts, both parents were strong environmentalists, convinced they could mould any child to their way of life, and before long they had found a two-year-old boy to their liking. They looked into his history, adopted him, and settled down to the happiness of bringing up two children, for whom they had ample means and affection. It was only unfortunate that they had neglected to look into the boy's personality from the point of view of their own psychologic peculiarities.

The child, as it happens, was an introvert and adequately, but not highly, intelligenced. In particular, he had no intuitive gift to counteract his native, introverted phlegm, and simply could not become a thinking personality. Let alone a mood-cycle probably quite different from that of either of his foster parents, he could not cope with their extraverted vivacity, nor with their more than average intelligence. They talked and he looked. Even as a child he did not know what it was all about. He was perhaps even slower because of his foster parents' quickness and articulation. The daughter, however, being gifted with her parents' intelligence and temperament, soon showed signs of becoming a thinking personality and in speech had already outstripped her brother by the age of four. The boy grew up still largely a orphan. Surrounded by love, with the most scrupulous fairness observed between his sister and him, he nevertheless felt out of it. There was no one in the family really like him, no one who really understood him. The hope of Mr. and Mrs. E.W.H. had been that a brotherly and sisterly affection would develop between the two children, who always shared everything. But in spite of their efforts little tendency in this direction appeared. The boy would have liked a sister who could feel with him, the girl a brother who could talk with her. But neither child could be to the other what he was not to himself. The boy was given a room of his own, and there particularized his possessions. He made a few feeling friendships with other boys in the town, went fishing with them, built huts with them, and was polite but not especially kind to his sister. Indeed he had more in common with his parents. They gave him what he had, and took care of him when he was sick.

Mr. and Mrs. E.W.H. before long became aware of the disappointment of their hopes. They were as fair and kind as ever, however, and certainly had not the slightest intention of going back on their bargain. They gave the boy an excellent schooling; but he was glad to escape to a small college in a town quite removed from his own. There he married and settled down, far away from the thinking environment that had fed and clothed him and given him all the love in the world, but that he had never felt at ease in. The adoption was not a disaster, but certainly it was not a success. The boy received as good an upbringing as he would have received anywhere (although feeling parents would have made him more articulate), but the parents received little reward for their pains. True, they are the kind to be content with a reward in heaven, and society would be better off if there were more persons like them. But society would have been better off, and Mr. and Mrs. E.W.H. far happier themselves, if only they had adopted a child more capable of receiving what they had to give. They had everything to give, as they gave to their daughter, and indeed as they gave to a second child they adopted several years later. Unconsciously guided by their past experience, they picked a boy slightly older than the first, of quicker mind and temperament, who by the age of five or six was talking in their own thinking sentences and as happy as they.

The above case history must stand for many. The situation is one that occurs again and again. It is not difficult to find parents disappointed in their foster children, and when the children are disappointing through incompatibility rather than through misdemeanor or failure in their studies, one would do well to look for the cleavage between thinking and feeling personalities. And not only does the situation occur through the adoption of children but, as already mentioned, through the relegation of children during their early years to nurses or other caretakers. Thinking parents who wish to enjoy their children when the children grow older (which is the period in which thinking parents most enjoy them) should remember that thinking personalities are not born, but made, and should take every precaution neither to relinquish their children to nurses nor to adopt children incapable of becoming thinking personalities.

7. Individual Predisposition

The languages of the head and heart, the values of maturity, the passing on of the torch—all this is clear and simple when the family environment is clear and simple. It is easy enough to see that on the whole thinking parents will have thinking children, feeling parents feeling children, and that the mature personalities will pass on the personality type passed on to themselves. But in the preceding section a child was discussed that could not become a thinking personality even though the family environment was clear and simple. And what of those families that present an alternative to the groping child? What of those marriages between feeling and thinking personalities that empirical study discloses to be not at all rare? As a matter of fact, marriage between the thinking extravert and feeling introvert might almost be said to be the rule, and marriage between the thinking introvert and feeling extravert is only a little less common. In such cases the investigator must explain the choice that the child inevitably makes. His problem is deeper than a mere differentiation of languages and values. His problem must lie in some kind of individual predilection itself.

The problem would be easier if the union between thinking and feeling personalities always resulted in unhappiness. Sons might, in that case, fly violently to their mothers, daughters to their fathers, or some other such simple solution of the problem might obtain. But unhappiness is not the inevitable result of marriage between thinking and feeling personalities. For the thinking extravert, marriage with a feeling introvert is, apparently, one of the happiest of combinations. Although the values of husband and wife are different, and although to some extent, even in maturity, husband and wife still speak different languages, nevertheless there are many grounds for marital harmony, and the children are permitted to seek their destiny without constraint. The marriage between feeling extravert and thinking introvert is less apt to be harmonious, but this, too, often works out, and the children are not conscious of conflict between their parents. Although it is doubtful if any marriage between feeling and thinking personalities can attain the complete harmony of those unions where the values and the language are the same, nevertheless such distinctions are beside the point when it comes to the child. The latter is well fed, well clothed, and well loved, and although his parents may not know the happiness of more perfectly matched couples, of this the child is unaware, and turns freely to the one or the other parent for his cast of personality. This he must do according to his own disposition. And it is this disposition, or predisposition, that is to be the subject of the present discussion.

To begin with, it will pay to look at the family of the late Professor A.K. The professor, a scientist, was a thinking introvert, his wife a feeling extravert, and although their marriage was not the happiest in the world there was never any danger of its ending in the divorce courts. He had his teaching and his children, and she, although she often sighed for the sort of marriage she had read about and sometimes seen—she, too, had the children to comfort her. As a result, these grew up well loved and without particular consciousness of parental conflict. There were four of them in number, all boys, ranging over a span of ten years. The first, an introvert, became a thinking personality like his father; the second, an extravert, became a feeling personality like his mother; the third became another thinking introvert; while the fourth became, not a thinking, but a feeling introvert. With such diversity of personality-type among the children, it will pay to look into the factors that may have determined the children's choice.

To take up mood-cycle first, it is to be noted that the father was a joy-depressoid, the mother a hope-fearist, but that only two of the children inherited a cyclic constitution as simple as theirs. The second son, the one most like the mother, was by the usual shift of the sexes predominantly anger-convivial, and the third son, the one most like the father, was like the father predominantly joy-depressoid. But the first and fourth children showed blendings of the cycles of their parents, the eldest being a joy-irritable and the youngest a convivial-depressoid. In other words, the pattern of the cyclic endowment of these four children did not anticipate the pattern of their thinkingness and feelingness, and with this family, mood-cycle must be ruled out as a possible factor in the determination of personality-type. Nor can a possible affinity of introvert for introvert, extravert for extravert, be entertained. The youngest son, who was very much of an introvert, became a feeling personality, not like his introverted father, but like his extraverted mother. In other words neither mood-cycle nor introversion and extraversion can be adduced as the cause of the personality-choice that each of these children made. With this family, some other factor must be found more clearly determinative in its results.

As it happens, the intellectual endowment of the children affords such a factor. For in this trait the children of Professor and Mrs. A.K. did not hybridize their parents, but took after the one or the other. The father's intelligence quotient was around 135 (although because of his thinking introversion and joy-depression it was as if it had been ten or fifteen points higher), the mother's was in the neighborhood of 110, and the children inherited the one or the other endowment as if in labeled packages. The first and third received their father's intelligence (and made the same use of it as he), the second and fourth their mother's. And since, with all other factors indeterminate or neutral, it is to be observed that the first and third children became the thinking personalities, the second and fourth the feeling personalities, it would seem as if in this family intellect was the deciding factor.

The study of half a dozen other families leads to the same conclusion, and in consequence it may be stated that highness or lowness of the intellectual endowment can of itself, where the parents are disparate and the other factors equal, swing the child toward the thinking or the feeling cast of personality.

It is not surprising that this should be so. It is axiomatic that the possession of a tool or faculty makes the possessor eager to employ it. Certainly singers are not loath to use their voices, and children given a hammer and nails will nail the furniture if nothing else is handy. It cannot be otherwise with the intellect. Its use gives pleasure to the owner, a pleasure that the thinking personality will experience more keenly than the feeling personality. For the intellect receives its fullest use in the practice of thought, a function never so well developed with feeling as with thinking personalities. As a consequence, the child with the unusual mind who has the choice to make will go out to the parent with whom he can use that mind most fully. Other things being equal, he will become a thinking personality. For although he receives affection from both parents, and gives it to both in return, with but one parent can he have the added pleasure of fully using his mind. Apparently this is a difference sufficient to tip the balance of the scales.

But intelligence is not always the deciding factor, and cannot have been with the three daughters of Mr. and Mrs. A.M.McW. For here, the more clearly because of its being unusually high, the intellectual endowment of all three daughters was the same. And yet the first took after the mother and became, like the mother, a feeling extravert, while the second two daughters took after the father and became, like the father, thinking extraverts. For the marriage of their parents had been one of thinking and feeling extraverts, the father a capable Scotch engineer and the mother a clever Scotch-Irish housewife. Needless to say, there was always a great play of brains in this family so plentifully supplied with them. Yet since the entire family was as extraverted as it was clever, it is clear that possible factors of introversion and extraversion, as well as of intellect, drop out, and that the investigator must turn to the emotional coloring as perhaps containing the secret of the eldest daughter's choice of the feeling cast of personality, of the two youngest daughters' choice of the thinking cast of personality.

In this he is not disappointed, for the eldest daughter was in mood-cycle quite different from her younger sisters. She, as it happens, received the usual feminine endowment of hope-fear in ascendance and anger-conviviality in abeyance, and in her consequent femininity turned to her mother and to her mother's cast of personality. The other two daughters received cycles more masculine in their coloring. Predominantly anger-convivial, the youngest of the three daughters was born with the usual feminine arrangement of the cycles reversed. She developed the emotions of hope and fear only upon marriage, after she had acquired a husband and child. The second daughter, however, did not develop these emotions even then. It might truthfully be said that hope and fear were two emotions she never experienced. Although the mother of several children, she never had a moment's worry about them and was the scandal of her older sister (as at times of her younger sister) for the detachment with which she regarded them. She was a woman among men, interested, and indeed engaged, in their pursuits. She was a career woman not only by instinct but by actual fact, and took her children as a matter of course. In her detachment and manlike qualities the second daughter was more typically the thinking extravert than the third daughter, and the explanation of this, as well as of her predilection for the thinking cast in the first place, clearly lies in the fact of her cyclic endowment.

As set forth in the chapter on mood-cycle, anger-conviviality is the most objective of the cycles. That individual disposed to be fraternal or angry with his fellows will be disposed to seek both vocation and avocation in the outer world. Other things being equal, anger-convivials will be more external than hope-fearists or joy-depressoids. But of course, extraverts are more external than introverts to begin with, so that when the individual inherits the combination of extraversion and anger-conviviality, he receives a double weighting toward the outside world. This is not remarkable in a man, but is remarkable in a woman, whose natural orbit time and the customs of the race have decreed to be the home. The woman who receives the double weighting will be different from other women. She will prefer the activities of men. And where, as in the case of the second daughter of Mr. and Mrs. A.M.McW., the father is a thinking personality, the mother a feeling personality, and every other factor apparently neutral or inoperative, she will choose the thinking cast of her father's personality.

Although occasionally a woman such as the second daughter of Mr. and Mrs. A.M.McW. takes her thinkingness from her mother instead of from her father, one suspects that in the beginning the original choice was always between a thinking father and a feeling mother. And even where it is the mother who holds out the thinking torch and not the father, the daughter, in all probability, still finds in the mother's thinkingness the greater externality, in the father's feelingness the greater domesticity. For in such cases it is usually the mother who sees to the family's finances, looks after the upkeep of the family's property, and approaches life's problems in a bold, independent way, the father who binds up the children's cuts and putters about the garden. Although the objectively weighted daughter may turn to a thinking mother instead of to a feeling father, one factor in her choice will certainly be the greater externality that thinkingness affords.

The greater externality that thinkingness affords is attributable to the nature of thought, *which is an internal function of external things.*[20] The thinker thinks in his mind about the world he observes, he meditates subjectively about objective things, but even as he meditates, the subjective meditations have a tendency to slip from his mind, and the objective truths and consequences a tendency to take their place. No matter how subjective he may be by birth and disposition, the thinker admits and accedes to the claims of the world as his thought develops. *The values of thought are external.* Thus thinkingness, whether offered by father or mother, presents a measure of externality in itself, and conversely, the anger-convivial extravert who becomes a thinking personality acquires an added externality from the fact that even his values lie beyond the human heart. To the anger-convivial extravert the thinking overlayer gives an insensitivity all the more noticeable because of his gregarious instincts. It goes far to explain his peculiar individuality, and if it is a woman who is thus gregarious and extraverted and a thinking personality, she will indeed be different from the daughters of Eve. On the other hand, although anger-convivial feeling extraverts may seem to be the *ne plus ultra* of those who live beyond their skin, nevertheless because of the very fact that they are feeling personalities, they possess a soft spot in their nature, which is their valuing of the things that lie within.

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[20] It is to be hoped that the reader will not quarrel with the narrowness of this definition. After all, a definition is merely a statement of meaning, and this definition is formulated only for the context of this book. True, a definition should also adhere, as far as possible, to the ordinary meaning of a term. But this, too, might be claimed of the above definition. For even when thinking is an internal function of internal things, even when the thinker is thinking about ideas rather than about facts, even here, for the most part, the ideas are but abstractions drawn from facts, and the thinker's thought is in reality an internal function of an internal function of external things. As for those ideas that are not ultimately drawn from facts, this small part of thinking is hardly germane to the point. As always, for the sake of the movement of thought, let us take the rule and let the exception go.

For feeling is an external function of internal things, the objective expression of inner states of mind. And as the feeling personality develops in the experience and expression of the feelings, with him, too, there is a tendency for the mere technique of the feelings to slip from consciousness, a tendency for the inner states to take their place. Actors and actresses, when tyros, are drilled to register this or that emotion, but on the stage they and we lose sight of the registering and pay attention to the emotion. Although the function is external, *the values of feeling are internal,* and the anger-convivial extravert who is a feeling personality has, as mentioned above, at least the feeling values to soften the otherwise unmitigated objectivity of his personality.

In maturity, however, the second daughter of Mr. and Mrs. A.M.McW. had neither the softness of the feeling values nor the softness of the subjective emotions to assuage her extraverted personality. She was as external, and as insensitive, as her father, of whom indeed she was the living image. They were great friends, and in truth there never was a doubt of the daughter's becoming a thinking personality since even in childhood her temperament made her go out to those values that were sympathetic with her being and to that parent who was most like her. Such was also the case with her younger sister, who, although more feminine and sensitive than she, did not develop until later the womanly emotions of hope and fear. But such was not the case with the eldest sister, who as a child was timid and hopeful, and who in spite of an equally capable mind found the hard, common-sense values of thought, and the hard, common-sense father, at variance with her own more truly feminine nature. She turned to her mother, the parent with whom she felt the greater sympathy, the parent who alone did not deny the subjective side of her nature. For other factors being equal, the child will always turn to the parent whose temperament is most in harmony with its own. Temperament as well as intellect plays its role in the determination of personality. Besides the brains, it takes the mood to be a thinker.

However, it is only with women and only when the dominant cycle that anger-conviviality can be a predisposition for the thinking type. Even then the thinking cast is not foregone. Women endowed with the emotionality of men become thinking personalities only when the stage is especially set, only when the individuals who offer them release from the woman's world are also thinking personalities. The activity of their brothers and fathers can be as external when they are feeling personalities as when they are thinking personalities, and the release they offer from pantry and linen closet as perfect as the heart desires.

As a matter of fact, when the stage is not especially set, anger-conviviality and hope-fear predispose not for the thinking but for the feeling type of personality. Anger-conviviality and hope-fear are the primitive cycles, the cycles of activity rather than of thought. Teleologically, their origin is to be found in the evolution of the village and the home, the individual receiving emotional discharge as the communal or the domestic task is furthered or achieved. Indeed, the activities of the village and the home provide the perfect medium for that external multiplication of inner states, that outward expression of internal things, which is given as the definition of feeling, and it is not surprising that the cycles of anger-conviviality and hope-fear should find in feeling the perfect answer to their emotional need and gravitate toward that form of personality in which feeling receives its fullest expression. Only when the cycles run counter to sex, only when the child is seeking escape from its destined role in life, can they lead to an alien form of personality. In particular, the anger-convivial woman becomes a thinking personality only when the thinking cast gives her the externality she can find in no other way. Most tomboys are free from any trace of thinking personality.

It is joy-depression that can of itself incline the personality toward thinkingness. Of all the cycles, it is the only one that is purely elective of the thinking personality. As explained in the chapter on mood-cycle, its weighting is curiously twofold. Those individual human beings (whether centered in the village or in the home) who are the chief concern of the anger-convivial and hope-fearist drop out with the joy-depressoid, and there is a consciousness simply of the world and of the self that comprehends the world. This consciousness is peculiarly harmonious with the thinking cast of personality. Of all persons capable of being thinkers, the joy-depressoid feels the greatest predilection to become one.

So strong is the force of mood-cycle, that the joy-depressoid coloring is able to nullify the predilection of introvert for introvert, of extravert for extravert. For such a predilection undoubtedly exists. Introverts with their sense of the self are inherently more subjective than extraverts, extraverts with their sense of the world inherently more objective than introverts, and when the other factors are equal, the subjectivity of an introverted child will find refuge in the subjectivity of an introverted parent, the objectivity of an extraverted child stimulus in the objectivity of an extraverted parent. Yet the empirical research upon which this study is based is filled with cases where joy-depression has caused an extraverted child to turn away from an extraverted parent that was a feeling personality to an introverted parent that was a thinking personality, an introverted child to turn away from an introverted parent that was a feeling personality to an extraverted parent that was a thinking personality.

E.M.D. is such a case. An introvert and predominantly joy-depressoid in his emotional coloring, he chose the thinkingness of his extraverted mother in preference to the feelingness of his introverted father. In his growing-up years the boy, an only child, saw as much of the one parent as of the other, in fact a great deal of both, and yet preferred to take after his rough-shod, material-minded mother instead of his quiet, pipe-loving father although in so doing he became the type of objective introvert described in the preceding chapter, and thus largely defeated the very choice that he made. Although a thinking introvert, in maturity there were few things more difficult for him to do than to sit down and think, so much had he been externalized by his outgoing, extraverted mother. Nevertheless that mother with her thinking categories and clear-headedness about herself and her environment decided the question for her joy-depressoid child, although introvertedly speaking, the father would have been a better companion for the boy. Still, introvert though he was, and like his son in this respect, the quiet, pipe-loving father never caught the boy's imagination. Purely gregarious and domestic in his emotions, he was a person whose activities were completely bounded by his home and by the circle of friends and business associates in which he moved, a person who had come to love the routine of his own life. To the son, cyclically disposed to take an interest in the world at large, the mother was the only parent whose point of view embraced that world. Although an anger-convivial thinking extravert of the very type described above, her interest in politics and social welfare, her interest simply in what was happening on the other side of the hill, presented a type of personality which was more attractive to the child than that of his father. To E.M.D., with his joy-depressoid coloring, the choice was in reality a choice between two worlds, the one narrow and, to him, without charm, the other spacious and exciting. He turned to the latter with clear-cut preference, for the fact remains that the combination of joy-depression and introversion gives the individual so strong a bias toward the world of the thinking personality that this study is without an instance of an introverted joy-depressoid who ever became a feeling personality if there was the least chance of his becoming a thinking personality.[21]

E.B. is another such case. She was the only child of an extraverted mother who was a feeling personality and of an introverted father who was a thinking personality, a father who became, shortly after her birth, an invalid virtually confined to his chair. The daughter, an extravert, was as outgoing and as clever as her mother, who was, intellectually, quite the equal of her husband. Yet whereas the mother's mood-cycle was the usual feminine endowment of hope and fear, the daughter inherited a joy-depressoid complexion from her father. And thus it was that straight across her natural, extraverted tendency toward action, straight across the wit and companionship of her mother, the daughter was led to the thinking and reflectiveness of her father. She, and not her mother, became the chief companion of her father in his illness, although he could be her companion only in affection and ideas. The daughter became a thinking extravert, once again of that subjective variety described in the preceding chapter.

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[21] It has been asked, "Can introverted joy-depressoids become thinking personalities by themselves?" Unfortunately, the only answer which the writer can give is that he doesn't know.

But it is time to bring the ramifications of this topic, so literally without limit, to their end. Many other peculiarities of environment and of individual selection could with equal justice be recorded. The cases upon which this section is based, however, are filled rather with accidents of environment which have *withheld* the individual from becoming the type he would ordinarily have become. There is the case of one mother, the type of thinking introvert later to be described as the "abstract introvert," who could speak to her child only in high-flown abstractions or in baby talk. She seemed to be without a vernacular for the ordinary situations of life, and the child, turning to the father, became a feeling personality when one would have said it would have become a thinking personality. There are instances where invalidism took a parent away from a family, or brought a parent into it. There is an instance where a host of feeling aunts and grandparents so surrounded an only child that he, too, became a feeling personality instead of the thinking personality that his mother was, and that one would have said he also would have become. But a study that aims at the presentation of a system as a whole cannot be exhaustive. It can aim only to show how various must be the influences at work in a family that is not simple and uniform, how various may be the children where the parents are both thinking and feeling personalities.

Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice* offers an instance of this variability so real and so complete that, as usual with great writers, one can only marvel at the author's knowledge of human nature. The psychology of *Pride and Prejudice* is unbelievably accurate. The title itself picks out a striking characteristic of thinking introvert and of subjective thinking extravert respectively, and the delineation of the different types of personality resulting, among the children, from the disparate marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Bennet is masterly. Mrs. Bennet, with her nerves and curious lack of sensitivity (that is, for a feeling personality), is the kind of feeling extravert later to be described as the "sentimental extravert." Mr. Bennet, a thinking introvert, has his ironic humor, his library, and his detachment. Their marriage was not a happy one, but like the marriage of Professor and Mrs. A.K., which it parallels, there was never a danger of its dissolution, and the children grew up well sheltered and well cared for.

The eldest daughter, Jane, inherited her father's introversion, but receiving a less gifted mind, or what is more probably the case, a more feminine emotionality, took after her mother and became a feeling personality. Elizabeth, the second daughter and the heroine of the novel, inherited her mother's extraversion, but receiving her father's intelligence (and perhaps a joy-depressoid cast of mind), took after her father and became a thinking personality. Mary, the third daughter, being born with her father's bookishness and introversion, became like him a thinking introvert, but less attractive than he, for the type often sits less well upon a woman. The two younger daughters, Kitty and Lydia, being simple, brainless extraverts, became feeling personalities like their mother, or rather, like their aunt Phillips, whom indeed they closely resembled.

For the accuracy of Jane Austen's portrayal extends beyond the immediate Bennet family to the children's aunts and uncles and lovers. It is evident, for example, that Mrs. Bennet came from a family of uniform feeling personalities, her sister, Mrs. Phillips, being a simple, unsentimental feeling extravert, and her brother, the excellent Mr. Gardiner, a simple feeling introvert. And Jane, as is so often the case, attracted a feeling extravert, the unstable Mr. Bingley, who was not worthy of her but became so through her own constancy; while Lizzy, as is again so often the case, attracted a thinking introvert, in this instance the hero of the novel, who spoke her thinking language and who loved her vivacity. The book is accurate beyond belief, and a hundred years from now will still delight the student as much as the casual reader.

8. Thinking and Feeling Distinctions

Closely akin to the values of thinking and feeling are the distinctions of thinking and feeling. Indeed, just as the values of thinking and feeling account largely for what thinking and feeling personalities believe in, so the distinctions that they make form a large part of their mental behavior. If, for example, one commits himself to what is true and reasonable in the first place, then he must distinguish between what is true and reasonable and what is false and unreasonable in the second place. The thinking personality tries to see things as they are, their real aspect as distinguished from their fancied. He tries to separate things from their coloring of human wishfulness; he tries to see them divorced from his own desires. And in so doing, he expends energy that is internal upon things that are external, with the essential emphasis falling upon what is external and removed from himself.

A thinking personality, for instance, is told by an automobile salesman that it is better to turn in his car every year, before it is necessary to spend anything on upkeep. But being a thinking personality he must examine the idea for himself. He admits that it is better for the salesman, but he does not see how it can be better for the salesman and for him at the same time. Some of the car's depreciation, he suspects, is due not to depreciation but to mark-up, which if he bought a new one he would be perpetuating, so to speak. Besides, he knows that as regards repairs and upkeep, it is one of the conditions of machinery to need them. It seems to him that the salesman's arguments are colored by the salesman's desires, and that according to the objective merits of the case it is better not to turn in his car until he has a valid reason for getting a new one. He approaches a decision that in its essence is objective, although subjectively arrived at. He has, in fact, looked at and compared two ideas of action. He decides that the one is true, the other false. He makes a thinking decision.

No one will pretend that there is anything very new or very difficult about the concept of the thinking distinction. It is, in fact, the usual notion of a distinction. The feeling distinction, however, is more subtle and not so immediately to be grasped. For unlike the thinking distinction, which distinguishes outside things from the inside, *the feeling distinction distinguishes inside things from the outside.* In the thinking distinction there are two situations to be tested by one mind. In the feeling distinction, *there are two states of mind to be tested by one situation, a difference in feelings about a single object which calls them forth.* The matter can be set forth diagrammatically:



Figure 3

And what is the criterion of the feeling distinction? Obviously it cannot be "true and false," for besides being the touchstone of the thinking distinction, "true and false" is irrevocably linked with the outer world where lodge the thinking values. The feeling criterion must be one of inner realities, perhaps of their outward manifestation, but never of things so far removed from the human heart as facts and ideas. Indeed a moment's reflection suggests that the standard is "right and wrong," not in any moral sense, but in the simple sense of "fitting and unfitting," "correct and incorrect."

Primitive personalities, in whom generally are best seen the characteristics of the feeling type, are forever concerned with the "right thing to do." One who has lived among humble men knows what a large part of their seriousness is given over to this eternally preoccupying problem. Let some one die, or retire, or be dangerously ill, or recover, or get married, or have children, and they want to do the right thing and frequently go into consultation about it. True, as feeling personalities become sophisticated they drop the simple terminology of right and wrong. They speak of actions as appropriate or inappropriate, in good or in bad taste. In particular, they say that a thing is done, or that it is not done. Essentially, however, there is no difference. Even when feeling personalities learn to speak about the emotions quite directly, their standards do not change. In spite of all Browning's intellectuality, he too, like so many other feeling personalities, is concerned with but one question, that of the right thing to do. In the *Incident of the French Camp* it is Napoleon who fails in the right response to the boy who rode to tell him the news of victory. In the poem about the lady who threw her glove into the lion pit, it is the page who has the right reaction. The rest are wrong. Again, in the poem about the bringing of the good news from Ghent to Aix, the citizens did the right thing in voting their last measure of wine to Roland, the horse that brought the news, and in the *Pied Piper of Hamelin* they did the wrong thing in not giving the piper his pay. The fabled profundity of Browning's philosophy is but obscurity of expression. In reality he poses but one problem. And the ladies of the last century who formed the Browning societies were capable of considering but one problem. It is doubtful if these societies ever enrolled a thinking personality. To thinking personalities, Browning is a bit of a bore. Though they can admire the spirit and lilt of the best lyrics, and the superb humanity of a poem like *My Last Duchess,* Browning's pretensions to thought tire and irritate them. He cannot think, and they know it.

In general, as regards society, feeling personalities spread from the bottom up, thinking personalities from the top down. Thus, as suggested above, the feeling distinction is often best seen among the lower classes, the thinking distinction, if not actually among the upper classes, at least among the better educated. Thinking personalities are always a bit astonishing when found in the humbler walks of life. Their detachment from home and family and their ability to talk about matters of general interest make them delightful people to chat with, but usually poor husbands and wives. Frequently they have a distaste for labor with their hands, wishing to make their living by the employment of their mind and thinking powers. And in circumstances where this is not possible, where, in the words of the immortal Candide, a sober cultivation of one's garden is the only way out, they are apt to remain crack-brained and visionary while their children go to the dogs. But if feeling personalities in the humbler walks of life are more responsible as parents and as heads of families, nevertheless when well-to-do and idle and divorced from the simple language of actions, they are often no less absurd. One thinks of the elderly ladies one meets on the verandas of summer boarding houses for whom the feeling distinction has become a thing entirely of words. Suicide is a subject that frequently sets them off. They pass right over the fact of it and rest on the circumstances. They declare, "My dear, you could tell he wasn't in his right mind, because he did it in his brother's house, and it was his poor sister-in-law who had to go in and find him afterwards." Their point is, apparently, that the indication of insanity is not the fact of suicide but the failure to observe the proprieties—as if even in suicide the critical thing is the right or wrong way in which it is done!

The thinking and feeling distinctions can be used as a rough diagnostic of the personalities they connote. For instance, feeling personalities in their wish to do the right thing frequently accept "rightness" simply as what their neighbors do. "Keeping up with the Joneses" is thus apt to be a characteristic, not of thinking, but of feeling personalities. Thinking personalities are apt to live not according to the Joneses but according to reason. And in so doing, for the most part, they appear quaint and ridiculous to their feeling brethren, who smile with amusement at the vagaries and eccentricities thus disclosed to them. This smile at the man who lives according to reason is another of the traits which frequently betoken a feeling personality. Thinking personalities, even when extraverted and urbane, are slow to see the ridiculous in what is arrived at through process of thought.

The writer recalls one of the few really great men he ever studied under, a mathematician of international reputation, a thinking introvert, and certainly one who lived by reason rather than by custom. When it rained, to avoid the bother of putting on and taking off overshoes, he wore half-length rubber boots to class and tucked his trousers in them. He had his students do their work on special paper of a more rational sort, kept their marks in a ledger like a bookkeeper, and had a system of ordinary and extraordinary credits so that by building up a stockpile of the latter, his talented students might take a day off whenever they wished. His classes were delightful for their freedom from red tape, and for the glimpse it was possible to get of the philosophy of mathematics. Yet not infrequently, for the want of some simple algebraic solution, this great mathematician would get stuck in the midst of a class demonstration, and putting his back (and usually one rubber-booted foot) to the wall, would tug at his beard until the answer came. Then many, if not all, of the feeling personalities in the class would smile at one another, for the Joneses do not give themselves away, and if teachers, do not get stuck in class. But the thinking personalities in the class, extraverted and introverted alike, would sit as serious as judges, as if it were the most reasonable of occurrences, and simply wait for the suspense to end and their professor, or some one else, to find the solution.

This diagnostic, although imperfect, is not without value. The distinctions of thought and feeling come so close to the very essence of the personality that the thinking personality who can find amusement in the thinkingness of some one else must be badly adjusted. He may be a man of the world, his values may be sophisticated as well as thoughtful—in particular, he may live by reason only when convention permits. But he cannot laugh at one who simply goes farther than himself. That would be turning himself inside out.

9. Thinkingness and Intellectuality

On the whole, thinking personalities do not laugh at the man who lives by reason. Yet feeling personalities often cannot suppress a smile of amused superiority, and this although their own intellectual powers are of the highest. The above-mentioned class in mathematics was one in second-year calculus. Its members were possessed of more than average ability, and the feeling personalities were distributed evenly throughout it. Two or three of the ablest individuals in the class were distinct feeling personalities, with gifts of brilliant mathematical insight.

In other words it is clear that one must take into account the *intellectuality* of personalities as well as their thinkingness. Thinkingness is the result of environment and where, as between thinkingness and feelingness, the child has the choice to make, intellect, as has been pointed out, may play the determining role. But more often, there is no choice to be made, the parents are alike in their thinkingness or their feelingness, and the child is destined to become one or the other type of personality. Particularly is it true that the child of high intelligence, and even of subjective mood-cycle, often has no alternative but to become a feeling personality. However, he will still retain his high intelligence, and if, in addition, his emotional coloring is subjective, he will probably become an *intellectual* personality. But he will not become a *thinking* personality.

Intellectuality may thus be defined as the utilization of, or delight in, one's intellectual powers. Thinkingness, on the other hand, is a business of values and distinctions. It comes close to being the texture of the psychic life, not its delight or entertainment. There is many an individual possessed of but limited intelligence who, through absence of choice to become otherwise, is nevertheless a thinking personality, yet a thinking personality who hates to use his mind. Everything he believes in, everything he says or does, shows his thinkingness; yet nothing is clearer than that he is not intellectual. He manages things and makes decisions. He has enthusiasm for the values of thought, and for ideas. Yet he hates thinking out his own ideas, and, in fact, intellectual effort of any kind.

On the other hand, nothing is more evident than that many of the wits of the hour, many of the chief intellectuals of the day, are distinct feeling personalities. Everything they say, everything they write, shows a basic belief in the feeling values of life, and their intellectuality does not alter this a whit. Thinkingness does not imply intellectuality, nor does intellectuality imply thinkingness. The two are different and must be kept straight.[22]

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[22] It is also necessary that intellectualism and emotionalism be kept straight. These are *philosophies* of thinkingness and feelingness, reasoned beliefs as to the superiority of the intellectual or of the emotional life. Since these are philosophies, and have been well understood for centuries, little needs to be said of them here. When the Christian trilogy of faith, hope, and charity was successfully opposed to the Platonic tetralogy of temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice, the two philosophies had been definitely formulated in the West, and indeed much of the history of Western thought since then may be explained by the periods of dominance which each of these philosophies has enjoyed.

What needs a further word is the fact that occasionally a clear-cut feeling personality becomes an intellectualist by philosophical persuasion, occasionally a clear-cut thinking personality an emotionalist by philosophical persuasion. Particularly is this likely to happen to a feeling personality in a thinking age, to a thinking personality in a feeling age. Thus Benjamin Franklin, a feeling personality by every fact of his private life, developed an enthusiasm for ideas and the thinking values that was the equal of any thinking personality of his age. Similarly Tolstoy, a thinking personality by every biographical detail, nevertheless came, in the second half of his life, to preach a philosophy of feeling that would have done justice to Rousseau. Yet Pasteur, in the same age, a feeling personality in every detail of his private life, preached an intellectualistic philosophy of work that was the equal of that of Diderot and Voltaire. Clearly the subject is one of great interest, and is a topic to which one would necessarily like to return.

10. Thinking and Feeling as Functions

But important as it is to separate thinkingness from intellectuality, it is more important to separate thinking and feeling as casts of personality from thinking and feeling as functions of the mind.

Until now the attention of this chapter has been principally engaged with the former—with thinking and feeling as casts of personality—which, as has been pointed out, is largely a business of externalities when it is thinking that is the cast, of internalities when it is feeling that is the cast. It has been made clear that the values and distinctions of thought lodge in the world removed from the individual, that the values and distinctions of feeling lie close to the hearts of human beings.

But it is now time to look at the other side of the picture, at thinking and feeling as functions of the mind, and to consider the contradiction that must occur when the one as a function is subordinate to the other as a cast. An individual whose chief function, for example, is thinking must experience conflict if that thinking is subject to the feeling cast of personality. It must be difficult for the thinking function to work with materials of an entirely different order from its own. Yet the thinking function will have to work with such materials if the values and distinctions of the personality are not external but internal. Indeed, not only will conflict occur, but to some extent imbalance of personality. For if function and values are alike internal or external, if thinking meets with the feeling values, or feeling with the thinking values, then the personality is all one way or the other, instead of somewhere in between, which is evidently the goal of nature.

Now perhaps it is clear without lengthy exposition that thinking, *as a function,* is major or dominant with introverts, feeling, *as a function,* major or dominant with extraverts. It was the thesis of the preceding chapter that introverts are those who live at the center of themselves, extraverts those who live at the center of the world, which is no more than saying that the ones are active for the most part subjectively, the others objectively. These activities are simply now defined as the functions of thinking and feeling respectively.

For the notion of function is of something active. The states or objects that serve as the bases of a function may be passive, but always the function itself, in being the multiplied part, is active. Indeed, not only is a function essentially active, but there is a certain antinomy between a function and its base, between the multiplication and its source. Thinking, for instance, as an activity, takes place in the realm opposed to the things of which it is a function. It takes place within the personality, although subtended by the outer world and of value (at least pragmatically speaking) when congruent with that outer world. In the same way, feeling as a function takes place in the realm opposed to that in which its realities have their existence. Although the states which give it birth, and which in the end make it worth while, lie within, the multiplication takes place without. The deeds, the actions, the utterances, of feeling are external. Moreover this conception of the functions in its essence must be true no matter how far the individual may wrest a function from its evident purpose, no matter how much he may seek to feed on his emotions without activity, nor to what extent he spins his thinking from the spidery stuff of his own mind instead of from the good, solid facts of the exterior world.

Thus the chief difference between thinking and feeling *as functions* is that the one is internal, the other external.

And the one is here predicated of introverts, the other of extraverts, and this irrespective of whether the individual is a thinking or a feeling personality. Although feeling introverts do not reason like thinking introverts, nevertheless they meditate and mull and seek to establish their intuitions, and this with the largest part of their being. Few will deny that Lincoln was a thinker and a great thinker. He thought about the destiny of a whole people, and thought so well that his thinking was taken for their own. Yet he was no thinker in the strict sense. His was the thinking of a feeling personality, the intuitive thinking of one whose values and distinctions are not those of thought. It was great thinking only because it was the expression of the essential nature of a great man, only because thinking was the chief function of this great man's introverted personality.

It is not different with the thinking extravert. Although the values and the distinctions of the thinking extravert are those of thought, and although the thinking extravert is thus capable of becoming a thinker in the strict sense, thinking is not and cannot be his major function. Underneath the thinking overlayer exists a tendency far greater than the tendency to make comparisons and to draw conclusions. The thinking extravert's major psychic activity is nothing so receptive or acceptive as thinking. Like all extraverts, the thinking extravert cares more for expression than for experience. He wishes to leave impressions upon his surroundings rather than to receive them. His major function presents an urge toward the outer world, an impulse to pass beyond the personality, a desire to do and to be. In combination with his thinkingness it is this that makes him (unless hope-fearist or joy-depressoid or rendered self-conscious by inferiority feelings) so thoroughly external. Yet it is this major function in combination with his thinkingness that also makes him capable of being a great leader and ruler of men. For great leaders and rulers of men must be active as well as thoughtful, doers as well as planners, and this, of all types, the thinking extravert is able to be. Lincoln was mentioned as an example of the feeling introvert. Washington is just as clearly an example of the thinking extravert. And indeed, when one thinks of Washington, it is primarily not of a person who was a thinker but of a person who was a leader—a leader and a builder of an army and of a country. True, he left his countrymen a testament of thought,[23] even as Lincoln showed great qualities of leadership. It is also true that the very fulcrum of Washington's greatness may well have been his judgment, which was superb. Nevertheless, if his judgment was the fulcrum of his greatness, his power of action was the lever. In comparison with his services as commander of the Revolutionary Army and as first president of the infant republic, surely Washington's thinking, and even his judgment, drop to second place. With extraverts who are thinking personalities there is visible a greater tendency for action than for meditation. Their major feeling function, in its desire for expression, restricts the thinking to a minimum. On the other hand, beneath the exterior of introverts who are feeling personalities, lurks the more important function of thought. Thinking extraverts and feeling introverts thus present a conflict of tendencies, a conflict that is to be the chief concern of the remaining pages of this section.

But although only with these two types, only with thinking extravert and feeling introvert, is it permissible to speak of conflict, it is clear that with all types there is a duality of principal function, that along with the major function exists a minor function—a minor function which becomes the major function when the type is reversed, when one

[23] This study will avoid the issue as to how much of the *Farewell Address* is Washington, and how much Hamilton.

turns from introvert to extravert, from extravert to introvert. As a matter of fact, this is only to go back to the introductory discussion of Chapter 1, in which perception, emotion, intellection, and volition were presented in their widest possible scope as the basic psychic functions of all human beings. Emotion and intellection (or feeling and thinking as they may also be called) were accorded positions of central prominence, and it is of these central functions that the terms "major" and "minor" will be used. Perception and volition, the initial and final functions, are of less importance, and can be disregarded for the time being.

Now the crux of the matter, as well as the basis of the conflict shown by thinking extravert and feeling introvert, is that the environmental accident of thinkingness or of feelingness (which is rightly regarded merely as a mould or cast of personality) gives priority and familiarity to that function most harmonious with it, and this, irrespective of the function's major or minor role in the personality. Thinkingness, for example, takes hold of the individual's thought capacity, whether major or minor, and plucks it to the fore. Not only is the individual given the values and distinctions of thought, but also, and indeed as a consequence, his thinking function is granted the right of way, the preference over his feeling function. In the same manner, feelingness, although in reality but an outward form, gives priority to the feeling function, and this, whether the feeling function is major or minor in the individual's constitutional makeup.

In other words, one must speak of the primary and secondary positions of the central functions as well as of their major and minor roles. Not only is there the constitutional factor of extraversion and introversion, which determines the amount of feeling and thinking in the individual personality, but there is the environmental factor of feelingness and thinkingness, which decrees whether this feeling or thinking shall be primary or secondary, familiar or unfamiliar.[24]

But it is time to halt the multiplication of terms and to offer a diagram that will sum up what has been reached thus far. Following the suggestion of Chapter 1, the matter can be set forth as on the following page. Here a return is made to the device of representing the functions of the mind by the fingers of the hand, fingers which can be lengthened or shortened to show dominance or subordinance of the functions, arranged laterally to show their order. In Chapter 1, four fingers were used to represent the four principal functions of the mind. But here, two fingers will suffice, the longer of which with introverts will stand for the thinking function, with extraverts, for the feeling function. The quantitative relationship thus expressed between feeling and thinking will not vary as regards introvert and extravert in the different repetitions of the diagram. For the representation is not actual but theoretical, not the graph of a particular introvert or extravert, but the diagrammatic representation of all introverts with respect to extraverts, of all extraverts with respect to introverts. Although each individual will vary in the actual proportion of his thinking to his feeling function, introverts will always show a majority in comparison with extraverts, extraverts a minority in comparison with introverts. The diagram will also illustrate the conflict between feeling and thinking, a conflict that can radically occur only when a major function is in the secondary position, only when an introvert by the circumstances of his environment becomes a feeling personality,

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[24] The terms "familiar" and "unfamiliar" will be used in this study in a more limited sense than in the pages of Jung. In Jung, the words are practically synonymous with "conscious" and "unconscious." In this study they will mean no more than "primary" and "secondary"—familiar because "first used," unfamiliar because "second used."


FEELING INTROVERT
primary
secondary
minor
FEELING
THINKING
major
FEELING EXTRAVERT
primary
secondary
major
FEELING
THINKING
minor
major
THINKING
FEELING
minor
primary
secondary
THINKING INTROVERT
minor
THINKING
FEELING
major
primary
secondary
THINKING EXTRAVERT

Figure 4

or when an extravert by a similar accident becomes a thinking personality.

Of the two, the thinking extravert presents the conflict the more conspicuously. His major function is not only major in role but inherently the more active. Yet being in the second place, this major and more active function must accept existence upon the terms of the minor and less active function. The thinking extravert's feelings can express themselves only by means of the thinking idiom. They must find their outlet not in feeling but in thinking things. And this, of course, in maturity is a more difficult matter than in childhood when the individual first becomes a thinking personality, and when his emotions have not yet attained their full vigor.

For good or for ill, the personality of the mature thinking extravert resembles a stream that is obstructed by a dam. From beneath the dam the stream now issues forth, shrunk in size but increased in velocity, its current accelerated in direct proportion to the narrowing of its outlet. Yet the energy in store behind the dam is not to be broached by new and other outlets. New and other outlets will diminish, not increase, the stream's effectiveness. Once the dam has been erected, the stream's usefulness can be encompassed only by confining its energies to the permitted outlet. Adjustment for the personality will lie, not in expressing its feelings directly, but in expressing its feelings by means of its thoughts.

On the surface of it, the figure is not so applicable to the feeling introvert as to the thinking extravert. With the feeling introvert, the inhibited function is not the more active function but the less active function. It is thinking that is restrained by feeling, rather than feeling that is restrained by thought. However, when looked at from the point of view of the function which is restrained (which is surely the way in which to look at it), the figure still holds. if to a less striking degree. As with the thinking extravert, there is a greater intensity to the inhibited function than easy flow. The feeling introvert's thinking is more brilliant than sustained. He thinks in flashes rather than by patient reasoning. Even where, as in the famous *Critiques* of Kant, there are pages of the most laborious reasoning, it will always be found that this reasoning is in defense of a position previously and intuitively arrived at. The feeling introvert does not reach his position by thought; he defends it by thought.

But to return to the figure of the blocked stream, the increased brilliance and loss of easy flow is most noticeable when the inhibited function has not yet been harnessed, or when, in time of flood, the harnessing cannot accommodate the excess of energy. For, as with the hydroelectric plant at the base of the dam in real life, the harnessing, or adaptation, of the personality converts the brilliance and velocity into usefulness of a specialized kind. As already suggested, for feeling introverts this harnessing is a feeling adaptation, for thinking extraverts a thinking adaptation, and when the one individual is sure-footed and secure in the feeling world, the other in the thinking world, all is well and the blocking gives power as well as show.

There still remains to be considered the type of personality in which primary and major function coincide, in which the first of the central functions is also the chief of the central functions. For these personalities the figure of the obstructed stream is not suitable. For them, the comparison is rather of a navigable river. One may say with justification that thinking introverts and feeling extraverts are like the more prosaic streams of the earth, the rivers bearing the trade and commerce of the world. Their broad major functions, out to the fore, sweep along without obstruction. In their breadth and freedom from restriction, these functions carry the burden of the personality, and with the burden of the personality, the burdens of the world. This is not to say that with such personalities the secondary and minor function is not to be observed. If feeling, this minor function may be regarded as furnishing the current; if thought, as supplying the eddies and bends, and rendering the navigable river not so simple as on first sight it seems. Certainly it is true that navigable rivers vary in the velocity of their flow and in the complexities of their navigation. But their course is always smoother, their descent to the sea more gradual, and their human usefulness easier to encompass than is the case with those streams obstructed by dams or falls.

And this is true not only of thinking introverts, those personalities who think first as well as most of the time, but of feeling extraverts, those personalities who feel first as well as most of the time. Feeling extraverts and thinking introverts alike find the utilization of their powers easier to come by than thinking extraverts or feeling introverts. Here, among the thinking introverts, are to be found those unromantic, linear-minded scientists upon whose thinking so much of the modern world has been built; here, among the feeling extraverts, are to be found those workaday citizens who with their feelings and their labor have built the world. Perhaps indeed the more vital spark comes from the inhibited personalities; perhaps the world could scarcely function on the unaided efforts of the concordant, uninhibited kind. But the truth of the matter is that both are necessary.

The discussion thus returns to that Aristotelian duality that is life as we know it. Both form and matter are necessary for a work of art (and all specific things), both empirical and rational thinking for a true philosophy, both reason and feeling for all human beings. One cannot conceive of the world without thinkers and feelers, without extraverts and introverts, indeed without any or all of their various combinations. The question as to which is better is surely that last sink of the controversial intellect beyond which it cannot go in its descent from the worth while to the ridiculous. This particular study, it is to be hoped, is both empirical and deductive, practical and theoretical, scientific and artistic, and although now one type, and now another, may be emphasized in the course of the discussion, this is not to abrogate the philosophic credo of these pages that it takes all kinds to make a world.

6

EXTRAVERSION AND INTROVERSION (continued)

1. Introduction

IN Chapter 4, it will be remembered, a first and largely descriptive survey of the extraverted and introverted types of mind was attempted. Although it was granted that no two individuals ever were or ever will be alike, the discussion proceeded in practical fashion to discriminate between two sorts of human being, dividing these two sorts into two more, so that this first consideration resulted in four general types—objective and subjective introverts, objective and subjective extraverts. These four types were described and differentiated.

But the chapter on thinking and feeling personalities has divided this classification yet again. For the earlier separation of individuals into introverts and extraverts that were objective and subjective was perfectly general, which means that these four types may now be either thinking or feeling personalities. Henceforth it will be necessary to work with eight types: with objective and subjective introverts that may be thinking or feeling personalities, with objective and subjective extraverts that may equally be thinking or feeling personalities.

Of course, were one minded to include mood-cycle as well, there would be even further types. For not only are there three essential cycles; there are also a number of hybridizations between them—so that the above eight types would be multiplied, not merely to twenty-four, but to several times twenty-four when one took into account the mixed as well as the pure cycles. Needless to say, this would be to exceed the limits of practical comprehension. In psychology there must be a mean between refusing to categorize at all and creating a type for every individual. In life, one does not throw his hat into a corner of the vestibule; neither does he drive a nail into the wall each time he wishes to hang it up. It is not otherwise in psychology. Between the extremes lies the mean of ordinary practicality, the mean that gives a person a rack on which to hang his hats, yet a rack of sufficient capacity so that he hangs coats as well as hats upon the given hooks rather than screw in new ones.

To speak merely from practical experience, the above eight types would seem to furnish such a hatrack. Nor is this surprising, for the eight types are the consequence of three simple, rational distinctions, and stop short of the complexity of empirical differentia. Thus when it comes to the distinctions of mood-cycle, it is natural that it should be easier to describe than to differentiate, to work with the individual rather than with the type. The varieties of emotional endowment are as manifold as the degrees and kinds of intelligence, and after a person has been differentiated two or three times it is surely the wisest thing to come at once to his individuality as a particular human being. The above eight types are means, not ends. Their function is strictly utilitarian, and their usefulness, like the usefulness of the telescope, is to carry one seven-eighths of the way toward his object. Once a personality has been classified, he can really be viewed as an individual.

The division of introverts and extraverts into thinkers and feelers, into subjective and objective personalities, must be regarded as sufficient for practical purposes. The arrangement of personalities at the end of the preceding chapter need only be doubled, the less usual objective and subjective personalities of Chapter 4 being added to top and bottom to represent all eight types. The new arrangement would thus be that of the following page.

It is to be hoped, however, that by this time some fault has been found with the above use of the words "objective" and "subjective." It was all very well in Chapter 4, when the subject was being introduced, to refer to those introverts who had abandoned their world for that of the extravert as "objective." It was equally well to speak of those extraverts who had given up the outer world for the inner as "subjective." But now, after the discussion of the preceding chapter, it is clear that the functions and their values are opposed in subjectivity and objectivity. It is evident that there must be some redefinition of terms.

The feeling introvert, for instance, because of the internality both of his major function and of his feeling values, is clearly subjective. But the thinking introvert, although likewise subjective in his major function, is objective in his values and distinctions. Other things being equal, he will be more objective than the feeling introvert. Yet this is not the distinction that was entertained in Chapter 4. Even the thinking introvert who spends all his waking moments studying the spectrum or the paramecia, the thinking introvert without a crotchet of individuality, without a

less usual,
Objective
Feeling
Introvert

less usual,
Subjective
Feeling
Extravert

more usual,
Subjective
Feeling
Introvert

more usual,
Objective
Feeling
Extravert

more usual,
Subjective
Thinking
Introvert

more usual,
Objective
Thinking
Extravert

less usual,
Objective
Thinking
Introvert

less usual,
Subjective
Thinking
Extravert

Introvert and Extravert

Figure 5

subjective whim or caprice, in his scientific nature, even he is not the type of personality that was described, chapter before last. In the very preoccupation with which he *studies* the spectrum or the paramecia, he fulfills the specifications of the undistorted introvert. Undoubtedly as between him and the introvert taken up with more subjective matters the word "objective" should be used. But in Chapter 4 a type of introvert was described who not only is preoccupied with the outside world but attempts to live in that world. Such an individual appears to be driven out from his own world, to be withheld from being himself. His distortion of personality seems to be the result, not of temperament or of values or of professional absorption, but of a power stronger than any or all of these. In the case of Mr. W.M., the New York lawyer of Chapter 4, it was a force disrupting his college days, thwarting his professional career, and manifest even in his leisure moments. For such a force one must employ a term of force. One must use the word *objectivation,* not refer to the phenomenon merely as one of "objectivity." For although such a scientist as instanced above seems not to have a soul of his own, nevertheless there is no turning out, or distortion, of his personality. He follows the profession of his choosing, and growing absorbed in it, becomes objective. But he remains no less introverted. Mr. W.M., on the contrary, tried to be an extravert, and to many seemed to have become just that.

In like manner, one cannot speak of the force causing an extravert to abandon his own world for that of the introvert as mere subjectivity. The difficulties of Mrs. O.M.R. in Chapter 4 came from something stronger than any subjectivity of values or of function. Mrs. O.M.R., as it happens, was a thinking extravert, a thinking extravert who in attempting to think about the inner world unwittingly blocked her major function from expressing itself at all. In fact the strong force causing Mrs. O.M.R. to reject the world of her birthright kept her from thinking even about her acts, which are in a measure external things. Mrs. O.M.R. endeavored by direct introspection to examine the heart of her personality, with the result that her major (but secondary) function could find no outlet, and that even her minor and primary function, instead of discovering real grounds for thought, could only dwell upon her sense of inadequacy and frustration. It took not long for the vicious spiral to complete itself. The more Mrs. O.M.R. thought about herself, the more she became depressed. True, Mrs. O.M.R. recovered. But her recovery, it will be remembered, came when she abandoned the inner world she was lost in for the outer world she was born to be at home in.

Yet although she recovered from her depression, and indeed was never again subject to it for any length of time, Mrs. O.M.R. did not attain the objectivity of the undistorted extravert. Even in her re-appraisal of the external world, the consciousness of things personal was always present. Her values never became those completely of impersonal thought. For the distortion she had been subject to, the turning-in of personality that from henceforth will be spoken of as *subjectivation,* is such a fundamental force that the subjectivated personality never quite overcomes its effect. The personality can accomplish a secondary adjustment, and return to the world it never should have left. It can learn to function largely as a straight thinking or feeling extravert. But it remains subjective at least in point of view. The scars of the subjectivation are never lost, although the wounds heal perfectly.

Indeed the difference between Mrs. O.M.R. before and after her breakdown brings out the difference between simple subjectivity and subjectivation. For the friend who helped her did not abandon what he had begun, but in after months aroused her interest in the study of several subjects as hobbies. These studies were objective in their subject matter, but because studies, subjective in their function, and because hobbies, subjective in their appeal. With the insight of many persons devoid of technical training, the friend knew that he must give Mrs. O.M.R. support in the world he had brought her back to, in particular, that he must support the subjective side of her nature. In her secondary adjustment, Mrs. O.M.R. approached the norm of the subjective but undistorted thinking extravert, the thinking extravert who while conscious of the inner world, brings that world to bear upon the outer world and does not attempt to live in it. Mrs. O.M.R. remained as intuitive as ever. Although still the life of the parties she attended, she was less often their organizer. She was a better wife than social worker (although she was both), a better mother than possible member of the school board (a candidacy for which she had the good sense to refuse). In short, although approximating the thinking extravert in her secondary adjustment, she functioned, not as the more usual objective type, but as the less usual subjective type. The branch that had been bent to breaking was propped in time, and almost straightened; but it never became completely straight. It was not possible to obliterate all signs of what had been before. Still, all who knew Mrs. O.M.R. would have agreed that her personality did not lose by the interesting subjective quirk in it.

Thus, to return to the eightfold conception of human personality, the first step will be, not to strike out the old terms, but to add on the new. For the old are not wrong;

they merely do not go far enough. Objective introverts are less usual than subjective introverts, subjective extraverts less usual than objective extraverts; but these distinctions are as nothing in comparison with those created by the objectivated and subjectivated personalities which, in their greater deviation from the normal, must now be placed at the end. So distinct are these latter personalities that even in secondary adjustment they do not become like the simpler personalities in the middle. The net result may be the same, but the personalities themselves, because of the traces of past maladjustment, remain always a distinct type. These objectivated and subjectivated personalities can alone be regarded as distorted, and will alone be referred to as *end-types*. The other personalities, whether objective or subjective, introverted or extraverted, can be regarded as at least relatively simple, and hence be grouped together as the *center-types*.

This can be illustrated diagrammatically, as on the opposite page. Here the colors black and blue are used to represent the lesser differences between the center-types, the color red to indicate the greater difference between the center-types and the end-types. The shift from blue to red thus represents the all-important distinction between "straightness" and distortion of personality. Furthermore, introverts and extraverts may now be placed in two mutually divergent semicircles, each semicircle showing a movement away from the natural center of its type, and thus approaching psychopathy at the ends. The movement is the centrifugal movement of maladjustment, for, as already mentioned, the natural movement of life, whether of adjustment or of readjustment, is apparently, not away from, but toward the center. So basic, in fact, is the centripetal tendency of life that there are many who would question the existence of a centrifugal tendency at all. They would


Objectivated Feeling Introvert
Objective Feeling Introvert
Subjective Feeling Introvert
Subjective Thinking Introvert
Objective Thinking Introvert
Objectivated Thinking Introvert
Subjectivated Feeling Extravert
Subjective Feeling Extravert
Objective Feeling Extravert
Objective Thinking Extravert
Subjective Thinking Extravert
Subjectivated Thinking Extravert

Introvert and Extravert

Plate 4

find the implied movement of the accompanying diagram to be theoretic rather than real, the conceptualization, simply, of a lack of the centripetal tendency. According to them, maladjustment is not a positive tendency but the absence of a positive tendency, or, at best, an extraneous force withholding the individual from moving along the natural centripetal way of life. But whether the implied movement is real, or merely theoretical, the accompanying diagram is submitted as an attempt to render more concrete the classifications of the preceding pages.

As for the objective and subjective types in the center, it is clear that they will show a hundred variations, that the line between their objectivity and subjectivity cannot be a hard and fast one. Not only do the surroundings of children differ markedly in their emphasis upon the external and internal worlds, but it is doubtful if two individuals were ever born with exactly the same organic weighting toward these worlds. In the chapter on mood-cycle the bias was discussed which each of the basic cycles gives toward externality or internality, and it was made clear that hybrid cycles are to be reckoned with as well as pure cycles. Thus in practice one finds thinking and feeling introverts, thinking and feeling extraverts, with every manner of cyclic endowment, with every shade of environmental weighting toward the objective or subjective worlds, yet without a trace of objective or subjective distortion. There is the introvert who has been allowed to grow up too nearly as he pleased, who spells and pronounces words in his own way, in fact who does everything not according to the world's standards but according to his own. He is functionally too subjective, and must adjust to life by becoming more objective. There is also the introvert who without the least distortion of personality is intolerably objective, and without the individuality that is asked of all human beings.

One thinks furthermore of the extravert who belongs to the passing show far more than to himself or to his family, of the Rip Van Winkles who find it easier to mend their neighbors' fences than their own. One thinks also of the extravert who without being either introspective or sentimental yet understands each intricacy of the human heart. Indeed every influence of the early environment is to be seen in the mature personality, every trace of the individual's organic endowment. Yet unless there is evidence of the turning-out or turning-in that may be described as objectivation or subjectivation, it is the position of this study that there is not an adequate cause for the creation of a separate type. There thus remain but objectivated and subjectivated types at the ends, and simple thinking and feeling types in the center. The objective and subjective variants of these central types drop out, and one is left with four adjusted types at the center, with four maladjusted, or readjusted, types at the ends.

These particular eight types may be regarded as definitive for the remainder of this study. Even the pathologic and subpathologic personalities to be examined on a later page will be found, in the main, to be but outgrowths of the end-types already specified. There will be the same order and relation of the functions; there will be the same basic characteristics distinguishing the personality. Indeed, the further description of these eight types will account for the greater part of the succeeding pages. For the discussion will not move away from them, but remain with them, characterizing and recharacterizing them according to this or to that criterion, seeking with each characterization a greater and more mutually exclusive reality. During the rest of this study it will be convenient, also, to employ the simple, rectilinear arrangement of the eight types which is given on the opposite page.

Objectivated
Feeling
Introvert

Subjectivated
Feeling
Extravert

Feeling
Introvert

Feeling
Extravert

Thinking
Introvert

Thinking
Extravert

Objectivated
Thinking
Introvert

Subjectivated
Thinking
Extravert

The Eight Types
Figure 6

There remains, however, one final task to be completed before the forces of objectivation and subjectivation can be looked at more narrowly by themselves, and the main body of the chapter undertaken. This is to provide the end-types with shorter and more graphic names. For it will be convenient to have a set of alternates, and since the business is one merely of providing names for what is already understood, it will pay not to be too methodical, but to call each end-type by whatever term comes readiest and most concretely to mind. Let the objectivated feeling introvert be spoken of as the *emotional introvert,* for the type seems often to be the most emotional of all, and let the objectivated thinking introvert also be referred to as the *abstract introvert.* For here, too, to know the type is to be impressed by the haze of abstraction that frequently seems to separate it from the concrete reality of the earth. Finally, let the subjectivated feeling extravert be called the *sentimental extravert,* and the subjectivated thinking extravert be termed the *introspective extravert.* Perhaps in these latter cases the chief weakness of the personality has caught the eye rather than the dominant characteristic, but the names fit, and lodge easily in the memory, and will serve as well as other captions. Thus on the opposite page is presented a final, simplified, and alternate schema of the eight types—a schema, however, that is identical with the preceding one, and in no respect to be regarded as different.

Emotional Introvert	Sentimental Extravert
Feeling Introvert	Feeling Extravert
Thinking Introvert	Thinking Extravert
Abstract Introvert	Introspective Extravert

The Eight Types
Figure 7

2. Objectivation and Subjectivation

What is this force, then, which produces eight types instead of four, which so stamps the individual that he never quite outgrows its marking? Its effect has been described, but its nature has not been disclosed.

That it is a single force seems inescapable. For whether it is referred to as objectivation or as subjectivation, it still remains a power estranging the individual from the realm of his birthright, a power causing him to seek recognition and success in a world different from his own. Surely it is clear that the terms "objectivation" and "subjectivation" represent but discriminated aspects of the same thing, that they are distinguishable only as regards the individual introvert or extravert to whom they apply.

Dramatically, there should be some new and hitherto undiscussed agency to reveal as this force of subjectivation and objectivation. After so much buildup, and the implication that half the ensuing study will be based upon this agency (since it accounts for four of the eight types), there should be something equal in novelty to the preparation. However, it is highly unlikely that any force so basic as is here presupposed should have gone all these years without discovery, and the force of subjectivation and objectivation would appear to be none other than the feeling of inferiority taken in the most inclusive possible sense. Indeed, it is chiefly necessary that the meaning be taken inclusively enough. The inferiority reaction as it is more narrowly and commonly understood will be the subject matter of another section of this chapter. The present discussion will deal, not with such obvious reactions as those produced by shortness of stature or lowness of social origins, but with those deeper states of the feeling frequently not recognized even by the individuals who possess them.

Empirically, to observe the objectivated and subjectivated is to be reminded again and again that the force lies deeply within. Far from being the rule, external handicap is no more common with the end-type than with the center-type, and on the other hand, one finds the end-type occurring with amazing frequency where the individual has been given everything—health, wealth, and a happy home life. Indeed, any theory unable to explain the development of the end-type in the midst of the most favorable circumstances will be conceived only to be rejected upon the first pragmatic scrutiny. The germs of the distortion must often lie in a setup that appears favorable to every one but the individual concerned. In fact this very favorability may come close to being the spark that ignites the whole. Hence it will pay to turn again to that early, family environment in which were found the seeds of the distinction between thinking and feeling personalities.

C.B.D. affords a case in point. At eighteen, he is a youth to whom much has been given. His parents are but in their early forties, harmoniously married, and delighted in their strong, intelligent son. One might suppose too much delighted, but such is not the case, and the boy has furthermore been protected from the perils of only-childdom by the presence of an elder sister with whom he has always lived on the best of terms. Nor could his family spoil him with material things, for they are not affluent; indeed after a season or two at a summer camp it was imperative that he receive a junior counselorship to return at all. Yet on the other hand, the family's standard of living has never been in jeopardy. At eighteen, with the help of a scholarship, C.B.D. is finishing in his father's preparatory school, and next year will go on to his father's college.

But in spite of good looks and brains and a certain athletic ability and a favorable setup at home, C.B.D. is undeniably an end-type, undeniably an emotional introvert. His temperament is less stable than his mother's or his father's or his sister's, and is upset by non-essentials rather than by essentials. He has a tendency to misinterpret markers and signposts along the way for the goal at the end of the journey, and instead of sticking to a task with the persistence of the adjusted introvert, to become discouraged or over-sanguine by anticipation of failure or success. It is characteristic of his objectivation that the captaincy of a sport has been more within his grasp than the honor roll, although inherently he has more scholastic than athletic ability. And whereas the ordinary, undistorted introvert, even at an early age, shows a certain independence of the world's way, this is not so with C.B.D. His way of life has been taken whole-cloth from his parents. He makes the round of their conventional, suburban pleasures. Yet to judge from the complicating rebellious streak that he also manifests, his heart cannot be in them. He has no other scheme of life to make him militant, or to suggest a way of escape. He gets into trouble quite within the scheme received from his parents, carrying the pleasures of home and country club to excess in night club and dance hall. This his parents cannot understand. In their circle he seems at ease, and they know he has not been overdisciplined or suppressed.

At eighteen, to be sure, the boy's escapades are beginning to grow less frequent, to the relief of parents and of teachers. Yet he has attained no introverted poise, no long-range planning or patience. In spite of any appearance to the contrary, there is much unrest within him. Above all, he presents the essential paradox of his type: a sharp consciousness of the self with an allegiance to the goals and values of the world of the non-self. On the surface, C.B.D. is his parents' son, interested in sports, wishing to please them, sharing in their convivial pleasures. Yet much of his thinking, as his English themes show at school, is surprisingly subjective and autistic. That his secondary adjustment is under way is evident from the decreasing frequency of his rebellions. But it is far from complete, and will never be complete until C.B.D. has resolved the conflict of his personality and resolved it in the only place where for him it can be resolved—in his world, and not in that of his parents.

As must be clear by now, no mere survey of the externals of C.B.D.'s life will account for the distortion of his personality. This is to be explained only by an examination of that family environment from which C.B.D. received the feeling cast of his personality in the first place. And here one notes that mother and father and sister are alike feeling extraverts, and that the mother, who is the most gifted member of the family, is particularly responsive and engaging. The son is especially fond of his mother, and admires nearly everything about her. To see the two of them together is to observe not so much her affection for him as his affection and stark admiration for her. Yet this admiration is not without its drop of bitterness. The son cannot equal his mother's responsiveness and attractiveness. He cannot go out to people with the immediate warmth and understanding that his mother possesses, and if he does, he finds that he does not then have what his mother has to give. His mother is to him the almost perfect personality; yet he perceives that he lacks the necessary warmth, or vitality, or whatever it is, to be like her. He fears he will not measure up to his mother's expectations of him. He has accepted her values, but he has not her personality. And at present he does not know what to do about it.

The case of C.B.D. by itself would mean nothing. But the observation upon which this study is based includes many C.B.D.'s. In some instances it is the warm-hearted, responsive father whom the son would like to equal; in others, it is the attractive outgoing mother whom the daughter admires beyond words. In fact there are so many C.B.D.'s in the records of this study that it can be stated almost as a formula that the introverted child whose parents are feeling extraverts will develop into an emotional introvert. Many times but one parent of the sort is necessary, and in any event it must be remembered that love and admiration on the child's part are aids rather than deterrents in the formation of the end-type.

However, when one turns to the counterpart of the emotional introvert, to the subjectivated feeling, or sentimental, extravert, it is clear that one must look for factors other than mere difference in type. In the first place, an introvert, being the less active personality, would be unlikely to arouse the above feelings of inferiority in an extravert; in the second place, it would seem that the situation of an extraverted child with introverted parents occurs only in cases of adoption or of second marriage. The records of this study are without an instance of an extraverted child both of whose real parents were introverts. Thus the problem, as regards type, is apparently unilateral. Apparently, only an introverted child may be made into an end-type by parents of the opposite general type. An extraverted child who betrays the distortion of the end-type will show an extraverted parent or brother or sister who has set the standard by which he has evaluated himself. Yet here, although difference in type is inoperative, much the same setup will be observed as with C.B.D. A son, although a feeling personality and an extravert like his father, will perceive that he is neither so aggressive nor so clever as his father and despair of being like him. A daughter, although basically a feeling extravert like her mother or her sister, will note that she is inferior in social initiative and social charm, and, giving up, *turn in rather than out.*

It is here that mood-cycle and the predisposition that it gives enters the picture. In the reshuffle of physical and psychic characters that a new birth entails, there is no more than an even chance that a child will inherit the same emotional factors as his parents. A son will prove less competitive than his father, a daughter less social than her mother. Above all, there will emerge from time to time temperaments of the joy-depressoid complex where the parents seem to be without this coloring.

This suggests one of the most interesting case histories of this study, that of Mr. and Mrs. S.M. and their five children.

Undoubtedly the striking thing about the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. S.M. was the remarkable physical resemblance between them. Probably it was what had brought them together in the first place, since, as the event proved, they had little in common beyond it. Nevertheless, in its obvious resolution of latent characters, this physical affinity produced in many of their children a temperament quite different from their own. Mrs. S.M. was a tall, vigorous thinking extravert, with very little of the woman about her, either in physique or in emotionality. Mr. S.M., on the other hand, although as tall and as vigorous and as anger-convivial as his wife, was a feeling extravert, and softer, as feeling extraverts are always softer than thinking extraverts. His wife was by all odds the dominant partner of their marriage, and indeed, shortly after the birth of their fifth child, Mr. S.M., being unable any longer to bear his subordination (and the neglect of the feeling values), left the family never to return. He fades from the picture, and from henceforth the interest of this study is in Mrs. S.M. and the five children that she brought up and supported.

Far from being a misfortune, the defection of Mrs. S.M.'s husband proved to be the release of her abilities. First she plunged into the credit-clearing business, then into real estate, and finally into an independent venture of her own, a small retail store, that having grown and grown is now the chief source of income of the family. But let it not be supposed that the mere support of her family absorbed the energies of Mrs. S.M. There was energy, and abundant energy, left over for dietary schemes and for free thought, for politics and for local affairs, for the education and upbringing of her children, even for making their clothes. In fact it would have been better for the children if Mrs. S.M. had had less energy to expend upon them.

For not content with unconsciously offering them a goal which few of them could hope to attain, Mrs. S.M. undertook to spur them on. She exhorted and admonished them. Mrs. S.M. suffered from the fault of many thinking extraverts, the tendency to projectize one's children. In particular, the success of her schemes and enterprises in the business world seemed only to whet her desire to scheme and plan for her children, and indeed gave to her proposals an unanswerable validity in the children's eyes.

It will be worth while, then, to look at the effect of Mrs. S.M.'s personality upon the five children. The first two were girls, the elder an introvert, the younger an extravert, both of whom became end-types, the elder becoming an objectivated thinking introvert, the younger, a subjectivated thinking extravert. The first daughter, it is true, inherited largely her mother's emotional coloring. But being an introvert she could not equal her mother in availability of emotion. She had as much energy, but in her essential subjectivity she begged to be allowed to grow up rather than be brought up, to be permitted to think things out in her slow way rather than in her mother's fast way. The unfulfilled desire of her childhood was simply to be let alone. Yet she could not help admiring her splendid mother. Coupled with her resistance to her mother (and indeed stronger than it) was the desire, doomed to defeat, to equal her mother, and today she much resembles her mother, although without her mother's effectiveness. She has her mother's excitement over ideas. But she does not have her mother's control over ideas, her mother's knack for putting them into practice and accomplishment.

As for the second daughter, although an extravert like the mother and in this respect able to be the mother's peer, the second daughter received a cycle almost totally different. Largely joy-depressoid, she had an instinctive predilection for the life of the mind *per se,* and between her and her mother there developed a conflict almost as strong as the conflict between her mother and her older sister. Mrs. S.M. had not an ounce of subjectivity in her makeup. Common sense was her rule and practicality her touchstone. Her dabbling in agnosticism was purely in reaction to the sentimentality of most of the women around her, and she took care of her children's health as she took care of her property. Seldom, if ever, did she read anything that might be described as *belles lettres,* and that her children should be interested in history or literature or art as ends in themselves seemed to her a great waste of time and energy. Consequently the second daughter, too, ran into inevitable conflict with her mother, and being unable to be either like her mother or like herself, became a subjectivated thinking, or introspective, extravert, *with the confusion between the self and the non-self which is the connotation of this, as well as of its chiastic similar, the emotionally introverted, type.*

The third and fourth children, however, grew up without distortion of personality. A boy and a girl, respectively, they enjoyed the incomparable advantages of middle place in the family. Both were extraverts, and the boy, who inherited a cyclic endowment concordant with his type, became, like his younger sister, a straight thinking extravert.

Still, one is led to believe that the freedom of these two children from distortion came, not from constitutional factors, but from their position in the family. For the daughter did not inherit her mother's anger-convivial cycle (which in its externality is sympathetic with thinking extraversion), but showed the more usual feminine pattern of hope-fear in ascendance and anger-conviviality in abeyance. Yet in spite of the predisposition that this coloring gives toward subjectivity, even toward passivity, this third daughter betrayed not the least sign of subjectivation. For the two elder children bore the brunt of their mother's energy, and were, so to speak, the spearhead of the children's resistance, while the two middle children, being neither so much projectized by their mother nor so prone to view their shortcomings in the light of their mother's ambitions and accomplishments, remained in comparative freedom to develop by themselves.

But the youngest child, an introverted boy, was in his turn withheld from becoming a center-type. Becoming a thinking personality (something he could not very well avoid in this thinking family) , he developed into the objectivated variety of it, differing from his eldest sister only in sex and in a greater joy-depressoid cast to his personality. For if his two eldest sisters bore the brunt of their mother's attack, he bore the end of it, and, as need scarcely be said, had something all of his own to bear from his extraverted sisters and brother. Although the most loved child in the family, and in his turn intensely fond both of his mother and of his next-to-oldest sister, he could not call his soul his own, and to be alone would frequently lock himself in his room for hours at a time.

And yet, this case history must be concluded on the theme of the preceding one. For the amazing thing about this family is the love and admiration which still persist for the mother, which indeed have never wavered. As mature personalities, three of the children are engaged in the last and most successful of the mother's enterprises, and the family hangs together as one would not expect where in the growing-up years there was so much stress and strain, and where, as a result, three of the children became end-types with all the problems of secondary and conscious adjustment that this entails. And Mrs. S.M. is still the center of the family, the bond that binds them all together, the splendid personality that all of them, consciously or unconsciously, would like to resemble more than they do.

One could multiply instances at will. The child who finds himself deficient in comparison with those whom he loves and admires is not rare and never will be. Yet there must be a limit to the amount of illustrative material in a study where the theory is the main thing, not the research upon which that theory is based. The number of case histories could be multiplied, but it is doubtful if they would further clarify the theory of the end-type. As suggested, it is frequently a gifted brother or sister who brings the situation about, rather than a father or a mother. And the instances where the provoking object is not an individual at all, but simply a bad environment or a personal handicap—these instances are too numerous to mention. The two histories given illustrate the contingency in which alone there would appear to be some subtlety, the contingency in which the circumstances are favorable, or very nearly so. If the end-type can occur here, it can occur anywhere.

The significant thing is that the situation which produces the end-type is always woven into the texture of the individual's life. It is not a question of something in particular which the individual cannot do, or of an occasional, even a recurrent, situation in which he finds himself at a disadvantage. It is a question of a situation from which there is no relief. The individual cannot get away from his inferiority. It surrounds him on every side, and he can only wish with all his heart that it were otherwise. Thus the distorting force springs largely from the individual himself, as he perceives that he is not the person he would like to be, as he attempts to be some one that he cannot be. A personality is not *drawn out* so much as he *turns out;* he is not *driven in* so much as he *turns in.* Objectivation and subjectivation are not extraneous, largely external influences, but forces that to no small extent arise within the individual himself. Whether the individual is extraverted or introverted, a feeling or a thinking personality, essentially it takes the inner feeling of inferiority to make him other than he is. And this inner feeling which is of so much power comes, not from a passing recognition of inferiority, but from a continuing recognition of inferiority. In the case of the end-type, the individual's dissatisfaction with himself is persistent and profound.

3. The Four Types of Early Environment

If subjectivation and objectivation are thus largely internal forces, it is clear that there can be but four general types of early environment. In spite of the eight types of personality, there are evidently but four types of family environment from which these eight types spring: the subjective feeling, the subjective thinking, the objective feeling, and the objective thinking environment. Thus irrespective of the individual's constitutional endowment, and of whether or not he is destined to experience the inferiority feelings that bring about distortion, the family surroundings into which he can be born would appear, from a psychologic point of view, to be relatively simple. A quick empiric glance discloses them on every hand.

Subjective Feeling Environment: The subjective feeling environment is set by the feeling introvert and the sentimental extravert. Although feeling is still an external function of internal things, in this environment the emphasis falls on the things rather than on the function. Never a uniform business in any event, the emphasis on function or on base here shifts in an internal direction. The result is that in this environment an indwelling upon the emotions is more to be remarked than their expression in outward activity. In this environment, feeling is not so much uttered as recognized, and the child is made to feel his parents' love rather than to witness it. He finds that family loyalty and a consideration for one another is important, that the unwritten (and unexampled) code of things is very strong.

Not surprisingly, the environment is seen more healthfully when set by the introvert. As previously explained, the feeling cast of personality is largely a matter of internalities, its values and its distinctions lying within the personality. Thus the feeling introvert, who is subjective by nature, that is, by virtue of his major thinking function[25]—the feeling introvert has the benefit of as much subjectivity as he desires. Although the feeling idiom of his personality gives priority, not to his major, but to his minor function, and although his major function is thus withheld from straight, out-and-out growth, and mushrooms to the side, nevertheless it attains full stature. The feeling introvert, although provided with emotional things to think about, and although thinking by flashes rather than by due process of thought, can still think to his heart's content. Growing laterally, if not linearly, his thinking function attains full majority. In consequence, the feeling introvert shows a marked evenness and proportion of personality. Thought is dominant (if unfamiliar), and emotion is not allowed to run away with the personality. Emotion must operate in the presence of a function greater than itself, a function that by its very lateral form is the more able to control it.[26] Hence emotion comes to exist in its adapted form, *as feeling rather than as emotion.* This in combination with the unimpeded, if deflected, growth of the major function, gives what is probably the most even, temperamentally, of all types. Evenness of disposition and a quiet sense of well-being indeed characterize the feeling introvert, and hence the environment which he sets for his children. When both parents are feeling introverts (as is not infrequently the case), it is likely that the children also will be feeling introverts, and that the family will be remarkable for the harmony it exhibits when together.

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[25] See above, pp. 112-113.

[26] The "control" that thinking may exercise over feeling is not to be understood in an active sense. Thinking is a reflective, not an active, function. If the feeling introvert's major thinking function is able to control his minor feeling function, it does so simply because in the time taken out to think, the consequences of emotion become not only clear but undesirable. As a result, the personality restrains his emotion so that it issues as feeling. In the form of feeling it may then be flexed here and there, moderated in and out, by an attention to its effect upon the exterior world.

The extraverted parent, however, who sets the subjective feeling environment for his children will be the sentimental extravert and will imbue the environment with some of his own imbalance of personality. For the sentimental extravert, in withdrawing from the exterior world, has denied his major feeling function its natural outlet, with the result that he frequently suffers from a development of tension. Furthermore his minor thinking function, which in its minority must in any event content itself with being merely the advisor of his major feeling function—his minor thinking function can offer advice only in accordance with his feelings and not in accordance with the accomplished act. Because of his very withdrawal from the world the sentimental extravert is without the adaptive check of action upon his emotions. Neither his thinking faculty nor the external act can serve as the corrective of his emotive faculty, which, as a consequence, remains unadapted, *and is found as emotion rather than as feeling.* Although unlinked with the habit of action, the sentimental extravert's emotions only too frequently run away with his personality, and the subjective feeling environment when set by him will be less harmonious than when set by the feeling introvert. There will be greater conflict, and more frequent emotional scenes, between parents and children. Still it must not be forgotten that this in itself cannot bring about a like development of the end-type in the child. As was pointed out in the preceding section, there must be factors more definite than this. The family environment, after all, is only the stage where the distortion of the child may or may not occur.

Subjective Thinking Environment: The subjective thinking environment is set more often by the thinking introvert, less often by the introspective extravert. With the thinking introvert, the indwelling that characterizes the subjective feeling environment becomes more purely intellectual, the personality's minor and now secondary feeling function being content with a preferential and selective role and his subjectivity being filled, not by a consciousness of his emotions, nor even by a consideration of the things which he holds dear, but more often by sheer impersonal reflection upon the objects of thought themselves. In the environment which the thinking introvert sets for his children, study is undertaken for its own sake, and nothing is enjoyed so much as a good problem. Indeed the outer world in this environment is not so much the recipient of the psychic life as the provider of it; in fact it occasionally comes to exist solely as the food for thought. The environment is, on the whole, one of detachment, and in consequence, it offers the setting in which thought reaches its fullest development. With its freedom from the immediate and the current, with its disregard for the comings and goings of mere routine existence, with the opportunity accordingly given for a recheck of the individual's recollections and intuitions, the subjective thinking environment, especially when set by the thinking introvert, allows more successfully than any other for true reflection. All the thinking processess flourish in it, and in particular it fosters the development of deductive thought.

The introspective extravert, however, who as well as the thinking introvert may set the subjective thinking environment for his children, does so within the limits of his own personality. In spite of the thinking values afforded by the idiom of his personality, in spite of the opportunity provided by his subjectivation for the exercise of thought, the introspective extravert finds reflection easier in the abstract than in practice. Notwithstanding thought idiom and subjectivity, his major feeling function presents a steady insistence upon expression and escape. It stands in fundamental opposition to contemplation. The need for emotional outlet is ever present and the result is, by and large, the most intuitive of types. For the intuitions of the personality (although meant to be subject to a further review) are pressed into service as the means of emotional escape, the personality receiving discharge as they liberate his emotions. Hence there is an insistence that ideas be put at once into speech or action. In other words the emotional function with the introspective extravert, being major and not minor, is not content to play the preferential and selective role that it plays with the thinking introvert but demands expression in its own right. Its concern is not for the world (which is largely cut off from it by the personality's subjectivation), nor for the minor (although primary) thinking function, but only for itself. It bursts out whenever possible, and when it can't, it waits until it can. Thus the introspective extravert, *like all the end-types,* remains unadapted in both major and minor functions. Neither the one nor the other is passed through the refining sieve of adaptation, the major function seeking outlet rather than union, and the minor function being arrested in the stage of *intuition rather than of thought.*

In fact it is clear that the essence of functional adaptation consists in a kind of functional review. The emotions of the feeling introvert, for instance, are reviewed and checked at the source. The explosive outbreak is restrained before it issues forth. Emotion, like the pruned and thinned apple tree, is not allowed to overbear itself one season and then lie fallow the next, but being subject to the review of the major thinking function, issues forth in the even flow of feeling. With the feeling extravert the same process obtains. Emotion is refined into feeling. But with the feeling extravert, since no predominating subjective function is present, the adaptive process depends principally upon the world. The world records its pleasure or displeasure, the personality noting the reception of its acts, and between the two, the emotive function is refined into a satisfactory means of rapport.

And so it is with the thinking function, which in its earlier stages consists of but the crude material of the memory and imagination. With the thinking introvert the major, thinking function, finding no countering force to bar its way, expands from the mnemonic and intuitive stages of unrefined thought to the adapted stage of true thinking. Its crude recollections and suggestions are compared and reviewed for a finer product. The minor function, playing a selective and preferential role, rejects all candidates until it finds the desired idea. Just as emotion, with the feeling introvert, is adapted subjectively, so thought, with the thinking introvert, is also refined within the mind of the personality. Although the thinking introvert may subscribe to the pragmatic credo, essentially he is satisfied with his own subjective examination. It does not appear that either Newton or our own Albert Einstein ever cared greatly for *corroborative* experiment. On the other hand William James, the great pragmatist, was clearly not a thinking introvert but a thinking extravert, and doubtless for this reason was more conscious of the external than of the internal check.

But with the introspective extravert, neither the subjective nor the objective check is present, no "further review" either of thinking or of feeling exists, and the type remains unadjusted both in major and in minor function.

Yet, as always, a mere lack of functional or of any other adjustment in the parent is insufficient to produce the same in the child. The introverted child, for instance, will find the subjective thinking environment, even when set by an introspectively extraverted parent, sympathetic in all respects and show the most normal of developments. And the extraverted child, *unless something interposes to make him lose confidence in the outer world of his birthright,* will take to that outer world as the bird takes to the air and receive only an enrichment from his exposure to the values and ideology of the subjective thinking environment. One must not lose sight of the need for *positive* distorting influence to bring about a development of the end-type in the child..

Objective Feeling Environment: The objective feeling environment is set for the developing child by the feeling extravert and the emotional introvert. It is more common than the subjective feeling environment, and is made so by the feeling extravert, of whose personality it is the direct and simple expression. Here outward activity takes the place of a consciousness of the emotions as such. Here the major emotive function of the extravert, free from the distorting influence of subjectivation, finds easy and effective outlet, and is shaped and refined into its adapted form by the outer world which always prefers feeling to emotion, blending to disruption. In the normal course of events the feeling extravert is disciplined by that outer world he wishes to be one with, his minor thinking function cooperating in the adjustment by marking the world's reception of the major function's acts, and by suggesting on the basis of this reception a mergence that is finer and finer. In other words, with the feeling extravert, the major function is not repressed, but is able freely to get out, and the minor function on the basis of the major function's acts is able to play its advisory and corrective role. The feeling extravert is a harmonious type, and the objective feeling environment when set by him will offer little in itself to disturb the growing child.

With the emotional introvert, however, the opposite of this obtains. The environment which he sets for his children, although the same in its essentials, lacks the harmony that it possesses when determined by the feeling extravert. For the personality of the emotional introvert is not without stress and strain within itself. As with all introverts, the major function of the emotional introvert is the thinking function. Yet this major thinking function must exist without the help of the thinking values, without the advantage of an unabashed subjectivity. The world in which the emotional introvert attempts to live is not the world even of the feeling values, but the outer world of the function of feeling, a world which denies the main tendency of his personality as effectively as the inner world of the thinking function denies the main tendency of the introspective extravert. True, the major thinking function of the emotional introvert can still employ itself in the advisory capacity that is its role with the feeling extravert. But for the emotional introvert this is not enough. His major function will seek to propose as well as to counsel. Above all, it will seek those off-moments when, free from the chain of external existence, it can meditate in its own right. To the emotional introvert comes the inevitable revulsion from a completely outer existence. The chain of external existence the emotional introvert will periodically throw off if only to reflect upon his own feelings and actions. In large part, this periodic revulsion is responsible for his characteristic instability. The emotional introvert is as uneven, temperamentally, as the feeling introvert is even. Unless the object of a thoroughgoing secondary adjustment (which can bring about a *conditioned* equanimity comparable to that of the feeling introvert), he remains moody and uncertain of where he stands. He will accordingly imbue the environment which he sets for his children with a disharmony similar to that of the sentimental extravert or introspective extravert.

Still, the imbalance that the emotional introvert brings into the child's environment will not of itself bring about a development of the end-type. More likely, it will produce merely a lack of discipline. As stated in the preceding section, it is difficult to imagine an introverted parent as the author of the distorting feelings of inferiority in an extraverted child, and if the feelings are aroused in an introverted child there must be factors other than mere instability on the parent's part. Sheer instability would, if anything, have the opposite effect. The child would be apt to look down upon the parent's temperamental displays, and react in a contrary direction. But of course, in his non-revulsory moods, the emotional introvert frequently reveals a magnificent power of accomplishment, a will to overcome all hindering obstacles. This might be the thing to arouse emulation (and perhaps despair) in the child or adolescent, and to this, one might look for explanation if it should be observed that an emotionally introverted parent has an emotionally introverted child.

Objective Thinking Environment: The objective thinking environment, which is set by the thinking extravert and the abstract introvert, may be described as the utilitarian. Here projects are more apt to be planned than theories to be conceived, and there is usually a great desire to put thought into action. In leisure moments (if there are leisure moments), intellectual games are preferred to sheer talk, and practical joking takes the place of wit. It is an environment where practicality and common sense are the watchwords, and although thought in its true, adapted form develops in this as well as in the subjective thinking environment, one notes that whether legal, political, scientific, or purely administrative, this thought is seldom far removed from the concrete realities of every-day life. Philosophically speaking, the environment fosters inductive rather than deductive thought.

The environment is set most commonly by the thinking extravert, and the above description of it has been colored by the greater energy which he gives to it. Although not so simple or forthright an expression of his extraverted personality as the objective feeling environment would be, nevertheless in its externality, the objective thinking environment gives to his major feeling function a satisfactory, if indirect, outlet in the exterior world. True, the idiom of the environment is that of his minor thinking function, and his emotional function, like the thinking function of the feeling introvert, must mushroom to the side, growing laterally rather than linearly. True, also, the possibility of internal conflict is ever present where the major function is in the secondary position. Yet this possibility of conflict is slight in comparison with the possibility of conflict in the end-type. The thinking cast may *deflect* the growth of the thinking extravert's major feeling function, but it does not *curtail* it, as does the force of subjectivation. Ordinarily, the objective world of the thinking extravert's schemes and projects gives ample scope for the exercise of his emotions and his feelings, and his emotive faculty attains to a full majority. As a consequence, the thinking extravert is at least relatively free of inner conflict, and although his personality by no means shows the harmony of that of the feeling introvert, his primary function is also permitted to develop in its adapted form, and appears *as thought rather than as intuition.*

Still, as with the feeling extravert, the real adaptive check is external, not internal. The subjective interval is lacking, and it is the world itself that must determine whether or not the personality's ideas are sound or unsound, his thinking logical or illogical. To be sure, the major function, like the minor function of the thinking introvert, will cooperate, choosing the idea or plan that seems most suitable. For unless the schemes of the minor function work out, the major function will fail of discharge. Thus the major function, with its sense of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, is ever on guard to select the correct response. But the thinking, the refinement of the intellectual material—this is achieved externally. The personality finds it easier to work with facts than with theories, he conceives by means of conference and conversation, he thinks by means of trial and error. The "further review" is quite different from that of the thinking introvert. Nevertheless there is a further review, and the thinking extravert is one of the two types in which may be found, *as a character trait,* the presence of adapted thought. The children of the thinking extravert are early made to believe in thought, and will see nothing but harmony in the reign of common sense and sound reason.

The abstract introvert, who as well as the thinking extravert sets before his children the objective thinking environment, fails to show an adapted thinking function. He may think in line of business. His profession may demand that he think or perish. Yet in off-moments he remains intuitive and visionary, frequently filled with schemes and projects, but seldom, if ever, elaborating these into successful accomplishment. His major thinking function is to the fore, incorporated into and blessed by the thinking environment. But the all-essential pause of subjectivity, the time-out that permits of thought, is not present. True, the thinking extravert also lacks the subjective pause of true reflection. But in the thinking extravert's case there is a great deal of desire. The thinking extravert cares so much about the world that he vigorously enters the world, and the world refines his thinking. The abstract introvert, although attempting to live in the extravert's world, lacks the major emotional function to make the attempt successful. His emotional function is minor, not major, and is not meant to play a powerful and sustaining role in his personality. The misfortune of his personality is that he is led into positions which he has not the emotion to maintain. Not only do his projects run away with his personality, but his personality lacks the power to make them real. They remain largely in the conceptual state, and one finds as a character trait that the abstract introvert is visionary and theoretical, often Utopian and crack-pot, and that he is unadapted both in major and minor function.

His children, however, will have largely the same values set before them as the children of the thinking extravert. Their parent speaks the language of thought and believes in thought. Like the thinking extravert, he finds this thought, not removed from the world, but present in the world. He thoroughly believes in the rationality of things. Thus unless other factors intervene, the extraverted child will simply turn more strenuously to making his thinking work out, the introverted child to discovering the error in his parent's unaccomplished schemes. On no account will the introverted child become himself objectivated unless some objectivating influence sets to work upon him, so that he gives up reviewing his thought (or his feeling) in the subjective world that is his birthright.

Conclusion: Surely it is clear by now that these four types of environment are not in themselves the producers of personality. They offer values and points of view and the terms of a vocabulary. They can alter the developing personality so that in maturity individuals, much the same as children, differ as day differs from night. Nevertheless the personality as a whole is not the result of environment alone, but of its influence upon the constitution with which one is born. Chief of the environmental influences will be the general thinking or feeling cast of one's surroundings, which indeed can often shape an individual to one type when naturally, if he had the least chance, he would become the other. The objectivity or subjectivity of an environment probably comes second, the individual frequently failing to respond in this respect unless with an organic weighting in its favor. As for the forces of objectivation and subjectivation, there is no need to repeat that these are individual in their occurrence, and in every case require a fresh start. Their presence in the parent does not imply their presence in the child. They spring from feelings of inferiority that are the result of the child's own experience, and although as strong a moulding force as any, they cannot be generalized into one sort or another of early environment.[27]

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27. Since this may be the last occasion of speaking of the child's early environment, it is perhaps worth while to point out again that often the parents of a child present *two* environments, between which the child must choose in selecting his cast of personality.

Usually, the term "environment" is employed to mean the entirety of a person's surroundings. Yet it may also be taken to mean the system of values which each individual parent projects around himself and into which the child must enter as he approaches that parent. From this point of view it is often necessary to speak of two environments. And indeed there is hardly a better way in which to describe those divided marriages where husband and wife have each a different set of values. Consider the case, by no means uncommon, in which one parent is a thinking introvert, the other a sentimental extravert. The two parents meet at meal times, they live in the same house, they go to the theater together. But on the plane of association, which is above the plane of propinquity, the line that separates them is as distinct as the line that separates the Labrador Current from the Gulf Stream. The mother (if it is the mother who is the sentimental extravert) has a system of values that has to do with the feelings—her feelings. The father believes in ideas and facts, and usually likes to live rationally. The values which the two parents project from themselves advance to meet each other, and then recoil. They do not mingle. And although the child may acquire individual values from both his parents, he must choose between them in the selection of his cast of personality, and in the great body of values which this cast means.

Indeed it is not unusual to find families where both parents are clearly end-types, yet where all the children show the most central of developments.

As a picturization of the factors that can be generalized, and as a summary of the preceding paragraphs, the diagram on the opposite page is presented. Here the double scale of the eight types is used as a basis, or hatrack, and upon it are arranged the above findings as regards environment. The more healthful and frequent of the two occurrences of an environment is set down in black, the less healthful and less common in red, and one notes that as always the more healthful occurrence is toward the center, the less healthful toward the end. The broken arrows (in red) that fail to cross from introvert to extravert, from extravert to introvert, call attention to the fact that the introvert can never attain the adjustment of the extravert, that the extravert can never attain the adjustment of the introvert. The solid arrows (in black) which pass from introvert to introvert, from extravert to extravert, indicate that adjustment (in this case, secondary adjustment) is always toward the center, that the way of health for the end-type lies in a re-approach toward the environment of its own general type. To be specific, for the emotional introvert the way of health lies, not in the direction of the feeling extravert no matter how much the latter may seem to present the ideal of life, but in the direction of the feeling introvert. For the abstract introvert, it is not the thinking extravert's world that holds a promise of success and happiness, but the world of the thinking introvert. For the sentimental extravert the way of health is the way of the feeling extravert, for the introspective extravert, the way of the thinking extravert. As always, the adaptive movement of life is centripetal, while movement away from the center, or toward the side, leads not to adaptation but to maladjustment.


Objective Feeling Environment
Subjective Feeling Environment
Subjective Feeling Environment
Objective Feeling Environment
Subjective Thinking Environment
Objective Thinking Environment
Objective Thinking Environment
Subjective Thinking Environment

The Four Environments

Plate 5

4. The Inferiority Reaction (terminology)

In the second section of this chapter the feeling of inferiority was brought forth as a cause of the development of the end-type. The experience of inferiority, however, can be a reaction as well as a feeling, a symptom as well as a cause. It can occur on the surface as well as in the depth, and in the manner of its expression be controlled by factors other and more fundamental than itself. Even where it is the cause of other reactions, and itself one of the chief shaping agencies of personality, it can take place in the same individual as a passing phase, separated from, and in its turn moulded by, the deeper state of the feeling.

The fact remains that although all types do not show the sense of inferiority as a determinant of personality, all types betray it, at least to some extent, as an effect. And it is as an effect, as one reaction among many, that this section will treat it.

Thus the purpose of this section, like that of the preceding section, is largely descriptive. The remaining sections of this chapter will also aim at clarification rather than at explanation. For the eight types have only been outlined. Not until they have been examined in the light of the inferiority reaction and of one or two further criteria will they be sufficiently defined to permit an advance to the more speculative chapters at the center of this study. Thus the feeling of inferiority as a shaper of personality will be neglected for the reaction of inferiority as a means of coming better to know the individual.

However, before entering the much-explored and much-popularized field of the inferiority reaction it is important that all terms be defined with unusual care. One cannot hope to embrace a tenth of what may be the implications of terms so widely used and so widely valuable. But one can make sure that what he does imply is distinctly stated, so that objection will be leveled not at what he omits but at what he says. To this end, the terminological diagram on the opposite page is submitted.

Perceptions of Inferiority: By beginning the diagram with the perceptions of inferiority rather than with the feelings they engender, the intellectual source of the reaction is specifically recognized. Without the intellect, without the comparative faculty as Pope called the intellect over two hundred years ago, there would be no inferiority feelings and no inferiority reactions at all. It is only because of the especial prominence of the feelings in every-day parlance that one needs to be thus explicit about the matter. For the intellectual nature of the reaction is carried in the very name. The term "inferior" is not an absolute one. It unavoidably implies a "superior" to which it is inferior. To say a thing is inferior means that it is inferior to something else, the comparative relationship of which is to be embraced only by the intellect.

Now it may be taken as empirically obvious that the perceptions of inferiority are of two basic kinds. They may be of the person's own perceiving, so to speak, or they may be of the environment's thrusting upon his view. In other words they may be more passively perceived, while the attention is in relative repose, or they may be more actively borne upon the attention, the distinction being much the same as between perceptions of a general and perceptions of a specific nature. Needless to say, the inferiority feelings arising from the general, quiescent comparison of oneself with one's fellows are less acute than those proceeding from the active, specific comparison.

Reactions of Inferiority: As for the reactions that are the final outcome of the perceptions of inferiority, once

Inferiority Perceptions

(leading
to)

Inferiority Feelings

(leading
to)

	Valid reaction	Negative reaction	Nonvalid reactions
General, long-range reactions	Compensation		Egocentricity
Specific, short-range reactions		Moodiness	Overcompensation

The Inferiority Reaction
Figure 8

again it would seem to be empirically obvious that there are certain distinctions to be made of a nature to embrace all kinds whatsoever. Obviously the reactions, as they correct the source of inferiority or leave it alone, may be of a valid or nonvalid sort. Furthermore it is clear that occasionally, even frequently, no reaction in the strict sense sets in at all and the personality takes out its sense of inferiority in depression and brooding. Hence there are not only valid and nonvalid varieties of reaction, but a third kind that may be described simply as negative. Thus two kinds of positive reactions are to be understood, one kind of negative reaction.

Finally it is clear that there will be a difference in the sort of reaction that the very nature of the perception either precludes or admits. It has been remarked that the feelings of inferiority arising from a general comparison of oneself with one's fellows are less distressing than those arising from a specific comparison. It is now clear that the reaction, too, depends upon the immediacy or remoteness of the inferiority perception. The more general and remote the unfavorable comparison, the greater the opportunity for a constructive response, the more specific and incontestable the comparison, the more tentative and even futile will be the reply. Passivity and inconspicuousness in the perception of inferiority permit of a constructive answer. But conspicuousness or aggression in the source of observation cuts off a corrective reply in the beginning. Thus the last classification is of general, long-range reactions and of specific, short-range reactions.

Compensation: To come to the particular reactions themselves, probably the first of the four sorts, or that of compensation, needs but little explanation. There is, however, a slight terminological difficulty. Compensation in this study will be taken to mean equivalence for inferiority in the broadest sense. Yet some writers would call the compensating development of a psychic faculty to make up for organic defect, not compensation, but overcompensation. The deaf person who develops a gift for language, the weak-sighted individual who becomes a great painter, would thus be overcompensated. With this terminology it is difficult to agree. The linguistic or musical accomplishments of the deaf, the artistic or architectural achievements of the dim-sighted, are essentially no different from the rise to high position of the socially obscure or the compensating development in arms and thorax of the individual crippled in his legs. It is difficult to see what is to be gained by making a distinction in the kind of compensation. Any countering development, whether of mind or of body, whether to make up for psychic or for social or for organic defect, is as much compensation as any other kind, and in this study, compensation will be understood to mean such counterdevelopment in its very broadest sense.

In passing, one further observation must be made. Whatever else may be said of it, compensation takes time. It is anything but an immediate reaction. The child stricken with infantile paralysis and crippled in its legs will need half a dozen years at a moderate estimate to compensate in its shoulders and arms for the injury. The individual lifting himself from poverty and social obscurity to a position of prominence in the community may require twenty or thirty years before his compensation can be said to be complete. Even the compensating correction of a trifling bad habit is scarcely to be effected overnight. Thus in this study compensation will be taken to mean, not only a reaction resulting in genuine equivalence, but a reaction that is long-standing in its tenure, a reaction to the general rather than to the specific perception of inferiority. These will be the two chief criteria employed in working with this concept.

Egocentricity: As with compensation, so with egocentricity. By the latter term will be understood egocentric behavior in the widest possible sense. And the distinguishing mark of egocentricity will be taken to be the impression created upon the human environment. Egocentric behavior in its essence is behavior aimed at the impressionability of this environment. In the desire of the individual to better his inferior state the testimony of his fellows is of vital importance. He seeks the countering validity not in himself, nor primarily in achievement, but in the reactions of other persons. Specifically, there is always in the egocentric's behavior an attention to the effect of his actions. And this attention, which may be called the "egocentric checkup," is apparently inseparable from the desire to impress others in the first place.

However, it is not enough to define egocentricity and point out the egocentric checkup. The most casual observation will return the further information that there are in general two fundamental kinds. One notices a kind that may be spoken of as a "merging" egocentricity and a kind that may be called a "self-elevating" egocentricity. In the former, the individual desires to counteract the sense of his unimportance and obscurity simply by belonging, by being incorporated. Hence the pictures of ladies' organizations that adorn the society pages of the local Sunday newspaper. These pictures (which one may be sure are eagerly scanned by the principals) are the egocentric checkup in a most tangible sense, and the behavior is egocentric in being concerned with testimony rather than with accomplishment. From egocentricity of such a simple, incorporative nature one passes to behavior which, while still of the social, merging kind, has more reference to the self. Here the individual desires more than simple belonging, more than simple incorporation. He desires the esteem and the plaudits of others. He desires that prestige which some writers would make the sole criterion of egocentricity. Here the egocentric checkup is more marked than above. The individual wishes not only to *see* the impression his activity makes upon others, but to *hear* it put into words. Praise is essential to these egocentrics, and they wish not merely to be incorporated, but to be incorporated into the good graces of their audience.

This latter is what is left behind as one passes from the merging kind of egocentricity to the self-elevating kind. In the self-elevating kind, the prestige that is desired is no longer of a sanctioning, incorporating variety. The individual no longer cares about the good graces of his audience, but only about its testimony as to his superiority. In the self-elevating kind of egocentric behavior sooner or later appears an infiltration of antisocial emotion. The audience must not only bear witness to the individual's superiority, but be shocked by it. Into the individual's behavior creeps an element of contempt. As the individual becomes more hostile, the audience must be injured. Finally it must be conquered, and even destroyed.

Yet in all this range of behavior, from simple desires of incorporation to desires for commendation, from desires for prestige mixed with disdain to positive enmity toward society, the essential criterion remains. The impression upon the environment is all-important. It is the testimony of that impression that gives the individual his satisfaction. It is to secure this testimony that he checks up on his behavior.

But as with all these categories, there is a second criterion almost, if not quite, as important as the first. As with compensation, so with egocentricity. It is not a passing but a more or less permanent reaction. The egocentric in his various roles acts from long-settled motive rather than from immediate stimulus. Indeed this is quite understandable logically. For the specific, overwhelming experience of inferiority denies by the fact itself the egocentric response. If the situation appears dominant, if one's inferiority seems patent and thrust upon him, neither the commendation of the audience nor its submission is easily to be conceived or likely to be secured, and the egocentric display is cut off before it commences. Not only empirically, but rationally, one observes that a certain passive neutrality is a necessary basis for the egocentric reaction.

Compensation and Egocentricity: To summarize the foregoing remarks, then, upon the first two categories, one notes that in each case there are two criteria of chief importance. Egocentricity no less than compensation is of a long-standing, general nature. Yet although both reactions are the result of a pervading, relatively quiescent sense of inferiority, and although both reactions have thus the opportunity for a constructive response, it is only with compensation that achievement really counts. Achievement when it occurs with egocentricity is always a second product, never a first product, for, as explained, egocentric behavior is aimed primarily at the creation of an impression. Thus in the diagram, compensation and egocentricity are placed in different columns in that the one is genuine and substantial, the other essentially false and testimonial. Compensation and egocentricity are, however, ranked in the same row, as proceeding from general, long-range perceptions of inferiority.

Overcompensation: From egocentricity, it is a natural transition to overcompensation. For if the one is bound up with the impression created upon the environment, the other is no less bound up with the impression created upon the self. Overcompensation will be understood as behavior directed primarily toward self-impression.

In denominating this type of inferiority reaction as overcompensation, it is clear that the choice of term is not altogether a happy one. It has already been noted that the term has been employed by certain writers to designate the overdevelopment of a psychic faculty to make up for weakness in an allied part. This meaning was rejected as creating a useless distinction in what is essentially the same kind of behavior. Furthermore, although conveying a meaning not far removed from that of self-impression, the terms "defense mechanism" and "defense reaction" must be rejected as being too particular for the purposes of this discussion and perhaps too hopelessly associated with popular connotation. On the other hand, it would seem as if the term "overcompensation" carried a certain implied meaning all of its own. For in a way, overcompensation is *over*-compensation, the individual being, as it were, too impatient to wait for genuine compensation and, in his strong desire for counteraction, overshooting the mark and satisfying himself with the *impression* rather than with the fact of achievement. Lastly, it is well known that overcompensation may in time pass into genuine compensation. A soldier's courage, for instance, may start out by being purely overcompensatory, purely a "defense reaction," and yet in time, through sheer force of habit if for no other reason, become very genuine indeed.

The impression on the self may be taken as the chief touchstone of the overcompensatory reaction. The flat-chested, puny individual who, upon emerging on a public bathing beach, throws out his chest and pretends to be robust does so to solace his own feelings. He does not do so to impress his fellow bathers. Far from being concerned with them, and showing the usual egocentric attention to the effects of his pose, such a flat-chested individual, if anything, avoids looking at his spectators lest his illusion be shattered. His bluff is for himself. He avoids if possible the exposure of it.

The above instance is perhaps too commonplace. Yet just as it is impossible to see a fundamental difference between the largely physical compensation in shoulders and thorax for an injury to the legs and the more psychic, willed compensation for social and economic inferiority, so here it is difficult to see any important distinction between the behavior of the individual on the bathing beach and the most subtle and elaborately contrived devices to render one's sense of inferiority less painful to oneself. Between the little man who bustles about as if he were six feet tall and the sentimentalist with the most ingenious of excuses for his own shortcomings there is no essential difference. The effort of the overcompensatory is directed primarily toward the impression on the self, and although this may conceivably entail genuine benefit to the individual or community (just as the egocentric may render real service to win the praise he lives upon), nevertheless since in both cases the individual thinks more of *impression* than of *acutality,* both reactions in the diagram are classed as nonvalid rather than as valid.

Now quite as egocentric behavior was found to be divided between an objective, merging kind and a subjective, self-elevating kind, so here it is clear that the self-impression may also be of two different kinds: the individual may fit himself up with an objective sort of self-impression (such as imaginary friends, distinguished connections, or interesting experiences), and the self-impression may be of a more purely subjective variety. Of this latter sort, perhaps sheer empty pride is the most common. The individual to solace his feelings of inferiority simply assumes the air and manner of the superior. But both kinds are alike removed from egocentricity in that although the environment may call forth the feelings of inferiority, the environment is not necessary to fix them up. This the individual is capable of doing by himself.

Finally, as with the preceding categories, there is a second and last general criterion to develop. The overcompensatory reaction would appear to be as clearly the result of the immediate, specific experience of inferiority as egocentricity is the result of the long-established sense of it. Thus overcompensation cannot be classed as a settled behavior pattern. It is not apparent that the overcompensator keeps up his pose when the stimulus is removed. Life is short, and the pretense, in fact, would grow altogether too wearisome. Not infrequently, in environments where he feels thoroughly at home, the overcompensatory individual loses all trace of his defense reaction. On the other hand it is often to be observed that egocentrics, without the least provocation, go out in search of an audience, deliberately seeking the opportunity to display themselves. When face to face with an unsusceptible individual or situation, it also frequently happens that their display goes all to pieces, that the erstwhile consummate actor becomes awkward and ejaculatory in his expression.

This is to the contrary of the overcompensatory individual. The overcompensatory individual does not seek the opportunity of pose, he does not watch to see the results of his demonstration, and when his feelings of inferiority are not specifically called forth, the inferiority pattern of behavior may leave him completely. His inferiority reactions are aroused by the immediate and specific sense of his shortcoming. It is to the latter that he reacts, and he reacts then to please himself. This he can usually do, and for this reason his fictions fail him less frequently than is the case with the egocentric.

Moodiness: Fortunately, the last category of the inferiority reaction resembles the first in its simplicity. In being negative, that is, in leading to no positive response whether false or genuine, distorted or direct, moodiness is easier to understand and easier to mark in every-day life. It is as simple in its negation as compensation is simple in its positiveness. The person who reacts to his sense of inferiority in this way simply responds with his wretched feelings. He makes no effort at long-settled compensation; he does not try to impress others; he gives up the attempt to impress himself. He recognizes his inferiority and feels miserable about it.

In other words it is clear that with some persons the experience of inferiority is cut short in the emotional stage, that with them the unpleasant feelings of inferiority do not lead to coherent action at all. This conception of the matter explains why it is that the term "moodiness" is preferable to the term "depression" although the latter emotion is probably the most common reaction of the sort and the one that usually comes to mind when this type of inferiority reaction is being considered. The term "moodiness" is preferable because it is clear that if the individual's characteristic mood-swing is from conviviality to anger or from hope to fear, instead of from joy to depression, then he will show anger or fear when his experience of inferiority fails to advance beyond the emotional stage. To be sure, on account of the inherent nature of the emotions themselves, this will happen least often with anger, most often with depression. Nevertheless, individuals will not infrequently be observed who, instead of being depressed, are made angry or fearful by their consciousness of inferiority, and who yet do nothing about it. They do not seek the slow amelioration of compensation, nor do they care for the commendation of their fellows, nor do they attempt to cloak their wounded feelings. No matter how strong their feelings of anxiety or of anger because of their awareness of inferiority, they do not get around to constructive or even consistent response. Their actions, if any, are but the blind expression of their emotions. Their responses are those of sheer moodiness, and from the point of view of the other reactions must be classified as negative. More often the individual is a depressoid, and his reaction without subtlety at all.

There remains to be considered only the last of the criteria for the reaction of moodiness, and this terminological survey of the inferiority reaction will be complete. And here it seems, no less than with overcompensation, that the reaction is the result, not of the quiet, general sense of inferiority, but of the acute, particular experience of it. Discrepancies that are passively perceived, that are recognized rather than thrust upon one, are not so agonizing but what attempts at correction can be made. Furthermore since these discrepancies are of the individual's own perceiving, so to speak, it goes without saying that the environment is at least neutral to impression, at least neutral to his endeavoring to work out a compensation. But moodiness, like overcompensation, advenes when just these qualities of passivity and neutrality are lacking. The same kind of specific experience that with the one individual, or upon the one occasion, leads to overcompensation, at another time, or in a different individual, leads to discouragement and gloom. The fact of inferiority seems so overwhelming that the individual has no heart to set about taking months (or even years) to the improvement of the situation; the perception appears so irrefutable that he entertains no hopes of impressing either himself or his environment.

And so he desponds and broods—until the occasion passes and he turns to genuine compensation, or indeed, to the ordinary affairs of life.

Conclusion: As this terminological survey is brought to an end, it is to be hoped that the foregoing remarks have been taken for what they pretend to be and not for what they make no assumption of, that is, as conceptual and not as factual and definitive. Here perhaps more than anywhere else it is apparent that all human beings show all traits. What human being, for instance, can solemnly declare on his Bible oath that he has never in all his life showed off (or, in other words, been guilty of egocentric behavior)? What individual would dare to maintain that he has never in his life attempted to save his face (or, in other words, reacted overcompensatively)? What individual, to compensate for real or fancied inferiority, never set about a course of lessons—whether in the arts or in physical development? And what individual in the face of overwhelming superiority never felt completely defeated and discouraged? Not only do all human beings show all traits, but individuals show every grade of transition between them, and the traits themselves pass constantly into one another.

Yet in spite of the flux of concepts and the particularity of human beings, no one doubts that individual traits are characteristic of individual human beings. In other words, although all categories exist in all individuals, and although all categories shade into one another, it is nevertheless clear that categories are categories if for no other reason than their marked and particular dominance in particular individuals. With this faith, indeed with this knowledge, the discussion will turn to the eight types, and attempt to ascribe the above types of inferiority reaction to the types of personality that show them in particular.

5. The Inferiority Reaction (application)

With a caution certainly advisable in a study so often deductive, an indefinite number of personalities already classified according to the double scale of the eight types were reexamined in the light of the inferiority reaction, and examined not by the writer alone but by a number of persons. Once again, a fresh empiric basis was desired since, as has been pointed out many times, deduction goes astray chiefly when it slights this basis. It is an old story that the science of the Middle Ages failed as science, not because its thinking was unsound, but because it rested its premises upon authority rather than upon observation. Fully aware of the pitfalls that beset the *a priori* thinker, the modern rationalist chooses to lean over backwards, grounding his thought again and again in the earth from which it springs, although his empiricism will in many cases produce only what he has speculatively foreseen.

Hence in the present instance it was the striking, not the logical, character trait that was the desideratum. Admittedly, the various kinds of inferiority reactions were not restricted to particular types of personality, but common to all. Thus the problem was one not of mutual exclusion but of simple description, and as always in such cases, it is the striking character trait which counts—the striking character trait which is caught swiftly as one catches the quality of a gem. Needless to say, if this most conspicuous character trait impresses a number of independent observers equally, it will count doubly or triply. Such was the event here, and the findings are tabulated on the following page.

The diagram is to be regarded as overlying the double scale of the eight types. In other words, compensation was found to be the most characteristic inferiority reaction of

Moodiness	Overcompensation
Compensation	Egocentricity
Compensation	Egocentricity
Overcompensation	Moodiness

The Inferiority Reaction

Figure 9

the feeling or thinking introvert, egocentricity of the feeling or thinking extravert; while it was apparent that overcompensation characterizes the sentimental extravert and abstract introvert, moodiness the emotional introvert and introspective extravert. These findings, to be sure, constitute a kind of system, but the "system" is purely empiric in origin, the result of the most objective of examinations.

But discovery of the most striking reactions proved to be a challenge to ascertain the less striking. With the conviction that here if anywhere all men show all traits, it was natural that a further scrutiny should be attempted to see if a further determination were not possible. To that end the personalities of the original examination were submitted to a reexamination, with the results as set down on the following page in the second diagram.

It was first apparent that compensation, perhaps as the essential inferiority reaction of introverts, is to be found in nearly all introverted types, egocentricity in nearly all extraverted types. This has been indicated in the diagram by the shorter arrows, which suggest that while most conspicuous in the center-types, compensation and egocentricity are to be found in the end-types as well.

It was next observed that egocentricity as an introverted reaction is least conspicuous in the abstract type, most conspicuous in the emotional type, and apparently gathers in frequency and intensity as the scale moves from the abstract to the emotional extreme. Similarly it was apparent that compensation as an extraverted reaction follows an inverse course on the other side of the diagram, being least prominent in the sentimental extravert, most prominent in the introspective extravert. And so with moodiness and overcompensation. The first had already been observed as the most striking inferiority reaction of the emotional introvert, the second of the abstract introvert. It was now apparent


Moodiness
Overcompensation
Moodiness
Compensation
Compensation
Overcompensation
Egocentricity
Compensation
Overcompensation
Egocentricity
Egocentricity
Moodiness
Overcompensation
Moodiness

The Inferiority Reaction
Figure 10

that moodiness declines as an introverted reaction as the scale approaches the abstract extreme, that overcompensation declines as the scale approaches the emotional extreme. Likewise in the extraverted half of the double scale it was apparent that overcompensation is strongest in the sentimental extravert, weakest in the introspective extravert, moodiness strongest in the introspective extravert, weakest in the sentimental extravert. These various grades and transitions have been indicated in the diagram by the longer arrows.

In other words it was possible to observe *all* reactions in *all* human beings. This was the conclusion reached by the thinking of the first appraisal of the subject, a conclusion which further empirical study strengthened rather than weakened.

But in this study, empiricism is not enough—although the basis of its thinking, and the end of it, too, according to the pragmatic light which it accepts as its only beacon. In this study the matter must be rational as well as empiric to be entirely satisfying. It must be possible to see the long chain of cause and effect leading to the empirical findings and perhaps pointing beyond them. Hence in the following paragraphs an attempt will be made to arrive at the above observational position rationally. Only then will it be possible to accept the above findings as fully true. Only then will it be possible to say that the problem has been studied "philosophically."

To consider first the predilection of extraverts for egocentricity, of introverts for compensation, it is not difficult to see that extraverts turn to egocentricity because, although the business of inferiority is subjective, their characteristic response to any stimulus is objective. From the beginning the extravert has been posed as the more objective of the two types. His immediate consciousness has been described as of the external world, with the awareness of the self as something secondary and removed. Hence although the perception of inferiority has chiefly to do with the self, it is not surprising that the extravert should turn for remedy to that which is chiefly within his control. He falls between the stools of the inner and outer worlds, and according to the terminology of the preceding section, responds with a nonvalid although positive reaction. As for compensation, it does not need to be pointed out that this is a subjective reply, a reply decided upon by the personality himself, in his own way, at his own time, and according to his own standards. In answer to those shortcomings that he has perceived in himself and felt badly about, the individual shapes his own remedy, the whole forming a continuous and self-sustaining cycle. The remedy is not only positive but valid, and, as it happens, is the remedy chiefly at the disposal of the introvert because of his own subjective nature.

The crux of the matter is clearly that the problem is a subjective one. Although it makes sense to distinguish between perceptions of a relatively active and perceptions of a relatively passive nature, and even to mention the environment's thrusting them upon the the individual's view, surely it is clear that this is but a manner of speaking, that on the whole, even in the case of the specific, concrete instance, it is a question, not of a comparison offered by another person, but of a comparison conceived by the individual himself. Were another person to make as well as to provide the unfavorable comparison, then the matter would come under the heading of injury and insult, which is a different affair altogether, and one that on the whole leads not to the inferiority reaction, but to anger and a fight.

No, the business of inferiority is subjective, and hence one-sided in the nature of the response to be regarded as valid or nonvalid. The introvert, by and large, has the more successful answer because, being a subjective person, his tendency is to reply to the problem in a subjective way. But the matter is a piece of luck. Were the problem an external one, it would be the extravert and not the introvert whose reaction was the more valid of the two, who answered in what must be regarded as the more consistent and effective manner. As it is, it probably can be maintained that extraverts are less susceptible to inferiority feelings in the first place, so that once again the balance of nature is restored.

But to continue, the influence of the inner and outer worlds accounts also for that difference in the kinds of egocentricity which was noted in the preceding section. It is not hard to believe that the self-elevating kind is to be found more frequently with introverts, whose innate sense of the self will the more naturally emphasize that aspect of the egocentric response to inferiority. In particular, this type of egocentricity characterizes the emotional introvert, and one thinks of Byron, perhaps the most famous of self-elevating egocentrics. The merging type of egocentricity, however, is by far the more common variety, and is rendered so by the greater preponderance of extraverted egocentrics who, with their innate sense of the world, find it hard to place the self above it.

Yet the distinction is not one entirely of introversion and extraversion, for here an element of mood-cycle may enter. Self-elevating egocentrics are not exclusively introverted, for extraverted egocentrics occasionally show a self-elevating cast to their actions instead of a merging one. Yet when they do, one may be reasonably certain that it is a case of the individual's emotional endowment as affected by his constitution or surroundings. For just as it is impossible to conceive of antisociality without ingredients of anger-conviviality, so where one finds a hostility to the world and an overvaluation of the self creeping into what would normally be behavior of a purely objective, merging kind, one may suspect a background of anger-conviviality with ill health or an unfavorable environment bringing about the down-phase of the cycle.[28]

By and large, however, this is the exception, and the usual extraverted egocentric is one who cares more for securing praise than for receiving admissions of defeat. His displays are to win commendation, not to vent his scorn. He strives to stand well in his community, whatever it may be.

However, neither egocentricity nor compensation, nor the predilection of the center-types for the one or the other, is the principal problem. The principal problem has to do with the end-type, and concerns the tendency of the abstract introvert and sentimental extravert toward overcompensation, the tendency of the emotional introvert and introspective extravert toward moodiness, and that secondary tendency of the emotional introvert toward egocentricity, of the introspective extravert toward compensation. Above all, it is necessary to account for the greater reactivity of the end-type to the specific instance of inferiority which, as explained above, leads not to the less painful, but to the more painful, experience.

To take up the last matter first, the answer would appear to lie in the very origin of the end-type. The end-type has been shown to be the result of inferiority feelings, and apparently the specific instance serves to irritate the old wound. The individual is already sensitive on the score of inferiority, and the specific instance, although perhaps far removed both in time and circumstance from the situation that occasioned the distortion of his personality, has a meaning for him that it does not have for the ordinary individual.

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[28] As always, the problem is more complex than such passing words would suggest. The self-elevating egocentric's hostility to the world may show ingredients of psychosexual emotion in addition to the substratum of anger-conviviality. There may be hate as well as anger. Furthermore the problem may be complicated by such a simple factor as the mere lack of discipline, always a more detrimental character trait with extraverts than with introverts. Such complications will be considered in various sections of this study to come. Only the general background of anger-conviviality can be mentioned here.

Not so the general instance. As previously explained, the general instance is of the individual's perceiving rather than of the environment's presentation. In point of fact it is not so much an instance as a gradual awareness on the part of the personality. It is the realization one comes to when hitherto one has been free from the bias of inferiority. In particular, the observations of inferiority that lead simply to compensation or to egocentricity and not to distortion of personality usually advene *after* the years of childhood (commonly in those of adolescence) and *outside* the family circle. They constitute a "first" perception, so to speak, a perception that brings in its wake, not discouragement and measures of defense, but hope and the determination to do something corrective. This the individual usually sets about, whether in a compensatory or egocentric manner; and with the psychic economy that all of us possess, he then decides that the inferiority department is closed. The specific instance, unless along the line he has adopted, leaves him cold, and if in accordance with the observations he has already made, it simply whets his appetite to *show* himself the contrary, or to *be* the contrary.

But the individual who has received the bias of objectivation or subjectivation is already so predisposed toward inferiority that his attention is alert to the passing proof of his wretched feelings. The general observation that he is inferior he has already made, usually in the years of childhood, and in the family circle or close to it. He makes the observation, and from the impressionability of his years and the closeness of the provoking situation receives a corresponding bias to his personality. Not infrequently he, too, does something about it. But the point is that the general observation having been made, the individual's chief remaining reactivity is for the specific instance of inferiority—the specific instance that leads, not to long-range reactions, but to short-range reactions, reactions which, on the whole, are either negative or defensive.

As for the proclivity of the abstract introvert and sentimental extravert toward overcompensation, it is not surprising that these two types should seek merely to cloak their feelings. The abstract introvert and sentimental extravert are the farthest away from a realistic approach to life. The center-types, both extraverted and introverted, have a realism of their own, differing in nature, but nevertheless attuned in their differing ways to the real world. And the emotional introvert and introspective extravert, although hampered by personal maladjustment, are yet in search of a realistic view of life. This, however, is not the case with the abstract introvert and sentimental extravert. The abstract introvert and sentimental extravert never make the basic separation between the world and the self, the sentimental extravert failing to differentiate the world from the self, the abstract introvert failing to differentiate the self from the world. With the sentimental extravert, all things are given a personal cast; with the abstract introvert, what is really individual is looked upon as the lot of all. Thus it is not surprising that these two types should take the easiest (if most unreal) way out of the inferiority impasse. They create an impression, a self-impression, and let it go at that, the chief difference between them being that on the whole the abstract introvert fits himself up with an objective kind of self-impression (telling himself, for instance, that his shortcomings are the way of the world), that on the whole the sentimental extravert provides himself with a subjective kind of self-impression—with excuses and justifications, with assurances, not that he has failed, but that he has been particularly and unfairly used. The abstract introvert universalizes the unhappy experience to ease the smart; the sentimental extravert particularizes it. But each has a "story" to fall back upon, all framed for self-consolation, instead of doing something about his inferiority, or at least admitting it, and then reacting with his emotions.

Finally, to come to the emotional introvert and introspective extravert, and to the proclivity of each toward simple moodiness, it is no doubt clear that this is the natural reaction of individuals sensitive to the specific instance of inferiority, yet not blind to the exigencies of reality. Their latent realism prevents them from pretending that the facts are not so, and not having the oppportunity to make a long-range response (or perhaps being committed to one already) , they brood until the moment passes. The chief difference beween the two types is that, on the whole, the emotional introvert is less often swept away by his moodiness, the introspective extravert more frequently plunged into despair. That these two types should also turn respectively to egocentricity and to compensation is not surprising either. The emotional introvert being externalized will not always have the patience, even when freed from the agonizing specific instance of inferiority, to stick purely to compensation, the basic reaction of the introvert. He will again and again attempt the shortcut of egocentricity, although as his secondary adjustment advenes, egocentricity as a way out will prove less and less satisfactory. The introspective extravert, on the other hand, lacks the externality necessary for egocentricity, the usual reaction of the extravert. His subjectivation goes deep within him, and when released from the specific instance, he will turn to the means of the introvert, to compensation. Still, not possessing the true subjectivity of the introvert, he will not be too successful at this. And as he grows older, and as his secondary adjustment takes place, usually, he gives up the attempt to create new talents and falls back upon his old.

An endeavor has thus been made to offer some reasoned explanation for the preceding observations on the score of type and inferiority reaction. It cannot be too strongly stressed, however, that factors not specifically discussed here can enter and upset the usual pattern, that the pattern in any event is an extremely fluid one. Of extraneous factors, undoubtedly mood-cycle is the most important. The cycle of joy-depression, for instance, will often withhold a personality from the variety of reaction that has been declared to be most characteristic of his type. Joy-depression is the cycle of contemplation rather than of action, and frequently one finds an abstract introvert of joy-depressoid coloring whose most characteristic response to the specific instance of inferiority is not overcompensation but moodiness. Similarly the emotional introvert of strong anger-convivial complexion will probably show greater egocentric tendencies than his joy-depressoid counterpart. Again, one will observe a center-type so completely surrounded by the specific demonstration of his inferiority, so cut off from all avenue of escape, that it would be miraculous if he did not show the specific rather than the general reaction to his experience. But here the second diagram will be of help, in the tendencies indicated by its longer arrows. For here, unless the diagram is much in error, the thinking extravert will respond with moodiness, the feeling extravert with overcompensation, the thinking introvert with overcompensation, and the feeling introvert with moodiness. One is prepared, however, for such exceptions and elasticities, and will not forget that the diagrams of this study are schematic and not definitive. The usual path has been pointed out. That the individual deviates from this path is recognized as one of the conditions of life.

6. Fundamental Relationship

In the section on the four environments, the notion of adaptation of function was introduced. It was suggested that adaptation of function is, in its essence, a kind of further review. From this point of view, adapted thinking is simply examined intuition, examined memory. It is the primitive thinking material submitted to a second consideration. It is memory squared with corroborating evidence. It is imagination trued with reflections of probability. Similarly feeling, or adapted emotion, is emotion that has been rechecked, emotion that has been held back for a second consideration. As emotion arises in the personality, it is largely if not purely subjective in origin. Before it can become feeling, the object which it is to affect must also become a factor. The appropriateness of the emotion must be considered, and, above all, it must be released slowly, so that its effect upon the object may be gauged in the process of its release, and the emotion correspondingly affirmed or altered.

To be sure, in the section on the four environments, only the functions of thinking and feeling were considered. But the principle was perfectly general, and it is clear that adaptation will occur in all the four principal functions of the human mind. Although the matter cannot be dealt with now, there is no doubt that perception and volition, as well as thinking and feeling, occur in a refined, as well as in an unrefined, condition.

Furthermore, in the section on the four environments, the process of adaptation was considered only with respect to the individual function. The process of adaptation, however, affects the whole living organism. It is the process which bridges the gulf between the individual and the world. Surely such a process presupposes a number of points of view. For one thing, different adapted functions suggest that the bridge of adaptation is composed of different materials in different human beings, and that there may be lesser bridges in addition to the main one. Again, the bridge may allow the flow of traffic in one direction only, and may, indeed, have been built only from one side, instead of from both sides with a joining in the middle. Finally, the observer of the bridge may not be interested in the flow of traffic, or in the method of the bridge's construction, or in the material of its composition, but only in the overall success of the structure. How secure is the bridge? he asks. What stresses of weather and of load will it sustain? How effectively does it fulfill the purpose for which it was erected?

It is with the flow of traffic that this section will be concerned, with the flow of traffic, and with the direction in which the bridge was built in the first place. For, disregarding any lesser bridge that may be in view, and any reverse traffic that may slip through in off hours, the fact remains that most bridges of adaptation handle traffic in but one way, and were built in one direction to begin with. With some persons the bridge appears to have been built from the individual to the world, and most of the business which it accommodates is also from the individual to the world. With other persons the situation seems to be reversed. The bridge seems to have been pushed out from the world to the individual, and most of the business over it seems to be in this direction also. In other words it is apparent that with certain persons the principal relationship with life is active, that with other persons it is cognitive, and that these two relationships are, in general, characteristics of feeling and of thinking personalities respectively. Indeed, so fundamental is this relationship that it apparently controls the choice of material for the bridge, the choice of that very function which, in being used to build the bridge, receives the "further review" that is the cause of its becoming an adapted function.

However this may be, the fundamental tie with life of all feeling personalities is clearly active, not cognitive. Fundamentally, whether introverted or extraverted, whether subjectivated or objectivated, whether of a social or of an unsocial mood-cycle, every feeling personality lives in a world where the first place is given to the acts of human beings. To feeling personalities, the active interrelationship of human beings is the fabric of life, and everything else merely embroidery. True, the requirements of existence, the need for making a living, may make an individual for a certain number of hours a day give first place to the embroidery. Even so, it is amazing how clearly the active, feeling fabric remains in view. The insurance agent may possess an encyclopedic knowledge of rates and endorsements. Nevertheless as he talks with his prospective client about these rates and endorsements, about the different forms of insurance, it is clear that to him the talking rather than the knowing is the thing that counts. To him, the selling of insurance is fundamentally a business of human intercourse, and his belief that he is rendering the customer a social service cannot be cynically brushed aside. The same is no less true of the home office. If one thinks of this great hive of busy workers, this great establishment of examiners and file clerks and office boys and stenographers, as kept together by the insurance view of life, he is fundamentally mistaken. The establishment is united by the acts of human beings, by the feelings that are at the basis of the acts. Were the threads of active, human interconnection to be severed, the establishment would fall apart in a minute. One must mount to the highest levels of the organization to find a view of life that is essentially cognitive, and even here its presence will not be absolutely certain. Only behind the doors of the actuarial department can one be reasonably certain of finding a tie with life that is essentially cognitive.

The essentially active relationship with life of feeling personalities is usually more evident in women than in men. The number of women who abandon career and professional training to devote themselves to the duties of a wife or mother is enormous. One meets their former professors complaining that so-and-so, who knew more than any one else about a certain figure in the sixteenth century, or who had a special aptitude for a certain laboratory technique, or who had a sharpness for research in his subject beyond that of any of his other students—that this promising scientist or scholar has thrown herself away to become a mere domestic slave when a dozen others could have served as well. Occasionally one meets these renegades. They seldom look either like backsliders or domestic slaves, but usually, fulfilled and at peace with the universe. Being feeling personalities, they have returned to what is essential in their natures. In point of fact they are more in tune with the world than they were before, and some of them say just this.

This return to an active relationship with life is even more frequently encountered among women who have had no particular training or career, but have received simply the usual college education and degree. In spite of marked intellectual ability and a distinguished record at college, ten years after graduation they show scarcely a trace of the education they received. With them, the care of children and the management of home and family seem to have come as a return to balance, as a restoration of health of mind, after the years of high school and college. Their instincts seem to have said, "For eight years, against the fundamental nature of your personality, you have been imbibing knowledge you will never use, knowledge you really do not believe in. You have been assuming a view of life that is not yours. Now it is time to put an end to this nonsense, and be yourself." For such a person, the fundamental tie with life is active, not cognitive, and in the last analysis learning has meaning only as a prelude to action. The theoretical knowledge gained at school and college departs as so much useless baggage, indeed without a regret, and the personality becomes expressed as never before. From the point of view of the individual concerned, the shift can only be regarded as good, not as bad. Perhaps it is an economic waste that such a person should have gone to college. But when once the college education has been received, the return to an active relationship with life is not a move in the direction of ill health but in the direction of good health, not in the direction of maladjustment, but in the direction of adjustment.

However, it is doubtful if the import of the feeling relationship with life can be fully understood unless the feeling personality is regarded, quite literally, as viewing the world through his active faculties. Theoretically, human beings are supposed to view the world through their senses and cognitive faculties. The world is supposed to be spread out before them like a vast panorama, and they are supposed to gaze upon it as upon a spectacle at a theater. Actually, feeling personalities more resemble creatures equipped with antennae, or better yet, creatures who perceive the world through their power of movement. Feeling personalities, who are united with the world by means of their feeling function, act first and perceive afterward. Their basic perception is as to the effect of their actions. True, all sorts of overlayers may be superimposed upon this essential view of the world. The individual may be so immeshed in an alien profession that he is able to use his fundamental relationship only in leisure hours. Again, the perception of the effect of the individual's actions may not be direct, but very indirect. The individual may perceive the results of the results of his actions. Finally, the individual may be oriented simply by the imagination of the results of his actions. Nevertheless the primary assumption holds. With all feeling personalities the essential relationship with life, the basic tie with the world, is active, not cognitive.

The conception may be grasped by the example of automobile driving. In automobile driving, the driver is oriented by the imagination of the results of his actions. In the early days of the horseless carriage, when the driver looked directly down upon the road he was traveling over at a very moderate speed, the gap between the imagination of the results and the actual consequences of action was not great. One foresaw the bump one must slow down for practically at the moment of driving over it. However, as automobiles have grown more bulbous in front, and swifter and swifter in their conveyance, the results of one's actions must be foreseen farther and farther in advance. The driver's vision nowadays is focused far in front, and he is oriented by the imagination of the results of his actions hundreds of feet ahead. Nevertheless the essential relationship is unchanged. The driver's primary consideration is for his own activity in the midst of the world, and for the results of that activity. Occasionally, one rides with some scholarly driver who never has attained to an active relationship with life and who, while piloting an automobile at fifty, or even sixty, miles an hour, preserves his disinterested, detached, cognitive view of life and is as much interested in the cloud formations ahead of him, or in the botany alongside the road, as in his driving. It is a harrowing experience. True, on an open stretch of highway, with little or no traffic, and no hazards from weather or from road, it is possible to relax the active relationship to some extent. But it is a commonplace that the driver never sees or enjoys the scenery as much as his passengers.

The thinking personality, whose fundamental relationship with life is cognitive, who is oriented by the panorama of life itself rather than by the pin point of his own activity in the center of it—the thinking personality has always been inclined to assume that his attitude is the only one. The psychological writers of the eighteenth century, upon whom so many of our concepts depend, were all thinking personalities, or at least intellectualists.[29] They looked upon emotion as subsidiary to cognition, and in particular, defined it as a "confused idea." Being imbued with the cognitive view of things, they bequeathed to subsequent generations certain almost ineradicable errors, and as a consequence, to this day, the true focus of the feeling personality's outlook upon life has never been as sharply recognized as it should have been. When all the overlayers of school and profession have been put aside, when the individual is looked at for what he is, unwarped by job or profession, then it is clear that if he is a feeling personality, he resembles the automobile driver in his fundamental relationship with the world. To be sure, the degree of the relationship may vary a good deal. The personality may literally be the driver of the horseless carriage, with his eyes riveted on the road immediately in front of him. On the other hand, he may be a modern driver whose eyes are focused so far in advance that he cannot help taking in a good deal of the environment through which he is piloting his car. Nevertheless the very essence of his being, like the very life of the driver, will depend to no small extent upon his primary regard for the results of his own activity.

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[29] See above, p. 111, note.

Even if the most unusual of feeling personalities is considered, the fundamental attitude will still be found to be active rather than cognitive. That great observer of nature, Henry David Thoreau, although clearly a feeling personality, would seem to be far from the driver of the automobile in his fundamental relationship with life. His principal occupation was the contemplation of nature, and although one may believe that he was introverted and joy-depressoid, it is difficult to grant that he was also active in his fundamental relationship. Yet Thoreau's contemplation of nature was far from the cognitive view of things. Whereas a thinking personality will observe nature solely for the truth to be drawn therefrom, a feeling personality is more apt to observe nature for what it means to him. Thus in spite of all the observation of nature, there is no science in Thoreau. The effect of his observations upon him, the results of his own perceptive activity—this is what formed the focus of his gaze. Thoreau was oriented, not by the panorama of nature itself, but by the pin point of his own existence in the center of it. In the center of the landscape that stretched around Walden Pond was always Henry David Thoreau, with his acute sense of what he was feeling, with his acute sense of what he was doing. True, since he was of a joy-depressoid mood-cycle, his activity did not involve others. The effects of his actions were not to be perceived in the reactions of other persons, but in the reactions of himself. Nevertheless the attention was there. Thoreau lived, not to gain knowledge, but to experience feeling. His attention was to the effect of his actions.

And so it is with all feeling personalities, unless indeed the exigencies of job or profession have forced a dichotomy in the man, so that, like a benign Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, for eight hours he is one man, for the remaining sixteen, another. In that case, the interest of the student of human nature is in the sixteen hours, not in the eight. And in the sixteen hours, in all probability, the fundamental relationship will be all the more conspicuous for its suppression during the preceding eight.

In spite of schooling and one's work, in spite of a life devoted to the solitary contemplation of nature, the tie with life of all feeling personalities is fundamentally active. So different is it from the thinking tie that it is really more accurate to conceive of a feeling personality as blindly working his way through the world like a mole than to conceive of him as viewing the pageant of life like a thinking personality, and then of reacting to what he views. The feeling personality ventures first, and then takes note. That is why the driver of the automobile knows that there is always an x-quantity which he cannot foresee. He is in motion to begin with. A tire may blow out; his steering apparatus may give way. It is much different from standing by the roadside and watching the traffic stream by. The cognitive and active relationships with life are sharply separate, and although perhaps most people combine them, they must be distinguished, not only for the sake of practical diagnosis, but for the sake of any theory to be built upon them. In particular, it is clear that the individual, in refining his adjustment to life, simply refines some part of that relationship which already binds him to the world.

Thus the individual does not "choose" the function which receives the refinement of the adapting process. This function is determined by the individual's fundamental relationship, and this, in turn, is determined when the individual becomes a thinking or a feeling personality. It is thinkingness or feelingness that decides whether the individual's basic relationship with life shall be cognitive or active, thoughtful or emotional. When once this has been decided, it is only natural that with repeated use a part of the thoughtful or emotional relationship should become refined.

What remains to be determined is the particular portion of the thoughtful or emotional relationship that will receive the individual's chief attention, and hence the reexamination which is the condition of functional adaptation. Even this is far from being a matter of the individual's free election. For this, in its turn, is clearly dependent upon whether the individual becomes an end-type with all its need for secondary adjustment, or whether, moving along the normal path of primary adjustment, the individual becomes a central type, a straight thinking or feeling personality. If this is the case, he simply develops, as already set forth, the adapted function of thinking in contrast to the unadapted functions of memory and intuition, or the adapted function of feeling in contrast to the unadapted function of emotion. Being unvexed by the disturbing influence of inferiority feelings, he refines that part of his fundamental relationship which is easiest to refine, that part which is most available for a further review, that part, in other words, which is most within his control.

But if the individual becomes an end-type (the very origin of which presupposes a weakness in the individual's relationship with the world), then the individual gives his chief attention to that part of his fundamental relationship which makes contact with the world. If his fundamental tie with life is active, if, in other words, he is a feeling personality, he will focus his attention upon the feeling process as it leaves the personality. If his fundamental relationship is cognitive, he will focus his attention on the cognitive process as it leaves the world. To return for a last time to the figure of the bridge, it is clear that the tendency of objectivation and subjectivation is to throw emphasis upon the end of the bridge away from the individual. The only difference between thinking and feeling personalities in this respect is that with thinking personalities the bridge is a thinking bridge and the traffic is from the world to the individual, that with feeling personalities the bridge is a feeling bridge and the traffic is from the individual to the world.

To summarize what has been said on fundamental relationship and adapted function, and also to differentiate the eight types a little further, the diagram on the opposite page is presented. It is a development of the diagram in Chapter 5 which presented thinking and feeling as the major and minor, the primary and secondary, functions of all human beings. The present diagram adds the functions of perception and volition which, as outposts of the major and minor functions, are the initial and final functions of every human being. With the central types, these functions are distinctly subordinate to the major and minor functions, and hence are indicated in the diagram by units of a third and lesser degree of magnitude. But with the end-types, the initial or the final function is the adapted function of the personality, and in being adapted is given an importance equal at least to that of the minor function. Hence in the diagram such a function is represented by a unit of the second degree of magnitude. Adaptation of function is also indicated by the device of large capitals, small capitals being used for the functions that are not adapted. The need is thus eliminated of indicating in the diagram that the unadapted form of feeling is emotion, of specifying whether the unadapted form of thinking is mnemonic or imaginative. The need is also eliminated of distinguishing between volition and its unadapted form of simple action, and above all, of entering into the question of adapted and unadapted


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Fundamental Relationship
Figure 11

perception which, as will be seen on a later page, presents more subtlety than the adaptation of all the other functions combined.

The accompanying diagram presumes only to show the fundamental relationship of each of the eight types, and consequently, the function that has become its favored, or adapted, function.[30] Thus only the functions which are comprised in the fundamental relationship are specified in the diagram—with feeling personalities, feeling and volition, with thinking personalities, perception and thinking. With the end-types that are feeling personalities the adapted function is always the second of the feeling functions—that part of the feeling process which leaves the personality and joins hands with the world. With the end-types that are thinking personalities the adapted function is always the first of the thinking functions—that part of the thinking process in which the messages from the world leave the world and indeed seem still to belong to the world. With the center-types, on the other hand, the adapted function is always the primary, or familiar, function, so that with these types, the words "favored" and "adapted," and "primary" and "familiar," are, in fact, the same.

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[30] The wisdom of introducing a synonymous term for adapted function that is much like the synonymous term for primary function is probably to be questioned. "Favored function" and "familiar function" sound so much alike that they will probably be confused. Yet once they have been distinguished the possibility of confusion is certainly much less, and there is a certain usefulness in having the two terms when it comes to the end-type. For with the end-type, the primary function is still the familiar function, the function that comes first in the individual's general appraisal of the world. Yet this function the end-type does not use as his principal means of connection with the world. He rejects it in favor of his initial or final function, so that it is this latter which receives the refinement of adaptation.

7. Formula

All this, however, represents but half the man. Fundamental relationship, the active or the cognitive tie with life, the favored function which receives the refinement of the adaptive process, these things have to do with the primary, or familiar, function—perhaps with the outpost of the primary, or familiar, function, but on no account with the secondary, or unfamiliar, function. Yet with certain personalities, notably with feeling introvert and thinking extravert, this secondary and unfamiliar function is the major function of the personality. With these personalities and with their correlated end-types, the major function has no share in the fundamental relationship. Thus it is clear that from the point of view of the total personality the fundamental relationship is far from being perfect. It may indeed leave the personality's principal resources untapped.

It is also clear that from the point of view of the environment the individual's fundamental relationship is no less far from being perfect. Whether a business of the minor or of the major function, it is obvious that the fundamental relationship cannot possibly respond to all the demands that are made upon it. There arise adaptive needs for which there simply is no answer in its repertory of replies. For one manifestly cannot have an active, feeling relationship with every situation, nor a thinking, cognitive relationship with every eventuality. A consequence is that the individual's fundamental relationship, no matter how highly perfected, never affords a perfect adaptation to life.

Perhaps this is most noticeable in just that thinking extravert whose major feeling function is in the second place. As a manager of men and things, as the headmaster of a school, for example, he is superb. The energy and humor which he is able to throw into his leadership is inspiring, his grasp of details is amazing, and the openness of his mind, the comprehension with which he accepts the suggestions of others—all this shows the master of men that he is. Yet every now and then when some one's father dies, or some one is seriously ill, or an anniversary rolls around, or a feeling occasion arises, this incomparable leader of men loses his grasp. Being apparently unable to gauge the individual element in the loss of one's father, he assumes that every one feels the same emotions toward one's father, is suffering from a standard brand of sorrow, and will, indeed, be benefited by a standard brand of sympathy. It is the same when one is ill. There is the standard visit to the bedside, whether well or ill chosen. And on feeling occasions there is the standard expression of the feelings, the standard response to what the thinking extravert believes to be the feeling exigencies of the situation.

Yet the thinking extravert's "sentiments" hardly deceive any one. In trying to be noble and elevated, in trying to be as superior with the feelings as he is with external realities, the thinking extravert more often succeeds only in being stuffy. Indeed his worst side is frequently his feeling side. He seems to be wordy, excessive, stilted, prosy, trite—everything, in fact, except natural. When, on the other hand, he is his own thinking self, there is often a tremendous magnetism to the very genuineness of his personality.

Much the same sort of thing obtains with the feeling introvert. When he tries to use his major function as a means of rapport with other persons he seems to be out of his element. Ordinarily, his intellectual powers are used upon the results of his actions, especially upon the material with which he works as a craftsman or engineer. When his intellectual powers are thus used, they seem to be a worthy auxiliary of his fundamental relationship. In fact, often there seems to be more auxiliary than fundamental relationship. But when the feeling introvert attempts to form an intellectual relationship with intellectual people by means of words and ideas, then he seems to have at his command only the most hackneyed expressions of commonplace wisdom. The person with whom the feeling introvert is attempting to make direct intellectual contact is told that it is a small world, that one must live and learn, that life is a mysterious thing, that it is a long lane without a turning, that it is just one of those things, and so on, and so on. Beyond all types it is the feeling introvert who makes use of the thinking formula, the pat, trite, little expression of wisdom that lost all pretense to originality several hundreds of years ago.

Now the very essence of adaptation lies in the individuality of the response. Life is never the same, two minutes in a row, and in his feeling relationship with life, the feeling introvert is well aware of this. He is in constant touch with every shift and turn of his environment, and his feeling response is never a stock answer, never a standard reply learned from some one else. But when he starts to use words and ideas as his means of response, then, like the thinking extravert, the feeling introvert seems unable to perceive the individual merits of the situation. True, it is a strain to have to make contact with people who speak a different language and have a different set of values. It is as though a difficult guest had suddenly appeared to make one extra at the dinner table. But the feeling introvert seems unable to muster any kind of originality at all. Instead of making an honest effort to put something on the table that the guest may like, or even something that he, the host, especially likes (and which may thus be new and interesting to the guest), the feeling introvert goes to the cupboard and sets forth a meal that begins with canned soup and ends with canned peaches. And the thinking extravert, as has been pointed out, does much the same when it comes to the feelings.

Indeed, it is clear that to some extent all the center-types make use of the formula when it comes to their secondary and unfamiliar function. The chief difference between them would appear to be that whereas with the feeling introvert and thinking extravert this secondary and unfamiliar function is the major function, with the feeling extravert and thinking introvert it is merely the minor function. With these personalities, in other words, the secondary and unfamiliar function is less likely to direct the personality's attention toward the half of life not embraced by the fundamental relationship. Thus the thinking introvert is far less apt than the thinking extravert to be bothered by the demands of a feeling situation, and the feeling extravert is far less apt than the feeling introvert to sense the gap separating him from an intellectual, thinking personality.

Accordingly, with feeling extravert and thinking introvert, the formula is apt to be expressive rather than adaptive. It is still unoriginal and taken whole-cloth from other people. But its principal use is to permit the subjective operation of the secondary and minor function. It is far less often used to bridge the gap between person and person. Thus a feeling extravert who may have high intellectual powers, but does not know how to use them, is given an idea which sets him on the path of an exciting and productive use of those intellectual powers. Many a stimulating university professor is of this sort. His natural vivacity and his intellectual talents make him a teacher to be envied, and frequently he pours these gifts into his research as well. But he is never the one to initiate a new departure, and usually his fundamental points of view are a complete inheritance from some brilliant teacher or teachers of his undergraduate or graduate days. Similarly the thinking introvert, whose emotional conditioning is always apt to be weak and to have been neglected in youth—the thinking introvert is frequently dependent upon some powerful and imaginative author for the interpretation which enables him to feel. Thus John Stuart Mill, a thinking introvert if there ever was one, and an individual whose emotional conditioning came late rather than early—John Stuart Mill was given the cue and signal for a whole range of emotion by the poet Wordsworth. As a boy, Mill spent a year in France with Bentham, the great botanist. He acquired a hobby for the rest of his life, a knowledge of botany and an enthusiasm for that knowledge that was never to leave him. But he did not learn to feel. It was the poet Wordsworth who gave him the formula (if one may use that term) which permitted him to feel, the formula which enabled him to love nature as well as to know her. And so it is with other thinking introverts. It may be the poet Wordsworth who unlocks the doors of their latent emotion; it may be the poet Robert Frost. It may be Conrad who gives them a love of shipping and the sea; it may be Hemingway who interprets Europe and travel in a foreign land. In truth, that thinking introvert is an unusual thinking introvert who is not dependent to some extent upon the formula for the exercise of his emotions, who does not need, in some degree, to be shown how to feel by the feelings of other people.

But by now the notion of formula has been clearly enough developed, both in its adaptive and in its expressive aspect, to permit a survey of the use of formula with respect to type. As in the survey of the inferiority reaction, a large number of subjects was examined by several observers, the results being tabulated in the usual form of the eightfold diagram. That diagram is given on the following page. As

No use of the formula at all	Use of the formula for the primary and secondary functions
Use of the formula for the secondary function	Use of the formula for the secondary function
Use of the formula for the secondary function	Use of the formula for the secondary function
Use of the formula for the primary and secondary functions	No use of the formula at all

The Use of the Formula
Figure 12

regards the center-types, the survey disclosed nothing that was surprising, but as regards the end-types, the results could hardly have been foreseen. In fact the results were so surprising that they were carefully gone over a second time. Yet there could be no doubt. In spite of the exceptions that are the condition of a study in psychology, it was clear that the sentimental extravert and abstract introvert use the formula for *both* their minor and their major functions, that the emotional introvert and introspective extravert would rather die than use the formula at all.

Of the two peculiarities, surely the more surprising is the use made of the formula by the sentimental extravert and abstract introvert. The refusal of the emotional introvert and introspective extravert to have anything to do with the formula might conceivably be set down to a laudable determination on their part to adapt by means of every function, to give a fresh and individual response to every situation whether the function involved be familiar or unfamiliar, adapted or unadapted. But the use of the formula by the sentimental extravert and abstract introvert for the familiar and major, as well as for the unfamiliar and minor, function must surely make the observer pause. Do these personalities, he asks, never give a fresh and individual response with their principal functions? Do they think and feel entirely by set rejoinders and standardized reactions? As end-types, they modify the exterior portion of their fundamental relationship, refining their powers of volition or perception. But do they never refine their thoughts or their feelings? Do they never attempt to reply with the unique feeling or thought which the situation demands?

Some such condition as this would indeed appear to be the case. The sentimental extravert, it will be remembered, is characterized by a withdrawal from the world. Thus the type, always more prevalent among women than among men, enjoyed its heyday in the nineteenth century when women, at least among the upper classes, were peculiarly sheltered. It was a time when, as regards the sentimental extravert, the *mores* of the age and individual tendency went hand in hand. During that period there were countless sentimentally extraverted women who in their thoughts and feelings never did adjust to life. When adjustment was necessary, it was the husband or child who did the adjusting, not the wife or mother; and if the husband or child was unwilling or unable to adjust, then, usually, the sentimental extravert developed a neurosis, and gained by means of ill health her goal of an unmodified existence.

To be sure, the type has declined unbelievably in numbers, and today is one of the less common of the eight types. Furthermore the distribution as between men and women is probably now more even. Nevertheless, whether sheltered or unsheltered, whether a relic of the past or the result of present forces, whether male or female, the sentimental extravert is still characterized by an abnormal lack of modification. Even the adapted function of the type, namely, the function of volition as opposed to the function of simple action—even this is the least differentiated, that is to say, the least affected by the object, of all the adapted functions. For after all, it is the influence of the object that, in the further review, changes emotion into feeling, and mere memory or imagination into thought. However, as regards volition, it is clear that a certain independence of the object constitutes the very essence of its adaptation. The individual with a highly developed will holds out against all discouraging and dissuading factors, he sticks to his post in spite of all practical counsels to the contrary, his very subjective courage is a match for all the external obstacles of the world. Even if his volition is of the negative kind (as is the case with the sentimental extravert), even then it is an extraordinarily undifferentiated function, a function that leans upon an increase of the subjective element for its very modification. The sentimental extravert whose adapted function is negative volition, or self-denial, refuses to leave her home and family although her husband is an admitted blackguard, her children no longer need her, and the lover proposing flight is everything that a woman could desire. Or, if she is practising her adapted function in more humble matters, if she is dieting, for example, she really does hold out against that extra slice of pie even though it is being urged upon her and her appetite cries aloud for it.

No, it is clear that such a sentimental extravert remains curiously unaffected by the objective world, and expresses her principal functions by means of the formula because she has never had to respond with them in any other way. Such a sentimental extravert has almost literally never made a thinking or a feeling adjustment in her life, and would not know how to respond with the individual, modified thought or feeling which, in reality, every situation demands. Instead, she sees the situation as a *kind* of situation, and responds with the *kind* of response which, as a child, she observed generally to be in vogue. Thus when the situation is of a thinking kind, she falls back upon the formulas of thinking which she heard as a child, and is, in fact, quite as devoted to the use of saws, clichés, and hackneyed quotations as the most prosaic of feeling introverts.

But this is a business merely of the sentimental extravert's minor function. When it is an affair of the major function the situation is somewhat different; yet the consequences of using the formula to express the major function are perhaps not entirely unforeseen. The formula has to accommodate a load it never was designed to bear. True, the thinking extravert also uses the formula to express his major feeling function. But the thinking extravert gets rid of a good half of his major function indirectly through the ideas, schemes, and projects of his primary, minor function. When he comes to express his major function directly by means of the formula, the load, although substantial, is not more than the formula can bear. With the sentimental extravert, however, the formula must bear the whole brunt of the major feeling function. The formula becomes a web of external relationships which is firmly, indeed violently, believed in. If one is fond of his parent, that is not enough; one must be fond of his parent because a parent is a thing to be fond of, because the relationship between a child and his parent is the same as fondness. Conversely, if the sentimental extravert meets a person who resembles a parent, he shows fondness toward the person for that reason. Instead of rising freshly in response to stimulus, and then of being shaped to fit the stimulus, the emotion of the sentimental extravert arises according to formula. The formula gives the lead, and frequently the very pith and substance to emotion. The sentimental extravert loves a person *because* the person is his father, wife, son, daughter, niece, grandfather, cousin, uncle, great-uncle, second cousin once removed, and so on. The sentimental extravert loves a friend a great deal, for instance, if their parents also were friends, and if he has known the friend all his life; a little less than if they went to school together—still less if it was only college; less than that if the friendship is a matter merely of a few years, and if he met the friend just last year, hardly at all. So powerful is the influence of the external pattern that the individual is spoken of as "your father," "your daughter," "your niece," and even "your dog."

The matter was mentioned in the chapter on thinking and feeling personalities in connection with the Victorian scale of feeling values, and indeed the pattern extends beyond the sentimental extravert's use of it. It is clear that one is in the presence of a feeling pattern so characteristic of extraverts that it should be spoken of as an "extraverted" feeling pattern. Much of the thinking extravert's use of the formula will be found to be a use of just such an extraverted feeling pattern, and even the feeling extravert, whose feeling is forever changing in response to his environment—even the feeling extravert occasionally feels in accordance with such a pattern. In fact it is clear that the extraverted feeling pattern is a help to feeling. For by and large, one *does* feel according to such a pattern. No matter to what extent the individual finds his own experience to differ, we are more fond of the members of our family than of strangers, more fond of old friends than of new ones, and simply as a result of experience, we finally become conditioned to feel in this way. Then when the stimulus is not clear, when the situation is new and one does not know what to feel, the pattern comes to one's help and suggests an emotion if it does not step in and supply the emotion. The pattern is "extraverted" simply because extraverts, on account of their major function, make more use of it than introverts, and because, accordingly, it is more characteristic of them than of introverts. Only the introspective extravert, who rejects all formula, makes no conspicuous use of it. And all the sentimental extravert does is to carry it to a ridiculous and absurd extreme.

Furthermore it is clear that the problem of the abstract introvert's use of the formula for both his major and his minor function is to be approached in much the same way. In fact it is clear that the abstract introvert makes use of an "introverted" thinking pattern that is quite the counterpart of the extraverted feeling pattern. Once again, this introverted thinking pattern is a kind of conditioning. For to think is but to observe the design of things. There is the simple temporal sequence of cause and effect to begin with. Then there is the spatial arrangement of class and member, and finally one comes to such grand, macroscopic designs as that of the heavenly bodies, or to such grand, microsopic designs as that of the atom. All personalities read a pattern into experience when they think, and the sentimental extravert and feeling introvert do no otherwise when they repeat their proverbs and hoary sayings. Such a thinking pattern is common to all human beings, and is only called "introverted" because introverts, on account of their major function, make more use of it than extraverts, and because, accordingly, it is more characteristic of them than of extraverts.

The peculiarity of the abstract introvert's use of this pattern is that, like the sentimental extravert, he leans upon it too heavily. Like the sentimental extravert, he believes in his pattern absolutely, *per se,* not at all as a useful bit of conditioning. It serves, in fact, as a vehicle of expression for his major and primary function, a thing it never was intended to do. When the thinking introvert, on the other hand, uses the pattern he does so with full awareness of what William James referred to as "irreducible and stubborn facts," and modifies his pattern to fit the facts, not the facts to fit the pattern. Even the feeling introvert, who uses the pattern to express an unfamiliar and unmodified function, is inclined to be modest and tentative as he utters his century-old crystallizations of recognized truth. But the abstract introvert will have none of this modesty. He believes in his pattern with fervor and conviction, and becomes, in fact, impassioned about the artificially simplified view of life which it presents.

Indeed, it is just this introverted thinking pattern which has led so many present-day abstract introverts into the communist milieu as fellow travelers. Professionally, they are physicists, economists, writers, poets, or what have you. Actually, they know little about politics or personalities, and what little they know is artificially simplified by their introverted thinking pattern. In fact, the great trouble with their presentation of their case is the very simplicity of its presentation. The true thinker knows that life just isn't so simple as they make out. The gentlemen in Moscow cannot possibly be such disinterested devotees of the good of the common people as they are described to be. The gentlemen in Wall Street cannot possibly all be connivant in a grand scheme to loot the poor and endow the rich. Russia cannot be heaven on earth, and the United States as black as hell. As a type, the thinking introvert, like his great prototype, John Stuart Mill, is very apt to be left of center. But he says to the fellow traveler, "I am interested in your theories, but they do not resemble life as I know it. They are altogether too simple, much too simple. Life is complex, and all mixed up. I admit that I know nothing about the gentlemen in Moscow, but my knowledge of history makes me suspect that they are not untainted with a desire for power. And my acquaintance with the one or two Wall Street brokers whom I know leads me to believe that most of them are quite average American business men. I am as much opposed to vested interests as you. I know that life is in constant progress, and that if the progress is arrested, it will burst forth with a deluge such as Louis XV accurately foresaw. But as for your particular theories I do not follow them. You seem to have arrived at them without sufficient thought."

But how reconcile, the reader asks, the fellow traveler's naive human theories with his professional attainments as a physicist or economist? His major thinking function is declared to be formulated and unadapted. Yet obviously he must think in his professional capacity. One does not attain eminence in a scientific profession without an exercise of some degree of thought.

The reconcilement of the contradiction, unfortunately, cannot entirely be carried out in this chapter. It involves the curious fact that in adapting his initial, or perceptive, function, the abstract introvert does so by a greater differentiation of function, by a greater infusion of the objective element, than is characteristic of the central types or of the central functions. Unlike the functional adaptation of the sentimental extravert, which involves a lesser differentiation and is simpler than the functional adaptation of the center-types, the functional adaptation of the abstract introvert is more complex and cannot properly be considered until certain other matters have been taken up first. It can only be mentioned here that this greater differentiation (which is, of course, in the direction of reality) has a tendency to be abstract and specialized, and to be at the bottom of the abstract introvert's profession. Thus professionally, and with the abstract materials of his specialized adapted function, the abstract introvert is able to think and does think. He has a small foothold in reality which the sentimental extravert does not possess. Yet when he steps out of this small segment of reality and plunges into life, when he leaves his profession and becomes a man, the abstract introvert is no more modified than the sentimental extravert and never, in the strict sense, either thinks or feels. Intellectually, he falls back upon the introverted thinking pattern; emotionally, he either depends upon an attenuated version of the extraverted feeling pattern, or else experiences emotion quite in its primitive form. Great intellectual powers and the refinement of his adapted function may carry him to high place in his specialized profession. But unless the object of a secondary adjustment, of a conditioned adaptation approximating the natural adaptation of the thinking introvert, the abstract introvert remains unmodified in his two principal functions and dependent, for much of their use, upon the formula. The result is often a gap between professional life and private life, between the office and the home, that catches the eye not only of the psychologist but of the neighbors as well.

So much for the types that make a double use of the formula. There remain to be considered the types that make no use of the formula at all. These are the emotional introvert and introspective extravert, as opposed to the abstract introvert and sentimental extravert.

Curiously enough, the emotional introvert and sentimental extravert, who are in this respect the exact opposite of each other, are nevertheless the products of much the same sort of experience. Both are feeling personalities, and both, as a result of their sense of inferiority, have refined the exterior portion of their active relationship with the world. The chief difference between them is that the emotional introvert, in being an introvert, abandons the inner world of emotional consciousness for the outer world of emotional expression, while the sentimental extravert, in being an extravert, abandons the outer world of emotional expression for the inner world of emotional consciousness. Thus, characteristically, the sentimental extravert develops the function of volition in its negative aspect, the emotional introvert, in its positive aspect. But the adaptation of either aspect, as explained, is by a decrease of differentiation, by an emphasis upon the subjective element. The emotional introvert, no less than the sentimental extravert, is characterized by an unusual lack of that modification which, for most people, is the inevitable consequence of living. But whereas with the sentimental extravert, this lack of modification comes about through a retirement from the world, a retirement that as far as women were concerned was aided and abetted by the Victorian Age, with the emotional introvert, the lack of modification comes about from too great a stress on personal activity—a stress which the Romantic Age at the beginning of the nineteenth century fostered as much as the Victorian Age fostered the withdrawal of the sentimental extravert. The period began under the star of Rousseau. To be sure, the world was not yet ready for the exercise of pure will, and the Rousseau who loved to dream would seem a far cry from the world-shaking emotional introverts of the Napoleonic period. Nevertheless Rousseau had all the courage of a revolutionist, a courage perhaps never better exemplified than when he broke away from the reigning Encyclopedists, and forsook Paris for the Hermitage and Montmorency. But above all, the man obstinately refused to conform in the slightest degree. After the banning of *Emile* and the flight to Switzerland, the least attention to common sense, the least willingness to modify thought or feeling, indeed, merely a consent to do nothing, would have allowed the affair to blow over and Rousseau to enjoy an exile that, after all, was not without its enjoyment. But casting expediency to the winds, Rousseau replied to the Archbishop of Paris, replied to the council of Geneva, renounced his Swiss citizenship, and ended by having to flee to England—only to refuse, once again, to modify his thoughts or his feelings, and to quarrel with his English hosts.

Now it frequently seems as if the sentimental extravert fails to adapt his principal functions through sheer lack of exposure to modifying conditions, as if his use of the formula is simply for want of a better form of expression. But the emotional introvert clearly fails to adapt his principal functions through too great an emphasis upon personal action. He is too busy projecting his ego upon the world to heed the world's demands. Furthermore, he is projecting his ego in order to gain distinction, a thing that is scarcely to be won by bowing to expediency, or by using the formulas of other men. The emotional introvert's development of positive volition, his determination to achieve his goals in spite of everything to the contrary, makes him not only reject all formulas but even all advice. The typical emotional introvert would rather drive ten miles out of his way than ask a simple road direction from a passer-by. If a student of the arts, he must work out everything for himself, and is hardly able to take a hint from his master. This trait is well exemplified by Rousseau. Far from being willing to use the formula for his secondary and unfamiliar function, Rousseau was unable to take the least suggestion from another person, and remained to the end of his days, as Professor Babbitt has pointed out,[31] a permanently unadjusted man.

But Rousseau, of course, lived and died before the Romantic Age burst upon the world, before Wordsworth and Coleridge rejected the poetic formulas of the preceding age, before Napoleon showed at the bridge of Lodi what the exercise of pure will might perform, before Humboldt, on nothing but his will, explored to the headwaters of the Magdalena and crossed the Andes onto the plain of Ecuador. In the Romantic Age, emotional introversion enjoyed its apotheosis. Then the whole world abandoned formula, and went in for sincerity and originality. Then the whole world believed that anything was possible if only a person willed it strongly enough. Then Wordsworth wrote,[32]

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[31] *Rousseau and Romanticism*, Boston, 1919, p. 74.

> Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
> But to be young was very heaven;

and Fichte could pray,[33]

> Supreme and living will, whom no name names, to thee may I lift up my soul, for thou and I are not parted.

The emotional introvert and the sentimental extravert, as remarked, are products of much the same sort of experience. But the results, simply because the one is introverted, the other extraverted, could hardly be more different.

On the other hand, the introspective extravert, who shares the emotional introvert's hatred of formula and love of independence, has a very different personality, and reveals quite different origins. For the introspective extravert is a thinking personality, with a cognitive fundamental relationship, and is led by his inferiority feelings to refine the exterior portion of this cognitive relationship, not the exterior portion of his active relationship. Furthermore, quite as in the case of the abstract introvert, he does so by a greater differentiation of function than is usual, by a greater infusion of the objective element. This is all the more remarkable in that the introspective extravert, in being an extravert, experiences the force of his inferiority feelings as subjectivation rather than as objectivation, and withdraws from the world instead of seeking to mingle with it. Like the sentimental extravert, the introspective extravert relinquishes the world in which he feels inferior; but unlike the sentimental extravert, he keeps a foothold in reality. Reality is a very necessary ingredient in his adapted perceptive function, in fact a larger and more necessary ingredient than it is in the adapted functions of thinking and feeling, where the proportion between the subjective and the objective seems again and again to be a fifty-fifty arrangement.[34]

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[32] *The Prelude,* Book XI, lines 108-109.

[33] *Bestimmung des Menschen* (1800), translated and quoted by Josiah Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy,* Boston, 1899, p. 161.

Yet in spite of this foothold in reality, the introspective extravert, like any other end-type, scarcely ever modifies an idea to fit a fact, or adjusts an emotion to suit a situation. Unless the object of a secondary, conditioned adaptation, he remains unmodified both in primary and in secondary function. However, unlike the sentimental extravert and abstract introvert, who in their lack of adaptation depend chiefly upon the formula, the introspective extravert wants none of any such device. Like the emotional introvert, he has only scorn for standardized thoughts and emotions. Yet his scorn for the two kinds of formula is not quite even. Upon examination it is clear that he reserves his greatest contempt for the formulated idea, for the thought that has been used by others before it comes to him. Clearly the introspective extravert's greatest insistence is upon originality of idea, just as the emotional introvert's greatest insistence is upon originality of feeling.

For the curious thing is that in spite of the emotional introvert's apparent stress upon originality of action, his real stress is upon originality of emotion. Like all feeling personalities, the emotional introvert is oriented by the consequences of his actions. But whereas for the ordinary feeling personality these consequences mean the consequences upon the outside world, for the emotional introvert, they mean the consequences upon himself. It is the problem touched upon in the last section with reference to Thoreau.[35] The emotional introvert devotes his adaptive attention to the exterior portion of his fundamental relationship, to his actions rather than to his feelings, yet, as if to make up for the greater effort involved, he skips the consequences of his actions upon the world and is concerned with their consequences upon himself. Thus the emotional introvert acquires an especial sensitivity to the state of his own feelings.

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[34] Surely the reader will take on temporary faith the assertion of this paragraph that the introspective extravert, although subjectivated, nevertheless refines his perceptive function by a greater admixture of the objective element than is normal with the central types. A discussion of the differentiation of perception would not fit into the context of this section. The differentiation of perceptive function will be taken up in the first part of the eighth chapter.

The result is a curious duality that runs through his life and is frequently the despair of those who are thrown into contact with him. The emotional introvert lives for the sake of action, which he carries out by means of his adapted function, yet of all the eight types he is the one who is the most conscious of the inner meaning of whatever it is that he does. In our athletically minded country, for instance, there is little doubt that the very top flight of athletic coaches is composed largely of emotional introverts. Most coaches are quite simple feeling extraverts; and very good coaches they are, too. But the really supreme coaches, the ones who seem to be independent of their material and to win in terms of seasons rather than in terms of games, these are very apt to be emotional introverts. Of first importance in their success is the power of their adapted function; but supporting this is the closeness of touch of their fundamental relationship, and underneath all, is the broad base of their major, introverted thinking function which permits them to entertain principles as well as to be opportunistic. Yet, as every one knows, they are the touchiest of people to congratulate upon a victory. Whereas the feeling extravert loves praise, all praise, and doesn't mind in the least being congratulated for a victory that was a piece of luck, the emotional introvert can positively be offended by such congratulations. With the emotional introvert, a victory is won against a subjective background which no one else can know and which is always the factor of prime consideration. If he began the season with nothing in the way of material, if the victory was won, point by point, with no dependence upon the element of chance, if he knows that primarily the outcome is due to his own planning and good judgment and determined will, then he himself receives a satisfaction that cannot be augmented by the congratulations of others. This is not to say that it is enough for the emotional introvert simply to know that he has done his best. Quite as much as the feeling extravert, he needs the outward test and the recognized victory. This gives his subjective triumph its true, objective flavor. But after the public victory the emotional introvert does not need the congratulations of the onlookers, although if deserved, he may accept them graciously.

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[35] This is not to say, however, that Thoreau was an emotional introvert. Because emotional introversion implies a concern with the subjective consequences of action it does not follow that a concern with the subjective consequences of action implies emotional introversion. Factors other than those of emotional introversion can bring about the same result, factors that will be discussed in a later chapter.

It is much the same with the introspective extravert. To be sure, in the beginning, the cognitive relationship is somewhat simpler than the active relationship. The messages from the world impinge directly upon the personality, and it is not practicable to make a distinction between their effect upon other people and their effect upon oneself. The cognitive relationship, however, approaches the active relationship in indirectness and complexity when the messages which have been received are rechecked with their source to make sure that they contain no error. It is in his failure to recheck the messages that the introspective extravert resembles the emotional introvert. The introspective extravert has been led by the force of his inferiority feelings, by his sense of insecurity in the world, to refine the exterior portion of his fundamental relationship. He has subjected his perceptions to the further review of the adaptive process. But the consequence is that his patience is all used up when it comes to the ideas which these perceptions subtend. He no longer experiences the desire to be cautious, and his ideas come to him with all the conviction, indeed with all the pleasure, of revelations of truth.

Thus it comes about that although the introspective extravert ostensibly stresses the function of perception, his real stress is upon the ideas which his perceptions suggest. These are the reward of his adaptive effort, and he has no inclination to subject them to a further review. That ideas are meant to be submitted to a further examination, and tailored and shaped to fit humdrum and prosaic facts—this to the introspective extravert seems monstrous and not to be borne. It is a thought he simply cannot endure. Needless to say, the converse of this is also true. Unless an idea comes to an introspective extravert in an immediate way, it does not seem like truth, and he has no use for it.

Accordingly, although an introspective extravert is able to receive suggestions of mood or of action, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for him to receive the suggestion of an idea. If you and he, in the course of your conversation, are both approaching an idea, and he sees that you are a lick ahead of him, he will cry out, "Wait! Don't speak! Don't speak! I have it! I have it!" And if you are fond of your friend you will wait, for the pleasure it may give you to express the idea is as nothing in comparison with the pleasure it will give him. And so it is with the emotional introvert. He is at times willing to receive unformulated ideas from another person. But suggestions of mood, or of action? Never! As mentioned, it is almost impossible to give an emotional introvert advice. In general, the chief emphasis of both types is upon originality and individuality, and the notion of formula is odious to them no matter what the function. Thus if one sees an introspective extravert or emotional introvert making use of the formula, one may be sure that this is as a result of secondary adjustment, and at the expense of a good deal of that delight which the individual once took in the immediacy of his feelings or ideas.

All this as regards the introspective extravert may be seen with infinite detail in Tolstoy's great novel, *War and Peace,* where the central character, Pierre Bezukhov, is clearly an introspective extravert.

The portrait is all the more convincing because, through the irony of heredity, Pierre received a massive physical constitution which tended to offset the introspective tendencies of his personality. Most introspectives are not so lucky. When bored they do not fall asleeep but reflect upon their boredom, and then pass from the stage of boredom to the stage of depression, which is much worse. But Pierre, who to begin with was probably more convivial than depressoid, was equipped with the flywheel of an enormous, unnervous physique. Thus the introspective characteristics which he shows stand out in relief against the general health of his figure, and are complicated by no neurotic or hypochondriacal traits.

Pierre is presented to Tolstoy's readers in the opening scene of the book, at Anna Scherer's soirée. Indeed, it is as though the scene were chosen for the sake of the man. For at the soirée, every one except Pierre is the soul of conventionality, and communicates entirely by means of the formula. Tolstoy likens the gathering to a spinning mill where all the spindles are supposed to go in a uniform manner, and observes that it was Anna's function to keep them running "in steady, proper, and regular motion."[36] No wonder, then, that Anna viewed the entrance of Pierre with alarm. For Pierre was an individual without formula, one who was unfamiliar even with the speeches that one makes upon entering or leaving a drawing room. In contrast with the mannered faces of the other guests, Tolstoy tells us that Pierre's face was distinguished by its "observant and natural expression." Pierre, in fact, had no idea that such a gathering was merely a form, a game, the rules of which every one knew except himself. Naively, he thought that it existed for the exchange of sincere and serious opinions. Thus in spite of Anna's attempts to keep his spindle running "in steady, proper, and regular motion," Pierre soon fell into serious discussion—into a discussion in which the merits of Napoleon were considered and in which he, Pierre, to the consternation of those present, became the defender of the Corsican upstart!

It is true that in his lack of formula, Pierre might be construed as an emotional introvert. Such is always the case in psychology, especially in a psychology of types, and is the reason why diagnosis remains the most difficult of the various disciplines. Yet as always, there is one trait which is not common and which determines the group to which the individual belongs. With Pierre, it is his weakness, indeed his virtual lack, of will. Far from possessing the function in its emotionally introverted development, the introspective extravert seems frequently not to possess it even in its normal development, and such is the case with Pierre. Pierre is the easiest of persons to be led by another, whether by the young rakes, Anatole Kuragin and Dolokhov, or by Boris's mother, Anna Mikhaylovna. When it came to his marriage, not only was he led into the affair by Hélène and her father, but the business was managed even without a specific proposal from him. True, after his participation in the retreat from Moscow, which caused in him a kind of secondary adjustment, Pierre was pleasantly surprised to find an improvement in his powers of decision. But in the early pages of the book Pierre is quite unreconstructed, and in his weakness of will cannot be conceived as an emotional introvert.

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[36] All quotations from *War and Peace* will be taken from the Maude translation.

It is unfortunate that limitations of space prevent an adequate treatment of this portrait of an introspective extravert. For the portrait is complete in all details, extending from Pierre's illegitimacy (surely an adequate cause of his subjectivation) to his explosiveness and search for the meaning of life—traits of the introspective extravert to be taken up on a later page. Pierre's lack of formula and lack of will have been pointed out. In the remaining paragraphs of this section, only the refinement of his perceptive powers and the conviction with which his ideas came to him can be mentioned.

To be sure, the frequency of a person's ideas depends to no small extent upon his native imaginative powers, and an introspective extravert like Pierre, who was not highly intuitive, will spend more time in examining his perceptions, less time in conceiving the ideas which these perceptions suggest. But the general movement is the same in all introspectives. There is a relaxation of tension away from the perceptions toward the ideas. The individual refines his powers of observation, but he receives his reward from the ideas which his observations suggest. Thus although Pierre spends more time in groping than in conceiving, the groping is always for the sake of the conceiving, and when an idea comes to him it brings with it all the pleasure and conviction of which an introspective extravert is capable.

For instance, after his very brief interview with Bazdeev, the Freemason, at the post station, an interview in which Bazdeev hardly mentioned his Order, Pierre was swept away by his notion of the new future which would now be so easy for him. "Not a trace of his former doubts remained in his soul," Tolstoy writes. "He firmly believed in the possibility of the brotherhood of men united in the aim of supporting one another in the path of virtue, and that is how Freemasonry presented itself to him." Then there is that extraordinary idea which became an obsession with Pierre, namely, that on account of the cabalistic significance of his name in connection with Bonaparte's he was the man destined to kill Napoleon. When the idea came to him, Tolstoy writes, the "discovery excited him. How, or by what means, he was connected with the great event foretold in the Apocalypse he did not know, but he did not doubt that connection for a moment."

There are many other instances. But since Pierre was not particularly intuitive, the refinement of his perceptive powers is more noticeable than the number or power of his ideas. Pierre was a person without formula, with very little will, and with hardly any *savoir faire*. It is typical that in Moscow he should have been arrested by the French almost as soon as he ventured out into the occupied city. But Pierre was unusually percipient of his surroundings, especially of the human beings in his surroundings. During the period of his becoming involved with Hélène, he was perfectly well aware of what he was getting into. He could reflect, "She's stupid. I have myself said she is stupid. There is something nasty, something wrong, in the feeling she excites in me." Pierre knew perfectly well that "to marry Hélène would be a calamity." He simply could not muster the will power to break the entanglement.

Pierre's sharpness of perception, however, comes out most clearly after his arrest by the French. Only the trembling of a leaf intervened between Pierre and execution. Yet far from being prevented by anger from making accurate observations of his surroundings, or by fear from making them at all, Pierre read sharply and correctly every flicker of expression in the faces of his French captors—from Davout, who interviewed him, to the individuals in the firing squad who carried out Davout's orders. Pierre could always perceive the smallest nuance of human expression if he gave his mind to it, as is evidenced again when he immediately sensed the change that had come over his captors after the orders for retreat had been given. That this sensitivity extended also to Pierre's nonhuman surroundings, readers of the novel will remember from his impressions of Moscow during the period of his captivity, and again at the time of his departure from the ruined city.[37]

Sharpness of perception and conviction of idea go hand-in-hand with the introspective extravert. As a type, the introspective extravert seems frequently ill-fitted to succeed in a world where formula and *savoir faire* are not without their value. But as a type, the introspective extravert is able to perceive his surroundings with unusual and especial accuracy. Pierre's spectacles and absent-mindedness did not prevent him from being, in reality, the sharpest-sighted of all the characters in *War and Peace*.

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[37] It is interesting to note that in his essay "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," William James quotes from Pierre's impressions of Moscow during the period of his captivity (*Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals,* New York, 1906, pp. 255-257).

7

THE THYMIC STREAM

1. Introduction

AFTER all has been said that can be said about the emotions, one fact emerges as more significant than the rest. Emotion, whatever else it may be, is always blind. It may attach itself to sight or sound coming from the outer world, it may be the personality's chief means of contact with that world, but in itself it never looks upon the world. Unlike thought, which arises beyond the self, feeling arises within the personality. It can reach the world only by leaving the personality, only by utterance—whether in speech or in action. And it can *connect* with the world only by causing change. Its connection with the world lies in its visible effects, in the visible evidence that it has *affected* the things and people which it sought to engage.

Now all this may be summed up by regarding emotion as a stream of personal expression, arising within the personality, and narrowing as it prepares to leave the personality and make the leap from the personality to the world. And the stimuli that come to us through the limited apparatus of the senses, through the limited apparatus of the attention, may be regarded in the same manner—if in an opposite direction. Once past the threshold of the senses and the attention, they unfold and spread out in the mind as the intellect contrasts and compares them, as it examines their opposites and their likenesses, their relationship with the past and their significance in the future. Indeed, quite as the cognitive, or *gnostic,* stream may be regarded as arising in the outer world and as expanding within the mind in intellectual dispersion, so the emotive, or *thymic,* stream may be regarded as arising within the mind and as contracting while it mingles with the gnostic stream.[38] Finally, the thymic stream narrows into action, and joins hands with the world in occasioning perceptible consequences.

The conception may be illustrated diagrammatically if one is prepared to make the necessary synoptic allowances. In this case, since objectively we know the source of emotion to extend to the ductless glands and the sympathetic nervous system, while subjectively the theater of emotion seems to be the mind, a compromise between physiology and metaphysics can be attempted, and the meeting place described simply as the brain. The diagram might then be drawn as follows:



Figure 13

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[38] The "gnos-" of gnostic should be pronounced as in "rhinoceros," the "thy-" of thymic as in "thigh."

This new diagram, it will be recognized, is but a development of the principal diagram of Chapter 1. Yet since here the interest is only in the blind, indeterminate fashion in which emotion arises, the blind, indeterminate fashion in which thinking ends, all suggestion of periphery (whether of mind, brain, or body) can be abandoned, and the matter looked at simply as the merging of two streams:



Figure 14

Here, then, is the final concept of dual function: of thinking as arising beyond the personality, of feeling as arising within the personality, and of the two as meeting in the center of the personality. It may be conceived that this meeting is part of the use and purpose of each function.

Thinking, as will be remarked on many occasions, expands so that feeling may have a variety of ideas from which to make its choice; feeling contracts so that it may concentrate upon a single idea and issue forth as action. Were the streams not to meet, the thinking would end in a cloud of unmeaning and ineffectual suggestion; were the streams not to meet, feeling also would not pass beyond the nebulous stage of incipient emotion and the personality would be palsied both in act and in thought. The circuit closes inside the personality when the streams do meet. The circuit closes outside the personality *when the gnostic stream picks up the results of the thymic stream, when thinking* (*no matter how rudimentary*) *observes the consequences of emotion.* The matter can be indicated in the diagram by an arrow curving round from the end of one stream to the beginning of the other:



Figure 15

But to return to the principal subject in hand, that is, to the blindness of emotion, it might be remarked that the old adage about love's being blind is truer than ever it supposed. The adage, to be sure, has chief reference to the power of love to think what it feels. But as a matter of fact love is blind before ever it obscures the intellect. What lover is ever sure for the first time how his lover's gift is going to be received? What friend is ever quite certain in time of trouble that his words of consolation or of encouragement will be the right words? What two persons have ever lived together in harmony and happiness without paying some regard to their effect upon each other? The lover who does not watch his beloved for the signs of returning affection, for the signs of his success or failure, will never succeed at all—this at least may be said. The peacemaker unattentive to the progress of his overtures will fail in spite of all his effort.

Indeed, how thickly lie the ashes of human endeavor because the results of emotion were not attended to! How strewn with wreckage is the long history of human relationships because feeling *is* blind, because in spite of the thinking which may precede it, it must to some extent leap in the dark, because in so doing, it may so easily fail of its mark! Only examination after the deed can show the accuracy of the aim. Only examination of his beloved's face can assure the lover whether his suit is progressing or failing. He must venture first and check up afterwards. He must observe the consequences of his emotion.

The foregoing may be spoken of as the *ex post facto* theory of the emotions. It is, of course, merely a broadening of the theory of the active fundamental relationship. In fact that relationship is now seen to be but the outward aspect of a condition that is inseparable from the nature of emotion itself. It is inherent in emotion to spring forth blindly from the personality, and to depend upon another function for the refinement of its aim. As a consequence, the feeling personality is, from the very nature of feeling, a leap ahead. He obeys his heart and considers afterwards; the thinker meditates and then acts. That is why in the sudden crises of life the feeling personality nearly always has the advantage. The Walter Raleighs who in the twinkling of an eye have their cloaks off for the queen to walk on, the Thomas Carews who stumble, extinguishing their candle the very moment they perceive the queen with a lover, are apt to be, not thinking, but feeling personalities.

Furthermore, what is here said merely of the emotions must be predicated of the entire thymic stream, of the entire egoistic process, from the lowermost states of urge, through the impulses and emotions, to the uttermost fiat of the will.

It is all of it, in itself, blind. Experience may refine its aim to an unbelievable degree, but each individual emotion, each individual act of the will, in its essence springs darkly from within the personality and gains mergence with the world only after it has left the confines of the body. There is only an *ex post facto* relationship between the ego and the world, although there is an anterior relationship between the world and the ego.

No matter how abstruse his thinking, the scientist experiences no break between the specimen and his observation of the specimen. The geologist may be as patient as he desires in examining the rock fault before his eyes—it will not vanish while he thinks. Whatever in its essence the outer world may be, there is no break between the world and our perceptions of the world. The world is there, let him look who will.

But the individual's emotions, which are internal things, reaching out from the person to the world, fail of union with the world more readily than the world fails of union with the person. They are fleeting and dynamic things, and in being limited to an active relationship with the world must lose their identity in occasioning their results. Only when the results occur do they enjoy objective reality; only when the results occur does a relationship exist. And only when the results accord *ex post factively* with the emotions which were their cause is the cycle complete, the bridge effected between the individual and the world. .

Only then is the avenue of communication between the personality and his environment open for further communication. Only then can it be said that the perishable internal commodities are taken up by a receptive world, and the stimulus given, so to speak, for the manufacture and marketing of further wares.

The individual is thus dependent upon effects for his personal relationship with the world. If the lover's words move not the stony ears, if his actions move not the unfeeling eyes, his feelings are wasted. And if they move but he perceives not, they might as well be wasted. In the one case they fail of objective connection; in the other, he fails of objective connection. The individual must act, and the individual must watch, if he is to make his mark in the world, if he is to gain what he desires. Only when his emotions produce effects, only when his emotions like a series of advance couriers, each one preparing the way for the next, succeed in delivering their orders and in having the preparations made, is the individual's journey through life a progress instead of a halting. And as the individual overtakes his couriers he checks up on the preparations, and in accordance with his satisfaction or dissatisfaction with what has been done, repeats or amends his instructions to the messengers.

Whereas with the objective world the connection lies within, as regards the subjective world the connection lies not merely without but without and within. One needs only to attend and to perceive to have the messages of the outer world stream in upon him. Yet to tie the inner world to the outer, not even feeling and acting is enough. One may feel and act to one's heart's content and come never the nearer any real connection with what lies without and beyond. Change, change and disturbance, must take place in the outer world for there to be connection, and the change must then be reported back to the individual for the individual as a personality to be joined with the things beyond, for the individual to experience his union with that world which he knows already to have union with him.

In other words, all avenues of consideration lead to the selfsame conclusion. Whether the individual is a feeling or a thinking personality, whether his life is a business of acts or of meditations, his crucial link with the world is perceptive. No matter what handicaps or ineffectualities he may suffer from, no matter how forceful or how impotent his personality may be, how intelligent or how stupid, all is not lost if that link remains, and all is very nearly lost once that link is broken. It is the individual's life line. It is what, above all else, must be kept free and clear.

2. Impulse

But it is time to turn to the beginnings of the thymic stream. The notion of the two streams of psychic life has been presented, as well as the most striking characteristic of the emotional life, and the moment has come to consider impulse itself, the raw material of the thymic stream, the basis not only of emotion and feeling but of action and volition as well.

Now in turning to impulse, where the psychologic is most closely allied to the biologic, the sanctions are strong that one should begin with the latest research upon the relationship between the two, that one should call into play the most recent studies in the region of the psycho-biological. But the temptation to accede in this respect is countered by the notion of the essentially mental nature of psychology. Strictly speaking, psychology is a business of the intangible and the immaterial exclusively, while psychobiology in its very hybrid nature is neither psychology nor biology, but now one and now the other. If only to avoid confusion, the strict psychologist believes that he should concentrate his attention upon conscious experience, upon volitions and feelings, upon ideas and perceptions, whether assumed objectively from deeds or reported by the individual himself.

On the other hand, the facts of biology are not to be denied, and the strict psychologist will certainly be hesitant to embark upon a theory that runs counter to known biological data. As a matter of fact, although the exact relationship between the body and the mind is as shrouded in mystery as ever, analogically, the parallel of the body is perhaps the most fruitful source of psychological theory that there is. Indeed, once the search for an exact relationship is abandoned, psychology may take its fundamental concepts from biology with more justification than the mathematicians began working with the $\sqrt{-1}$. In that case, as in so many others, the mathematicians began with pure speculation. But the psychologist knows that there is some connection between the mind and the body (even if he does not know what it is), and assumes that psychology belongs to the same order of things as biology. If the latest findings of psycho-biology must properly be rejected in a strictly psychologic study, nevertheless those commonplaces of ordinary biology may be used which, in being commonplaces, have become philosophic truths. It is in this light that the consideration of impulse in this study will begin with the simplest and most fundamental concepts of biology.

Very early, indeed, in the study of biology, the student learns that living matter is to be distinguished from non-living matter by the presence of a separate energy. Non-living matter may have all sorts of energies, crystallization, coagulation, and the like, but in the strict sense it can neither nourish itself nor perpetuate its kind. The student is told that this energy has eluded the preparers of synthetic protoplasm. The biochemist, he is informed, may prepare a protoplasmic substance responsive to heat, to light, and to what not, but he cannot make it actively incorporate its own subsistence, or actively pass on the torch of its own living nature. This separate, active, almost purposeful energy (to be distinguished from all forms of physical or chemical energy) the student of biology learns to call impulse; nor does the psychologist alter its name. Neither does he alter the biologic conception of this energy's inherent duality, which he, too, recognizes by discriminating between an impulse to individual life and an impulse to racial life.

Which comes first, protoplasm or its peculiar life-energy, and which is more important, the impulse to individual life or the impulse to racial life, are conundrums for the amusement of the idle. Protoplasm, by definition, is not protoplasm unless endued with impulse; and impulse is not impulse unless both reproductive and self-sustaining. Nothing is to be gained by determinations of priority and importance, and the duality of the living matter and energy, as well as the further duality of the living energy itself, may be taken as ultimate data. Life, as we know it, consists of physique and impulse, and impulse seeks the preservation of the individual and the preservation of the species. The amoeba betrays this complexity, and we may be sure that the first protozoan that ever lived betrayed it equally. The garden plant offers an illustration under our eyes. It has corporeality and the dual impulse. It seeks in the earth and air its nourishment, and by efflorescence reproduces its kind.

That is why one is justified in quarreling with those sociologists and psychologists who list, empirically, various odd numbers of "cardinal" impulses. The impulses must always be divisible by two, since all are derivatives of the basic impulse to life which is found to be dual in its greatest simplicity, in the lowest living creature. Hence if one includes an impulse to self-development, one should also include an impulse to race-development, and so on, and so on. The individual and the species go hand in hand, and the general tenor of the living energy is to take care of the one as well as the other.

3. Impulse and Emotion

But the strict psychologist will not linger on the subject of impulse. He takes the position that impulse is something to be hypothesized rather than dwelt upon. Impulse in itself, he believes, is never experienced directly. As a matter of fact the words "impulse" and "impulsive," as used in ordinary conversation, he takes to mean no more than "strong emotion," "strongly emotional." And the concept of impulse as used in psychology, implying the energic basis of the whole psychic life, he takes by very definition to be an assumption and not an observable fact. The energic basis of the psyche must, by its very nature, be too nearly connected with the physical to be a component of conscious experience. It is the position of the strict psychologist that only in moments of crisis is impulse experienced even indirectly.

Still, it will do no harm to look at the matter empirically, and for the sake of example, one may take a rough-and-tumble lumberjack in camp all winter and coming to town in the spring. According to the popular notion, the lumberjack feels, and is driven by, the straight sexual impulse. With this notion it is impossible to agree. One familiar with the situation described, or with a situation similar to it, will recognize upon a moment's thought that the lumberjack quite consciously desires woman. Indeed, not only does the lumberjack experience desire (in other words, an emotion and not an impulse), but there is mixed up with his desire a large intellectual component. The lumberjack knows exactly what kind of woman he wants, and more likely than not, as the spring advances, will be at pains in the bunkhouse to declare in detail the object of his quest when he arrives in the city. One hunky will have a girl, another a full-blown woman; this one a brunette, the next a blonde; and so on. It is not apparent that the lumberjack or any one else ever experiences directly the sexual impulse. It is only apparent that one's desires may be aroused, and that these (when equipped with the necessary motor ideas) may lead to action.

Yet it may be granted that impulse may be experienced indirectly. In moments of mortal terror, even in moments simply of spasmodic fear, the male body, it is known, may experience involuntary orgasm, seeking, as it were, in its last act to ejaculate and to perpetuate the species. In moments of such unusual psychic strain the normal emotional process may indeed be short-circuited, and what is hypothesized as lying below appear on top. Yet even in such moments, as far as the individual is concerned, the impulse seems to be experienced after the act. At the time, the consciousness is entirely of the emotion of fear. It is only after the impulse has expressed itself, and the act has happened, that the individual perceives that he has been subject to an impulse as well as to an emotion, that he perceives that another life-tendency besides that of self-preservation has been at work within him.

To be sure, between the above conception of impulse and that of general unconscious desire the distinction is not great. Both are equally unconscious, and both as indifferently to be observed after the act. Still, in speaking of involuntary orgasm as above, without sexual object or partner, it is correct to hypothesize not unconscious desire but impulse. Desire is not desire without an object. Even one's unconscious desires manifest themselves as attached to the nominal, and it is clear that one must desire something to desire at all. With impulse, however, as in the instance above, the object is lacking and only the life-tendency, only the broad purpose of the impulse in general, is to be observed. Although the distinction is not great, nevertheless it is to be made.

But it will be worth while to consider one more example, especially if it illustrates, not the impulse to race-preservation, but the impulse to self-preservation. The impulse may be taken in the form perhaps best described as the impulse to nourishment. Once again it is apparent that only where hunger has advanced so far as to present a real crisis is the raw impulse ever experienced, and that even then, no less than with the sexual impulse, the impulse is experienced after expression rather than before or during the act.

Surely every one in his youth has been on a camping trip where owing to miscalculation the provisions ran short. Perhaps they only grew scanty, but perhaps they stopped altogether, and not at all improbably during the time of little food, the individual and his companions were obliged to keep up the activity of the excursion, the walking, the canoeing, or what not. During this time, in all probability, there was much fantasy, and considerable talk, of things to eat. Great bowls of crackers and milk, steaks smothered with onions, piles of steaming potatoes, and the like undoubtedly filled every one's imagination. With the return to home or civilization and the possibility of making fantasy and talk real, no doubt the imagined and desired things were ordered and eaten with ravenous appetite. Yet no matter how ravenous the appetite, how violent the first mouthfuls of food, the process was everywhere, as we see it, rational and conscious, nowhere impulsive and unconscious. That the need for food *can* become so acute as to lead to the involuntary seizure and swallowing of anything chewable one knows from report to be true. Then indeed the brute impulse to feed and to survive may appear, without desire and without emotional object. But in that case, as with the involuntary expression of the sexual impulse, knowledge of the impulse comes after its expenditure in action. No more than the impulse to race-preservation, can the impulse to self-preservation be experienced directly.

And this is to speak of the two basic impulses in their more primitive aspect. That their developmental sides can be experienced at all, directly or indirectly, exceeds the power of comprehension.

Indeed, so compelling do these truths seem, that one is led to advance an hypothesis to account for them. In the absence of impulse from the conscious life, in the identical purpose and function of impulse and emotion, it would appear that the emotions are directly subtended by the impulses, that the emotions are sublimed, distilled impulses, *that emotion is impulse transmuted so that it may enter the rational realm*. In fact so necessary is such an hypothesis for the understanding of impulse and emotion that one is justified in picturing a sort of mental midriff above which the impulses as impulses may not pass, a sort of mental diaphragm beyond which the impulses can penetrate only by a vaporization of their volatile parts. In the happy absence of crisis from the lives of most of us, it would appear that this transmutation of impulse into emotion is the normal means by which the body's fund of impulse expresses itself.

From the point of view of conscious experience it is thus clear that there are two forms of thymic energy—the one form latent and unexpressed, the other form manifest and articulate. The expressed and articulate form is the normal prelude to action; the other form appears only when the principle of life itself is at bay. The manifest, emotional form, being psychic and rational and constituting a datum of conscious experience, is used by the strict psychologist very nearly to the exclusion of the latent form. But the latent form is implied in everything that he says about the manifest form. To be sure, there are also implications about the presence of the emotional object. But for the time being, it will pay to look upon emotion and impulse simply as varieties of the same thing, remembering that, normally, only by becoming psychically active, or volatilized, can the impulse life express itself at all.

Furthermore, if the impulse life is the source and storehouse of the emotional life, one will not look to find emotion present in greater amount than impulse. As a matter of fact, one will not expect the volatilization of impulse to be more than partial, since some of the store of impulse must be saved to carry out the desires of the volatilization. How futile would be the generation of emotion if that were the end of it! If a person's desires are generated for an adaptive purpose, then some of the body's energy must be preserved to make them real. Moreover, in a transmutation of energy thus partial and fractional at best, in a volatilization that is never complete, one will look for variation in the amount of volatilization, variation in the fractional degree. In other words, since even with that individual whose emotional cup is overflowing the emotionalization of impulse is only partially complete, it will be natural to regard cups that have been less generously filled as the result of lesser degrees of volatilization.

On the other hand, in the absence of factors to the contrary, one would expect the quality of the impulse life to be carried over into the quality of the emotional life. Indeed not always, but frequently, vigor of desire is to be observed with vigor of bodily effort, weakness of emotion with a low threshold of fatigue. That there is a correspondence between the strength of one's desires and the strength or weakness of one's physical energy, common sense as well as psychologic insight would seem to imply.

This introduces the last generalization about the impulse life that it seems practicable to make. Although the distinction between intensity and amount has meaning as regards the emotional life, as regards the impulse life, it seems to be without significance. If impulse, or the peculiar life-energy, is coextensive with protoplasm (and such has been assumed from the beginning), then as regards impulse, quantity is not a variable but a constant factor. There will be as much impulse as living matter, and the only variation between individuals will be in the strength, or intensity, of the endowment. Hence although an individual may appear to have been given energy in slight amount, strictly speaking, he was endowed with it in a weakened degree. A general debility of impulse is to be assumed rather than a shorting of it here or there. To be sure, as far as practical consequences go, it is all one whether a person be scantily or weakly endowed. A new battery that is not charged will fail to start a car quite as effectively as an old battery that has been charged to the limit but is still too weak to turn the motor over. Hence, as regards the impulse life, it is not necessary to employ a strict terminology. That will be saved for the emotional life, where a significant basis for the distinction has been found, where quantity of emotion corresponds with the degree of volatilization, and where strength of emotion comes from the strength of the impulse life.

The above remarks complete what may be called a theory of impulse and emotion. Yet, as regards a psychology of types, they serve merely as an introduction. For in the quantitative independence of the emotionalization of impulse may be found the basic predication as regards introvert and extravert, the predication which will constitute the axis of this study. In the chapter on thinking and feeling personalities, it was stated that thinking is to be equated with introverts, feeling, with extraverts.[39] Now it may be added that this almost fundamental qualification is, in reality, to be ascribed to the difference in the degree of volatilization. The extravert is he whose store of impulse (whether strong or weak) is volatilized more or less to a total emotional capacity, the introvert, he whose store of impulse is volatilized only to a proportion of what it is with the extravert, *who becomes, therefore, a sort of norm.*

This fits in with the percentile understanding of the matter that has been stressed from the beginning. In the first chapter upon extraversion and introversion it was declared that the distinction between extraversion and introversion is one only of degree.[40] Here it may be stated that this degree is the degree of transmutation of basic energy, a transmutation partial at its fullest. This fullest sets the scale, and when the volatilization is less than 50%, not of the store of energy, but of a possible emotionality, one observes that the gnostic stream has a more than 50% opportunity to flow in upon the individual; that when the volatilization is more than 50% complete, the gnostic stream has a lesser chance, perhaps almost none at all.

The above concept of the differing degrees of emotionalization permits, in fact, the introduction of a basic criterion in the diagnosis of introverts and extraverts, *the criterion of subjective pause.* For if the introvert is he whose gnostic stream flows in to occupy a more than 50% share of his attention, this is only because there is a more than 50% retirement of his emotional stream enabling it to do so. In other words, when the individual is so well adjusted that it is apparently impossible to tell whether he is extraverted or introverted, the observer will do well to ask himself if the individual ever experiences that true cessation of feeling which comes from an emotionalization less than 50% complete. The extravert, for instance, is far less often to be observed in that mood of vacancy, in that suspension of the animated attention, where the individual seems to be conscious only of his inner state of being. The extravert in his moments of leisure will read, or turn on the radio, or go to bed and sleep. As a matter of fact the distinction is usually borne out in the eyes. With the extravert there is generally a brightness, not of inner, intellectual excitement, but of outer, emotional concern. Although his thinking powers may be so well trained and his emotions so well held in check that he seems as measured as an introvert, there is usually an outer attention in the extravert's eyes, an exterior vividness of focus, seldom if ever to be encountered in the introvert. In the first chapter on extraversion and introversion it was stated that with many well adjusted personalities diagnosis as to extraversion and introversion is difficult, if not impossible, of attainment. Here it may be said that as the diagnostician grows more skilled the margin of uncertainty at least diminishes, and that no criterion so surely reduces it as the notion of subjective pause. Briefly, it is this pause that is the ground and basis of the introvert's essential subjectivity, the ground and basis of his essential capacity for thought. He has this if nothing else.

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[39] See above, pp. 112-113.

[40] See above, p. 43.

In other words, it should be clear that it is with the degree of volatilization that this study is particularly concerned. As with mood-cycle, so with strength of emotion. The latter is a factor of extreme importance, but outside the structure of the eight types, and not to be reckoned with until one leaves the type and approaches the individual. Like mood-cycle, which was equated with the general structure of the physique, strength of emotion is to be associated with the general quality of the body's impulse life. Indeed, as with the impulse life itself, strength of emotion is too closely allied to the physical to command a central place in a strictly psychological, or philosophical, study of the human mind. On the other hand, degree of volatilization occurs as a truly psychic factor, appearing first in the emotional life, and throwing in its vote just before those other psychic factors of thinkingness and feelingness, of subjectivation and objectivation.

Returning to the figure of the emotional cup, one observes that the cup may be filled with wines of differing shades of color (that is, with wines of different cyclic complexion), with wines of varying degrees of strength, and finally, with abundance or with scantiness. Although only the last of these variables is of use in the conception of the eight types, yet the other factors are not to be forgotten in any just appraisal of the individual. Although perhaps the filling of a man's glass is of chief importance to him as he sits down to dinner, yet surely whether his wine be weak or strong, white or red, is worth his passing notice also.

4. Impulse and Emotion (continued)

If one excepts mood-cycle, there are then three factors that must be borne in mind in any attempt to take up the emotional life in detail. One must bear in mind the strength or weakness of impulse, the strength or weakness of emotion, and finally, the degree of emotionalization, which will be referred to, indifferently, as the emotional capacity, or as the emotional reservoir. Although but one of these factors is truly psychic, and although all three are distinctly factors of the background, they must nevertheless be reckoned with in any true appraisal of emotionality.

It will pay to look at these three factors more empirically than has been done.

The first of them has already been declared to be the only factor as regards impulse. And here let an answer be given to all those who by being overscientific would be unscientific. Strength or weakness of impulse is not so subtle a thing as to need narrow defining and close clinical observation. There are certainly divers kinds of strength of impulse. Every one knows that some persons are good for the quick pull, others for the long haul; some for thought, others for manual labor. Yet the energy is there, and the individuals are good for something. However, there is that other, unhappy individual, often debilitated in health, who is good neither for the short pull nor for the long haul, neither for work with his mind nor for labor with his hands, the individual without energy of any kind. Physically speaking, he is short-breathed; mentally speaking, a few obstacles turn him over. The individual is weak in impulse. The condition, as already suggested, is one of organic endowment, and one strongly suspects that the ill health follows in the wake of the weakness of impulse, rather than the weakness of impulse in the wake of the ill health.

This gives a cue for a more exact determination. For it must not be thought that ill health and weakness of impulse are by any means synonymous. Ill health may, of course, derive from causes quite other than weakness of impulse, and before rendering judgment one must balance the individual's productivity, and even his attitude, with his ill health. Robert Louis Stevenson, for instance, an invalid all his life, was anything but weak in impulse. His walking trips, his canoe trips, his donkey trips, and all in spite of his ill health, bespeak the man's unquenchable vitality. The long shelf of books written in little more than a score of years gives a measure of his productivity. His strong, courageous attitude is seen in the essay *Aes Triplex*.

The judgment as to strength or weakness of impulse is one that each diagnostician will make according to criteria of his own. But he will never be far removed from the individual's productivity, even if he discounts the individual's attitude. Whether he measures miles walked or yards swum, letters written or books published, children supported or trophies won, he must measure impulse by determinable result. And when ill health advenes, he must gauge the productivity in the light of the impediments, reserving his judgment of weakness for those who surrender early to their ill health, for whom impediment is not impediment but insuperable obstacle. These are the people really weak in impulse.

Then there is the factor of emotional strength to be borne in mind, parallel with the factor of strength of impulse. Here, too, the diagnostician will look for tangible criteria, and will determine strength of emotion by what it accomplishes, by what it will bear. If he notes persons avowedly attached to their friends but observes that their attachment supports little in the way of service, if he perceives that the spontaneous, generous act is almost never theirs, he will suspect the strength of the attachment if he does not question its reality. And as with weakness of impulse and ill health, where it is necessary to evaluate two, not clearly opposed factors, so here (especially with extraverts), emotional strength must be weighed with emotional distractibility. The duration of emotion (too often confused with the strength of emotion) may be overthrown by the sheer number of desirable ends, by the sheer number of intriguing things, in the world. The individual may appear weak in emotion when in reality he is only spread too thin. Yet even here, short as the tenure of the particular desires may be, it is not impossible to gauge their strength. The individual whose affection for his friends is strong rather than weak at least attempts acts of service even if he is unable to carry them through. More often, he accomplishes his desire in isolated actions, betraying his emotional dissipation by his failure to incorporate them into any kind of sustained effort or program. The individual whose emotion is weak, however, seldom makes attempts, for he cares about nothing very much. He loves no one strongly, and his affection will bear little in the way of act. He is selfish from weakness of emotion.

The last of the three factors is more subtle than the other two. It is, on the surface of it, more difficult to gauge the individual's emotional capacity than his strength of impulse or strength of emotion. For here the useful criterion cannot be one of measurable result, but must be one of role in the individual's life. It may be contended, however, that even this can be determined accurately and scientifically. For, as suggested in the second chapter of this study, there is no reason why the answer cannot be secured by taking an undistorted life-period and plotting an average day therefrom. Nor should this be unreasonably difficult. One seeks a period removed from school, from job, and from wooing and winning influences, since school and job weight the intellectual, wooing and winning the emotional, sides of an individual. Vacations are particularly useful in giving this undistorted period, although all leisure moments are not without their value. From such a period, simply by noting the average number of hours given to emotion and to the activities of emotion, one should be able to arrive at an estimate of the individual's emotional capacity.

At the moment, the concern of these pages is particularly with those individuals who feel strongly, but feel only a portion of the time; with the individuals who, although suffering from no weakness either of impulse or of emotion, feel almost never at all. This is the scale of introversion, a scale that must, from the point of view of extraversion, be regarded as hypothymic. But to describe introverts as cold and unemotional is to miss the point completely. Their latent emotional capacity may so store itself up between times that when it bursts forth they seem to be the most emotional of people. Yet with the introvert there is never that continual generation of feeling which the extravert experiences. Above all, when the introvert feels, he has usually been emotionally at rest. The introvert, if left to his own devices and undisturbed by early environmental habit, usually occupies himself with some kind of comparatively unemotional activity, in particular, with some kind of thought activity, although an emotional bias may not be lacking.

As a consequence, one is forced to distinguish between a hypothymia that is functional, and a hypothymia that is organic. The former is the concomitant of the introverted personality, and to be equated with degree of emotionalization. The latter occurs only where there is a definite and usually demonstrable defect in the basic strength of impulse.

A matter solely of weakness in the quality of emotion, the organic type of hypothymia has little place in a study that aims at being strictly psychologic. It may provide a basis for the inferiority feelings of objectivation or subjectivation, but in itself it is without influence in the formation of the eight types. This is reserved for the functional (if constitutional) kind of hypothymia, the kind which conditions introversion.[41]

As always, however, there is a complication that must, in passing, be mentioned to round out the appraisal of the whole. There is a good deal of evidence to lead one to believe that the hypothymia which is at the basis of the schizoid personality is a further development, not of the organic type of hypothymia, but of the functional type of hypothymia, the type of hypothymia which, in the last analysis, simply makes people thoughtful rather than cold, introverts rather than extraverts. Schizoids with strength rather than weakness of impulse are an every-day occurrence. Frequently they show not only strength but even violence of the basic life energy. Yet often they are colder than those who possess a weakness merely in the strength of their impulse and emotion. In other words, the coldness of schizoidia is apparently quite different from the coldness of a deficient emotional intensity, and is to be equated, not with weakness of the impulse strength, *but with a further scanting of the emotional reservoir.*

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41. It may be that this distinction between an organic hypothymia and a functional hypothymia that is nevertheless constitutional is not altogether a happy one. Yet the net result of the functional hypothymia in the normal introvert is simply to bring about a shift of functions. Thinking becomes his major function instead of feeling, and the central introvert is every bit as healthful and well-adjusted a personality as the central extravert. On the other hand, the organic hypothymia is always unhealthful. Whether extraverted or introverted, the individual whose emotional life is weak in quality is at a disadvantage. And so, irrespective of the fact that both hypothymias are equally constitutional, it seems wise to call the hypothymia that conditions introversion merely "functional," the other hypothymia, "organic."

For instance, if one assumes that the healthful filling of the introverted reservoir ranges, say, from 35% to 50%, then apparently the schizoid filling ranges from 20% to 35%. The healthy introvert has emotion enough to be fond of friends and associates and at the same time to love his wife and his children. But apparently the schizoid has not. If the schizoid has enough affection to be fond of a devoted and slavelike wife, then he is apt to lack it for friends and for children; or again, if he has enough for children and for old people (that is, for the ones who make no demands upon him), then he is apt to lack it for wife and for friends. Frequently, of course, the reservoir of the schizoid is not taxed beyond its limited capacity. But frequently it is, and then out of the pre-psychotic may emerge the psychotic, out of the schizoid may develop the schizophrenic, condition. All this is matter for a more detailed consideration later on. It can only be mentioned here that the hypothymia of schizoids, according to the observation and reasoning of this study, is a business of the emotional capacity and not of the emotional strength.

5. Resonance

If the foregoing is true, then the schizoid is to be regarded simply as an extreme introvert. Furthermore, since the condition of schizoidia has long been recognized to rest upon a physical basis, this is a strengthening of the view that the pause upon which introversion rests is constitutional in origin and beyond alteration in the individual case. Degree of emotionalization, no less than strength of impulse and emotion, would appear to be established before the individual begins to function as a percipient human being, before the individual begins to be modified by his exposure to the outer world. At any rate, it may be held that the truly psychic commences when the influences of the outer world first begin to play their role in the development of the individual, and the part of emotionality which then comes into operation, as opposed to the constitutionally determined, may be called emotionality proper.

Conversely, it may be said that emotionality proper begins when the thymic stream enters the emotional reservoir and becomes exposed to the influences of the exterior world. True, these influences of the exterior world may merely be reflected within the individual's own mind. The messages of the exterior world may be considerably weakened as they are simply recollected or imagined by the individual himself. Nevertheless, whether real or reflected, the messages of the exterior world are a factor in the emotional reservoir, or rational realm, as it may also be called, and the study of emotionality proper is quite different from the study of the thymic stream as it may be inferred to exist in the subrational regions of the human mind.

Furthermore, since the study of emotionality proper is the study of something that is dynamic, it naturally becomes the study of a beginning, of a middle, and of an end—a study of how emotion enters the reservoir, of how it behaves while there, and finally, of how it departs, making room for more. These departments of the problem of emotionality are usually described as those of *reactivity, resonance,* and *discharge,* terms which have, perhaps, an unnecessarily technical sound, but which are in no way opposed to the individual's own, common-sense view of his emotionality. For whether one's emotions are aroused by a moving picture on a screen, or by a record that he plays on a phonograph, or merely by an idea which he conceives in his mind, it is difficult to think of the origin of emotion except as a business of *reactivity.* Moreover, once a person's emotions are aroused, something happens to them. They come out as tears or as words, they lead to actions or to promises, or indeed, as the Freudians have made clear, they may be banished to that limbo of the psyche, the unconscious mind. In other words it is equally difficult to think of the outcome of emotion except as a business of *discharge.*

It is also clear that reactivity and discharge consist of gnostic and of thymic elements. Thymically, reactivity does not take place without a latent capacity for emotion, without a certain amount of emotion ready and waiting to be aroused. Gnostically, the arousing does not take place without an emotive stimulus. For no matter how ready and waiting one's latent emotions may be, how poised at the edge of the reservoir, it is common knowledge that certain things arouse us and other things leave us cold. The things that arouse us, the stimuli of our emotions, may accordingly be spoken of as the field of our excitation. It is the same with discharge. Thymically, there is the reservoir of emotion, now filled and ready and waiting to be discharged. Gnostically, the reservoir will not be discharged without a pattern of action. True, the ideo-motor field, as it may be called, is not always so apparent as the field of excitation. The patterns of discharge, more often than the emotive stimuli, are found below the level of consciousness. The patterns of discharge can be largely unconscious, even instinctive. Nevertheless it is impossible to think of discharge without a pattern of action, and the business of discharge, quite as much as the business of reactivity, must be regarded from the double point of view.

Then there is the speed, or *tempo,* of the reactivity and discharge. It is here that emotionality comes into view. For in the last analysis, the ideas that arouse emotion or that give it release—above all, the emotions that are aroused and released—these are inner things, to be reported by the individual, or to be inferred from his actions. But the tempo of emotion, the speed with which a person reacts or discharges his emotions—this not only is outward but frequently is the very thing to which one objects in other people. If only so-and-so were not so "gummy," one hears it said. If only so-and-so were not so hasty in his actions. Clearly, a trait psychology will linger on the subject of tempo.

Finally, there is the inner course, or *resonance,* of emotion, which has been left to the last since it is not a characteristic of the emotionality of all human beings. All human beings react, and all human beings discharge the emotions which have been aroused in them. But only where the personality is naturally subjective can there be an inner course to emotion in the strictly conscious and rational sense with which it is taken in these pages.

For resonance, or inner course, does not mean the delay that may occur while one is searching for a pattern of action. During that delay the individual's attention is straining toward the possibility of discharge. Resonance, or inner course, implies a delay in its own right, a delay in which there is no pressure toward discharge, a delay in which an emotion, after it has been aroused, remains as an emotion, while the attention moves on from whatever aroused it to something else. Thus the thought of an impending and desired vacation may excite in one a feeling of hope. However, if the feeling is to experience an inner course, instead of being expressed by huzzahs or by the action of getting out one's things for one's suitcase, it must remain as a feeling, while the mind goes on to reflect upon the desired vacation which may, for example, depend upon the return of another employee whose own vacation has been protracted by ill health, and who is now overdue at the office. This second thought imparts to the individual's hope an element of fear, which throws the hope into relief. To be sure, the individual will then think of other, encouraging circumstances, which serve to fortify his hopeful mood. But again, he will also think of further reasons why his fellow employee may very well be delayed, each of these reasons fortifying his mood of fear, so that in the end his emotion of hope has experienced an "inner course" in a very real sense, and in this course has acquired the dimension of "depth."

True, such a simple illustration of the quality of resonance as the foregoing seems to refute the assertion that the quality is not a characteristic of all human beings. Who has not known both hope and fear when the life of some beloved person is hovering between life and death? And indeed no assertion in these pages is absolute, or can be absolute. Nevertheless, only with certain personalities does an emotion run an inner course in perfect freedom, with no tendency either to be discharged or repressed. Such freedom, for the most part, is found only with introverts, whose natural pause favors the development of resonance, or inner course. The extravert who is watching at the bedside of the beloved person is inclined either to express his fear and receive encouragement from the physician, or to put it out of his mind and give rein to his hope. Extraverts experience contrasting emotions no less frequently than introverts. But either the contrasting emotions appear as contrasting actions, as tears mixed with laughter, as caresses mixed with blows, or the less favored emotion is assigned to the unconscious, it being generally recognized that the mechanism of repression is more commonly employed by extraverts than by introverts. Except in the case of the sentimental extravert, there is little tendency among extraverts for the emotions to be experienced inwardly as emotions, and hence for an emotion to be felt with that depth which can only be given to it by a touch of the opposite kind of emotion.

It is clear, in other words, that resonance is not likely to occur apart from the habit of reflection, a habit but seldom shown in its pure form by an extravert. An extravert can learn to reflect upon almost any type of problem, even upon the abstract, speculative problems of philosophy, but the natural habit of stopping when one has felt, or thought, or done something, and then of reviewing that feeling or thought or action in the arena of the mind—this habit, because of the limited filling of his reservoir, nearly every introvert possesses, and this habit, because of the abundant filling of his reservoir, an extravert very seldom possesses. That is why William James fell into the only serious error of his philosophical career when he supposed that we are sad because we weep, that we are angry because we have struck out or wanted to strike out. Indeed, as William James himself has shown, a man's point of view is inevitably colored by his own personality, and James's theory of the emotions is simply the way in which an extravert's emotions seem to an extravert. The extravert has so little consciousness of emotion apart from action that he may well think that his sorrow is the result of his weeping. In his lack of subjective pause, the stimulus to emotion is so soon followed by the discharge that he may well believe that his anger is the result of his blows. But the introvert cannot accept such an explanation. Not being subject to the emotional pressure of the extravert, he has the opportunity to experience his emotions as emotions, and to mark a more accurate sequence of cause and effect. He perceives that with the extravert, because of the extravert's greater pressure to feel, the inner course is either highly foreshortened, or else entirely dropped out.

The business of resonance thus appears to be a corollary of that prime distinction which was made in the first of the two chapters on extraversion and introversion. There it was presented that the selves of extraverts come to them from the outside, that extraverts are never entirely familiar with their selves, that subjective extraverts, accordingly, are prone to utter statements of personal taste as if the most objective of truths in the world. Whereas the introvert seems to possess his self in a private room at home, the extravert seems to possess his self in a booth at a fair. Not only has he picked as public a place as can well be imagined, but his booth, although perhaps enclosed on three sides, is open to the world in front. The extravert is clearly in business with the world, and what is more, seems often not to know just what he has for sale until the world, by making inquiry, prods him to find out.

It is true that the sentimental extravert, for one, does not have a very active booth. He seems to be at the fair, not for the world's purposes, but for his own, and in this respect he approaches the introvert. But his booth is still public, not private, and what activity it manifests is set in motion by the coming and going of the passers-by. There is a certain amount of stock-taking and shelf-arranging in the sentimental extravert's booth, even if little is sold.

Thus although the sentimental extravert seems to enjoy a kind of subjectivated (if not subjective) pause, and although his inactivity gives him ample scope to savor his emotions, to the introvert, there is something external, something bogus, about the sentimental extravert's consciousness of his emotions. The introvert observes him reaching out for the means to feel, retelling an anecdote for the sake of the emotion involved, putting on a special pair of slippers in order to give depth to the tale he is reading, and cannot understand emotion that is thus whipped up from the outside. He does not deny that the sentimental extravert experiences his emotions as emotions, and as a consequence, knows the quality of emotional depth. But he finds such resonance beneath contempt, and frequently cannot contain his scorn for emotion that thus seems to him to be artificially engendered.

Conversely, the abstract introvert, although possessed of the introvert's private room for the occupancy of the self, will have none of it. The external values of his thinking personality in combination with the objectivating force of his inferiority feelings have turned him away from the inner life, and he has locked the door of his private room and gone out into the street. Unless the object of a secondary adjustment restoring to him some of his lost subjective pause, the abstract introvert knows but little resonance of feeling. He remains as unique among introverts as the sentimental extravert is unique among extraverts.

On the other hand, although similarly propelled into the outer world by the objectivating force of his inferiority feelings, the emotional introvert does not close the door of his private room, but on the contrary, keeps open the door of his house as well, so that he may return at a moment's notice. For the emotional introvert's final values are the inner values of a feeling personality; the things which he ultimately holds dear are the feelings, his own and other people's.[42] Thus although the emotional introvert goes out into the world to do great deeds, deeds that will make a stir and remove from him the onus of inferiority, these deeds take their meaning from the feelings they arouse. In fact, since the individual is an introvert, they take a greater meaning from his own feelings than from other people's, so that in the last analysis he does his deeds for his own satisfaction. Hence, when the deeds are done or not a-doing, he returns to his private room to review the course of his life and to receive the reward if there is any. Actually, his excursions into the outer world have the effect of making him value his inner life all the more. More than any other type it is the emotional introvert who finds the retrospection of his adventures not only satisfying but at times more satisfying than the adventures themselves, a tendency that must in part be due to his unusual capacity for resonance. For in retrospection, a man's past returns, not only better than life on account of the selection of memory, but thrown into relief by the knowledge that as real life it has passed away. In retrospection one's pleasure, rendered more intense by the selection of memory, is rendered doubly intense by the poignancy added to it by the sense of loss. This experience the emotional introvert, because of the unusual depth of his emotional life, must especially know.

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[42] Since the feeling introvert is also a feeling personality and an introvert, much of what is said here about the emotional introvert will apply to the feeling introvert. He, too, will have his private room, and in his private room he, also, will have ample opportunity to savor the depth of emotion. The chief difference will be that not being so violently propelled into the world, he will not show the same contrast between his private and his public life. His public life will take a flavor from his private life. His private life will consider the problems of his public life. In general, throughout this study, much of what is said about the emotional introvert will apply to the feeling introvert, and *vice versa.* And the same will be true of the abstract introvert and thinking introvert, the introspective extravert and thinking extravert, the sentimental extravert and feeling extravert.

It is needless to add that the schizoid, who often seems to be a kind of extreme emotional introvert, carries these tendencies to an excess, and in so doing experiences an undue resonance of feeling.[43] On account of the schizoid's more limited emotional capacity, the contrast between the private room and the public thoroughfare is more pronounced than in the case of the ordinary emotional introvert, and the schizoid's desire to return to the private room is correspondingly more intense. The schizoid spends more time in this room than the emotional introvert, and there the contrast between private and public, between the world of the imagination and the world of fact, between himself as he might have been and himself as he is—all this becomes unusually heightened, and the schizoid's feelings become unusually resonant. Especially does the schizoid's sense of deprivation make poignant what has passed away, what has slipped from his grasp never to return. The sense of loss which adds depth to the retrospection of the emotional introvert does the same with the schizoid. But the sense of loss is ever stronger, ever more closely allied to pain, ever more ready to become the dominant emotion.

Thus Hölderlin, the great German lyric poet, was kindled for the first time to the truly great in poetry by the loss of his beloved Diotima. The pain he suffered threw into elevation the love for life and poetry that he had known during the three years they were together, that she had kindled in him. The curious and relevant thing, however, is that Hölderlin's greatest poetry came, not as a result of this intensification of what was lovely and beautiful, but as a result of the passing of this intensification. It was when the heightened sensitivity which the loss of Diotima had given to him was beginning to wane in its turn, when he saw that even this was being taken from him, that Hölderlin wrote his most poignant and sensuous poetry. Then loss added to loss, pain added to pain, threw the principle of life itself into relief, and for a short time, before the twilight fell, Hölderlin attained the truly supreme in poetry.

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[43] Only those schizoids are considered here who are feeling personalities. The schizoid can, of course, become a thinking personality. But then the result, as will be explained on a later page, is to close the split which is the significance of the name, so that the term is no longer applicable. In this study, the schizoid will be assumed to be a feeling personality and, in the arrangement of his functions, to resemble the emotional introvert, or, occasionally, the feeling introvert.

It is clear that resonance has a particular meaning for the schizoid. As mentioned previously, the schizoid's limited emotional capacity may never be taxed beyond its slender means. But if it is, if the schizoid is subject to undue demands, so that his adjustment passes into maladjustment, and his schizoidia into a schizophrenia, then at the center of his maladjustment may very well be found a sense of pain that is inseparable from the normal resonance of an introvert. Again and again, the center of the schizophrene's behavior seems to be an abnormal capacity for suffering. Yet this, it is now clear, is but an exaggeration of behavior that is more or less a characteristic of introverts, and of emotional introverts in particular. The schizoid, whether in health or in psychosis, simply carries certain tendencies of the introvert to an extreme.

6. Tempo

Depth of feeling can thus be a doubtful blessing. Even when it is a virtue, as in the case of Lincoln, where it was and is one of the reasons for his great human appeal—even in such cases it must be remembered that to the individual himself, depth of feeling is often much the same as a capacity for pain. And when exaggerated, as in the schizophrenic psychoses, the quality can verily become the means of the individual's destruction. Thus when one is inclined to speak disparagingly of an extravert's lack of resonance, one should remember that emotional resonance is an ingredient that can bring woe as well as happiness. Extraverts, in their lack of resonance, may at times seem superficial in their attachments; but introverts, even normal ones, with too much resonance can be a burden to their friends and a bore. Who has not seen an introvert, supposedly blighted in love, with a face a mile long and an inability to think about anything else? He seems to have no bounce, no sense of proportion, no philosophy of life. In such a case, what would one not give for a little less indwelling and resonance, for a little greater readiness to close one chapter and go on to the next, for a simple valediction that one had loved and lost, and might have better luck next time.

But whether blessing or handicap, resonance is a quality to which a trait-psychology can devote no more than a passing glance. When the chief interest is in type, the problem of emotionality becomes one principally of reactivity and discharge. It is accordingly fitting that the problem of reactivity and discharge be examined in greater detail, that a narrower scrutiny be bestowed upon those factors which have been stated to form the essence of each.

To turn, then, to these factors, it may be pointed out that the emotional stimulus, or gnostic element in reactivity, can play a role in speeding the volatilization of impulse as well as in releasing it. When the level of entrance to the reservoir has not been reached, the emotional stimulus is often able to lift the gathering volatilization to the dimensions of a conscious emotion. It can, in fact, cause an emotionalization of impulse that has not even started to gather, as is the case whenever news of joy or of grief suddenly reaches our ears. Such an emotive stimulus does not play a releasing role but an exciting role. It arouses an emotion that would not ordinarily, or at least not at that time, have come to pass.

Now it is a biological truism that an organism, after being spurred, needs rest, and when the emotions have thus, so to speak, been artificially induced, there must be an ensuing recuperative pause, a pause not experienced, or at least less frequently experienced, by the more abundantly emotional. It must be a pause which those whose volatilization of impulse is ever brimming at the door of the reservoir seldom, if ever, know. For where there has been pressure toward emotion, there is not recuperation after stimulus, not weakness, but release and neutrality of emotional condition. On the other hand it is clear that an individual whose degree of volatilization is low rather than high, yet whose walk in life carries him among the more abundantly emotional—it is clear that such an individual will feel the exciting more often than the releasing stimulus, that such an individual will then know the emotional fatigue that requires the recuperating pause. Indeed such an individual may well know an habitual fatigue if constantly living beyond the plane of his emotionality. At any rate, unless fresh from a period of emotional rest, it must be that an introvert responds more slowly to emotional stimuli than an extravert, whose fund of impulse, by definition, volatilizes more rapidly than that of the introvert. It must be that introverts as a class are slow to feel.

The relationship between speed of volatilization and speed of discharge is perhaps not immediately so clear. Once the reservoir has been filled, whether by releasing or by exciting emotional stimuli, it might be supposed that the discharge would follow as quickly with an introvert as with an extravert. However, although an exciting stimulus may indeed arouse the introvert's lethargic emotional capacity to reservoir proportions, even beyond them, one cannot but observe that to some extent an unhabitual, infrequently used machinery must then be called into play. For reactivity and discharge go together. To feel less often is to act less often, and other things being equal, the introvert's ideomotor field will be less responsive to the presence of emotion than the extravert's. Furthermore, the introvert's ideas are inclined to be of an interpretive, thoughtful kind rather than of the active kind that sets emotion free. Emotion, neither in its beginning nor in its end, is his major activity, and it is clear that, basically, the introvert will be both slow to feel and slow to act.

The same or similar factors will be found at work in the extravert. Rapidity of volatilization will be as much of a force in reactivity and discharge as slowness of volatilization. The rapidly volatilized fund of impulse will need less often the exciting emotional stimulus; often it will require only the suggestion of a motor idea. Indeed, being frequently called into play, the motor ideas will be the more ready to appear, and the individual will be able quickly to discharge his quickly aroused emotion. Furthermore, the extravert's ideas to begin with are more apt to be of the active sort than of the interpretive sort. In other words, the extravert may be conceived to be as basically vivacious (i.e., *quick to feel and quick to act*) as the introvert is basically phlegmatic (i.e., *slow to feel and slow to act*).

Yet although in comparison with the strength of emotion the capacity for emotion is sufficiently variable to allow one to create upon it a psychology of types, nevertheless as regards tempo, it is the rigid rather than the plastic factor. On the basis of an almost exhaustive observation it may be said that nothing can materially increase the introvert's emotionalization of impulse beyond a certain constitutional degree. It may equally be said that nothing can really reduce the extravert's emotional capacity, presented to him at birth in more abundant proportions. It is true that whether introvert or extravert, the individual may fail to realize the potentialities of his emotional capacity. As is well known, even an extravert may develop, temporarily, a completely stuporous condition. Nevertheless this is not an exception to the general statement that as regards emotionality, and hence, in a way, as regards the individual's adjustment to life itself, the thymic element is the fixed and not the variable factor with which one works.

It is not surprising that this should be so. One cannot lose sight of the fact that capacity for emotion, like strength of impulse and strength of emotion, is an asset, a definite endowment for the good. The extravert's ever-filling reservoir, when harnessed and made effective, is his great capital resource, his asset of assets, his very worth as a man. The introvert, whose reservoir is less frequently full, would by so much be at a loss if he did not, in the very absence of plentiful emotion, have an opportunity to develop the other side of his nature definitely and precisely as a compensation. Indeed, whatever the generosity with which one's purse has been filled, what money it contains is not to be thrown away in a huff because there is not more. Nor is it to be wasted because there is a great deal. What money there is, as nature clearly implies, is to be used as thriftily as possible. And adaptation comes in as the introvert learns to invest his money so that it comes back six- and sevenfold; as the extravert learns to spend it wisely, and not squander it bit by bit. With both introverts and extraverts (unless organic disease play its role), variations above and below the normal tempo of the personality must largely be due to nonthymic causes, and must largely be corrected by nonthymic means—indeed, by working with the factors that spring, not from within, but from without the personality.

With introverts, this is a question, more often, of providing greater and more varied interests to bring out the latent emotional possibilities; less often, of reducing the number of interests that scatter the personality's limited quantity of emotion.

With extraverts, where alone the issue presents any subtlety, a retardation of either phase of emotionality can, of course, never be due to emotional, but must be due to intellectual, reasons. An outwelling stream may find obstruction in an exterior object, but it cannot obstruct itself. As a matter of fact one is not permitted to regard even an overquickened emotionality as attributable to an excess of the emotional commodity. Although with extraverts, the reservoir may frequently seem too highly charged for its own or anything else's good, nevertheless it is absurd to find the fault in too great a quantity of emotion. The hydroelectric engineer might as sensibly reject an overflowing stream as possessing too copious a supply of power. The fault must lie solely and exclusively in the absence of harnessing. The excessively vivacious person must be excessively vivacious either because too many things arouse his emotions, or because too many ideas lead to their discharge, or both. With extraverts, all undesirable variations of emotional tempo must be owing, not to largely ineradicable conditions of emotional endowment, but to a defective gnostic stream or to a defective uniting of the two streams, that is, to a lack of development of the intellect, or to an emotional centering upon too many ideas, or upon too few.

To make a long story short, one bestows upon reactivity and discharge a closer scrutiny only to be impressed again with the relative stability of the emotional factors, the relative alterability of the intellectual ones. The actual business of emotional tempo (and hence, from one point of view, of the individual's adjustment to life) is a matter not so much of capacity or strength of emotion as of the breadth and variety of the individual's intellectual life. The emotional capacity, or thymic factor in reactivity and discharge, is indeed broadly determinative as to type; but the variations of individual personality come rather from the influence of that inpouring gnostic stream upon that other, thymic stream, which seeks to well out in its midst and by its means. It is the reason why growth and adjustment to life is a matter of education, why the story of one's passage from childhood to maturity is the account of what one learns, of what one is taught. As a matter of fact, if growth did not lie with the intellectual faculties, if we could not learn, we should be condemned at birth, for our emotionality is largely constitutional and fixed. We can, however, by many means play upon this emotionality. We can adjust it and ourselves to life.

7. Correlation with Type

It is not enough, however, to stop with the general vivaciousness of extraverts, the general lethargy of introverts. Cutting across all differences of extravert and introvert is the distinction between feeling and thinking personalities, and equally to be reckoned with is the separation of personalities into center- and end-types. Surely these distinctions, so significant from other points of view, will have their bearing upon tempo. Although it remains that all introverts are basically phlegmatic (i.e., *slow to feel and slow to act*), all extraverts basically vivacious (i.e., *quick to feel and quick to act*), nevertheless one's attention must be given to the minor variations as well as to the major variations.

Yet to attain these variations either by the straight and narrow empirical path or by the straight and narrow deductive path would be as foolish as it would be impracticable. True thinking is as much a marriage of the inductive and deductive processes as is matrimony a union between man and wife, and it would be as sensible to put up the bars between one of the pairs as between the other. Deductively, it is obvious that the further variations will be those of *slow to feel and quick to act, quick to feel and slow to act*; inductively, it is obvious that the quickest way in which to gain these variations with respect to type is to observe, empirically, how the variations fall with individuals already typified according to established criteria.

Hence, after denominating the slow to feel but quick to act as *explosive,* the quick to feel but slow to act as *excitable,* it was discovered on the basis of a wide empirical examination that the explosive personalities were, on the whole, the emotional introverts and introspective extraverts, the excitable personalities, the sentimental extraverts and abstract introverts. In other words, the variations of the basic introverted and extraverted pattern fell out, once again, according to that chiastic relationship which has already been brought to the reader's attention. Furthermore, whether one looks at the matter deductively or empirically, it is clear that the thinking introvert is more phlegmatic than the feeling introvert, the feeling extravert more vivacious than the thinking extravert. The thinking introvert, being the introvert of introverts, would naturally exhibit the basic introverted characteristic the most sharply of all; the feeling extravert, being the extravert of extraverts, would show the general extraverted trait no less conspicuously.

Thus the thinking introvert would be less sensitive than the feeling introvert to the normal, feeling range of emotional stimuli, less familiar with the normal, feeling range of motor ideas. For the feeling introvert possesses the values of the feelings (even if it is more natural for him to think about those values than to act upon them). The thinking introvert, however, does not possess the values of the feelings, and may be totally unfamiliar with what calls them forth and with what lets them go. Similarly, the values of the thinking extravert will, in the same way, estrange him to some extent from the free, feeling play of emotional stimuli, from the free, feeling play of motor ideas. Deductively, one would suppose him less vivacious than the feeling extravert, and empirically, this is just what one's observation discloses. The thinking extravert, no matter how median and well adjusted, is nevertheless less supple in his emotional tempo than the feeling extravert. Although perhaps as quick to act, he is certainly less quick to feel. Similarly the thinking introvert, in spite of any appearance to the contrary, is always less sensitive to genuinely emotional stimuli than the feeling introvert. The feeling introvert, it is true, can take forever to respond to the need for emotion; but the thinking introvert is apt not to respond at all. He is apt not to respond until the situation is all over and he has had time to think about it. Indeed, whether from empirical or from deductive considerations, one is justified in describing the thinking introvert as *Phlegmatic A,* the feeling introvert as *Phlegmatic B,* the feeling extravert as *Vivacious A,* and the thinking extravert as *Vivacious B.*

A combination of reasoning and observation thus leads to the table given on the opposite page, which the reader will note is similar to the ones already presented.

But a table that has been constructed deductively, if only in part, carries with it the need of pragmatic validation. It is thus necessary to return to life, and to reexamine this table in the light of the behavior of a number of typical human beings.

Take the emotional introvert, the romantic hero of the nineteenth century, the Mr. Rochester of fiction and the Lara of verse. He is as noted for his long-suffering patience as for the violence of his acts once that patience is exhausted. His eyes betray his smoldering passion, a passion that wakes but slowly, but a passion that sweeps all before it when once aroused. The Byronic hero takes his beloved by storm. He does not ask her father's permission. Again, he neither forgets nor forgives, for in general it takes an emotional cataclysm to alter the tenor of his ways and in the absence of emotional explosions he keeps to the old mood instead of changing to a new. Indeed the emotional introvert is also the romantic villain of the same century, the individual who can nurse a life-long grudge and pay off his enemies with a burst of demoniac laughter. Without the emotional introvert, the romantic writers of the nineteenth century would have had to close up shop.

Explosive	Excitable
Phlegmatic B	Vivacious A
Phlegmatic A	Vivacious B
Excitable	Explosive

Tempo

Figure 16

And emotional introverts are as explosive in every-day life as in literature. In fact, they can be described as the people who might, or do, throw things. Their patience snaps, and the gadget they are repairing is hurled to the floor, the dress they are sewing is ripped in two. As is well known, not only bottles of ink, but parrots in parrot cages, flew from Byron's windows. At parties, in guessing games, emotional introverts are apt to meditate and then shout out an answer, stamping their feet and flailing their arms. In boarding school, they are the young devils who lead the other boys in explosions of rebellion against the school authority, the boys who live long in school tradition. Such emotional introverts, in later years, may turn out to be the pillars of their community, but they are the problem boys of youth. And a great deal of their deviltry comes simply from the explosiveness of their emotions.

The explosiveness of the introspective extravert is of a slightly different kind. It is usually shorter-lived, and less violent. Whereas the explosiveness of the emotional introvert may be said to come from a quickness to act, that of the introspective extravert comes from a slowness to feel. The introspective extravert is inhibited in the inception of his feelings. Although his capacity for emotion is more than ample, yet the ordinary bases of feeling are lacking, and it takes an unusual situation or idea to bring his feeling to the surface. This, in combination with his extraverted quickness to act, makes his tempo explosive. Indeed his actions may be more sudden and disruptive than those of any other extravert because of the greater accumulation of his emotion. The emotional introvert, on the contrary, is explosive through an overquickened discharge. He preserves the slowness to feel of the undistorted introvert. But his sense of inadequacy has made him conscious of a need for action, and, in fact, given him a freedom from volitional inhibition. Hence when he acts, he is apt to act not only explosively but beyond his emotional capacity, and afterward to be sluggish because of the effort. On the other hand, the explosiveness of the introspective extravert involves no overstraining of his emotional resources, and afterward there is not the same period of emotional recuperation. The introspective extravert explodes and forgets about it. And from this comes the greater lightness of his acts.

Yet the same outlines are to be noticed in the behavior of each. The introspective extravert is only a little less stormy at parties. Perhaps he doesn't thump so loudly with his feet, but he shouts as loudly with his voice. At games of round-robin ping-pong he will very likely be the most vociferous player present. In school there is the shift from rebellion to simple mischievousness. But introspective extraverts, or the children who will later become that type, are scarcely model pupils. In fact they are the ones who are a delight to poke and to pinch, for they can be counted on to explode with a loud "Ouch!" in a quiet room. As is not surprising, introspective extraverts are poor keepers of secrets, for they betray them suddenly in moments of unconscious impulse. In general, except for the secret cause of their inferiority feelings, they wear their hearts upon their sleeves and are delightful people. The delay in their feelings gives them insight as well as explosiveness, and like their chiastic similar, the emotional introvert, they seem to combine much of the best of the introverted and extraverted personalities.

Sentimental extraverts and abstract introverts show the other extreme in irregularity of tempo. Their quickness occurs at the beginning rather than at the end of the emotional arc. They are the ones who feel quickly, but do little about it. "Up like a rocket and down like a stick," might be said of them.

And yet the two feel quickly for different reasons. The abstract introvert feels quickly because in turning toward the outer world he has become conscious of the need for feeling. Being a stage or two removed from the concrete concerns of the emotional introvert, he senses the need as one for feeling rather than as one for action. But he responds quite in the same manner with overreaction, which, when coupled with his natural introverted slowness to act, makes him an excitable type. Yet he is not so excitable as the sentimental extravert. The latter's quickness to feel is the natural endowment of all extraverts, and his slowness to act comes from a subjective distortion which, like the subjective distortion of the introspective extravert, simply prevents him from reaching the tempo of his general type. The sentimental extravert is withheld from his norm; the abstract introvert, plucked above it. As a consequence, the excitability of the abstract introvert is the more febrile of the two conditions. The excitability of the sentimental extravert is the more natural, as indeed it is the more common, state.

One sees this excitability in the tendency of sentimental extraverts to rhapsodize upon almost any provocation. Praise, in itself a good thing, is apt with them to become a torrent merely of personal expression. Things quite prosaic are described as "heavenly," things quite material spoken of as "simply divine," and human beings who have not gone out of their way are set down as "too kind." Sentimental extraverts are apt to be the telephonists who, safely removed from the need of doing anything, can be lavish in the outpouring of their sympathy or indignation. In general, they get in dithers but not in sweats. In the last century, if women, they would screech at a mouse on the floor but do no more than get up on a chair; even nowadays when a bat flies into the room they merely clap their hands to their hair and wait for some one else to come to the rescue. Lastly, when sentimental extraverts get drunk they get drunk in their own peculiar way, which is, to be sure, a very harmless way. They get tittery in the early stages, and jocular in the latter, but they never do themselves or property any real damage. At their most extravagant they simply fling their arms and legs about and, if women, put on something like a man's hat and look self-satisfyingly silly. On the whole they are harmless people, people whose bark is always worse than their bite.

With abstract introverts the furore is about ideas, whether purely theoretical or connected with things in the shape of plans. The world they live in is conceptual rather than real, and in this conceptual world the slightest spur can set them off. If the possibility is one of marriage, then there will be plans for the costumes of principals and attendants, plans for the suppers before and receptions after the ceremony, plans for the music, plans for the honeymoon —and all this, like as not, before the date has been set or the fact itself agreed upon. Usually, as above, the stimulus is of a personal nature, but the result is always the same gin fizz of excitement. Some real estate is purchased or otherwise acquired, and although there may not be a penny in the bank, no detail of the future house is too minute to be imagined. A small skiff is excuse for a copy of Lloyd's register and a whole library of books on navigation. Indeed, with abstract introverts, the greatest excitement is usually over the least practical details of whatever they have in mind. If a tearoom is the project, then the spices will be laid in first—not casually, but a complete line of them, from mustard to anise seed. If the idea is of an expedition into the woods, then the first purchase will be a patent traveling mirror or a new preparation against insects.

Nevertheless, as is true of the other end-types, abstract introverts frequently show an excellent secondary adjustment. Their talent for ideas has only to be joined with a capacity for execution to make them valuable persons. When secondarily adjusted they may closely resemble the thinking type at the center. Then it is that one must go to their leisure moments for the old, tell-tale excitement, for the excessive language, for the passion over sheer ideas. Secondary adjustment in any event is usually a matter of business, and once removed from business, the abstract introvert is able to indulge himself in the old, delightful disproportion between concept and reality. This he never really loses. Indeed without this, life itself would not be too much worth the living.

With feeling extravert and thinking extravert, the problem is more subtle. As always, it is more difficult to distinguish between the center-types than between the end-types, and in this case, the differences between Vivacious A and Vivacious B are hardly to be grasped by direct inspection. Thinking extraverts, like feeling extraverts, are quick to feel and quick to act, only less so. The distinction is one of degree, not of kind. Hence it is to be sought in the consequences of emotion rather than in the emotions themselves. Feeling extraverts are able to express their feelings by feeling words and by feeling deeds; but thinking extraverts, because of their thinking values, are denied this easy outlet and must express their emotion by means of thinking talk, by means of thinking deeds. The indirect outlet is, of course, less facile than the direct, and the thinking extravert, even when unhampered by subjective distortion, is less vivacious than the feeling extravert.

As a consequence, the thinking extravert suffers from a greater emotional pressure than the feeling extravert, which is evident in his greater impatience. In conversation the feeling extravert becomes restless enough when some one preempts the center of the stage and monopolizes the opportunity for feeling discharge; but the fretting and fuming of thinking extraverts when their projects are slowed is proverbial. In general, a more satisfactory release of the emotions is afforded by thinking activity than by thinking talk. Whereas feeling talk can go on forever, thinking talk sooner or later runs into a *cul-de-sac* if it is made to serve the ends of emotion. For these reasons thinking extraverts are apt to be men of action, and consequently, their vivacity is frequently better seen in what they do than in what they say. It is the opposite with feeling extraverts. Theirs is a touch-and-go of the feelings that actions can never fully accommodate. Actions are not fast enough, and the opportunities for action not frequent enough, to provide feeling extraverts with the fullest possible scope for their vivacity.[44] Indeed, the glibness of the feeling extravert is often what chiefly impresses the looker-on. The thinking extravert, however, in his greater impersonality often finds actions easier than words, and unless intellectual (which is something quite different from being a thinking personality), prefers to subordinate conversation to work. As these pages have had occasion many times to point out, the thinking extravert is commonly a better executive than consultant, a better doer than planner. Not that he is unable to plan and to advise things well, but that he is able best of all to carry them out. Here in the management of things he can expend his emotionality. Here he can find rest and relaxation. And here, if anywhere, he can gain achievement and success.

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[44] The only statement made here is that actions fail to provide the vivacious feelings of feeling extraverts with the fullest possible scope. As explained in the section on "The Two Languages" (see above, p. 65), actions constitute the basic language of feeling personalities, words the basic language of thinking personalities. Most feeling personalities, for example, no matter how dearly they love to talk, would much rather express their feelings by means of a present than by means of words. Yet, as explained on page 69, to mature is to pick up the other language also, and as regards the adult feeling extravert, it must be said that words come in handily to accommodate the overflow of his vivacious feelings.

The difference between thinking introvert and feeling introvert is of much the same order. The difference is not one of kind but only one of degree, and to distinguish between Phlegmatic A and Phlegmatic B one must look to origins and to results rather than to the feelings themselves. The lesser emotional lethargy of the feeling introvert comes from his sensitivity to the feeling values. The common, every-day things of life arouse his feelings and permit of their discharge. The thinking introvert does not have these values. Typically, his activity is the activity of thought itself, and when he speaks, it is not about the feelings that he talks but about ideas. As a consequence, his feelings are stirred and released the most tardily of all the eight types. The thinking introvert seems aloof and preoccupied, or laborious and unimaginative. The ordinary situations of life pass him by, and he appears absorbed in the details of his business or profession. He is seldom temperamental, and unless erratically endowed, is one more apt to be commended for his work than for his personality. In reality, he may be highly emotional, but as explained in the section on formula, his emotion is apt to need the release of a channeled source. The moving, dramatic situation must be pictured, or it must be told. More than any other type, the thinking introvert, emotionally, needs the interpreting, refracting medium. The formula is needed for his emotions; his responsiveness is for ideas. These are the stimuli which excite him, and yet his forte is not a quickness to feel about them (as is the case with the abstract introvert), but a patience to work with them. This is his chief talent, his superiority to the abstract type, of which his type may be held to be the adaptation.

The feeling introvert, however, lives in the world of the feeling values. Feeling talk and feeling actions are as natural and as available to him as they are to the feeling extravert, and if a tendency is to be noted in him very much to prefer deeds to words, it is simply because he does not possess that effervescence of emotion which spills over into speech before, and after, it has recourse to action. Not being possessed of emotional ebullience (and not being made conscious of his lack), the feeling introvert is a contented man. The actions of the retiring and of the peaceful are his prerogatives, and he is characterized by a quiet euphoria. The feeling introvert is the pipe smoker *par excellence.* Thinking introverts in their preoccupation let their pipes go out and burn matches instead of tobacco, while the other types are altogether too temperamental to get the good that is to be got out of a pipe. Again, feeling introverts are the putterers, the "household" or "carpet-slipper" type. Their patience over their feelings, their willingness to wait for the fructification of their schemes, gives them an easy superiority as gardeners, householders, and maintainers of property in general. Frequently feeling introverts develop into the craftsman type, the individuals superlatively good with their hands. They become the sought-out dentists, the careful printers and painters, the deft and sure workers in wood. "Little by little" might be taken as their motto, and they whistle and hum to themselves as they work. In time they develop speed as well as dexterity with their hands. But they never develop quickness in their feelings. In fact their very skill depends upon the quietness of their emotional ebb and flow, for one cannot be a craftsman and be hasty as to result or personal satisfaction. But their virtue is also their flaw. Feeling introverts fill the ranks of the quiet and the capable; they produce less often the great and the illustrious. The irritant that leads to success beyond one's need, the grain of sand that makes the pearl in the oyster—this is not there. And it is not that they prefer comfort to achievement; they are comfortable to begin with. Temperamentally speaking, they are the calmest of types. Whereas the thinking introvert, for all the greater simplicity of his personality, frequently comes into conflict with a preponderatingly feeling world, the feeling introvert is at home in that world. He has little conflict that is inner; little comes to him that is outer. He remains equable above all things.

8. Correlation with Type (continued)

Although the correlation of tempo with type has been completed, the last word has not been said upon the subject. From a theoretical point of view the four end-types have not been adequately dealt with, and surely the treatment of the emotive stimulus leaves much to be desired. Perhaps in dealing with the four end-types more fully it will be possible, at the same time, to say something that will be clarifying about the emotive stimuli.

No doubt, in the course of the preceding discussion, it was observed, not only that the introverted end-types take half their tempo from the extraverts, the extraverted end-types half their tempo from the introverts, but that all the end-types frequently outstrip their fellow introverts and extraverts in that part of their tempo in which they run true to form. It was noted that the introspective extravert often responds with action more quickly than any other extravert. So, too, the sentimental extravert is often the quickest to feel of all extraverts, and the abstract introvert the slowest to act of all introverts. Finally, it may be pointed out that the emotional introvert is frequently not only extraverted in his quickness to act but more-than-introverted in his slowness to feel. Surely these peculiarities call for further investigation, an investigation that will not fail to add to one's knowledge and understanding of the emotional life as a whole.

It has been mentioned that the emotional introvert is prone to overreach himself emotionally and to be fatigued afterward. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that his secondary adjustment is largely a matter of learning how to control his emotional explosions, not only that he may avoid their outward consequences, but that to some extent he may avoid the attendant fatigue and be able to feel more quickly thereafter. As the emotional introvert learns to act more slowly (and hence to feel more quickly) he approaches the norm of the feeling introvert. Yet this he never attains, for no secondary adjustment of an end-type ever equals (although it may approach) the primary adjustment of a center-type. Underneath the exterior of the best-adapted emotional introvert there remains a slowness to feel that is not a characteristic of the feeling introvert. And since the trait persists in the midst of the individual's secondary adjustment, it cannot be ascribed to an habitual fatigue. No, there must be some other explanation of the emotional introvert's peculiar slowness to feel, a slowness that is not infrequently the forerunner of a serious despair.

Indeed this slowness to feel would appear to be not so much a sluggishness in the feelings themselves as a sluggishness in the emotive stimuli, and perhaps not so much a sluggishness in the stimuli as their simple want and dearth. Again and again, the experience of the emotional introvert is of a desire to feel, of a want that is relieved as soon as he finds something to feel about. And when he cannot find something to feel about, again and again his longing is simply for any emotion at all.

Yet the longing for emotion can hardly be said to be a peculiarity of the emotional introvert. On occasion the introspective extravert suffers even more from the lack of feeling, and it is evident that the more sensible approach to the problem would be to find the type, if any, that is indifferent to the state of its feelings. In fact it would seem that the peculiarity is quite the other way around, and that there is only one type that does not seek emotion, that does not care whether it has feeling or not. This is the thinking introvert, and indeed, with the thinking introvert, the functions are in such order, and the hierarchy of function to function so well established, that as long as an emotional stimulus to the individual's intellectual life is present, the individual may not even be aware of the emotional deficiencies he may possess in a nonintellectual, or purely human, way. In fact, an emotional condition closely resembling schizoidia can be present without attracting notice save from the trained psychologist. The reservoir is filled below the normal, introverted level. Yet this deficient filling, because the individual is a thinking personality and has not been distorted by objectivating influences, is scarcely to be distinguished from the usual condition. Perhaps, if anything, it is an advantage, for the thinking introvert so endowed forges ahead with the brilliance of the schizoid but without the conflicts of the schizoid. Although he possesses but little warmth, yet he is quite insensitive to affront, and friends are attracted by the unusual qualities of his mind. He leads the most successful of lives.

However, the thinking introvert's indifference to the amount of his feelings is unique. To most individuals, any sluggishness or shorting of the emotions is productive, not only of conflict with an emotional world, but of heartache and misery to themselves. Yet most individuals have not been niggardly dealt with. They possess a helping either of lavish, extraverted proportions, or if of more measured, yet of thoroughly adequate, introverted proportions. It is apparent that they cannot get to their helpings. The truth of the matter must be that the emotional stimuli themselves are of a limited order, that the helpings of emotion are on the table before the individuals, but that they cannot get them up to their mouths for want of the proper utensils.

Indeed, even with introverts, it appears that the emotive stimuli must be looked upon as the things that permit of emotion rather than as the things that pluck it up—as releasing rather than as exciting agencies. To be sure, in the strictest sense, an emotive stimulus is just what the term implies, a spur to the feelings, and one is able to observe instance after instance where a gathering emotional tension (or perhaps none at all) has been lifted to the level of the reservoir by a moving and dramatic event. Yet instances such as these are exceptions rather than the rule. Far more often the individual, whether extraverted or introverted, would like to feel and is in search of the source of feeling. The search may be satisfied by so simple an expedient as a trip to the theater, or it may be alleviated only by the altogether unusual in human experience. Yet the satisfaction of the quest is always the finding of something to feel about. It is a question of that rational object already referred to, an object which is rational because the gnostic stream, which alone can supply the objects of feeling, springs from the conscious and not from the unconscious mind.[45] Apparently the difficulty with those who have the capacity to feel, but cannot feel, is not with the feelings themselves, but with the limited and peculiar nature of the objects of feeling.

There is thus a return to that primary principle of the emotional life that emotion cannot exist without an emotional object. The vaguest of desires, it would seem, must attach themselves to the nominal to be desires at all. As for the emotions of dreams, it will be remembered that even dreams, strictly speaking, are phenomena, not of the deeply unconscious mind, but of the mind that is already semiconscious.

No, the development of emotion is as dependent upon the furnishing of the nominal as upon the supplying of the emotional. As a matter of fact, in the deeply unconscious state, there is scant reason for believing emotion *as* emotion to exist at all. True, the mechanism may be there. The channels and aptitudes for emotion may be present, all ready to burgeon forth at a minute's notice; but this minute's notice, whether supplied directly by the world, or indirectly by the memory or the imagination, is a matter essentially of gnostic elements and cannot occur before the mind is at least approaching the state of consciousness. As already declared, the reservoir of emotion, far from being a reservoir exclusively of emotion, cannot contain emotion unless it contain thinking too. At the gateway of the rational realm stands the condition of the mind's inescapable duality. Emotion cannot enter the reservoir except in conjunction with the emotional object. It is this object that permits the volatilization of impulse, and when one speaks of the pain that comes from the lack of emotion, he speaks of a tension that exists beneath the reservoir, of a condition deep in the psyche.

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[45] This is not to deny the emotive power of memory and fantasy, both of which spring from the unconscious mind. It is, however, the working assumption of this study that whether of individual or phyletic origin, memory and fantasy have their primary source in the exterior world. It thus makes sense to pass over the details and regard the gnostic stream as entering the psyche through the conscious mind, the thymic stream as entering the psyche through the unconscious mind.

It is clear, in other words, that the distinction between extraversion and introversion must be sharpened and further defined. True, the extravert is he whose reservoir of emotion fills to an extent that may be taken more or less as a maximum. True, the introvert is he whose reservoir fills but partially to that extent, or if it fills to that extent, then fills less often. Yet this maximum and this partiality, in the light of the above understanding of the matter, cannot be so much an absolute as a relative condition, a degree with which emotion surrounds and suffuses, or is surrounded and suffused by, the nominal furnished by the outside world. In the overflowing reservoir of the extravert there is emotion to flood and to permeate, to suffuse and to sweep along, the objects of exterior experience. In the less ebullient reservoir of the introvert, the emotion does not so much surround as support, not so much inundate as qualify. The nominal dominates rather than the emotional.

Yet with neither type can the reservoir be filled with emotion unless the nominal permit of the filling. The catalytic role of the given is as important with extravert as with introvert. No matter whether the major or the minor faculty of the personality, no matter whether the adapted or the unadapted functon, the gnostic is still the open sesame of the emotions.

To be sure, all sorts of complications exist and the matter is not a simple arithmetic mixing of two ingredients, the one gnostic and the other thymic. As always, the organic can enter and upset the normal processes of psychic life. One is minded of the loss of feeling deplored by Coleridge in the great *Ode to Dejection*. The objects that had once aroused him now left him cold, and he was filled with the pain that comes from the loss of emotion. Although feeling with every one has a tendency to slip away from its objects, and there is a constant need for renovation of the emotional stimuli, yet here, in Coleridge's case, the loss of feeling undoubtedly stems from an intrusion of the organic, from a catatonia (however mild) of bodily origin, and the matter is of interest simply as a reminder that although the nominal permit of emotion, it does not guarantee its stay.

But the immediate problem is not that of the duration of emotion, nor that of its rise and fall according to time and season in the individual's life. It is concerned with the generation of emotion at any time or season according to the nature of the gnostic element. Hence in the remaining paragraphs of this section the discussion will return to the emotional introvert who is especially slow to feel, to the introspective extravert who is especially quick to act, and to the remaining two end-types with their respective irregularities of emotional tempo. An explanation of these irregularities will be sought in the general nature of the emotional stimuli.

To begin with the emotional introvert, it may be observed, empirically, that actions are what he most admires in people, that actions are what he is most inclined to feel inadequate in, that actions are indeed the chief concern of his emotions. Apparently, in his objectivation, the emotional introvert has turned to a world that is filled, not primarily with things, nor even with human beings, but chiefly with deeds. In the feeling world in which he is at home but in which he feels inferior, it is the peculiarity of the emotional introvert that his objectivation has made him conscious, not of the essence of feeling, but of the expression of feeling. It is the externality of emotion that has caught his eye, and essentially his concern is for the exploit, whether passively to be perceived in others, or actively to be done by himself.

This would account, in large part, for the peculiar sluggishness of the emotional introvert's feelings. For the emotional introvert is prevented by his inferiority feelings from accepting the commonplace in human activity. He is on the spot, so to speak, and must conceive and perform more than the average to make up for his real or fancied deficiencies. As a consequence, he is interested only in the unusual in human event, in the exploit and the adventure. His reflective powers, furthermore, assist him in distinguishing the ordinary from the memorable. But when the memorable fails, as necessarily it must fail for a good part of the time, then his feelings are cut off at the start. Inevitably, the emotional introvert must broaden the range of his interests if his secondary adjustment is to proceed. Inevitably, he must acquire sources of emotion that are easier to come by than the remarkable in human deed and endeavor. Until he does, the emotional introvert will suffer from the relatively narrow range of his emotional stimuli, a range that must to some extent account for the slowness of his feelings.

It is much the same with the abstract introvert. The abstract introvert has likewise been objectivated, and in the world of his objectivation it is likewise the external aspect of his familiar function that engages his attention. The difference is that the things which excite his interest are the objects of thought rather than the actions of human beings, and that these constitute the base of his familiar function rather than the function itself. To shift the analogy from mathematics to masonry, the emotional introvert is interested in the wall that can be built from the stones at his disposal; but the abstract introvert is interested, not in the wall, but in the stones themselves. As a result of his objectivation, the abstract introvert seems to be engrossed by the materials of his thinking function.

Yet this is not the entire story. For inferiority feelings, on the whole, do not concern themselves with such impersonal, unintimate things as the objects that one may think about. It will be recalled that the emotional introvert sensed his inferiority as a weakness in the realm of personal action. The abstract introvert, it would seem, is inclined to regard his weakness as an inability to feel the remarkable and exciting emotion. No doubt his inferiority feelings were aroused in the first place by the presence in his family environment of an enthusiastic thinking extravert, a thinking extravert whose enthusiasm came and went with an ease second only to that of the feeling extravert. Now, in the order of things, it is not possible that an introvert should experience this natural vivacity of the feelings. Yet there it is, a source of perpetual self-comparisons, and in his straining to equal it, the abstract introvert turns not only to the world of the thinking extravert but to the objects of the thinking extravert's enthusiasm—to the bases of the latter's thought. Indeed, in his straining to equal the vivacity of the extravert, the abstract introvert makes a sovereign, but understandable, mistake. He does not perceive that the thinking extravert's enthusiasm is subjective in origin, that it is independent of the objects of thought. The abstract introvert thinks that it comes from the facts that the thinking extravert is so excited about. Thus in his endeavor to compensate for his inferiority the abstract introvert seeks to discover the unusual fact. For he will, of course, make up for his deficiency and equal the enthusiasm of the thinking extravert, not by any old fact, but by facts that are amazing and remarkable.

Indeed, it is clear that in his search for the unusual fact, the abstract introvert will be inclined to endow facts with a greater unusuality than impartial inspection will allow. Quite as the thinking extravert showers the facts and things of the prosaic world with the natural ebullience of his emotive nature, so the abstract introvert endows them with possibilities that are no less subjective in origin. The greater his intuitive powers, the greater will be his ability to see the remarkable in what to another is only humdrum and commonplace. And the greater the pain of his feeling of inadequacy, the greater will be his desire to find in facts and things some of that zest and enthusiasm which he so much admires. The desire may be so intense, and the energy consumed in endowing objects with ideas so extensive, that but little energy is left over for the functions of action and volition. In spite of the projects into which his interests may lead him, the abstract introvert may well be, in daily life, the slowest of all introverts to act in response to stimulus.

In any event, the ideas that lodge in the world (or seem to lodge in the world) are but poor soil for the nurturing of accomplishment. The ideas that are productive of accomplishment are the ideas that spring from the psyche and are clothed with the warmth of personal interest and predilection. These ideas reflect the broad aims, the major ambitions, of the personality; they lead to activity that furthers these aims and ambitions. The ideas of the abstract introvert lack the cohesion of subjective bias. They exhibit the particularity of the objective world, and unless the individual's secondary adjustment is very strong, lead only to an acquisition of useless learning. The individual's range of emotional stimuli is too wide for his own good, and must be narrowed if he is effectively to adjust himself to life.

The introspective extravert is similarly dependent upon his intuitive faculty for the release of his emotions. Like the abstract introvert, he too must think before he feels. But whereas the abstract introvert, if a physicist, will show you the *curiosa* of his laboratory, induction coils that fling aluminum rings to the ceiling and neon lights in perpetual-motion harness with photoelectric cells; or if a classicist, will trundle out the rare volumes of his collection or regale you with anecdotes of the Attalids and the Ptolemies; the introspective extravert has no use for furniture of this sort. The intuitions that are connected with facts, let alone with facts that one saves, are to him no more than stale and warmed-over muffins. The introspective extravert has turned his back upon facts, upon the objects of thought. The world of facts is the seat of his inferiority, and he has rejected it for the world of ideas.

Indeed, quite as the emotional introvert is in search of the unusual action, and the abstract introvert in search of the unusual fact, so the introspective extravert is in search of the unusual idea. The difference in his case is chiefly in the aetiology. For whereas the inferiority feelings of introverts are frequently aroused by the presence of extraverts, who seem superior and enviable in the greater rapidity of their action and their feeling, the inferiority feelings of extraverts are seldom aroused by extraverts. Rather, the inferiority feelings of extraverts are aroused by their outward circumstances, from which they turn to the inner world as to a place of compensation. Thus to make up for lowly social origins the introspective extravert falls back upon his intuitions; to compensate for the fact of an inferior physique, he proffers his ideas. Nor is he content with that process of thought which gives the thinking introvert, and at times the thinking extravert, so much pleasure. The source of power that presents itself to the introspective extravert as a possible compensation for his real or imagined inferiorities is not the exercise of his thinking faculty but the result of it—the result that may serve as coin in a world where he feels his bank account to be deficient. It is the outcome of thought, the summarizing rather than the initial intuition, that the introspective extravert values, that releases his emotion. To return to the analogy from mathematics, if thought is a function of exterior things, then those exterior things, when the equation is solved, are equal to something. It is what they are equal to that interests the introspective extravert. He likes the answers to life's riddles. They constitute the field of his emotional stimuli.

Unfortunately, in life, as in mathematics, the answer to a problem is but a small part of it. In valuing the solution more than the equation, the introspective extravert has moved away, not only from the base of his familiar function, but from the very process itself. For if the foundation of an abundant thought-life is formed by the facts of the objective world, then the process of thought is the structure erected upon those facts, and the solution is no more than the finial that crowns the top. Yet this is where the introspective extravert has taken his position.

Is it any wonder, then, that in the variations of his tempo the introspective extravert falls between the introverted and more-than-extraverted extremes? On account of the limited nature of his emotional stimuli, his feelings in their sluggishness suggest the introvert; on account of the consequent accumulation of his emotional tension, his actions in their rapidity may exceed those of any other extravert. However, this rapidity, as already explained, is more of interest than of moment. Only rarely does the introspective extravert have to suffer from the quickness of his actions. Far more often it is his slowness to feel that brings trouble in its wake—a slowness that, as with the emotional introvert, frequently is the forerunner of a serious depression. Yet it ought to be repeated in the introspective extravert's behalf that the delay in his feelings gives him insight as well as an irregular emotional tempo.

As for the sentimental extravert, like the introspective extravert he, too, has turned to the inner world to gain those feelings of sufficiency, even of superiority, which he lacks in the outer world. But whereas with the introspective extravert it is an idea that makes up for the sense of outward lack, with the sentimental extravert it is feeling itself that restores the individual's good opinion of himself. To repeat, with the sentimental extravert it is not an unusual action that is proffered as an equivalent for inferiority. Far less is it an unusual fact or idea. The sentimental extravert's own remarkable feelings are the things that enable him to hold up his head in spite of the inadequacy which he believes to be his in other respects.

For the sentimental extravert is a feeling personality, a feeling personality whose minor and unfamiliar thinking function has been removed only farther from the sources of an abundant thought-life by the experience of subjectivation. Thus in that inner world to which the sentimental extravert has withdrawn, feelings make up the principal furniture, and feelings become the field of his emotional stimuli. The sentimental extravert values the feelings above all else, and they in turn are the objects that release his emotions. Or, to put the matter in a different terminology, with the sentimental extravert it is feeling that permits of feeling, feeling that allows the reservoir to be filled.

The above, however, expresses an antinomy, and can hardly be allowed to stand without qualification. It has been stated that feeling must attach itself to the nominal to gain entrance to the emotional reservoir. It is not evident that the sentimental extravert is an exception to the rule.

Rather it is clear that the sentimental extravert, in order to regard his emotion as an equivalent for his deficiencies in the outer world, must make a gnostic substitute. At the beginning of this chapter it was noted that the usual perception of the emotions takes place after they have left the personality and expressed themselves in action. It is true that the individual does not have to wait to feel. He feels as he perceives, before he perceives. But he does not *know* that he has felt, he does not *perceive* his feelings, until these have become a memory or an outward effect. Thus it is as facts and not as feelings that the sentimental extravert becomes aware of his emotions, as facts that set him apart and even above those persons who are superior to him in a material way. The sentimental extravert prides himself upon the circumstance of his devotion to mother and to friends, upon the circumstance of his piety toward church and toward pastor, upon the circumstance of his benevolence toward the worthy and the poor. The sentimental extravert becomes quite definite about his emotions. For in order to know, in order to possess, them, he must label them. After that, it is only a matter of time until the emotions and the labels get mixed up, until the labels come to pass for the emotions.

Attention is thus called to one of the chief peculiarities of the sentimental extravert, to the extraordinary presence of pattern in his emotional life. In fact, as was made clear in the section on formula, not only is his emotional life patterned but so is his intellectual life. Neither the one nor the other is strictly *sui generis,* strictly fresh-springing from the particular merits of the immediate situation. The sentimental extravert's thought is jacketed, his emotion is jacketed, and as for the emotion that permits of emotion, it would be better to speak of the *concept* of emotion that permits of emotion. Sentimental extraverts are people with sundry and various hierarchies of the feelings. The sacred order into which one's family fell in the nineteenth century has already been mentioned. But childhood, marriage, love, death—any one of these ideas can, on occasion, be the gate that releases the flood of sentiment. Indeed, it is only a step from the notion to the object, from the word to the fetish, and one finds the paraphernalia of childhood, marriage, love, and death to be almost as productive of emotion as the realities themselves. There are many sentimental extraverts, in fact, for whom it is the thing rather than the concept that comes to be the symbol of the feeling. These personalities end their days amid a litter of possessions the value of which is as they suggest and stand for emotion. But whether the symbol is thing or idea, article or label, it is clear that the sentimental extravert can compensate for his inferiority by means of his emotions only by a substitution of the gnostic for the thymic, only by an exchange of what is known for what is felt.

Hence it is that sentimental extraverts are so quick to feel. They do not need to wait for the situation. They need to wait only for the label. And lest that fail, they can provide themselves with artificial labels, with mementoes and knickknacks that can produce the emotion any time they wish. The sentimental extravert is apt to be the quickest of all extraverts to feel, so quick that often, as with the abstract introvert, there is but little emotion left over for the functions of action and volition. To be sure, other factors enter into the sentimental extravert's slowness of action besides the squandering of emotion in inception. For one thing, as has been pointed out, in adapting his final function, the sentimental extravert develops the negative form of volition, and thus becomes characterized by a determination not to act rather than by a determination to act. But here, it is the variation of tempo in which the sentimental extravert outstrips his own general type that is chiefly of interest, and this, it would seem, is to be attributed essentially to the labeling, or conceptualizing, of emotion.

The conceptualization of emotion in the sentimental extravert, however, only draws attention to the other end-types. For in the conceptualization of function they are all set off from the center-types. It hardly takes the proverbial second glance to recognize that with the emotional introvert the conception of the exploit goes hand in hand with the exploit, so that when the exploit falls short of the idea there is discouragement and gloom, when it exceeds the idea, there is elation and joy. So too with the abstract introvert and introspective extravert. The one's endowing the object with possiblities of his own conceiving is not widely different from the conceptualization of that object, while the other's abbreviating the process of thought to come to the result of thought is not far removed from the conceptualization of that thought.

Indeed with all the end-types, the abandonment of the natural world of psychic habitat entails with it, if not a rarefication of psychic process, at least a summarizing of psychic process. The individual has taken up residence in a world for which he is ill-fitted and in which he is not at home. He has neither the aptitude nor the freedom to make the most of it. The truth of the matter is that he can live in this alien world only at the expense of some part of his psychic makeup, only at the expense of some part of the very world in which he is attempting to live.

Now in the strained world of the end-type the unfamiliar, or secondary, function remains relatively undisturbed. Being unfamiliar and secondary it is not exposed to the influences of the alien environment until the more conspicuous function has borne the brunt. It is the familiar, or primary, function that is caught in the cross-fire of the personality's maladjustment. For it is this function that is the function of general utility, the function which chiefly interprets the personality's impressions of life and guides its activity. With the end-type this function must still play its critical role. But in so doing it is inevitable that it should lose some of its fullness for the sake of immediate effect. In fact so great is the need for immediate effect that the end-type cannot refine, or adapt, its familiar function, but must adapt its initial or final function, which has, so to speak, the advantage of being already anchored in the world. With the center-types there is the leisure to develop the familiar function as the adapted function—a practice that results in a great increase of psychic efficiency. But leisure, or at least the sense of leisure, is just what the end-types lack. They are worried about their relationship with the world to begin with, and the familiar function, which is separated from the world by the initial function, cannot be lingered over. Instead, the end-type adapts its initial or its final function.

Nevertheless, in spite of adapted initial or final function, in spite of curtailment or condensation of the familiar function, the familiar function remains a potent force. It determines the personality's fundamental relationship with life. It dictates the terms upon which the secondary function may express itself. It controls the nature of the personality's emotional stimuli.

Hence, on the following page, a schematization is presented of the chief emotional stimuli. In the middle are the center-types, making the fullest use either of the inner or of the outer aspect of their familiar function. At the extremes are the end-types, conceptualizing that aspect of their familiar function which is less natural to their general, introverted or extraverted type. Thus the center-types constitute the norm, the end-types the vagary, of the use which both extraverts and introverts make of the same familiar function. Indeed the individual's familiar function, and hence the general nature of his emotive stimuli, is determined when the individual becomes a thinking or a feeling personality. The particular nature of his principal emotional stimuli comes later, as the personality is subject to the adjusting, or to the maladjusting, forces of individual experience, as he becomes, in other words, a center- or an end-type.

There is, however, one *caveat* to enter before the end of this section can be reached. No more than with the sentimental extravert is it tolerable to suppose that with the feeling introvert feeling literally arouses feeling. What is meant is that the expression of feeling drops out of view, and that to all intents and purposes it is feeling which arouses feeling. Actually, the feeling introvert is dependent upon a hundred manifestations of the hidden, or not-so-hidden, mood. He perceives quite by gnostic process, but the perception of the mood outweighs the means of the per-

Concepts of actions	Concepts of feeling
Feeling	Actions
Thinking	Things
Concepts of things	Concepts of thinking

The Chief Emotional Stimuli
Figure 17

ceiving, and it is the awareness of emotion in another that arouses his own emotion in return. So, too, with the thinking introvert. The diagram indicates that thinking is what chiefly excites his emotionality, what chiefly sets in operation his feelings. But thinking begins with the perception of a thought-provoking particular; thinking starts with a suggestive ingredient selected from the welter of experience. The schema implies only that the suggestive ingredient becomes lost in the implications of the thinking process, that with the thinking introvert, thinking itself is the principal source of the individual's emotions.

With the last two center-types, with feeling extravert and thinking extravert, the problem poses less subtlety and needs less explanation. The feeling extravert's chief source of emotion is simply the activity of his fellow human beings. And this he takes quite at its face value, without subjecting it like the emotional introvert to any self-conceived standard of excellence or unusuality. Although the presence of exceptional intellectual endowment or of unusual emotional coloring may complicate the feeling extravert's simple dependence upon the activity of others for the emotional staple of his life, yet in its essence the source of his feelings is not far removed from the actions of human beings, from such elemental realities as deeds, good or bad. With the thinking extravert, there is a predominating concern for the externals of thought, for the facts that thinking cannot do without. The thinking extravert thinks and likes to think. But the things that really arouse his emotions are the sources and the verifications of the thinking process. For all the significance of his thought, no man was ever more of a man of facts than Charles Darwin, and as for William James, the great father of pragmatism, it need scarcely be said that in spite of his subjective coloring he was quite centrally a thinking extravert. Despite his unmatched powers of conception, what kept him going were the facts from which his conceptions grew and the facts to which they returned—the facts which lay, like well-known landmarks, both to the fore and to the aft of his thinking.

9. Correlation with Mood-Cycle

In this, the final section on tempo, it will be necessary for a moment to return to the original discussion of mood-cycle. There, it will be remembered, the argument dealt with the simplest of classifications—with mood that was social and with mood that was unsocial, with mood that was masculine and with mood that was feminine, with moods that were major and minor with respect to the sexes. These elementary classifications must be taken up again. But to make the problem easier, the unsocial emotions will not at first be considered, nor the thinking personalities that betray an affinity for them. The discussion will at first consider only emotion that is social, and only feeling personalities.

To begin, then, with these latter topics, it will be recalled that men on the whole are more active than women, women more passive than men, that men are the spenders, women the savers. It will be remembered that anger and conviviality lead to an expenditure of effective energy, that these emotions can be considered teleologically only if looked upon as social forces, as forces for the furtherance of communal enterprise. According to the teleological point of view, anger releases energy that an obstruction may be removed, conviviality (or the comradely emotion), that a helping shoulder may be lent to the wheel. The tendency of these emotions is outer and explosive. Their outwardness and explosiveness would appear to be characteristically masculine.

The explosiveness of anger is evident in every phrase describing it. Whether it is said, "And then something snapped within me and I told him what I thought," or, "Finally I couldn't stand it any longer and just struck out," every mention of the emotion indicates a gathering tension and a sudden release. Anger must evidently occur in the form of irritation to escape its characteristic explosiveness. A moment's consideration will also reveal that a certain explosiveness is inherent in the very nature of conviviality. Who has not been awakened by the noisy blasts of a band of New Year's revelers? Who has not had the quiet of his evening broken by the chant of "Hail! Hail! the gang's all here!" And who has not had his back quite wrenched by the hearty pound of friendship, his arm all but dislocated by the convivial but explosive handshake? It is clear that conviviality is as explosive as anger, although anger may appear to be the more explosive of the two emotions.

Conversely it is apparent that hope and fear are the less energetic, the more excitable emotions. Perhaps primitively they, too, led to impulsive, explosive acts—to running away from things in fear, or toward them in hope. But as forces of human, even of animal, society they oftener bring about the less explosive activities of storing things up, for or against the future. Certainly fear more frequently leads a housewife to accumulate provisions for a rainy day than to run away from that day when it comes. Certainly hope makes her lay away heirlooms for children and grandchildren yet unborn. Certainly, too, it is excitement that seizes children when their hopes have been raised for an event on the morrow, just as it is excitement that wakes them up early on Christmas morning. In fact it is excitement that wakes any one up on the morning when an important event is to occur. And in all this the emphasis is on the feeling rather than on the acting, on the constancy of the emotion rather than on the sudden energy of the deed. For one saves not by great, explosive efforts, but by a continuous reactivity to the smallest opportunity for gain. And when one saves, if one has an emotional tempo at all, it is clearly excitement that characterizes him and not explosiveness. Even the squirrel becomes excited rather than explosive at the prospect of a nut to be stored away.

From every point of view it is apparent that anger and conviviality are stronger in the discharge than in the inception, hope and fear stronger in the inception than in the discharge. Hitherto the terms "fast" and "slow" have chiefly been used in the study of tempo. But as the relationship between tempo and mood is considered, it will pay to look upon the matter also as a weighting of the affective, or of the active, end of the emotional arc. For probably certain emotions are excitable in their nature because inherently a business of reaction rather than of discharge, certain emotions explosive because inherently a business of discharge rather than of reaction.

It would follow, then, that anger and conviviality should by nature be harmonious with the explosive type of personality, hope and fear, with the excitable type of personality. To consider only feeling personalities, one would expect to find an affinity between anger-conviviality and emotional introversion, an affinity between hope-fear and sentimental extraversion. And this is just what empirical study discloses.

It is furthermore to be observed that there are more emotionally introverted men than women, more sentimentally extraverted women than men. In other words there is probably present not merely an affinity between type and mood-cycle, but a causal relationship. Feeling extraverts when men, and when possessed of the normal masculine mood-cycle, would find themselves withheld from the distortion of their end-type. The weighting of their cycle is objective, its tempo explosive, and when maladjusted and emotional they would show the characteristics, not of the subjective sentimental extravert, but of the objective egocentric feeling extravert, the type of extravert that might be denominated as the "swashbuckler." In the same way feeling introverts when women, and when possessed of the normal feminine cycle of hope and fear, would find themselves withheld from the objective distortion of the emotionally introverted end-type. The cycle of hope and fear is subjective in its weighting and excitable in its tempo, all of which would keep them from reacting in an outward way to the presence of inferiority feelings. When one is constitutionally fitted to hope and fear for one's nearest and dearest, it is likely that inferiority feelings will only make one hope and fear for oneself. Inferiority feelings will make the personality not less subjective but more subjective, and there arises what may be called the "peccadillo" type, the type of woman that dwells upon her moral and religious shortcomings, the type of woman that throngs the confessional booth and the minister's study. Conversely, one notes that women who are emotionally introverted frequently show a preponderance of the masculine mood-cycle (normally minor with them), while men who are sentimentally extraverted are apt to show a preponderance of the feminine mood-cycle, or perhaps indeed of that joy-depressoid cycle which is not being discussed here, but which in one half of its weighting is even more subjective than the cycle of hope and fear.

There remain for discussion the two strict feeling types, where emotion as a function becomes refined into feeling. Because of the fact that emotion as a function does become refined into feeling, and in so doing loses much of its characteristic emotional tempo, one notes with feeling introvert and feeling extravert (as indeed to some extent with all the center-types) a diminishing of the mood tempo and an emergence of the type tempo. With feeling introvert and feeling extravert, mood becomes a sense of thymic tone, neither excitable nor explosive, but simply vivacious or phlegmatic as previously described. Although the basic cycle may still be anger-conviviality, the conviviality is apt to be not so much a back-slapping exercise as a readiness and desire to coöperate with one's fellows. The feeling introvert, for instance, feels less an impulse to burst into song than a general glow of good fellowship; while his anger becomes, rather, a sense of opposition to hindrance and to obstruction. Again, although the basic cycle may still be one of hope and fear, one notes that with feeling introvert and feeling extravert the fear is likely to become caution, the hope, optimism. In other words, with feeling introvert and feeling extravert one must content oneself with observing the general lethargy or vivacity of the individual's feelings, the general color of his acts.

With joy-depression and with thinking personalities, the problem is more difficult. Here there is no easy, natural explanation, both teleologic and apparent, discoverable in the simplest pursuits of life. Joy-depression is necessary neither for getting things done nor for treasuring things up. Fields will be cultivated, and closets filled, without the help of a drop of it in the world.

Yet not quite. For on second thought it is clear that the hope-fearist knows joy when his hopes are realized, depression when his fears come true. The anger-convivial is apparently the simpler of the two personalities, his anger and conviviality yielding satisfaction simply in their expression and release. The hope-fearists, it would seem, are more subtle people. Apparently with them there is a double system of emotional control. Apparently their principal system is not complete and independent in its own right, but must refer to a lesser system for its final instructions and rewards.

That this is true, the very nature of hope and fear assures us. If one's hopes and fears were resolved simply by being expressed, the world would be a different place from any that we know. No, one's hopes and fears are linked, not with the present, but with the future, and cannot be resolved until that future comes making them true or false. Then comes joy or depression, not mere release and ease from the emotions themselves. Hope and fear are thus apparently only provisional emotions. The satisfaction that we call joy is the end of hoping (when one's hopes come true); while the anticipation of that satisfaction is what keeps the individual going. Similarly, depression is the pain that comes when things finally turn for the worse, the pain that one ultimately dreads. Even when we hope for things in the outside world, and fear things equally concrete, actually, if we plumb the springs of human conduct, the things hoped for bring us joy, and the things feared, sorrow and dejection. The frozen torpor of "hopeless" fear that one reads so much about may not be fear at all, but the despair that follows it.

Hence if hope-fear is the cycle of provisional emotion, joy-depression might be called the cycle of absolute emotion. Better yet, it might be described as the cycle of registration, for it is as though it were a sort of inner, clinical thermometer, registering the personality's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life. Joy-depression is recipient rather than expressive. It is the terminus of thought and action rather than a station on the way.

This is why the poets have told us that ecstasy, or excess of joy, is painful. It is painful because the emotion of joy does not yield itself easily to expression, because emotion that cannot be expressed is painful. Most people either feel joy more moderately or transmute it into love. Many an embrace or kiss in the presence of great beauty (and satisfaction) has saved the individual from what would otherwise have been a distressing rather than a joyful experience.

Nor does depression find the avenue of expression any easier. The very nature of depression is as of a bottomless pit where the individual folds his arms and plumbs the depths of his despair. Depression is no more outward than joy. It is the bottom of the clinical thermometer.

In fact because joy-depression is the cycle of registration, because it does suggest a clinical thermometer, its intensity can be gauged more readily than is the case with the other cycles. Indeed, not only can its intensity be gauged, but what is more important, it is apparent that from of old, the degrees, or something like the degrees, have been recognized in our language. Hence with many apologies for the unscientific nature of the drawing, and with full knowledge of the fact that no two persons would ever agree as to the precise wording of the gradations, the graph on the following page is submitted as a picturization of the scale of joy-depression.

To conclude this part of the discussion, then, it may be observed that joy-depression as the cycle of absolute emotion ranges itself over the three cyclic types. It is found least of all with anger-convivials, since with them it occurs in noteworthy proportions only as a concomitant of the minor cycle, if and when this minor cycle occurs. With hope-fearists, joy-depression comes more into its own, being a necessary part of the chief emotional setup of the personality. But with joy-depressoids, all subservience to other mood-cycle is lost and the cycle gives the predominating emotional color to the individual. The thermometer of personal satisfaction has become the wellspring of the individual's emotionality, and this although the ordinary personal ties of hope and fear have been lost. The situation, as need not be said, introduces many new complications. In fact the chief paradox about joy-depressoids is that they


mania
exhilaration
elation
enthusiasm
interest
Apathy
Apathy
boredom
depression
dejection
despair
melancholia

THE GRAPH OF JOY-DEPRESSION
Figure 18

take impersonal things so personally, personal things so impersonally.

Still, with respect to tempo, it is probably clear from the preceding analysis that there can be no predilection, one way or the other, as regards joy-depression. Anger-conviviality and hope-fear in their very natures have a weighting toward one end or the other of the emotional arc. The hope-fearist, so to speak, watches for the small leak in the dike; the anger-convivial manfully stems the tide once the dike has broken. But with joy-depression, there is no connection with either end of the emotional arc and it is meaningless to speak of an affinity with tempo. Joy-depression is linked neither with saving nor with spending, neither with watching nor with doing. It may show varying degrees of intensity, but it has no relationship with tempo in the strict sense. True tempo implies a relationship between the beginning and the end of the emotional arc; there is an ebb and a flow of reactivity and discharge. Joy-depression seems to be removed from this, to be isolated within the personality. As pointed out, joy-depression registers up and down; it does not pass in and out, completing a circuit. One does not feel joy or depression as a stage between stimulus and response, as one does when one feels angry or hopeful. Nor does joy-depression have the tendency of the other cycles to make a person patient or aggressive.

Yet an examination of joy-depressoid personalities reveals that they often have a special tempo of their own. They are apt to tremble when their path is crossed; their eyeballs pop at the suggestion of an attractive idea. Frequently they seem keyed up a good part of the time. Yet this excitement is quite different from the reactive excitement of genuine tempo, from the reactive excitement of the excitable types. Sentimental extraverts, for example, become excited under pressure of emotion. They pant when they tell a tale; they heave as they give voice to their indignation. But joy-depressoids seem to be excited *before* they feel emotion. Their excitement seems to possess a static rather than a reactive quality. There is a perennial tension to their behavior that distinguishes them from the more motile, truly excitable types. In fact so conspicuous (because constant) is this excitement that the circumstance leads to one of the most common mistakes of psychologic diagnosis—this eagerness which is not motile being often taken for the quickness of true tempo. To be specific, it is this excitement which frequently nullifies the natural phlegm of the introvert, superimposing upon his slowness to emotional stimuli a quickness to environmental and intellectual stimuli, which, because superimposed, seems more typical than the underlying lethargy.

What, then, can this excitement be? It is not the excitement of hope-fear, for hope-fear is observed and premised to have dropped out. It cannot be the excitement of type, for that is quite different. It is not an exclusive characteristic of thinking or of intellectual personalities, for individuals of each kind are to be found who do not possess it. It does not come from intuitive endowment, for although the intuitive undoubtedly grow excited as their intuitions rise to the surface, yet in between their intuitions their excitement subsides and is not a constant characteristic. By sheer process of elimination it would seem as if this peculiar, static excitability were to be equated only with joy-depression, a cycle which nevertheless has been stated to be without tempo affinity. Is there an answer to this paradox?

Apparently there is. Apparently the peculiar, nonfunctional excitement of the joy-depressoid remains, like the vermiform appendix, to remind one of former structure and of former use. It remains to convince one of the provenience of joy-depression, of the fact that joy-depression was once subsidiary to the emotions of hope and fear. Yet this excitement, although in the main vestigial, survives to some practical purpose. It increases the individual's alertness to the possibilities of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. It whets rather than dulls his curiosity. It spurs him on to avoid the pain of failure and depression. And yet, because it is the vestige of former cycle rather than the accompaniment of present cycle, the excitement of joy-depression subsides as the gathering mood takes place. It subsides as the solution comes and the individual experiences joy. It subsides even as the mood of hopelessness and despair grows uppermost in the heart.

True, as already explained, the utterance of joy or depression is not always easy to come by, and the accumulation of the one or the other mood may bring about a noticeable tension. But the tension of repressed joy or depression is quite different from the excitement that precedes joy or depression. The muscles of the jaws tighten, but the individual does not grow tremulous or palpitory. And when the means of expression is finally found, be it no more than the contented puffing of one's pipe or the telling of one's troubles to a sympathetic listener, the individual's emotion usually then subsides into the quiet registration of well- or ill-being which is the characteristic of joy-depression, and which, as pointed out, is divorced from tempo in the strict sense.

To conclude this chapter there remains to be considered only the influence of mood and its tempo upon the thinking end-types. However, with the thinking end-types, there is not the clarity of definition that characterizes the feeling end-types when it comes to tempo and to mood. Empirically, it is not to be observed that either men or women predominate in the thinking end-types, and one notes that neither anger-conviviality nor hope-fear presents the complete correspondence in weighting and in tempo that was found to be the case with the feeling end-types. True, anger-conviviality is as explosive as introspective extraversion, hope-fear as excitable as abstract introversion; but in weighting, anger-conviviality is opposed to the subjective tendencies of introspective extraversion, hope-fear, to the objective tendencies of abstract introversion.

No, there is not the same clearness of outline with the thinking end-types that was found with the feeling end-types, and as regards the connection between mood and type, it is necessary to fall back upon individual observations upon which it seems impracticable to generalize. Anger-convivials are to be noted who have been rendered introspective extraverts by peculiarly sharp inferiority experiences; but curiously enough, the objective weighting of their cycle seems to save them from the self-examination that is the greatest curse of their type, so that it is almost more proper to speak of them as subjectivated thinking extraverts than as introspective extraverts. Again, hope-fearists may be observed who have developed into abstract introverts in spite of the clash between objectivity of type and subjectivity of cycle. But in their case one notes a heightened excitability, and indeed so close a resemblance to the sentimental extravert as to render off-hand judgment impossible.

As for joy-depression, which is without tempo affinity, its role in the development either of the thinking or of the feeling end-type can only be as it directs the individual's attention toward, or away from, the self. Even here, its influence cannot be decisive, for as will be recalled, the weighting of joy-depression is curiously ambivalent. Although in a way more subjective than any other cycle, since relationship with the self is an object of its prime concern, nevertheless this relationship is with the world, and the cycle has its objective as well as its subjective side. Joy-depressoids, for instance, almost never present a subjectivity so complete as that found in the peccadillo type described above. Even when subjectivated, they preserve a latent regard for the environment which, when seized upon and made effective by some other faculty, is frequently the salvation of the personality.

The joy-depressoid, who takes impersonal things so personally, personal things so impersonally, presents no significant bias for or against the distortions of objectivation and subjectivation. As a consequence, the joy-depressoid is found among all the four end-types. Far from being rare, joy-depressoid emotional introverts have furnished a large proportion of the world's poets. As sentimental extraverts, joy-depressoids may be seen climbing the paths of Mount Washington with packs on their backs and enthusiasm in their eyes, totally at variance with the customary sedentariness of the type. As abstract introverts, joy-depressoids are apt to show a greater unworldliness in their excitement than anger-convivials or hope-fearists, and as introspective extraverts, they present a greater problem to the psychiatrist. Clearly the cycle is without predilection for any one of the end-types. That it predisposes toward the end-type in general might be argued. It may well be that the joy-depressoid is more often an end-type than a center-type, his cyclic weighting toward the self possibly inclining him in the direction of the inferiority reaction. In any event, since the world is predominantly social in its emotionality, there must always be an element of conflict between the joy-depressoid and his anger-convivial or hope-fearist neighbors.

But this is matter, rather, for the psychiatric chapter of this study. The conclusion of the present reflections is that joy-depression may dispose toward the end-type in general, but not toward any one of the end-types in particular.

8

THE GNOSTIC STREAM

1. Organic Sensation

THIS section, for all its serving to introduce the discussion of the gnostic stream, cannot take up the new, but must restate the old. It must strengthen old ideas, and sweep away the sources of possible future confusion. Since sensation is a gnostic function of prime importance, organic sensation, which is something quite different, must be clearly defined and set down for the abstraction that it is.

In the first chapter of this study it was mentioned that organic sensation, to be experienced at all, must be well nigh catastrophic. Those struck by lightning (and some live to tell the tale) undoubtedly experience organic sensation in its elemental form. The experience is so blinding, so dazzling, that the mind cannot say "this is thunder," or "this is lightning," or "this is death," or "this is anything." The sensations are experienced and neither coalesced into objects nor called by name. But such moments are unique in life.

In other words, consciousness must be regarded as beginning with perception. The old illusion that perception is a process of maturation, a gradual compounding and coalescence of elemental sensations, has been destroyed never to be restored. It is clear now that any such notion is pure fallacy, the naive transference to the outer world of the process of thought itself. Life is complex, not simple, and like the First Symphony of Brahms, begins at full score, with all the instruments playing. True, to understand it one simplifies it, and works out small threads of cause and effect, just as in the score of a symphony the role of a single instrument may be followed to the exclusion of the rest. But in the end, lest the symphony be lost, the single instrument must be restored to its context, and in life, lest one lose the picture of the whole, the single thread of cause and effect must be returned to the fabric from which it came.

No, like the assumption of molecular movement to explain a hot and expanding body, organic sensation is something assumed to explain the facts of consciousness, not a fact of consciousness itself. The child begins with perception, and first learns about organic sensation when he studies biology in school. What subdivision of perception he is capable of is not a "building up" but a "breaking down," not synthesis but analysis, and as such (in spite of the precocity of individual children) comes late rather than early. Ruskin's "innocence of the eye," like so many other shibboleths of that voluminous but shallow thinker, is sheer romantic nonsense. The conscious, retinal perception of the world is not innocence of the eye but sophistication of the eye, learned in art school, not lost in childhood.

Thus in this study, organic sensation is something that is assumed and then forgotten. Strictly speaking, it belongs to biology, not to psychology, which commences with the conscious and the complex. As for sensation, this is conceived to be, not the building up, but the breaking down of perception, and can occur only after perception has taken place.[46] As a function of the mind sensation is derived, not original, and hence cannot be the first, nor even the second, topic in a discussion of the gnostic stream.

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[46] Readers of Jung will note that in this study the word "sensation" is going to have a different meaning from its meaning in the pages of Jung. In Jung, the word is synonymous with observation or perception.

2. Perception

The gnostic stream as we know it, as that which reaches us from the outside world, is composed essentially of objects. These objects may be broken into their constituent parts, but they persist, nevertheless, in their entity. The columbine lies in its component parts under the botanist's glass, but the parts have no meaning except in relation to the whole. Furthermore the species survives the destruction of the individual. New and other columbines arise for new and other botanists to dissect. And when the species becomes extinct, the parts go out of existence also. The dodo is dead and gone, and the zoologist cannot examine its anatomical structure at will. Evolution itself is a succession not of parts but of individuals. From *Eohippus* to the Clydesdale pulling the coal cart there is a series not of hooves, nor of legs, but of individual animals. Even as regards the nebulous world of the inorganic, the human being is persuaded that the sun and air, the winds and the clouds, are entities, although their limits are vague and ill-defined. Common sense, as well as psychology, tells him that the world of experience begins with things, let him do with them as he pleases.

And let it be said here that one of the great services rendered philosophical psychology by William James was his declaring once and for all that there is nothing to be gained by talking about the association solely of "ideas."[47] Metaphysics may concern itself with the relation between object and image, but the ends of psychology are secured as well by talking about the one as by talking about the other —in fact a good deal better by talking about things, which lodge in the world about us rather than in the world within us, and by so much are the easier to handle, the clearer to see. William James accordingly speaks of the association of "things" rather than of the association of "ideas."

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[47] *The Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1890, I, 553-554.

This is true in discussion of any part of the perceptive process. It makes not the slightest difference in one's results whether one talks about things or about percepts, whether about qualities or about sensations. Indeed when it is a question of that secondary function which in this study is termed sensation, it is often more practicable to speak of qualities than of sensations. "Blue" is "blue," and happily the psychologist need not concern himself whether it is in the sky or in the mind, whether in the sky because in the mind, or in the mind because in the sky.

To be sure, as William James also says, each science must eventually bring its findings, together with its assumptions, to that meeting place of all the sciences, to the forum of metaphysics.[48] This is the final court, which will declare how much of weight is to be ascribed to the claims and assumptions of each of the sciences in question. Nevertheless until that time comes, until sufficient findings have been obtained to make a case, each science clearly has the right to pursue its limited way without reference to the others.

In fact the above methodological non-distinction between object and image, between quality and sensation, leads to the basic definition. *By perception will be understood whole objects, concrete things, entities that God or man has made; by sensation will be understood qualities, aspects, characteristics, and the like.*

Now this definition must be taken quite literally. The difference lies not in the noticing but in the noticed. The function is distinguished by the fact, the variety of perceptive process by whether it is the whole or the part that is observed. True, as has been pointed out many times, the mind's eye may see more than the body's. The object may receive its "wholeness" from the apperceptive rather than from the strictly perceptive processes of the mind, and there may be reason for believing that it is not with perception, but with sensation, that the apperceptive processes decline. Nevertheless, whether supplied by the mind or furnished by the world, whether given or largely assumed, in the distinction between wholes and parts, between things and qualities, will be found the criterion as to the variety of perceptive function. At the moment, the criterion is things.

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[48] *Psychology: Briefer Course,* New York, 1892, pp. 461-462.

To conclude, the perceptual world is that good, comfortable, inductive world of things and facts, with neither too much thought involved nor too much aesthetics. It is the world of that great age of science out of which we seem to be passing, in the laboratories of which so many of us were trained. Indeed the perceptual world is the world both of primitive society and of the industrial revolution. The farmer used to the horse and the well-bucket and the tallow candle has never had seriously to adjust his psyche to substitute in their place the tractor, the automatic pump, and the electric light—more complicated things, to be sure, but still things. The age of Faraday and of Thomas Edison that has transformed the world has transformed it as much in the shop as in the laboratory. The scientist with his fact-born laws and the inventor with his mechanical devices have borne an equal share. By and large, they may both be regarded as perceptuals, and it is because both may be regarded as perceptuals, no doubt, that their contrivances are safe contrivances, and that the expectancy of human life has not decreased in spite of the amazing speed of modern things.

3. Sensation

However, to turn to sensation, there can be no doubt that as a function of the mind to be distinguished from perception, this is an adapted and not an original faculty. It is found with cultivated, not with simple people. It is a function derived from perception, not tributary to it, and is characteristic of maturity rather than of youth. It is the product of intellect rather than of feeling.

If it be objected that in the days of the frontier the plainsmen and Indian scouts were both primitive and sensational, it may nevertheless be questioned if they really were. Sensation as a faculty implies a certain consciousness of the qualities by themselves—so much so that they stand out from the objects to which they belong. Sizes and shapes, colors and sounds, acquire at least a temporary existence in their own right. The subject finds them interesting and intriguing for their own sake; and if he seeks to explore their further significance, he does not return to the objects to which they belong, but looks laterally to similar or dissimilar qualities in other objects, or backward or forward to still further qualities in still further objects that may stand in the relation of cause or effect. The subject's interest is in the parts of things, not in their wholes. Furthermore, out of this interest in the parts of things arises a *tertium quid* that is neither part nor whole, a *tertium quid* that may be a structure of thought built upon the spaced-out qualities, or a feeling of aesthetic appreciation.

With this in mind, it may reasonably be questioned if the sensitivity to sight and sound of the early frontiersmen was properly sensational at all.

The signs they observed (to drop into Berkleyan language) were not observed *per se,* least of all for the sake of the thought or aesthetic appreciation involved. They were observed for the sake of their significance, for the sake of the whole objects, or entire occurrences, to which they belonged. The Indian scout wasted little time in considering the flattened marsh grass, or the hoofprint in the river-bottom, or the scent of smoke on the breeze, as phenomena suggestive or interesting in themselves. Rather he visualized the animal that had lain in the grass, the Indian pony that had gone up the river-bottom, the encampment from which the smoke must be coming. A hollow reverberation in the ground did not catch his ear as a species of sound interesting in its own right, but as evidence of a stampede beyond the horizon. And when the sound was one he did not recognize, one may be sure that worry to know *what* the sound betokened predominated over all desire to become acquainted with the sound itself. Finally, with increase of experience on the plainsman's part, it is clear that the tendency was for the signs to drop out altogether, leaving the significance, or whole objects, in possession of the field.

Indeed whether the faculty of sensation lead to the life of contemplative thought or stop with that of aesthetic appreciation, it stands equally removed from the life of action. The life of action has little use for the qualities of things save as they contribute to the goals of its activity. With so much to be done in the world and so little time to do it in, with so many mouths to be fed and so many bodies to be sheltered and clothed, the concrete means of life are of first importance, and the perception of qualities is of value only as it works with these means and leads to their ends. Only when the need of fending for immediate existence is removed is the subject permitted to explore beyond the entirety of things to their constituent parts, and from these to the thoughts or feelings they involve.

Not sensation, but perception, is the fundamental faculty of the sentient life, as action, not volition, is the basic faculty of the volitional life. Qualities are analyzed from things, motives from deeds, and as functions of the mind, sensation and volition are not given but acquired.[49] Although things cannot be conceived without distinguishing characteristics (which is why perception cannot be conceived without sensation), the world as we know it is a world primarily of objects. In this, the original datum of consciousness, sensation exists only as the instrument of perception, serving no other purpose than to render perception effective. Only when it is no longer subservient to perceptual entities can one speak of sensation by itself. Only then does sensation become an independent function of the mind.

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[49] The reader will note that one of the defects of this book is that in the chapter on the thymic stream there are no sections on "Action" and "Volition" to correspond with these sections on "Perception" and "Sensation." Such sections were originally planned, but never written, partly because much of the material had already been presented, partly because a completion of all the sections originally planned would have stretched the composition of this book from a twenty-year term to a forty-year term.

However, the reader will scarcely quarrel with the above statement that as qualities are analyzed from things, so motives are analyzed from deeds. The volitional function is the function in which the gnostic and thymic streams finally come together to form a pattern for that activity which marks the issuance of the thymic stream in the exterior world. Usually, no emphasis falls upon the function, so that the basic function of the volitional life may well be called that of simple action. But when emphasis does fall upon the function, then the intellectual component extends beyond that of the ideo-motor ingredient. There is an analysis of deeds, whether based upon one's own actions or upon those of others taken for one's own. Finally, after the motive is analyzed, the thymic (and preponderating) element comes into play in pure, undifferentiated form. For whether the personality determines to pursue the chosen motive or not to pursue it, whether the function is positive or negative, the function of volition, as explained on page 208, is adapted, not by the usual differentiation, or adjustment, of function to object, but by an *under*-differentiation of function. The subjective determination to persevere, whether in doing or in not doing, is the very thing that constitutes the refinement, or adaptation, of the function—the very thing that enables the personality to make a more successful adjustment to the world by using his final function in its adapted form.

4. Primary and Secondary Qualities

More often, sensation is the instrument of perception. With every human being a certain amount of sensation is needed if only to keep the various objects of perception straight. Furthermore it is clear that with perceptuals this minimum remains more or less of a constant, that increase or decrease in the development of the powers of observation means increase or decrease in the number of things observed, not in the number of subsidiary qualities. For as long as order exists in the perceptual's world the ratio of sensation involved cannot fall far below the utilitarian minimum. And if the ratio of sensation rises above the utilitarian minimum, the rise will be specific, not general, the result of special endowment of intellect or of sense, of special training or vocation, since the personality as a whole, as has been made clear, is interested not in the parts of things but in their wholes.

Indeed the utilitarian role of sensation with perceptuals explains why it is that with them the qualities observed are usually of Locke's secondary kind.[50] Perceptuals for the most part are doers rather than thinkers, concerned with the subjective distinction of object from object rather than with the objective relation of object to object. Hence the qualities they tend to mark are those qualities of sight and touch, of sound and smell, peculiar to the object itself. And when relationship is their concern, the relationship is normally not of the impersonal kind that may exist between things and things, but of the personal kind that exists between things and human beings and does not have to do with qualities in the strict sense at all. The perceptual is chiefly interested in what may be called the subjective "properties" of things. His clothes are chiefly important for their *wearability,* his books for their *readability,* his house for its *livability.* As for his sensation faculty, this he employs principally to keep his possessions straight. The housewife with her knowledge of every sheet and towel and mixing bowl and saucepan is a case in point. Her knowledge is founded upon an observation of properties and secondary qualities that indubitably are present in the objects concerned, but upon an observation so subjective in its nature as to be of little use to any one else. True, the perceptual can be found for whom the measurement and weight and dimension of things is important, but this is usually not to be separated from his vocation as a mechanic or engineer, as a carpenter or stone mason, and is characteristic of men rather than of women. To conclude, it may be remarked that the attributes of things which are principally important to the perceptual are the attributes that have, or may have, a bearing upon him.

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[50] It is customary to use Locke's terminology of "primary" and "secondary" when discriminating between qualities such as those of weight and size and those of color and sound. Nevertheless the distinction is as old as Plato and Aristotle, the latter of whom drew it as between the common and the special "sensibles."

In fact the difference between the primary and secondary qualities can probably best be understood in just this way—by employing the psychologic distinction between the objective and the subjective, and by looking at the matter without metaphysical implication of any kind. *The primary qualities may be defined as those qualities that leap into prominence as objects affect each other; the secondary qualities as those qualities that are important as objects affect us.*

For example, when one buys a trunk for an ocean voyage, it is not the relationship of the trunk to the individual that is of chief importance, but the relationship of the trunk to the berth it must fit under. Again, a fourteen-foot rug, no matter how alluring to the eye, will not go into a twelve-foot room. As with the steamer trunk, the principal concern cannot be one of beauty but must be one of *size.* So too with the billiard table. The balls do not strike each other and send one of their number into a pocket because of the colors involved (although these serve to distinguish them), but because some are in *motion* and some are at *rest.* Furthermore the glass paper weight upon the writer's table is not useful because of its peculiar, velvety feel to the touch, but again, because it has *weight* in small space. And to conclude, the writer must soon burn the contents of his waste-paper basket, not for the warmth it will afford him, but because he has put such a *number* of paper balls in it that one or two more will spill over onto the floor.

Size, motion, rest, weight, number—these and the rest of the primary qualities have to do with the relatively impersonal relationship of things to things. The primary qualities are accordingly prominent in the speech and writing and mental processes of those personalities chiefly concerned with the study of things *per se.* Normally, they are added to that minimum of the secondary qualities already mentioned, so that with these personalities, both kinds of qualities are found together, the primary qualities being only the more conspicuous. When the primary qualities are very prominent, to the partial or nearly complete exclusion of the secondary qualities, then the trait will be found to be a diagnostic, as regards the thinking personality, of that externalization which has been termed objectivation. The individual is so turned out that the flavor of things has become lost and their effect upon each other is all that counts. In the same way, an unusual dominance of the secondary qualities is, with the thinking personality, an indication of that internalization of personality which has been termed subjectivation. Here, of course, the individual has come to live so much within himself that the flavor of things has become their whole, and their power to fit ill or well with one another has been well nigh forgotten.

Thus far the discussion of the qualities has had to do chiefly with things. But a moment's reflection will show that the theory can be as readily applied to human beings—and applied to human beings in their twofold capacity as persons and as personalities.

For the primary qualities of men and women as persons are certainly as important as the primary qualities of things. No man or woman more than six feet tall enjoys sleeping in a six-foot bed. The size of the two simply do not fit. It is also an incontestable fact that if two human beings walk toward each other in the same *direction,* there will be a bumping of heads unless one of the persons steps out of the way. And to conclude, if human beings were not frequently at a *distance* from one another the telephone and telegraph companies, to say nothing of the postal system, would be in the way to lose much important business. Indeed one cannot long consider human beings in the light of the primary qualities without recognizing that the animate body is but little different from the inanimate.

And the secondary qualities of human beings as persons are no less important—at least to lovers. The taste of lips and the touch of skin, the fragrance of hair and of breath, the color of eyes and the sound of voice—surely these have their value even as of things.

But more essentially than they are persons, human beings are personalities. And as personalities, a similar distinction obtains between those qualities, or characteristics, of individual import and those qualities, or characteristics, of inter-individual import. Character traits, for instance, do not in themselves affect other people. They serve to distinguish, they provide a basis for understanding, they permit one to confide and to trust—but they do not directly alter human destiny. Human destiny is not the story of one man's life but of several, and when human beings mingle together, it is not what they *are,* but what they *do,* that is of chief importance. Actions are of greater consequence than character traits. And the actions of human beings can no more pursue their way irrespective of the actions of other human beings than the fourteen-foot rug can fit in the twelve-foot room.

Indubitably, some such distinction as exists between the qualities of things is to be found when it comes to human personality. It is true that the primary and secondary qualities of material bodies cannot entirely be carried over into the psychic realm. There are differences not to be overlooked, not the least of which is that while the primary qualities of things are the most removed from the observer, the deeds of human beings touch him nearly. Nevertheless it would seem to be both important and logical to distinguish between the primary and secondary qualities of personalities—in short, between *actions* and *character traits.*

As a matter of fact, that actions can be a quality, indeed the chief quality, of a personality is hardly to be denied. With Dickens, that most perennial of authors, the peculiar and odd mannerisms of human beings are their principal characteristics. In fact with a writer of so pronounced a bias a clear-cut exposition of character traits as such is scarcely to be found. Whether one thinks of Mr. Dick and of his kite-flying and memoir, or of Mr. Wemmick and of his postoffice face and nightly signal gun, or of the Rev. Mr. Stiggins and of his pineapple punches, or of Jerry Cruncher, or of Madame Defarge, it is clear that in Dickens the mannerism constitutes the man. Of Madame Defarge, to be specific, Dickens does not state that she was inflexible or cruel or vindictive or bloodthirsty; he merely describes her knitting. With Hardy, on the other hand, characters are qualified not by habitual actions so much as by clearly thought-out character traits. Of Angel Clare, Hardy writes, "His affection itself was less fire than radiance, and, with regard to the other sex, when he ceased to believe, he ceased to follow. . . . When put upon his mettle, his power of self-mastery was appalling—almost inhuman."[51] Of Eustacia Vye he says, "The subtle beauties of the heath were lost to Eustacia; she only caught its vapors. An environment which would have made a contented woman a poet, a suffering woman a devotee, a pious woman a psalmist, even a giddy woman thoughtful, made a rebellious woman saturnine."[52]

The distinction is as great a divider of every-day men and women as of authors. Those persons chiefly interested in the character traits of human beings are once again those persons chiefly interested in the strict qualities of things, whether primary or secondary. Those persons chiefly interested in the actions of human beings are those persons most concerned with the subjective properties that things may possess. In fact the interest in what people *do* as opposed to what they *are* indicates a fundamental difference in point of view.

For those who observe character traits do so, on the whole, that they may conclude, while those who observe actions do so, chiefly, that they may narrate.

With the ones, in fact, the conclusions are usually of greater importance than the observations—like the reconnaissance worked out at home from the mere aerial photographs. With them, the observations show a tendency to become swallowed up by the thinking, the whole contributing to that mental picture which is held to possess a greater reality than the evidence upon which it is based.

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[51] *Tess of the D'Urbervilles,* Modern Library edition, p. 274.
[52] *The Return of the Native,* Modern Library edition, p. 83.

With the others, the principal knowledge of life does not come from observation or from intellectual process. These individuals learn chiefly from experience, from the pain of living. Thus it is that they repeat their parents' mistakes, the mistakes of their brothers and sisters, and sometimes, when the lesson has not been sharp enough, even their own. These are the persons, again, for whom the endless chronicle of "what she done" and of "what he done" is always satisfying. Such a tale shows no tendency to run into the ugly dead end of a conclusion, and there is always the same surprise or indignation each time at the surprising or indignant moment. Indeed, as with the knowledge of the concluders, the tale frequently takes on a greater reality than the event. With these persons, one cannot see the forest for the trees, let alone a mountain top or a distant storm. It is all woods, and like hunters, they are interested only in what starts up as they walk along.

On the other hand, it must be said that frequently the concluders see everything but the individual trees, everything but what happens right under their noses.

Families of narrators are amazing things. Their enthusiasm for what happens and their gusto in relating it are alike wonderful and inexhaustible. One of the best passages in Jane Austen occurs in *Mansfield Park* on the occasion of Fanny's return to her family in Portsmouth. She has been away for eight years, yet neither her home-coming nor her brother's new appointment is what stirs the family. Her brother's ship moved out of the harbor that morning, and as Fanny and William arrive the excitement of the family is all for that. From the maidservant who greets them, to their father who comes in after the rest, one and all take their turn, not in welcoming the strangers, but in shouting the really important news: "Have you heard? The *Thrush* went out of harbor this morning."

To be sure, as the Sermon on the Mount states, "By their fruits ye shall know them." True knowledge of personality comes only from an observation of actions, and in the last analysis every one is an observer of actions. Even the concluder must have the flicker of a facial expression upon which to base his knowledge of a character trait. Yet there is a vast difference in the point of view. For narrators are interested, not in the knowing, but in the fruits, and concluders, not in the fruits, but in the knowing.

But enough of narration and conclusion, and of the interest in what people do as opposed to what they are. It is time to make the point that while thought is principally interested in the primary qualities of things, it is chiefly interested in character traits, or the secondary qualities of personalities; that while feeling is chiefly interested in actions, or the primary qualities of human beings, it is principally interested in the personal, subjective properties of things. In shifting from things to human beings, thinking turns from outer to inner attributes, from primary qualities to character traits. In turning from human beings to things, feeling makes a similar shift from attributes that are outer to attributes that are inner, from actions to properties of subjective usefulness and personal meaning.

The explanation is not far to seek. It has before this been pointed out that thought is interested in a detached appraisal of the objective world, functioning at its greatest perfection in that interval which may be spoken of as the subjective pause. As thought passes from the world of things to the world of human personality, it is clear that in the shift of its attention from outer to inner attributes, from primary qualities to character traits, it only preserves its bias. The secondary qualities, or character traits, of the human personality it can alone observe with its wonted detachment, with its wonted freedom from possible implication. That individual interested in a detached appraisal of the objective world will by nature incline to the observation of character traits rather than to the observation of actions, which latter are so much the closer, if only by identification, to involving him. He pursues that side of human nature which, paradoxically enough, is the more objective of the two.

Feeling, on the other hand, is a tendency for mingling with the world, attaining its greatest perfection, not in moments of subjective pause, but in moments of objective flow. As it passes from the human to the nonhuman world, and in so doing shifts its attention from outer to inner attributes, from the actions of human beings to the personal, subjective properties of things, it, too, merely preserves its fundamental order. The personal, subjective properties of things alone present a possibility of mergence. The qualities that have to do with things as things are beyond the scope of feeling. That individual interested in the qualities of human beings that affect him will by nature turn to the properties of things that are to his advantage, to the properties of things that have a personal meaning. That person interested in the actions of human beings will be interested, not in the objective, but in the subjective, aspect of the material world.

But the awareness of human personality and of its qualities comes late rather than early. It is clear that, basically, the stuff of consciousness is composed of a continuum of perceived objects—a continuum, however, not without an important complement of sensed qualities. Perception is not found alone. Yet neither is sensation. And sensation does not expand beyond its utilitarian proportion until, in the central thinking types, it attains equality with, and finally, in the thinking end-types, superiority over, perception. Independence of the sensation faculty comes only with the thinking end-types, where sensation has become the adapted function of the personality. Among extraverts, such adaptation occurs only with the introspective type, although it may be approximated by the subjective but undistorted thinking extravert. Among introverts, adaptation of the sensation faculty occurs only with the abstract type, although it may be approximated by the objective but undistorted thinking introvert. Even with the abstract type it is not always sharply in evidence, since the function is frequently merged in the individual's professional life. Taking the human race by and large, it is clear that the continuum of consciousness is principally a continuum of things, that the world to most people is composed not of qualities but of objects, not of parts but of wholes.

This basic continuum may be of use as the material of thought, and as the material of feeling.

When the continuum is matter for thought, it is noticeable that the perceived objects retreat into the background, leaving the foreground to be occupied by their qualities. When the continuum is matter for feeling, the objects, along with their qualities, also take second place, allowing their human properties to become of greatest consequence. Yet since these human properties, these attributes of human purpose and utility, are largely extra-corporeal and intangible, the objects of perception must remain to some extent to serve as the foci of these supernumerary qualities. It is noticeable that with feeling, the objects do not retreat so far into the background as with thought. For the strict qualities of sensation, whether primary or secondary, are relatively tangible and intra-corporeal (even if peripheral), and the perceived objects can, when it is a question of thought, the more readily yield up their thought components and retire from the field of immediate consciousness.

Finally, it is to be observed that thought, being interested in the independence of its structure, chooses for its basis the aspect of things and human beings the least personal, the least likely to disturb or be disturbed; that feeling, being interested in mingling with the world, chooses for its data the aspect of things and human beings either actually, or potentially, the most humanizable and mergeable.

In other words, although one takes as many avenues as lead to the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, they conduct one and all to the fundamental conclusion that the chief determinants of conscious personality are thought and feeling. Their presence or their absence or their combination prescribes the variety of the psychic material, and it may truthfully be said that as a man is so perceives he.

5. Perceptual and Sensate

But before pursuing the logical development of these ideas, it would be well to explore a little further the basic differences between perception and sensation, especially the differences between those personalities that show a marked presence of the one, and those personalities that show a marked presence of the other.[53]

Perhaps the first generalization to be made about perception and perceptuals in this second consideration of the topic is that in perception the apperceptive processes are more active than in sensation, that they play a larger part in the personality's determination of the world. The perceptual's mind's eye is stronger than the sensate's. In fact, not only is the perceptual's mind's eye stronger, but what amounts to the same thing, so are his unconscious and semiconscious processes, and one notes that the sensate, although an advanced type, betrays in every way a simpler observation of the world.

Of this demonstrable truth, there must be some not too obscure explanation. Indeed the explanation would seem to lie once more in the perceptual's greater interest in the wholes of things, in the sensate's greater interest in the parts. For it is clear that the wholes of things in their true perceptive entirety can never come before one at a given moment of time.

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[53] In the previous section it was mentioned that sensation attains equality with perception in the central thinking types, superiority over perception in the thinking end-types.

Yet this mere outline of the facts must be interpreted with sufficient flexibility. The thinking introvert as a type extends from the feeling introvert to the abstract introvert, and embraces a wide range of individuality. In some thinking introverts sensation has not attained to parity with perception; in others it has passed beyond parity and is approximating the condition which constitutes adaptation of function. And the same is true of the thinking extravert. As regards development of the sensation faculty, the type ranges from almost no development at all to a condition approaching that of the introspective extravert. In general, it is the position of this study that the presence of sensation and volition in the central types depends upon the central functions, that the personality has as much sensation or volition as the central functions require for the accomplishment of their purposes.

Hence the development of sensation as a faculty varies greatly in the central thinking types. Yet in a prevailingly perceptual world, any development of the function at all may well appear marked, and parity of the function with perception will often seem justification enough for speaking of the personality as a sensational person.

For instance, as a perceptual picks up an orange, he sees, not merely an orange-colored sphere with various tactile, kinaesthetic, and olfactory qualities, but an orange-colored sphere that when cut in half will reveal a design of star-shaped segments, that when last cut in half was woody rather than juicy, that when cut in half this time will possibly look the way it should, that will then give forth the proper amount of juice, and so on, and so on. Although the demarcation between perception and thought, as suggested in the first chapter of this study, is never clearly to be ascertained, yet with a perceptual the above reflections would, on the whole, cluster about the particular orange, as part and parcel of the original observation, and not take place when the orange itself had slipped from the center of consciousness. In point of sober fact, a good half of what one perceives is assumed and not given, is imagined and not seen. The basic truth about perception is that the perceptual entity, if it exists anywhere, exists in the mind and not in the world. Hence the perceptual's world, unless other factors intervene, must always be more indistinct than the sensate's.

Although the sensate's world is the same as the perceptual's for a good share of its existence, yet standing apart from that world of wholes and indistinctness is another world of parts and sharpness, a world that occupies the foreground of his consciousness against the background of the other. Even in so routine and early-morning an operation as the squeezing of orange juice, the world of the sensate's observation is narrower in scope, yet sharper in outline. He observes the waxy feel, or the weight, or the greenness on top, or the brownness on the bottom of the orange-colored sphere in his hand. But he lets it go at that, and does not branch out into those happenings, past or future, that are apt to form part of the entity with the perceptual.

With the sensate, the past and the future are more clearly relegated to that part of the mental arc that comes after perception and sensation. With the sensate the beginnings of the mental arc are more clearly conscious, and observation is limited to that which can outwardly and immediately be perceived. With the sensate, to conclude, the process of observation is restricted to what is tangible and distinct—that which is intangible being left to the intellect which, as opposed to the world, is the realm of the intangible and the imaginary. The sensate's world is free from the vagueness and dimness of the perceptual's world because, in the last analysis, only those parts that can exist in a given, apprehensible moment of time make up its existence. The remembered and the imagined are treated as what they more truly are, as outgrowths, and not as parts, of the immediate datum of experience.

This is the basic distinction between those who perceive and those who sense. The sensate lives in a world that is both simpler and more distinct. The perceptual lives in a world that is at once more complex and more vague.

But vagueness is hardly the quality desired by the world of practical consequences and of concrete results. In fact it is clear that education to a great extent consists of developing the function of sensation in personalities that would ordinarily employ only the function of perception. Spelling is a case in point. Perceptuals—and it must be remembered that every one is a perceptual to begin with—perceptuals certainly are inclined to go at spelling in the wrong way. They carry over into reading and writing their natural tendency to see the wholes of things and not the parts. Far from seeing words as syllables, or the syllables as composed of letters or sounds, they look upon words as units embracing one knows not how many associations of a purely subjective nature. Unless well-disciplined to begin with, and intelligent to boot, they must be taught to observe the parts of which words are composed. Again and again perceptuals must be taught that small observational differences make great practical differences in the results obtained. Girls in sewing class must be taught to look at the parts of a seam as well as at the whole, to observe the places where the stitching runs off, or goes in too close. Boys in trade school must be taught how important a part a thousandth of an inch can be, what mischief a sliver of steel can occasion in a roller bearing. Boys and girls in Latin class must be taught what a complete difference in the eventual translation the mere difference of a case- or tense-ending can make.

Hence it is that the influence of education and of the training that comes from one's work in the world must always be discounted in one's diagnosis of the adult individual. The feeling extravert, for instance, may undoubtedly be described as the most perceptual of all types. Yet frequently he is found in the most highly specialized and technical of professions. In his capacity as physician or surgeon, not the smallest detail of the perceptible total escapes his notice, while cause and effect come to be associated in his mind, not with the whole, but with the part. All this, however, must entirely be disallowed in one's appraisal of the personality, in one's diagnosis of the type. The profession is only too often an overlayer, cast aside when business hours are over, and of little use in one's study of the individual as one personality among others. In general, education and the world's work tend to develop the thinking, sensational sides of people; social intercourse, the feeling, perceptual sides; so that with the adult man one must not be too much impressed with professional, intellectual ability; with the adult woman, not too much impressed with social, tactful *savoir faire.* The one for all his technical ability may be a feeling, perceptual personality; the other, for all her social *adresse,* a thinking, sensational personality.

Yet away from education and the world's work, away from manual trade and scientific profession, away from the laboratory where the parts of things are of equal importance with the wholes—away, in other words, from the business of life, the sensate often seems at a disadvantage to the perceptual. In spite of the greater sharpness of his powers of observation, in spite of the greater clarity of the world in which he lives, he frequently appears to get along less well as a human being. The perceptual is apt to call him a flaw-picker, a perfectionist, and to thank God for his own vagueness of observation that allows him to relax when work is over. If the one type is better for work, common sense says that the other type is better for play, and a return is thus made to that fundamental credo of this study that it takes all kinds to make a world.

It is necessary, however, before turning to the last topic of this section, to make one cautionary distinction. It is necessary to point out the difference between "sensuousness" and "sensation." The latter term is taken in these pages to denote a specific psychic function, the perception of the part rather than of the whole. The term "sensation" has no necessary connection with sensuousness, which may be taken to refer to the pleasure that may be derived from the use of one's senses. Often, to be sure, in the pursuit of such pleasure, there is a demonstrable sharpening of one or two of the senses, so that the individual may seem to be a sensational type. But categorically this can be stated never to be the case. To constitute an occurrence of the sensational type there must be a universal use of the sensation faculty. To be a sensational person, the individual must use not one, or two, but all his senses. He must observe not one or two kinds of quality but all kinds to make clear, not that accident of organic endowment or peculiarity of psychologic type has brought about the trait of sensuousness, but that sensation itself has developed as a distinct function of the mind. The truth of the matter is that many a person who fancies himself, or is fancied, to be the possessor of a highly developed sensation faculty is merely sensuous—just this and nothing more.

Mr. C.B., for example, is a teacher of the piano in one of the country's leading conservatories of music, in fact the head of his department and a recognized master of his calling. The possessor of a melting, sensuous touch, it is not surprising to learn that he was apparently born with a sense of absolute pitch and that he early gravitated to his chosen profession. He plays beautifully, and above all, can impart to his students the tone quality which characterizes his own playing. The feeling he has for music has spread to the other arts, and one notes that Mr. C.B. considers himself (not without justification) as a connoisseur of silver, furniture, and one knows what not. He even thinks he is a gourmet. But here the fact belies the fancy. For the real gourmet would find the pasty white rolls he affects, the diet that is at heart quite a simple thing of meat, potatoes, and starches, almost revolting. Mr. C.B., being a bachelor, loves to entertain at his club or at one or two select restaurants, and when he does, always has a private conference with the chief steward as he leads his guests into the dining room. And what for? Simply to make sure that the rolls are hot, or that his special brand of cigarettes is at hand, or that the lobsters he ordered have been procured and are now being properly prepared in the kitchen. No one ever ate a really unusual dish with him. As a matter of fact he knows nothing about recipes, or about combinations of food. In particular, he eats without employing his kinaesthetic sensations, something that is anathema to the truly sensational person.

After all, one eats not only to live but to enjoy oneself, and it is not surprising that individual preferences in the matter of diet should often be a dependable give-away as to the truly sensational person. By and large, and unless the influence of an early perceptual environment is very strong, sensates like to eat pretty much the same sort of thing. In particular, sensates like to employ as many sense-impressions as possible. Hence when they eat, they like to use their kinaesthetic as well as their olfactory and gustatory sensations, and they go in for whole-wheat bread, for salads in the Latin style with plenty of raw, mixed greens, for wild things, for things with their skins on, for things that crunch and bite and chew. Puddings of the cold-cream variety, cakes and breads of the flabby sort, potatoes and vegetables that are overcooked—all these are hateful to them, and if an individual is found whose tastes are of this sort one may question his being a sensational type no matter how strong the dissenting opinion.

The true sensate, although he may not qualify as a connoisseur in any one department, and although his thinking faculty may all but swamp his sensation faculty, nevertheless uses his sensation faculty quite generally. When he eats, he likes to chew as well as to taste. Texture is as important to him as flavor. True, he may lack a sense of absolute pitch, and be unable to carry in his mind a particular shade of color to match some material for his wife. But one observes a general predominance of the qualities in his observational world. Unless he suffers from organic defect, one does not notice that any department of his sensation faculty is signally lacking.

As a matter of fact, the Mr. C.B. described above is neither a sensational nor a thinking personality but quite simply a sentimental extravert of the variety later to be denominated as "intellectual." It is in this type that the confusion between sensuousness and sensation is most likely to occur. For the sentimental extravert is the most self-conscious of extraverts, and when intellectual—that is, fond of intellectual things—is bound to show a development of the secondary qualities. However, the latter seldom extend to their whole range, and are never put to any use. The sentimental extravert employs his sharpened sense of the secondary qualities merely for the sake of the pleasure they afford him. Of all types, the sentimental extravert produces the greatest number of voluptuaries.

But tastes in eating hardly constitute a broad enough character trait to serve as a clear example of the difference between perceptuals and sensates, and no doubt before closing the subject, the distinction between perception and sensation should be traced out in some more general aspect of human life. Needless to say, any distinction thus noticeable in the very substance of the observational and intellectual life will bring about its discrepancies in all activities of the human spirit. Theoretically, one should be able to choose any of a number of activities. Perceptuals and sensates must surely be different in their work and in their play, in their habits of study, in the way they settle their houses, in the clothes they buy. But here the love that exists between men and women will be considered, first because there is no experience more universal to the human race, and second because, since it is largely thymic, the experience will show perhaps more conclusively than any other the pervading importance of the different gnostic worlds in which people live.

Thus it will be observed that perceptual love is a business chiefly of the mind, of wholes (which can exist only in the mind) rather than of parts (which may exist separately in the world). It is the loving of a woman or a man not as a combination of qualities and properties—eyes, hands, laugh, voice, wit, dress—but as an entity of all properties. As a result, the perceptual lover is more sensitive to the mood of his beloved than to her appearance. The various elements of her personality fuse into an indefinable and in reality abstract picture. On first meeting, his beloved appeared merely as a woman of a certain physical aspect. But with the first words she uttered this aspect began to change and to take on additions, so that when the perceptual lover tries at a future moment to compose a mental picture of his beloved he finds his own thoughts—his memories of past incidents between them, his recollections of past feelings on her part, his hopes and fears for their future—in short, his thoughts and feelings aroused by everything she ever was, or is, or may be. In other words, the perceptual lover who seeks to call up an image of his beloved finds only the vague notion of her personality as conceived by himself. This personality, furthermore, is closely related to the personalities of other and previous beloveds, so that these, too, form a part of the picture. In brief, the perceptual lover does not see a definite physical person, let alone a personality of well-established mental type, but a totality lacking in definable form. For this totality the word "ensemble" may be used.

Sensational love, on the other hand, is a business chiefly of outer reality. It is concerned with parts, which may exist by themselves in the world. The sensational lover finds no difficulty in summoning up an image of his beloved, for the image he summons up is that of her physical person. This in life, he views as a separate object, and this because viewed in life as a separate object he is able to recollect as readily as any other object he has thought or felt about. Whereas perceptual lovers, for whom the beloved object is the total personality, find upon examination that what they love is, objectively, completely intangible, sensational lovers do not find an intangibility in the beloved object. The uncertainty they find (when they become too introspective) is as to the reality of their own affection.

The sensational lover, to continue, is able to make a distinction between the physical and the spiritual. He is able to summon up a definite image of his beloved. He is able to recall her voice, or her pleasant laugh, or her gray-blue eyes. He can think of her wit. With the sensational lover there is no ensemble to resist dissection, and first one side, and then another, of his beloved can become uppermost in his mind. The sensational lover divides his beloved into compartments, each compartment having a different function, and each function being called into play at a different time and place.

The perceptual lover never dissociates one part of his beloved from another. Intellect and emotion are closely interblended, physical love and spiritual love, bridge playing and conversation, talking and embracing. The interblended components form together an ensemble as a whole attractive or unattractive, good or bad. The beloved of the perceptual lover is a mixture of relative values. She may be a witty and inspiring talker but a poor bridge player, a sensitive and sympathetic companion but sexually unrestrained, a brilliant and sincere artist but headstrong and temperamental. She may be all these and more, or all these and less. The perceptual lover scarcely cares. For to him it is the overall picture that counts, an overall picture often determined by an original and instinctive liking he has never bothered to analyze. If to the perceptual lover the overall picture is excellent, he conceives of his lady as excellent although she may possess many ill qualities. Indeed, he is apt not to notice the ill qualities.

Not so the sensational lover. He is fully cognizant that his mistress is poor in certain respects and rich in others. He is apt to choose a wife for a single compartment of her personality that appeals to him strongly. The sensational lover is not concerned with the ensemble of his beloved, but with one or more of her various attributes.

On the whole, sensational lovers are more ready to give and to receive criticism than perceptual lovers. In fact, sensational lovers often fall in love through the very process of giving and receiving criticism, the criticism, as it were, in the midst of the superficial objections, bringing out the deeper traits that the personalities learn to love and admire. Often a sensational (and thinking) love affair, like that between Elizabeth Bennet and Mr. Darcy in *Pride and Prejudice,* takes the form of a contest in criticism, the outcome being the paradoxical and mutual victory of falling in love.

Perceptual personalities, on the other hand, cannot endure the dissection of an ensemble that criticism implies. They cannot bear to have a component of an ensemble taken out from the whole and left unprotected and alone. They always preface (and sometimes conclude) any criticism they may make by such a summing-up remark as, "I'm just as fond of you as ever, Mary, but you know—" Even on hearing a sensational personality condemn a quality in a third person, the perceptual personality is likely to wince, and this although he knows that the criticism is fair and just. For the sensational person, no doubt, has not mentioned a good quality in the same breath with the bad quality, thus keeping the ensemble unmarred and complete, and the perceptual person translates the remark into a condemnation of the personality as a whole.

With the perceptual lover, to sum the matter up, it is all or none. The whole controls the parts, rather than the parts the whole. Hence if a part is strong enough to color the whole it is strong enough to color the other parts as well—in fact strong enough, on occasion, to destroy them. With the sensational lover, the parts have no power to color the whole, nor can the whole bend them to its will. They stand on their own two feet for as much ill or as much good as they possess. The sensational lover says, "One part at a time, if you please!" Again, with perceptual lovers the parts are no more than nominally constituents of the central entity; rather are they past, present, and future entities connected with it. Sensation plays no more than its subservient role, and with the perceptual personality the various parts of the whole are not so much "fillings-in" as "addings-on." Indeed, since with all personalities actions are the chief addings-on, character traits the chief fillings-in, it is to be expected that what the beloved object *does* is of chief importance to the perceptual lover, what the beloved object *is,* to the sensational lover.

If objection is made that in this study sensational love (something quite different from sensuous love) is too narrowly associated with thought, perceptual love too narrowly associated with feeling, the objector is referred to the eighteenth century, the great century of reason. Men never thought so much, and wives and mistresses were never so compartmentalized, never regarded so realistically—if one may use that term. The great novel, *Tom Jones,* moves in an atmosphere of qualitative, not of entire, judgments. Sophia, most sensible (and charming) of heroines, forgives her lover his faults for the sake of his good qualities—that is, she overlooks the ones for the the sake of the others. Yet, as it happens, the motivation of *Clarissa* is no less clear. In the new tide of sentiment, Richardson's great novel is the counterpart of Fielding's masterpiece in the old tide of realism, and one finds that Lovelace's transgression, no matter how much repented of, no matter how much atoned for, had damaged the total of his personality beyond repair in Clarissa's affections. She could forgive him for what he had done, but she could not love him, because, as she truthfully said, to her he was not the same person he had been before. As stated above, what Tom Jones *was* was of chief importance to Sophia, what Lovelace had *done,* to Clarissa.

6. The Strata of Thought

In the preceding sections it has been taken more or less for granted that sensation is to be equated with thought, perception with feeling, that sensates (in the strict meaning of the term) are much the same as thinking personalities, perceptuals, much the same as feeling personalities. In the same vein it has been assumed that thinking takes more kindly to the part than to the whole—perhaps because, intellectually, the part is more manageable than the whole. Off-hand, one would say that thinkers are sensates, feelers perceptuals.

But empirically, it does not always work out this way. The *type idéal* of the thinking extravert is not the sensitive, reflective sort of personality so well illustrated by Darwin or by William James, but rather the type of individual exemplified by Cecil Rhodes—the bold, aggressive individual with neither too much subjectivity nor too much sensitivity in his makeup. In spite of the fact that such an individual's fundamental relationship with life is cognitive, that his forte is his judgment, it is clearly the expression of his thought rather than its formulation that interests him. Essentially, such an individual is interested in the execution of his schemes and projects. He conceives of mergers and syndicates, he has the imagination of an empire builder,[54] but the greater portion of his energy he gives to the details involved in making those mergers and syndicates become real. Now these details are always facts of the exterior world—whole objects, entire events, entities that

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[54] In this respect, the reader will recall Washington's everlasting interest in proposed land-development companies, in the Mississippi Company, the Dismal Swamp Company, the Potomac Navigation Company, the James River Company, and so forth.

God or man has made. Unless subjective by disposition or as the result of early environment, the thinking extravert works with wholes and not with parts.

In other words, although sensation has been equated with thought, and although the assumption has been made that sensation can attain equality with, and superiority over, perception only in the case of a thinking personality, yet in one notable instance empirical scrutiny presents such a personality and states that with him sensation is still subservient to perception, perception still dominant in the intellectual life. With the thinking extravert, thinking is primary and familiar, as with all thinking personalities. Yet perception is still uppermost in his intellectual life, and the observer is unable to detect any essential difference between his thinking and that of the feeling introvert.[55] Both with thinking extravert and with feeling introvert, the thinking is concerned with things rather than with qualities. Although the individual may formulate principles, and indeed derive those principles, not from the whole, but from the working part, yet these principles have to do with concrete realities, and above all, fail to be connected with one another or worked into a body of theory. With feeling introvert and with thinking extravert, the thinking, although formulated and explicit, is characteristically practical, seldom theoretical. Even at its purest it shows a tendency to be limited by the ends it has been evoked to attain, scarcely ever pushing on from initial to more fundamental reasons, and seldom becoming speculative.

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[55] That is, if the thinking of the feeling introvert is looked at apart from the feeling values of his personality. Surely, this can be done without denying those values, or contradicting what has already been said about the nature of his thought. In the first mention of the topic, Lincoln was offered as an example of the greatness to which the thinking of a feeling introvert may attain (see above, p. 114). Furthermore, one of the peculiarities of Lincoln is that the great issues of the Civil War and his elevation to the presidency increased rather than decreased the emotional subject matter of his thought.

Even so, this thought can be looked at apart from its subject matter. If this seems too difficult, one can go back to the Illinois trial lawyer, the quality of whose concrete and practical thinking has come down to us in a host of courtroom anecdotes. Surely here the man's thought may be seen *as* thought, apart from the myriad actions and litigations that brought it about. Nor will so looking at it deny anything that may be said about his feeling personality. In this section, a personality's thought will be regarded *as* thought, nor will this invalidate what has previously been said about the personality as a personality.

Here, then, in the very similarity between feeling introvert and thinking extravert is an exception to the general rule. For the personalities are the consequence of different environments. The thinking extravert has grown up, not in a feeling, but in a thinking environment. Yet it appears that his thinking is concerned, not with parts, but with wholes, that with him, sensation has not followed in the wake of thought. The exception, however, is a real exception, and will end by revealing more about the rule than about itself.

Apparently with the thinking extravert the major feeling function has the power to subvert the natural tendency of the primary thinking function to select the variety of perceptive faculty. With the thinking extravert the major feeling function, although unfamiliar and secondary, nevertheless retains its full vigor, unimpeded by the hostile forces of subjectivation. It is what gives the personality his interest in the expression of his thought. It is what holds him in contact with the exterior world. For with the thinking extravert there is no deflection from the outer world. On the contrary, as already pointed out, the values of thought may combine with the personality's natural outwardness to give him an overwhelming objectivity. Now the faculty of sensation needs a moment of reflection. It needs that pause of natural subjectivity, or of extraverted subjectivation, wherein the brute object may be broken down into its constituent parts. This pause the thinking extravert, unless subjective from unusual mood-cycle or from unusual environment, conspicuously lacks. Hence he takes the objects of perception as they come to him. They are the furniture of his world. They are the substance of his thought.

With the feeling introvert, the major thinking function cannot color the choice of perceptive function. Relatively speaking, the thinking function is a passive, not an active, function. As a consequence, despite its dominance in the feeling introvert's life, it is unable to overcome the disadvantage of its secondary position, and the feeling introvert shows little tendency as a type to develop the faculty of sensation. Although the feeling introvert may be intelligent in the extreme, and subjective from force of mood-cycle as well as from force of introversion, he is seldom qualitative and analytic. In spite of subjective pause and the training of schools, in spite even of intellectual genius, he remains a perceptual personality.

Indeed, as already observed, the feeling introvert is like the thinking extravert not only in the variety of his perceptive faculty but in the general use to which he puts his thinking function. The thinking of both personalities has a tendency to be practical rather than theoretical, applied rather than unapplied. Furthermore there is a comparable similarity between the thinking of the emotional introvert and the thinking of the feeling extravert, between the thinking of the thinking introvert and the thinking of the introspective extravert. The thinking of the emotional introvert and feeling extravert is not only perceptual in its subject matter but curiously implicit in its manner. Emotional introverts and feeling extraverts apparently experience a great reluctance to deal with thinking *per se,* to formulate thinking as thinking, even for the sake of practicality. Like Benjamin Franklin, they prefer to put their thinking in the form of a story or proverb, or to consider it in experimental form. On the other hand, the thinking of the thinking introvert and introspective extravert is not only qualitative in subject matter but both explicit and theoretical. Thinking introverts and introspective extraverts share neither the reluctance of the emotional introvert and feeling extravert to deal with principles as principles nor the reluctance of the feeling introvert and thinking extravert to deal with thinking that is not practical. Thinking introverts and introspective extraverts, as a matter of fact, are apt to regard the uses of the world as far from supplying the permanence which their particular values require. They are apt to be impressed with the vicissitudes of human fortune and utility, and to view the acquisition of knowledge *per se* as the only intellectual pursuit that is truly worth while. Indeed the similarity between feeling introvert and thinking extravert with respect to thought is not more striking than the similarity between emotional introvert and feeling extravert, between thinking introvert and introspective extravert.

As a result, one seems to gain a correct view of the different kinds of thought, and of their correlation with personality-type, not by looking at the diagram of the eight types in the usual way, but by viewing it as composed of inclined, or diagonal, strata as given on the following page.

But what, one asks, is the significance of the personalities not mentioned in the discussion leading up to the diagram presented on the following page, the personalities left unpaired at the ends of the double scale? How do sentimental extravert and abstract introvert fit into this schema of the various kinds, or levels, of thinking? What is the nature of the first and the fifth strata of thought?

As a matter of fact, these questions only pave the way for others. How can intuitive and strict thinking types, one asks, be placed in a single stratum of thought? To say nothing of the disparity between feeling introvert and thinking extravert in this respect, the introspective extravert is


I
II
Emotional Introvert
Sentimental Extravert
III
Feeling Introvert
Feeling Extravert
IV
Thinking Introvert
Thinking Extravert
V
Abstract Introvert
Introspective Extravert

THE STRATA OF THOUGHT
Figure 19

perhaps the most intuitive of all types, the thinking introvert perhaps the most truly thoughtful. Yet in the thinking of these two pairs of types a similarity is alleged to exist, not only in content and form, but even in attitude. And how, the reader asks, is it possible to include in a single, major category both objective and subjective personalities? Emotional introverts and feeling extraverts are, to be sure, either external or externalized; thinking introverts and introspective extraverts, either subjective or subjectivated. But feeling introverts are perhaps the most truly subjective of all types, thinking extraverts perhaps the most external. And finally, the reader queries, how is it possible for the thinking function to become adapted (as is declared to be the case with the thinking extravert) and yet remain largely perceptual in content? Is the process of adaptation independent of the subject matter of a function?

In the face of such questions it is clear that there is need, for a moment, to return to the theory of functional adaptation.

In the section on the four environments it was observed that the process of functional adaptation consists, in general, of a kind of functional review, that in particular, the adaptation of thinking is a review of the functions of intuition and memory. In the case of thinking, one might suppose that the review as well as the function is internal. Nevertheless it was pointed out in the section on the four environments that with the two central extraverted types the review, whether of feeling or of thought, is accomplished largely by means of the world. With the thinking extravert, to be specific, it is the world rather than the individual that tests the fitness of the personality's intuitions, the accuracy of the personality's memories. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the subject matter of the thinking extravert's adapted thinking function can very conveniently consist of the whole objects of which the world seems naturally to be composed. The objects of the thinking extravert's conceiving and recollection can all the more easily be matched with the objects of the world; the facts of the world can all the more easily verify or prove false the facts of the thinking extravert's imaginaton or remembrance.

Thus it does not seem surprising that whole objects, entire events, can constitute the subject matter of an adapted thinking function, that a strict thinking type can be a perceptual as well as a sensational personality. It is true that thought can build a more impressive structure subjectively with parts than objectively with wholes. It is true that by definition thinking is an internal function of external things, that the typical thinking extravert more often seems to be a man of action than a man of thought. Nevertheless his intuitions and his memories, the substance of his thought, as of all thought—this is still an internal function of external things. That in his case the "further review" is external, that his thinking is concerned with wholes rather than with parts—these circumstances are interesting but not critical. The thinking extravert as well as the thinking introvert shows an adapted thinking function, although in content, and even in attitude, it may differ widely.

But perhaps it seems a more serious confusion to place the deep, harmonious subjectivity and unadapted thinking function of the feeling introvert in the same category with the adapted thinking function and often excessive externality of the thinking extravert. It is clear that a thinking function can be both perceptual and adapted. But what can be the bond between a thinking function that has been subject to the further review, that has been "processed," so to speak, and a thinking function left in its original unadapted state? And does the general objectivity or subjectivity of a personality have no effect upon the category of his thinking function? To answer these questions it will be necessary to direct a final glance at the theory of functional adaptation.

In this theory, it will be remembered, the further review is assumed to be perfectly general. It makes no difference whether the function is that of the emotions, or that of one's intuitions and memories. True, the method with the emotions is slightly different. Whether depending principally upon the world or principally upon the personality, the emotions are held in check physically, so to speak, while the individual notes their effect upon the world. They are guided as they come out. They are prevented from overwhelming the situation. Nevertheless the basic principle of a further review is maintained. Indeed, from the point of view of the world, the student of human nature is impressed by the fact that it matters very little whether one's adapted function is thought or feeling. Whether it is the one or the other, the adjustment to life is there, the smoothness of the personality's interplay with his environment. In the case of feeling, the individual has an *a posteriori* (although essentially immediate) connection with the situation; in the case of thought, an *a priori* (although essentially discontinuous) knowledge of what will be the results of his action. In the case of feeling, the individual's knowledge of his actions follows the event, although he controls his feeling as it issues in action. In the case of thought, the individual's knowledge of his actions anticipates the event, although when he acts he knows that he is trusting to the mercy of the gods. From a psychological point of view the means are widely different. But from the world's point of view it is the adaptation that counts, and an equal success seems to attend the effort of either personality.

In this respect one cannot help thinking of Mr. and

Mrs. B.M.A. They furnish an instance of the frequently successful marriage between a feeling introvert and a thinking extravert. Yet the interest here is not in the success of their marriage, but in the example they afford of the feeling and thinking adjustment to life. For fundamentally, Mr. B.M.A. belongs to the craftsman type. He has always been a refinisher of furniture, a builder of shelves, a householder who, in the skill that his type gives him, far surpasses the ordinary handy man. It is interesting to watch the operation of his feeling adjustment as he planes and chisels and saws. Being an introvert as well as a feeling personality, Mr. B.M.A. has amassed much knowledge through the use of his reflective faculty. But he does not work that way. His working function is his feeling function, and since this is dependent entirely upon a close attention to the results of action, upon the *ex post facto* checkup already described, it is noticeable that as he planes and chisels and saws Mr. B.M.A. is careful not to go too far, or too deep, or too fast. Professionally, Mr. B.M.A. is an engineer, the proprietor and manager of a shipyard. The establishment covers several acres of land, comprises many buildings, and with its employees numbered by the hundreds, would suggest a thinking personality rather than a feeling personality as its chief executive.

Yet such is not the case, and the circumstance must be taken as a confirmation of the notion that as regards the world it makes very little difference whether the personality's adapted function is feeling or thought. Indeed, the primary fact about the shipyard is its success, and it is within the framework of this fact that the psychologist must look for those differences that nevertheless will distinguish it from the yard managed by a thinking personality. Thus it is worth noting that in the first place the yard, although large, is not too large for the personal direction of one man.

Furthermore, it is clear that Mr. B.M.A. directs the yard, not by principle or by system, but by personal identification. As he instructs his foremen, he puts himself in their places where, vicariously, his *ex post facto* checkup can be at work; in fact, as he discusses with his foremen the men under their charge, he identifies himself even with these employees. It is noticeable that Mr. B.M.A. himself arrives promptly at 7.30 when the gates open. Again, although the yard possesses much modern equipment, which is well kept up and in good order, and although everybody seems to know where everything is, there is, nevertheless a want of system in the yard which a thinking executive would lose no time in declaring to cost several thousands of dollars a year. Finally, one cannot forego the observation that the success of the yard depends to no small degree upon the success of Mr. B.M.A. in employing craftsmen of his own type of personality, craftsmen who can work almost without his supervision. It is the thinking personality, not the feeling personality, who by means of system and principle can train relatively inexperienced men to perform specialized functions in a complicated organization.

Mrs. B.M.A. attracts the attention of the student of human nature in much the same sort of way. He passes over her enthusiasm for politics, with its origin in strong liberal convictions. Like the interest of her husband in the manual arts, this interest in politics is characteristic of her type, and hence not of particular concern. It is the success of Mrs. B.M.A. in gardening and poultry raising that is rather astonishing. For gardening and poultry raising are supposed to be feeling activities. It will take a hardy psychologist to maintain that the lovely gardens of Mrs. B.M.A. are the result of science rather than of the proverbial "feel" for flowers, that her healthy, beautiful birds are the result of knowledge rather than of an "instinct" for animals.

Yet the student of the psychologic factors involved is unable to hold a different opinion. But five minutes' acquaintance with Mrs. B.M.A. discloses the fact that far from possessing an unconscious feel for flowers and birds, Mrs. B.M.A. possesses an unusually articulate store of knowledge. As a matter of fact, she has been wishing for years to write a garden book, and maintains that she would have done so long ago if she had not been obliged to manage her husband's house. Furthermore it is clear that her flocks and her flowers have reached their present enviable condition through yearly increments of improvement, through yearly increments of knowledge on Mrs. B.M.A.'s part. They clearly have not evolved as Mrs. B.M.A. felt her way. Mrs. B.M.A., even with her chickens, takes stock when one season is over, gets rid of faulty equipment or purchases new, and above all, makes note of what she has learned from one year's experience to be applied to the next. Finally, Mrs. B.M.A. does not instruct her gardener and poultryman by any process of personal identification, nor does she feel that she must dig in the garden or work in the poultry house, although she loves to weed and to handle the birds herself. The truth of the matter is that her present employee, after several unsuccessful predecessors, is a man who demonstrated his fitness for the job, not by having the "feel" for birds and flowers which his mistress may be said to lack, but by showing his intelligence to understand her various systems, and by being willing scrupulously to perform her particular instructions.

To return, then, to the staggered diagram, and to the thought life of the feeling introvert and thinking extravert, it is clear that the notion of different strata, or levels, of thought does not extend beyond the content and form of the thinking function, beyond the utilitarian or theoretical attitude of the thinker. It does not involve the personality's general objectivity or subjectivity, his fundamental relationship with life, or his basic introversion or extraversion.

Nevertheless one notes with renewed confidence that the thinking of the feeling introvert and thinking extravert is similarly perceptual, explicit, and applied. The knowledge that Mr. B.M.A has acquired is not only concrete and formulated but almost exclusively practical. The knowledge that his wife possesses is likewise practical, likewise composed of a body of principles, likewise concerned with whole objects and concrete results. This is what is of concern at the present moment, and not the fact that the knowledge of Mrs. B.M.A. has been gained by an empirical testing of her ideas so that it may be used in *a priori,* yearly installments, not the fact that the knowledge of her husband has been kept from going astray rather by a dependence upon his *a posteriori* feeling function than by the use of his proper reflective powers. In spite of the difference in their fundamental relationship with life, it is not too much to say that Mr. and Mrs. B.M.A. live in the same intellectual world, and that this community of their thought life must in no small measure be a reason for the success of their marriage. It may go far to explain why the two types so frequently marry, and will certainly cause the observer to look for the deterring factors when similarly paired personalities of the opposite sex in the other strata do not experience the same tendency to marry each other.

But this is all matter for future comment, and the time has come to turn directly to the strata of thought themselves.

The First Stratum, Emotional Thinking: Except that there must be a bottom to every bin, a least amount of any given commodity, it is doubtful if the intellectual process of this stratum should be called thinking at all. Thinking is always for a purpose. Whether it be to persuade, whether it be to produce answers to problems, whether it be simply to resume and abbreviate the phenomena of experience, thinking, like any other genuine function of the human mind, has a definite role in the psychic economy and exists for a reason. In the first stratum, this is not evident. The individual gets along on his other functions. Indeed, the circumstance is one of the marks of distinction between the first and the second strata. In the second stratum, thinking, no matter how subordinate to feeling, exists in its own right. It has a function to perform and performs it. In particular, it puts some kind of order into the individual's perceptible world. In the strict sense, thinking does not begin until there is a definite rearrangement of the phenomena of perception.

Thus association by similarity, that initial step in the classification of the world, first makes its appearance in the second stratum. In the first stratum, the individual may associate by subjective emotion, he may associate by external contiguity; but he does not abstract qualities, and link objects together which have a quality in common. Hearing an anecdote that arouses in him a sense of amusement, the individual may be prompted by his amusement to reply with an anecdote of his own. But usually, there is not a single objective, or imaginal, connection between the two stories. There is just the link in the feelings of the subject's mind.

Needless to say, the bottom of the bin exists in all of us. This is, in fact, the significance of the first stratum. It is thinking reduced to its lowest terms. The images are there, the gnostic message from the outer world has reached the subject; but the message has not been reworked. As thinking develops, linkage by means of the feelings is the first kind of association to drop out. Among mature, well-adjusted men and women, there are not many who associate purely by emotion. However nearly every one associates by habit, or external contiguity, which is the way in which the mind tends to retain its material when this is more or less removed from the main business of life. In this type of association, although there is still no reworking of the gnostic material, the cues are objective. As opposed to association by emotion, it is an external rather than a subjective event that prompts the recollection. Thus a white-throated sparrow, heard in the South in March, will recall New Hampshire where it has usually been heard in June. Similarly, an old college friend, not seen for years, will bring back one's student days more or less in their entirety. Nevertheless, in the main business of life, especially as one finds a greater and greater need to derive from experience some increment of knowledge, some measure of truth, the individual comes to associate by class. More and more, the materials in his bin lie rough-sorted according to qualities; less and less, as tumbled in by experience; and even less, as tied together by the emotions.

This is not the case, however, in the first stratum. What usually happens in the first stratum is that a reminiscence is prompted by an emotional cue, and after being prompted, goes on by habit-association until spent. The mind, in attempting to think, simply relives a portion of its past until that portion has been finished, or until its attention has been turned by the emotions to another portion of its past. Often, the reliving is so complete as to go by the name of "total recall." Of this phenomenon, William James offers as examples the Nurse in *Romeo and Juliet* and Miss Bates in Jane Austen's *Emma,* and speaks of the insufferably garrulous old woman whom we all know, unsparing of a detail, and incapable of distinguishing between the trivial and the important.[56] Usually, the anecdotes of such persons are rigorously, and quite primitively, connected with the self.

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[56] *Psychology: Briefer Course,* New York, 1892, p. 261.

Indeed, the thinking of the first stratum might well have been called "childish thinking," since the childish connection with the self is as conspicuous as the association by emotion. It was called "emotional thinking" rather than "childish thinking" because in this study the concern is principally with personalities that are psychically mature. The end-type is regarded as the result of distortion, not as the result of immaturity, and the sentimental extravert, who is psychically mature, is taken as the representative of the first stratum rather than the Nurse or Miss Bates. The Nurse and Miss Bates are people who have psychically not grown up, who psychically still are children. They do not illustrate the bottom of the bin so much as a bin that never has been built. The sentimental extravert represents no such simplicity as this. His is a more complex type. And not the least of his complications is that amid his pretensions to wit, elegance, urbanity, and what not, one observes, like a page missing from a book, that his thinking is of the sort that characterizes the Nurse and Miss Bates. The sentimental extravert in many ways seems to be an advanced type, and certainly must be set down as psychically mature. Yet contradictorily, he keeps his mental material together principally by means of his emotions.

In the second stratum, the objects of perception are more clearly separate from the subject's own personality. These objects, in consequence, the subject is more ready to link, not according to their relationship with him, but according to their relationship with one another. The individual has made that first, great separation between the personal and the impersonal, accepting the condition that objects and events shall enjoy a reality apart from him. In other words, the first step in truly ordered thinking occurs when the individual associates, not by personal experience, but by objective similarity. In passing from association by emotion and association by habit to association by similarity, one first enters the thinking as opposed to the feeling realm. For thinking, as long since pointed out, is essentially (if paradoxically) realistic, feeling essentially (and no less paradoxically) egoistic. The association of true thinking is based upon the impersonal rather than upon the personal. Thinking may be an internal function, but it is an internal function of external things.

Now the interesting thing is that although the sentimental extravert, in the staggering of the diagram, is the only one of the eight types to be included in the first stratum, he actually does not occupy it alone. For the presence of emotional cues to the thinking process, and of mere habit-associations after the process has started—all this suggests the schizophrene, who represents the stage of maladjustment beyond that of the emotional introvert. Clearly, the schizophrene, in the deterioration of his thinking, descends to the first level of thought, to the level ordinarily occupied (among the psychically mature) by the sentimental extravert. In the same way it is clear that the manic-depressive, who represents the stage of maladjustment beyond that of the introspective extravert, occupies the space left empty at the bottom of the scale. It is clear, in other words, that the first and the fifth strata of thought are exemplified by the two principal insanities as well as by the sentimental extravert and abstract introvert, and that the two kinds of thinking can occur in a malign, as well as in a benign, form.

On the following page the completed diagram is now given, the names of the different strata being added to the drawing, although as yet only the first stratum has been discussed.

Although the matter cannot be considered in detail until


I
Schizo-
phrene
II
Emotional
Introvert
Sentimental
Extravert
III
Feeling
Introvert
Feeling
Extravert
EMOTIONAL
THINKING
IV
Thinking
Introvert
Thinking
Extravert
IMPLIED
THINKING
V
Abstract
Introvert
Introspective
Extravert
APPLIED
THINKING
Manic-
Depressive
UNAPPLIED
THINKING
FLIGHTY
THINKING

THE STRATA OF THOUGHT
Figure 20

the next chapter, nevertheless it is clear that the link between the personal, emotional thinking of the schizophrene and the personal, emotional thinking of the sentimental extravert is formed by the imperfect differentiation of the world which is characteristic of both types. The difference is that with the sentimental extravert, the world has never been differentiated, that with the schizophrene, it has been differentiated and then lost. Thus what with the sentimental extravert is simply a contradictory, becomes with the schizophrene a psychotic, condition.

In the last century, when the women of the upper classes were sheltered and protected as perhaps at no other time in the history of the Western world, the sentimental extravert (at least when female) flourished and abounded. The women of the age were encouraged in the belief of childhood that the personal world is the only world. On the other hand, the world of social, sexual, and economic fact was carefully excluded from their ken. The only world which they knew seemed to be an extension of themselves, and naturally, their emotions were the things which connected and bound this world together. Thus when they thought, their emotive faculty prompted their thinking, as indeed it prompted everything else. Although with changing times the type has become considerably less frequent, nevertheless it survives as one of the eight fundamental types. And when it thinks it does so in the old personal way. This is true even when the personality is that variety of the sentimental extravert best described as "intellectual." To be sure, such a personality, like the late Alexander Woolcott, may make his living by the exercise of his mind. He may become the wit of the hour, the talk of the town. His intellectuality may seem to be his greatest trait, his dominant characteristic. Nevertheless there is a personal bias to everything that he says, and it is doubtful if all his thinking put together amounts to more than a heap of ill-assorted intuitions linked together only by the common denominator of personal interest. Brilliant as these intuitions may be, they still do not constitute an example of genuine thought, and the truth of the matter is that in the strict sense such a personality does not think at all. He only prefers.

However, with the sentimental extravert, the thinking, undeveloped as it may be, is a question only of the personality's minor function. The sentimental extravert's principal store of psychic energy flows into his major and primary feeling function, which continues in real (if negative) contact with the world. As a consequence, unless other factors intervene, the personality remains in psychic health.

With the schizophrene, the picture is different. Here the thinking is a question, not of the minor, but of the major function, and of a major function which, on account of the personality's schizoidic defect and increased subjectivity, has come to play a greater and greater role in the personality's mental life. Nor is there any question here of the personality's failure to detach the world from itself. The world is seen in all its objective indifference, often, in all its seeming hostility. Nevertheless, as long as the personality remains in contact with the world, it tends to sort the world's messages by objective similarities and dissimilarities. But as the world grows more hostile (or simply loses its charm); as the perceptive aperture narrows, and the personality withdraws from the world of the object to the world of the subject; then emotion becomes more and more the prompter of the intellectual life. Eventually, as is well known, one or two emotions do all the calling, while a series of stereotyped actions or words run off the lines after the cues have been given. In the end, on account of the lack of nourishment even of the emotional life, the emotions cease calling the cues, the intellectual life comes to a stop, and for long periods a stuporous condition may obtain.

With the sentimental extravert, on the other hand, the individual remains not only in volitional contact with the world, but in perceptive contact with the world. Although the negative variety of perception which is characteristic of this type, and which is to be explained on a later page, tends to exclude the agents and the circumstances of events, it does not exclude the events themselves. What it does is to purvey a diet especially suited to the emotive capacities, so that the major part of the personality blooms and in fact seems eternal. Feeling is everything, and the thoughts of the personality are borne along like leaves on a stream. The exact opposite obtains with the schizophrene. Even if the schizophrene's emotional life were not defective, it could not indefinitely nourish the intellectual life after the latter is cut off from the supply of exterior image. The emotional life, too, is dependent upon that supply, and although its nature is such that, for a time, it will go on by its own momentum after the perceptive life has virtually stopped, yet it, too, will come to an end, so that finally the entire mental machine ceases from action.

The first stratum of thought, however, as it exists in all of us in general, and in the sentimental extravert in particular, is by no means a psychotic affair. Even with the schizophrene, it is only that level of intellectual development into which he is propelled by forces of the world and of his own personality that are quite extraneous to thinking.

To conclude, the first stratum of thought is simply that first stage of intellectual development where the resolution of psychic forces gives to the thinking little or no effect. The separation between the world and the self is not at all distinct, and the associative process is largely emotional. The intellect may be used, but it is commonly the creature of the emotions and never the instrument by means of which one solves objective problems. The personality remains emotional above all, thoughtful least of all.

The Second Stratum, Implied Thinking: In the second stratum the link with the individual is severed, and the thinking, although highly charged with emotion, assumes the proper objectivity of thought. This is the stratum of proverbial wisdom, of inventive thinking, and of artistic thought—of the thought which the thinker seeks to reclothe with life, of the thought which is *implied* rather than *applied*. Conspicuously, it is the thought that is found in creative literature.

It has already been mentioned that association by similarity is one of the characteristics of this stratum. Yet although fully developed thinking, and implying a sense of dissimilarity, association by similarity is but the first of the three fundamental arrangements of thought. For association by similarity arranges objects only in accordance with the present. In addition to the present, thinking also arranges objects according to the past and the future, according to cause and result. These three arrangements represent the fundamental arrangements of thought, and hence it is not surprising that thinking which attains to the level of art, thinking which attains to the condition of the independent and the detached—that such thinking should show all three arrangements. In the second stratum, cause and result are present as well as similarity, although, to be sure, feeling demands that they be expressed on her terms. Indeed it is apparent that what feeling objects to is not so much the substance of thought as the elaboration of thought, not so much the function of thought as the separating, intervening tendency of its language.[57] It is as if feeling had no quarrel with thinking so long as the arrangements of thinking are represented by objects and events. It is as if the arrangements of thought were not real to the emotional or artistic eye unless seen as arrangements of the world rather than as arrangements of the mind.

In Shakespeare's *Macbeth,* for instance, the destinies of a number of individuals are presented in the brief interval of a couple of hours, and on the few square feet of the stage of a theater. In particular, the story of Macbeth is followed from his appearance as a brilliant general, who defeats two enemies in a single day, to his death as a fear-haunted, hag-ridden tyrant anxious for the tale to be told. In like manner the story of Lady Macbeth is traced from the overzealous wife, waiting to congratulate her husband, to the remorse-burdened woman who finally commits suicide. Furthermore it is clear that in Macbeth himself the play presents an imaginative person for whom the future is more real than the past, and who is thus dogged by fear rather than by remorse. In equal fashion, it is apparent that in Lady Macbeth the play portrays a mnemonic person who, upon the threshold of murder, is held back by the memory of her father, and who, after the deed she could not do has been done by her husband and she has returned to smear the grooms with blood, is henceforth never able to forget the sight either of the murdered king or of her own bloodied hands. The one hallucinates his fears; the other somnambulates her memories. If explicitly and articulately set down in words, this and the rest of the thinking compressed in the play would fill volumes—as it has in the hands of the many critics of the play. But the thought is not expressed. The action is not slowed down. The thought is only implied in the characters' actions and words, in the concrete unfolding of the tale.

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[57] The discerning reader will note that, conversely, what thinking objects to about feeling is not feeling itself but the elaboration of feeling—not the bestowal of a gift, but the wrappings and unwrappings that must go along with it, not the expression of hospitality, or of friendship, or of sympathy, but the ceremonies that "irrationally" extend the expression. Alas, no man may escape his bias, and as remarked in the chapter on thinking and feeling personalities, it is doubtful if the two types can ever be made completely to see eye to eye.

As was remarked of the first stratum, the second stratum exists in all, or very nearly all, of us. Undoubtedly the majority of artistic personalities are either emotional introverts or feeling extraverts, and it would seem that the number of artistic individuals distinctly declines as one approaches the thinking extremes of the double scale of personalities. Nevertheless no type can be said to be unrepresented by the artistic personality. There is good reason for believing that Shakespeare himself belonged, not to the above-mentioned, usual category of artistic individuals, but farther down the double scale, toward the introspectively extraverted extreme. For one thing, although no man was ever more a master of the concrete, implied way of stating a human truth, his characters go in for a good deal of unimplied, even quite theoretical, thinking. It would almost seem as if in compensation for the second-level, artistic limitations of the drama and the stage, Shakespeare expressed his own bent for fourth-level thinking through the lips of his characters. But this is matter for future speculation, and it needs only to be brought out here that the proportion of artistic thinking in the more advanced levels of thought probably depends upon the proportion of unresolved feeling in the makeup of the individual. The more feeling is discharged by means of articulate thought, the less, in all probability, will be the use of implied thought in the person's intellectual life. The greater the amount of unexpressed feeling in the individual's makeup, the greater, in all probability, will be the need for second-level thinking.

Finally, as with Tolstoy (who may also be regarded as an introspective extravert), feeling may refuse to put up with thinking on any terms, and demand that it entirely cease from functioning.

However this may be, it is clear that in the second stratum feeling is still in the ascendancy, that thought has attained its development only on the terms and conditions of emotion. In the next stratum, the third, there may be reason to believe that some sort of working compromise has been obtained. But none has occurred in the second stratum. Feeling is dominant, and thought, although fully developed, remains plastic and perceptual, and expressed in the terms of another function. The second stratum is the stratum of artistic thought.

The Third Stratum, Applied Thinking: In the third stratum, the thinking is characteristically *applied*. In the third stratum it is also articulate and express. For whereas in the second stratum, it is the exception rather than the rule to find the elaboration of thought as such, in the third stratum the separate existence of thought is taken for granted. In the second stratum the individuals composing it endeavor to put their thinking into action, or into the represented action of art. In the third stratum, the thinking is collected as knowledge. The acquisition of knowledge becomes a goal of human activity, indeed an object of human desire, and hence the urge to reclothe the bones of thought with flesh is not so strong in this stratum as in the one preceding. Thinking itself, and its repository, knowledge, gain stature in the third stratum, and acquire parity with feeling.

This stratum, furthermore, not only shows a greater independence of thought, but is more complex from the point of view of psychologic analysis. As pointed out, it includes individuals for whom thinking is still unfamiliar and unadapted, and individuals for whom thinking has become the familiar and the adapted function of the personality. Thus this stratum shows a wide range as regards the development of *formal* thinking. Although it is a distinguishing mark of this stratum that the thinking is collected as knowledge and is then applied to the problems of life, nevertheless with the more primitive individuals who compose this stratum the thinking is largely analogical. In the face of a particular problem the individual remembers a previous experience which seems to him parallel with the present instance, and which accordingly suggests to him a course of action. The experience has lain in his memory, grouped by classifications of similarity; it has even been classified according to cause and result—so that in the present instance it is able to suggest a way out. Nevertheless no general principles have been drawn from it, and no general principles are used when it is applied. The individual's memories, although grouped and classified according to the arrangements of thought, exist in all the concrete particularity of their original occurrence. His thinking is different from the thinking of the preceding stratum chiefly in the use to which it is put. The individual wishes to turn it to practical account rather than to reclothe it with life. He uses it as a means, as a tool. And hence, as is only natural, he amasses thinking as a carpenter amasses tools, and considers, not without justification, that the better his tools are arranged, the better, or at least the easier, will be his work.

Inductive thinking, however, with its formulation of principles as principles, characterizes the third stratum rather than analogical thinking, and is found with both feeling introvert and thinking extravert. Even deductive thinking, with its necessary analysis of the part, is attained by those thinking extraverts subjective from mood-cycle or unusual environment. It is interesting, however, that in this stratum, the type of deductive thinking which is usually found is the practical as opposed to the theoretical. Thus in James's chapter on "Reasoning" in the *Principles,* the discussion is more concerned with productive reasoning than with demonstrative reasoning. For William James, who was clearly a subjective (but not subjectivated) thinking extravert, found it more natural to consider the syllogism from the pragmatic point of view than from the theoretical. With him it was natural to place the major premise after the minor, in the least important place in the tripartite formula, and to conceive of deductive thinking as a means of discovering truth rather than as a means of proving one's point.[58] The use of deduction in its own right, divorced from all use and practicality, is a characteristic of the fourth, not of the third, stratum.

The third stratum, however, embraces a wide sweep. It extends from simple analogical thinking, through the broad field of induction, to the pragmatic type of deductive thinking. It only does not include the types of thinking that come into existence when the thinking is not put to any use. As mentioned, it does not include demonstrative reasoning. But most conspicuous of all is its lack of systematic thinking. For systems and coordinated theories come into existence when thinking itself, and not the use, is the end of view. In the third stratum, the thinking remains essentially applied.

The Fourth Stratum, Unapplied Thinking: The chief characteristic of the thinking of the fourth stratum is that it is *unapplied.* To be sure, when one considers the thinking of such distinguished thinking introverts as John Stuart

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[58] Evident as this is in the two-volume *Principles,* it is still more evident in the one-volume "Briefer Course," where the discussion is concerned with productive reasoning almost to the exclusion of demonstrative reasoning. In general, the essence of James's psychological thinking is best grasped in the "Briefer Course," where limitations of space led him to preserve what he really thought important.

Mill and the late Mr. Justice Holmes, the one serving in Parliament and the other on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, the term "unapplied" may seem wide of the mark. Nevertheless nothing was more characteristic of these men than that when they thought, they thought for the sake of thought, and let the use fall where it might. That is why it was clear from the beginning that Holmes would be a better judge than a practising lawyer, and why as a judge his opinions were frequently disconcerting to those who thought they had labeled him—labeled him according to some use, or party, or point of view. His opinions were free because they were the free expresson of a thinking function unwrested to this or that preconception, to this or that political aim. Although good use may be made of the thinking of this stratum, nevertheless in its essence it is unapplied. The thinking of this stratum remains theoretical rather than practical.

From the point of view of type, the fourth stratum presents the same complexity as the third stratum. Like the third stratum it includes individuals whose thinking faculty is adapted, and individuals whose thinking faculty is unadapted. Although all personalities included in the fourth stratum are thinking personalities, and hence familiar with their thinking function, yet with only one type, the thinking introvert, does the thinking faculty occur in its modified, adapted form. With the introspective extravert, the insecurity of the personality's relationship with the world, the insistence of the personality's sense of inferiority—all this has forced a substitution of perceptive for intellective function. The perceptive function has become overrefined (that is, for an initial or final function), and the thinking function remains in its simple intuitive or mnemonic state, unaltered by the adapting review of thought. Far from being thoughtful, the introspective extravert is one of the least thoughtful of personalities. His thinking, like that of the thinking introvert, is "pure" and unapplied. Yet in the strict, adapted sense, it is not thinking at all.

In fact the difference in this respect between thinking introvert and introspective extravert calls attention to the differentiation of thought within the stratum. A similar differentiation was noticed in the third stratum, where the thinking moves from the simplest of analogical parallels to the pragmatic type of deductive thinking. The differentiation in the fourth stratum, however, is more striking, since the movement of the differentiation is away from the specialization of thought, not toward the specialization of thought. True, the bonds between the thinking of the thinking introvert and the thinking of the introspective extravert are important and numerous. Both personalities deal naturally with the qualities, those stepping stones of thought, and both personalities, whether at work or in play, pursue their thinking without thought of ulterior reward. Nevertheless the introspective extravert is incapable of organized thinking, indeed, of thinking in the strict sense at all, and the systematic thinking that is the *fine fleur* of this stratum is, in reality, the prerogative of only one of the types composing the stratum.

This difference between the thinking introvert and the introspective extravert is interesting because it is clear that the introspective extravert, in spite of the extraverted store of emotion at his command, cares about no single idea strongly or consistently enough for it to serve as the directive of his thinking. His thinking is without a beacon to keep it on its course, without a guiding concept which the personality wishes to prove or disprove. The introspective extravert has been led by the subjectivation of his thinking personality into the world of the thinking introvert, into a world where the function of thought is valued more highly than its base. Yet in that world he is without a goal idea with which to systematize and organize his thinking.

The explanation, apparently, lies in the fact that for all his sense of personal deficiency in the outer world, the introspective extravert has not lost his essential interest in the outer world. His principal use for thought, as pointed out, is to provide him with ideas to act as a substitute for that exterior distinction which he thinks that he lacks. Indeed this is one reason why the introspective extravert loves words perhaps more than any other type. Words serve as the vehicle of his unusual ideas; words serve as the means by which he restores his sense of personal worth. Indeed, in the subjective world in which he dwells, words serve as the outlet of his feelings. Consequently, the introspective extravert becomes fond of words in their own right. He loves to divine their etymologies, he is fond of word games, and when he writes, the reader is sure of the refreshing and the unusual in vocabulary. The truth of the matter is that the introspective extravert invests words with a good part of the psychic energy which other people bestow solely upon acts.

On the other hand, a large amount of the introspective's psychic energy moves to the fore of the mental process, to the function of perception—in fact so much that the function becomes the adapted function of his personality. Thus it is impossible to find an introspective extravert without some love of the external world. Indeed it is impossible to conceive of the adaptation of perception without it. For we do not adapt the functions which deal with what we hate, but with what we love. As a matter of fact the predilection is probably at the base of the adaptation, the libido moving to the province of the function before the adaptation of the function begins. Thus the introspective extravert refines his function of perception because to begin with he has a basic interest in the perceptible world.

It is clear, in other words, that in the introspective extravert there is a curious forking of the psychic energy, a forking toward the beginning and toward the end of the mental arc. A large part moves toward the personality's perception of the world, which, as has been pointed out, becomes refined into the adapted function of sensation; a large part moves toward the words and acts that give vent to the personality's intuitions and feelings. As a consequence, little is left for the functions of process in the center of the personality; and scarcely any is left for those goal ideas that govern the process of thought, that alone can orient and systematize thinking. To be sure, in the exterior world, especially as secondary adjustment advances, the introspective extravert is able to adhere to a plan of action. Even in the semi-exterior world of art and creative literature, introspectives are able to cling to a goal idea and probably include among their number such names as those of Shakespeare, Tolstoy, and Katherine Mansfield. But they do not include among their number any systematic thinkers. In fact, they do not include any thinkers in the strict sense at all.

Still, although the capacity for systematic thinking is what particularly characterizes the thinking introvert, the lack of it is not what is most striking about the introspective extravert. The introspective extravert seldom ventures into the realm of pure thought. His ambitions are confined to more worldly ends, to literature or to school teaching, to portrait painting or to the theater, and in these pursuits he finds his intuitive thinking faculty quite adequate for his purpose. He gets along very nicely on the intellectual talents that he has, and consequently, his inability to think systematically is not especially noticeable. Rather, what one notes about him is the development of his sensation faculty, the need he experiences to discharge his intuitions, the pleasing, disinterested quality of his ideas and projects. The cohesiveness that is lacking from his thinking is not particularly striking since this is supplied by his pursuits in the world of art or things. It becomes chiefly evident when his thinking is compared with that of the thinking introvert.

The Fifth Stratum, Flighty Thinking: In the fifth and last stratum, the lack of cohesiveness is the chief characteristic of the thinking. It is also very nearly the chief characteristic of the abstract introvert, who alone among the eight types is included in this stratum. Ordinarily, the adapted function is the most striking character trait of a personality. Yet although the abstract introvert and introspective extravert exhibit the same adapted function, this function is not so conspicuous in the abstract introvert as in the introspective extravert, for the refining of the abstract introvert's perceptive faculty has made him conscious, not of the secondary, relatively tangible qualities of things, but of the primary, relatively intangible qualities of things. As a result, the adapted function of the abstract introvert is often to be recognized only by analysis. What is more apt to strike the observer is the lack of aim to his thinking, the desultory, although perhaps brilliant, nature of his mind.

Several factors contribute to the lack of cohesion, or flightiness, of the abstract introvert's thinking. For one thing, it is undeniable that the primary qualities as qualities have a certain negative character. By definition, the primary qualities of things are those qualities that have to do with the relationship of things, and it is clear that they resemble a strip of paper out of which a series of paper dolls have been cut. The relationship between the dolls is present, but not the dolls themselves. Furthermore just that relationship which it is normally the function of thought to determine is given to begin with, so that the possibilities of thought are distinctly limited. Indeed it is clear that if the thinking faculty is to exercise itself by means of these given relationships, the relationships must be supplied in considerable quantity. Like birds when the seeds are small and few and far between, the intellect will have to range far and wide to find its sustenance, since it is asked, not to think out the relationships of things, but merely to recognize the relationships as given facts.

But principally, of course, the flightiness of the thinking of the abstract introvert comes, not from the negative character of the primary qualities, but from the sense of inferiority that led him to by-pass his familiar thinking function in the first place, and to adapt his initial function. As pointed out,[59] in his desire to equal the vivacity of the extravert, the abstract introvert turns to the world of the extravert, seeking in the objects of that world a source of the emotional excitement which he perceives that he lacks. In this pursuit of the remarkable and exciting object, the abstract introvert's intellectual faculty is used, not to process the facts and things of the objective world into an exciting structure of thought, but to endow those facts and things with qualities and relationships that may yield emotion directly. As a matter of fact, not only does the abstract introvert's thinking faculty leave its natural habitat, traveling out into the region of perception, but his emotional faculty follows suit. For since the whole point of the quest of the remarkable object is that the individual may feel a remarkable emotion and thereby achieve distinction, the emotions quickly journey in the wake of the conceiving imagination so that the purpose of the quest may be fulfilled. Thus the individual's emotions follow his intuitions to the front of his personality, with the result that not only is his intellectual faculty depleted of ideas to serve as the directives of his thinking, but his emotional faculty is depleted of the feeling with which to make such ideas persist.

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[59] See above, pp. 290 ff.

In other words it is clear that with the abstract introvert, the flighty thinking is a consequence of the forces that have moulded the individual to begin with, that the type of thinking is inseparable from the type of personality. Only secondary adjustment can correct the tendency, and even in secondary adjustment it is noticeable that abstract introverts do best in fields where the gathering of the data and the initial generalizations have already been completed. Frequently even the problems and directing ideas are presented to them whole-made, and they have nothing to do but push on from initial relationships to succeeding relationships. Abstract introverts are never among the pioneers of science, always among the latter-day workers. Abstract introverts are apt to be found in those departments of physics where the problems have been reduced to mathematics, in those branches of astronomy where similar conditions obtain, in governmental agencies where reports from various parts of the world have to be coordinated, in actuarial departments where the statistics have already been assembled. Abstract introverts are frequently fond of politics. But it is never the politics of men and women, always the politics of ideas and relationships. Finally, abstract introverts are often superlative at chess. With them, the chessmen are able to slip from sight, like the dolls from the strip of paper, so that only the relationships remain. When playing with such individuals, ordinary players, who must have the pieces before their eyes, are at a hopeless disadvantage, and usually, from five to ten moves behind their abstractly introverted opponents.

Yet this stratum of thought, which with the abstract introvert not only is normal but even possesses advantages, represents with the introspective extravert the stage to which his thinking descends when further maladjustment rather than readjustment overtakes his personality.

What factor can it be, then, that renders what is normal and natural with one type, abnormal and psychotic with another? What factor can it be which takes the simple flightiness of the abstract introvert's thinking and so magnifies it that it becomes the psychotic element in the introspective's thinking if and when that personality goes insane? Clearly the flighty thinking of the manic-depressive is different, at least in aetiology, from the flighty thinking of the abstract introvert. With the abstract introvert the trait is constitutional, frequently observed in secondary adjustment, and conditioned when the cornerstones of the personality are laid down. In its essence it comes from the adaptation of the personality's initial function, and from the shift of the central functions forward. But with the introspective, in spite of a similar adaptation of initial function, the central functions have not been shifted forward. The personality is subjectivated, not objectivated, and as has been pointed out, there is a forking of the individual's psychic energy, so that the final function receives but slightly less than the initial function. As a result, the central functions are left in the center of the personality.[60]

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[60] It may be that this difference between the abstract introvert and the introspective extravert is more apparent than real. Perhaps the forking of the introspective's psychic energy catches the eye of the observer because the introspective has much more psychic energy than the abstract introvert. Perhaps the shift of the abstract introvert's central functions forward is in reality but a branch of a similar forking, a branch that is paralleled by another, abortive branch toward the final end of the mental arc. For certainly the abstract introvert has the *forms of action* at his command if not the substance. Perhaps with all the end-types there is a deflection of psychic energy toward the beginning and the end of the mental arc, the variations depending upon the amount of psychic energy to be deflected and whether the personality is objectivated or subjectivated. Speculative as these queries may be, they will receive some kind of answer before the end of this book.

Yet the introspective extravert does go insane, and when he goes insane his thinking, at least in the manic stage, is characterized by the flight of ideas.

The answer, probably, is to be found in the imperfect differentiation of the self, the self never having been differentiated with the abstract introvert, and having been differentiated and then lost with the manic-depressive. For the self is the region, not only of those goal ideas that bind thinking together and produce systematic thought, but of those goal ideas that in the exterior world give the introspective a plan of action. The conceptions one is seeking to prove or disprove, the order one is trying to introduce in the facts he has collected—obviously such directives exist, not in the world, but in the self. But so does the theme the introspective is trying to bring out in his novel, the meaning he is trying to give to his painting, the organization he is trying to form for the betterment of mankind.[61] All these directives of one's thinking (and of one's acting) lodge in the self and not in the world, and to lose the self is to lose the directives.

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[61] In this respect it is natural to think of that great introspective, Clifford Beers, whose autobiography, *A Mind That Found Itself,* will be referred to more than once in the forthcoming pages. Beers left his last mental hospital in 1903, not only pronounced well, but with subjective notions of an organization for the betterment of mankind—the organization that finally became the National Committee for Mental Hygiene. For a year, Beers tended to his job as a security salesman. But then the old humanitarian ideas returned, Beers writing 15,000 words in support of his project in the first two days of 1905. The immediate result, to be sure, was a month's voluntary recommitment until his "elation" wore off. The final result was the great autobiography itself and the National Committee. (Cf. *A Mind That Found Itself,* New York, 1948, Chapter XXIX.)

7. The Two Selves

But how can an introvert fail to develop a self, that aspect of his personality which was declared in the first chapter on extraversion and introversion to be of chief importance to him? How can the development and subsequent loss of a self bring about consequences so dire with an extravert, when with extraverts the self was stated to be of secondary importance? And finally, how can an extravert who has been subjectivated, who has been made unduly conscious of the self, nevertheless lose that sense of the self, not as he grows more adjusted, but as he grows less adjusted? Clearly, the last stratum of thought brings up matters leading beyond itself. Clearly, it would be well for a moment to return to the concepts of the first chapter on extraversion and introversion, in particular to the diagram of that chapter—the diagram of the "knower" and the two concentric rings. It will be remembered that the knower was conceived to be in immediate touch only with the inner ring, that the outer ring was represented as existing in parts rather than as a whole, that with introverts the inner ring was declared to be the self, with extraverts, the world.

As a matter of fact the same problem occurs in the first stratum. In the first stratum, the sentimental extravert seems never to have developed a world-sense at all, while with the schizophrene it has been developed and then lost. Yet with the sentimental extravert, as with all extraverts, the world-sense represents the inner circle, the more important circle of the personality, while with the schizophrene, where the consequences of the lack of it are so much more serious, it is the less important circle. Finally, the curious fact remains that although an undue sense of the world is no small factor in the schizophrene's maladjustment to begin with, nevertheless the loss of it is a sign, not of readjustment, but of further maladjustment.

The Relationship with the World: Perhaps the matter can best be regarded from the point of view of the fundamental relationship with the world. It will be recalled that with all feeling personalities the fundamental relationship with the world is active rather than cognitive. Feeling personalities keep in touch with the world by acting upon the world and then by marking the results of their action. In the last analysis, the feeling personality more resembles a mole than a hawk. He views the world rather through his power of movement and collision than through his power of vision at a distance. On the other hand the thinking personality's fundamental relationship with the world is essentially cognitive. He stakes his life and happiness, not on doing the right thing, but on seeing the right thing. Thus the main point about Winston Churchill is that, in his own words, he has "not always been wrong." A man of indomitable courage, an individual of energy and action in the highest degree, it was nevertheless his correct appraisal of the world that gave him his unique value, and enabled him to guide his country through its greatest crisis. His books, his speeches, his decisions, all point to a relationship with life that is essentially cognitive, and on this score alone England's great wartime Prime Minister can be declared to be a thinking personality.

The Relationship with the Self: But all this has to do with the world, with but one of the circles of the diagram of the knower and the two concentric circles. Every personality in addition to his relationship with the world has a relationship with the self—indeed a relationship that with introverts is more essential than the relationship with the world.

Now the curious thing is that whereas feeling and thinking personalities differ in their relationship with the world, all personalities have the same relationship with the self, a relationship which, by the nature of things, cannot be active but must be cognitive. For an active relationship implies an object that can be modified by activity on the subject's part, even if the object is so intangible a thing as as a human personality, and the activity merely that of words. Where there is an active relationship, there is always some kind of *outward* expression which modifies an *outward* reality.

Such a relationship is manifestly impossible with the self. For a man's self, even if taken in the Jamesian sense of "all that he can call his," is not an outward reality. Even if the definition includes a person's "lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account" (and the Jamesian definition does include them),[62] nevertheless as parts of the self, these objects exist, not outwardly, but inwardly. Only the subject knows that they all form part of the self, and it is only within the self that they all come together and constitute a unity. The bank clerk knows about the individual's bank-account, and perhaps has heard of his yacht. But he knows nothing about his lands and his horses. True, as parts of the world, the individual can modify his possessions by outward activity, indeed by the mere giving of orders. But by no outward activity can he modify them as parts of the self. As parts of the self they persist in the memory unchanged by outward modification. As parts of the self they can be modified only by such *inward* activities as forgetting and romantic recollection, which are forms of reflection, and constitute a relationship that is cognitive.

Thus no matter what the individual's relationship with the world, he has only a reflective relationship with the self.

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[62] See above, p. 44.

The Two Selves: Yet oddly enough, this self with which the personality has only a reflective relationship, this self which the personality can only remember or forget—this self is not the same with thinking and with feeling personalities. At the center of the "me," at the center of the lands and horses and yacht and bank-account as they exist in the individual's thoughts, is the person who the moment before, or the day before, was either contemplating the world or being active in the world. At the very heart of the remembered personality, of the empirical ego, is the person who has a relationship with the world. Inevitably with feeling personalities, this person is a doer of deeds. Inevitably he tends to be a concrete person, and may indeed take on the features of the person's mirror image. The thinking personality, on the other hand, who views the world directly through his perceptive faculties rather than indirectly through his active faculties—the thinking personality tends to see the essential self, not as the doer of a number of deeds in the world, but simply as the person who, the day before or the moment before, saw what was going on in the world.

The truth of this can be seen in any gathering of thinking and feeling personalities where the individuals are led to an exchange of experiences. No doubt, thinking personalities are less given to reminiscence and the telling of anecdotes than feeling personalities. Nevertheless even thinking personalities on occasion surrender to the temptation, especially if the persons they are with are fellow enthusiasts of such a group as the Sierra Club or Appalachian Mountain Club. As the conversation turns to memorable experiences in the mountains it is instructive to note the different points of view. Feeling personalities nearly always relate their experiences as a series of actions. "We came to the top of the ravine," they say, "and there, in place of the trail that usually led to the bottom, we saw a smooth slope of snow and ice. Night was falling, and to make matters worse, a hundred feet or so down the slope Willis lost one of the party's two flashlights. Thus for every one except the leader, the rest of the trip was a series of slidings in the dark. How we got down I really do not know. When we did, it was only to find the floor of the ravine so dark that without our single flashlight to pick out the blazes we should have had to spend the night right there. Fortunately Arnold had put fresh cells in the flashlights that morning, and we reached camp between nine and ten. We built a fire. But we were too tired to eat, and turned in and slept."

Not so with thinking personalities. To hear a thinking personality tell of his experiences in the mountains (or anywhere else) is frequently to wonder in what capacity the person was present. Such details as "We turned in and slept" never make part of his narrative. Rather, it is what the thinking personality saw and felt that is recollected and described. "I remember the top of Baldpate well," he says. "It is a series of granite ledges rising so steeply that the summit is not certain until you get there. On the afternoon we climbed it, the goldenrod on the ledges was in full bloom and made a magnificent spectacle against the bare rock and blue sky. From the summit, the view was equal to the ascent. Half of Maine lay stretched before us, a world of green forest, lake, and distant mountains dozing in the August sun. We stayed on top for a long time, and I can say that I never enjoyed a mountain more." The thinking personality's memory has been recalled to him by mention of the mountain top in question. He, too, has been there, and remembers the moment as one of the best he ever had. But he remembers the moment for the scene, not for the exploit. How he got there, and by what activity, seems not to figure in his recollection. He, the climber, seems to form no part of his memories of the mountains.

To be sure, the matter is not always so simple as this. To say nothing of factors of introversion and mood-cycle. which may make an individual seem to be a thinking personality when in reality he is not, in such a group as imagined above, a thinking personality may not reveal his deepest experiences. Again, the full force of the contemplative relationship with life develops late rather than early, and as the thinking personality tells of youthful experiences these may indeed be a series of exploits. Nevertheless it is clear that as one passes from feeling to thinking personalities, the essential self which the individual recollects is apt to vary from the most concrete of physical persons to almost nothing at all.

The Self of the Sentimental Extravert: This difference between the selves of feeling personalities, and the selves of thinking personalities goes far to explain the success with which the sentimental extravert regards his self as the world. For it is clear that he is able to regard his self as the world because, as with all feeling personalities, this self is concrete and tangible. It is one object among other objects, one person among other persons—indeed the principal person of his environment. Like the self of any feeling personality the self of the sentimental extravert is of the same order as the world, and remains as the world because no other object or person has become more interesting. To be sure, the self of the sentimental extravert exists in reflection rather than in outward fact, and requires a development of subjectivity to begin with. This, however, is just what the sentimental extravert possesses. The influences of his early environment have turned him inward, not drawn him outward, and in vividness the facts of the outer world cannot match the facts of the inner world.

When the feeling extravert (who represents the type into which the sentimental extravert would normally have evolved) differentiates the world from the self, what happens is simply that a more vivid, and hence more immediate, reality comes to engage his attention. In the absence of a tendency toward subjectivity, the objects of the world take on that vividness which is naturally theirs. Although the self is still of the same order as the persons and things that make up the world, it grows paler and paler in comparison. The world becomes the prime object of the feeling extravert's concern, and his self retreats to the fringe of consciousness.

With feeling extraverts, this usually happens very early. The Rip Van Winkles show up long before maturity. They may not be able to mend their neighbors' fences at the age of three or four, but they are already more interested in their neighbors' business than in their own. Indeed discipline, which is lodged in the self and which is absolutely necessary for a successful life, usually has to be imparted to them externally, either in school or by experience.

The opposite is true of the sentimental extravert. The self is not driven to the fringe of consciousness by a more attractive and immediate reality, and on the other hand, as has been pointed out, the sentimental extravert develops negative volition, or self-denial, as his adapted function, which is a kind of discipline. Furthermore, as the personality matures and develops the vigor of an adult, the ring of the self (to refer to the diagram) swells to proportions it never exhibited in childhood. The self ring becomes as large as the world ring of other extraverts, perhaps larger. Yet the interesting thing is that this quasi-external self of the sentimental extravert, for all its size and monopoly of the personality's psychic energy, nevertheless betrays the lack of wholeness which is characteristic of the selves of extraverts.

For in spite of his subjectivation, the sentimental extravert is no more truly reflective than any other extravert. As with all extraverts, his fundamental principle is thymic, not gnostic; it is expression that counts with him, not experience. In spite of his withdrawal from the world, in spite of the inactivity that comes to him from the development of his adapted function, the sentimental extravert does not develop habits of genuine reflection although he has the opportunity to do so. His emotive faculty has not been removed, but only suppressed. Denied the release of outward expression, it remains bottled up, clutching onto the personality's labels and mementoes, ready to burst forth at a moment's notice, and preventing the personality from passing in any real review the various departments of his "me." Thus the sentimental extravert presents the picture of a person rendered unduly conscious of the self without any solid relationship with the self. Characteristically, sentimental extraverts need "A Line a Day" to keep track of their past; or they are obliged to cram their drawers with objects from that past. The result is that the self of the sentimental extravert tends to be a thing aroused by the stimulus of the moment. It is the conversation in which the sentimental extravert is engaged that prompts the expression of personal feeling stated as if the judgment of the world, that prompts the telling of the personal anecdote in which no one except the narrator is really interested. Or again, it is one of the personality's souvenirs which recalls to him the past, and permits him for a moment to relive it. Subjectively, the sentimental extravert's self remains unorganized, a thing of parts. It never quite comes together, and in consequence, cannot be so represented in the diagram. Although it is the prime object of his feelings, and occasionally even of his thoughts, the self of the sentimental extravert is not a continuous but a broken thing. Paradoxically, the continuous ring of his personality is just that world which serves merely as the springboard of his anecdotes and sentimental reflections. Although unimportant in the psychic economy of his personality, and scarcely, if at all, differentiated from the self, it nevertheless enjoys a constancy, if not a vividness, of interest, which is not vouchsafed to the self.

The Self of the Introspective Extravert: Needless to say, much the same sort of thing obtains with the introspective extravert. Although rendered unduly conscious of the self, he is no more genuinely reflective than the sentimental extravert. His fundamental principle also is thymic, not gnostic, and his emotive faculty is altogether too insistent to allow him to develop habits of genuine reflection. Genuine reflection, although always accompanied by a feeling tone, is gnostic, not thymic. When the feeling tone so increases as to become the principal psychic activity, then reflection ceases and emotion begins. Although the introspective extravert knows moments that are free of emotion, moments when he is capable of genuine reflection accompanied by no more than a normal feeling tone, nevertheless these moments do not come often enough, or close enough together, for him really to do anything about them. The introspective extravert never enjoys, as does an introvert, hours at a time when he can range over his past, trace out sequences of cause and effect, date events and reconstruct them, and finally view his ego as a unified whole, indeed as a greater reality than the present fleeting moment.

Yet with the introspective extravert no less than with the sentimental extravert, the sense of the self is the most important thing about his personality. Although the self remains in parts, and never succeeds in becoming organized into a subjective whole, it nevertheless receives the greater part of the subject's psychic energy. Where the difference comes in is that the introspective extravert is not without a sense of the world. To be sure, this is less important than his sense of the self. Nevertheless it does exist. The introspective extravert is not so prone as the sentimental extravert to confuse subject with object, although this happens, as when, in *Anna Karenina,* Levin thinks after his betrothal to Kitty that all Moscow is sharing his emotions. With the introspective extravert, there is a duality of self and world not found with the sentimental extravert.

Introspective Extravert and Sentimental Extravert: Yet the above is not the greatest difference between the introspective extravert and the sentimental extravert. The greatest difference comes from the fact that the one is a thinking personality, the other a feeling personality. The introspective extravert's relationship with the self is of the same order as his relationship with the world; in fact the two relationships are really one and the same relationship, the individual's lands and horses and yacht and bank-account being viewed in quite the same manner as the world. Furthermore this single relationship is rendered apparent to the individual by his development of sensation as his adapted function. The introspective extravert's awareness of the object, his consciousness of a relationship between object and subject, is strengthened by the pleasure which he receives from his observation of the secondary qualities.

The sentimental extravert does not have this advantage. His relationship with the self is of a different order from his relationship with the world, and besides, his relationship with the world is weakened by his development of negative volition as his adapted function. Since his tendency is to deny himself participation in the activities of the world, the sentimental extravert does not become fully aware of how difficult the world can be. The world is not seen as distinct from the subject, nor in its objective variegation is it a source of pleasure to the subject. In fact, from his relationship with the world, the sentimental extravert receives no clear-cut notion of what the nature of a relationship may be.

Thus when it comes to the sentimental extravert's less fundamental relationship, to his relationship with the self, it is not surprising that this should suffer from the weakness of his principal relationship. The sentimental extravert seems frequently not to know that a person can have a relationship with the self, that there can be a "knower" and a "me." The sentimental extravert, in fact, often seems to be an incarnation of the unitary self of the German monistic philosophers. There is not a duality even within himself. There is just the single person—the person who is as he feels. True, as with the unitary self of the German philosophers, the sentimental extravert shows a subjective ramification. The sentimental extravert extends himself by means of a web of feeling, in particular, by means of the extraverted feeling pattern. But how far this is from genuine relationship may be seen in the case of the sentimental extravert whose feeling is not reciprocated. Thus a sentimentally extraverted mother, solely on the basis of her own emotion, can believe that she is mutually linked with a child who feels no affection for her and goes out of his way not to see her.

Not only does the sentimental extravert substantially lack a relationship with the world; he is without a genuine relationship with the self. For relationship means connection. There is a bond between two entities. The feeling personality acts upon the world and sees that he has made a change; the world succeeds in conveying its message to the thinking personality. Of the two relationships, the gnostic would appear to be the simpler. The world would appear to make connection once its message has reached the personality, and the self, too, would seem to achieve a relationship once it presents itself to the subject. Nevertheless even this simple relationship is not at all well defined with the sentimental extravert. Although the self succeeds in preempting the subject's attention, it does not succeed in presenting itself to the subject *as the self*. It is a label, a memento, or worse yet, supposedly the world. Thus to refer again to *Anna Karenina,* the Princess Tcherbatskaya encourages Vronsky's attentions to her daughter because of his wealth and social position and the implied flattery to herself—Kitty, of course, being still a part of herself. Then when the world has failed to respond to her manipulation, and Vronsky has jilted Kitty, the princess declares that there ought to be a law to prevent such happenings. In other words, the Princess Tcherbatskaya believes that her substitution of the self for the world should be externally enforced. Who has not heard an aggrieved sentimental extravert declaring like the Princess Tcherbatskaya that "there ought to be a law"? Far from having a genuine relationship with the self, the sentimental extravert never knows the self. The self never succeeds in presenting itself to the sentimental extravert as the self. Sentimental extraverts know only what they think is the world, and when the world acts like the world, and not like the self, then they say that it ought to be made to act like the self, and that a law should be passed.

The introspective extravert does not experience this difficulty. Whether it is because he has a relationship with the world, or because his relationship with the self is of the same order as his relationship with the world, the introspective extravert's self is able to present itself to the subject as the self. The trouble with the introspective extravert is that this self is not the tangible self of a feeling personality but the intangible self of a thinking personality. As a matter of fact, it is not even this. For actually, the person who sees tends to be supplanted by the sight that is seen. In retrospection, it is not the viewer who is recalled, but the view which the viewer saw.

The Introspective Extravert's Loss of the Self: Thus the introspective extravert, who is a thinking personality, is confronted with a problem which the feeling personality never knows. For when the view is separated from the viewer, little if anything is left. To be sure, thinking by definition is an internal function of exterior things, a subjective elaboration of elementary perceptions. But one of its peculiarities is that the elaboration is ascribed to the exterior things. Thus although a geologist may spend hours in subjective elaboration of the rock sections under his microscope, that elaboration appears to him as part of the material being examined, and were he to separate the observed from the observer he would be at a loss to give content to the observer. To give content to the observer, the geologist would have to approach the problem, not as a geologist, but as a psychologist, strictly separating the added from the given, the elaboration from the material, and this, in all probability, since he is a geologist and not a psychologist, he would be unwilling to do.

Now the geologist, needless to say, may be a feeling personality. The point of view with which he examines his rock sections may be a discipline of the laboratory, abandoned when he puts on his hat and coat and leaves for home. With the thinking personality, however, it is the fundamental attitude toward life, and the observer (from whom the thing observed may be subtracted) is the very center of the ego, the essential self, the remembered subject of the minute or the day before. Thus if a thinking personality is led to subtract the observed from the observer he may come to the conclusion that the self amounts to little or nothing at all. If, in addition, his subtraction is prompted by inferiority feelings, by a poor opinion of himself to begin with, then the consequences of his reflection may be adverse in the extreme.

It is clear, however, that normally the thinking personality is without this tendency to subtract the observed from the observer. As he retrospectively builds up his ego, the viewed is taken for the viewer; the individual's experiences themselves are remembered as the essence of his individuality. No matter how subjective he may be (and retrospection implies a certain degree of subjectivity), he seems to have no tendency to examine the nature of the self too closely, and is quite content to let what he has seen be his self in its very essence. If his experiences are memorable, if what he has seen is inspiriting and rewarding, so much the better. It all goes to make life the more worth living.

But the introspective extravert is not merely a subjective personality; he is a subjectivated personality. He is subjective because of his painful sense of inferiority. To be sure, like any one else, he can have a predisposition toward subjectivity because of cyclic weighting. Furthermore he can be inclined toward subjectivity because he grew up in a family where thinking was a principal activity and the values were largely subjective. But the peculiar subjectivity which marks the introspective extravert and sets him off from the merely subjective thinking extravert—a subjectivity perhaps better described as egoism than as subjectivity —this subjectivity comes from the personality's sense of inferiority, and comes from the outside in.

For it will be remembered that with all extraverts the sense of inferiority is apt to arise in the outer circles of the personality—if not in the circle of one's lands and horses and yacht and bank-account, then in the circle of one's family and social and economic position; and if not here, then in the circle of one's physique and external appearance. This latter, with a feeling personality, is close to the center of the remembered ego; but with a thinking personality, it is still exterior to the essence of the ego. Thus an introspective extravert, who is a thinking personality, is inclined to become subjectivated through the backdoor—not through the essence of the self, but through its more external fringes. He begins on the outside, not on the inside. Yet it is because of the inside that he is led to separate the observed from the observer, a separation which those more normally subjective never make, and which even the introspective extravert does not make in the first stages of his introspection.

The first stages of his introspection are concerned simply with those external defects that have made him conceive of himself as inadequate in comparison with others. Usually, when the provoking situation is relieved, when the stimulus to the inferiority reaction passes, then the introspective extravert returns to the world from which he has momentarily withdrawn and is simply set down for the moody fellow which in truth he is. The tendency to separate the observed from the observer, to examine the very essence of the self, comes as the result of a prolonged introspection. The original provoking situation is not relieved. The individual is not allowed to return to the world after an unpleasant day or hour. The original reminder of his inferiority persists, and from a preoccupation with the more external components of his self the introspective extravert advances to the more internal components, to his talents and his characteristics, concerning which the conclusion may be as unfavorable as the conclusion with respect to his person. If the mood of self-belittlement persists, finally the introspective will look upon his very self of selves and declare, not without reason, that this self is in reality nothing at all, and that (at least for him) the continuance of life is without meaning. The introspective extravert has been prepared to take this step, not only by his introspective concentration upon the self, but by the increased withdrawal from the world which each stage of his introspection has brought about. Each stage has meant a further retreat from the concrete and the viewable, and the introspective extravert is quite ready when he comes to the ultimate self to see it as it strictly is—as the viewer and not as the viewed.

Thus Mrs. O.M.R., of the early chapter on extraversion and introversion, had a certain amount of reason on her side when she told her husband that she had broken with her friends, that she had discovered that she really didn't care for music, that she had lost her interest in everything. She had been depressed for months, and this was her final position. She had not been so bereft in the beginning. In the beginning, when she had begun this particular cycle of introspection and depression, she still had a substantial ego, in which the witnessed was not yet separated from the witnesser. But as her maladjustment increased, the two seemed to divide. At each stage she seemed to withdraw more from the world, and at the same time to see more sharply the difference between the viewed and the viewer.

Now the friendships of thinking personalities form a series of experiences more or less viewed as at a distance. This does not mean that thinking personalities are less fond of their friends, or less capable of friendship, than feeling personalities. They may be intensely fond of their friends and highly capable of friendship. It does mean, however, that when a thinking personality thinks of his friends, and of the experiences they have shared in common, these experiences take on a certain impersonality in which he, the thinking personality, to some extent fades from the picture. A thinking personality, for instance, may be so dependent upon a traveling companion that he never travels alone. Yet when he thinks of his friend and of their travels, of the splendid walking trip they took in North Wales, of the bicycle tour they made up the valley of the Loire, of the ten days of climbing they had in Zermatt, friend and travels, sight and scene, all form part of a memorable panorama for which, if anything, his affection increases, yet in the midst of which his own role is slight indeed. Now whereas the ordinary thinking personality simply appropriates these memorable experiences to the ego, and in so doing acquires all the warmer feeling for his friend and for their friendship, Mrs. O.M.R., upon subjecting such experiences to the analysis of introspection, saw them as separated from her by all the distance that separates the viewer from the viewed. Prompted by her adverse feelings about herself, Mrs. O.M.R. came to the conclusion that although her friends may have meant something to her, she, the mere viewer, meant nothing to them. Thus Mrs. O.M.R. decided not to answer their letters, and informed her husband that she had broken with her friends.

It was the same with the rest of her complaints. In each case, Mrs. O.M.R. had separated the observed from the observer, and had come to the conclusion that although the observed may have had meaning to her, she was without meaning to the observed. As regards her interest in music (she herself did not play an instrument or sing), Mrs. O.M.R. reflected that the music she had once enjoyed had after all been removed from herself. Music, Mrs. O.M.R. perceived, had an intimate connection only with the performer, and was consequently something in which it was quite foolish for her to take an interest. So it was with everything. The great pageant of life, once seen with delight, and unconsciously appropriated to the ego, now seemed, upon examination, to be quite indifferent to the subject, and quite foolishly appropriated to the ego. Always Mrs. O.M.R. came to the same conclusion. It was not that she had any quarrel with life. Nor did she maintain that life had changed in the least respect. She only declared that she meant nothing to life, and that accordingly it was senseless for her to go on living.

It is thus clear that the difference between the selves of thinking personalities and the selves of feeling personalities explains the fact that the introspective extravert begins by being unduly aware of the self, but ends, as he grows more and more psychotic, by losing this awareness of the self. It seems to him in the end that he is just nothing at all, and it is at this moment that the introspective's friends should take measures to persuade him of his error, or, until they can, take precautions that he doesn't end the existence of that self which he has thus discovered to be nothing at all.[63]

[63] This is not to forget that the introspective's loss of the self was originally brought forward to explain the flight of ideas in mania, not the tendency toward suicide in depression. Unfortunately, the original problem cannot entirely be answered until, in the next chapter, the factors that predispose toward mania or toward depression are taken up. Here it can only be conjectured that the two problems are at least similar. Apparently the chief difference is that in depression the subject consciously subtracts the observed from the observer; that in mania, it is the observer who is subtracted from the observed, and this without the subject's notice.

Now the normal thinking personality may assign a small role to himself when he remembers his walking trip in North Wales, his bicycle tour in France, his climbing in Zermatt. But the experiences are his, and in being his are quite separate from the world. It is just this "his-ness" that is subtracted from the experiences when in mania the introspective's thinking comes to be characterized by the flight of ideas. The viewer falls out of the view. To be sure, the views are inclined to be prospective rather than retrospective, connected with the future rather than with the past. But this is all the more reason for the presence of the viewer, with his physical, economic, and even topographic limitations. His loss is to remove the brakes of common sense, with the result that the views come thicker and faster until finally the condition might better be called a torrent of ideas than a flight of ideas.

The Self of the Abstract Introvert: After what has previously been said about the movement of the abstract introvert's psychic energy forward, surely little needs to be said now about his failure to differentiate a self. To the abstract introvert, external things early become more attractive than internal things. The world runs away with his interest and with his attention. Thought and feeling both move out to concern themselves with the objects of the exterior world, leaving the inner world (which houses the self) relatively bare of interest.

Yet the exterior world does not succeed in presenting itself to the subject in all its depth. Although the abstract introvert through his faculty of primary sensation is aware of the relationships of things, and becomes, as a matter of fact, a great collector of statistics and objective facts, these tend, nevertheless, to convey to him a world that is largely actual. To entertain the conceived as well as the actual requires a development of that self which the abstract introvert conspicuously lacks. As a result, when the abstract introvert abandons observation and begins to think, what emerges is apt to be merely the introverted thinking pattern. In the last analysis, the abstract introvert has only an immediate relationship with the world. The world tends to appear to him in the dimensions only of space, not in the added dimension of time and human eventuality.

In other words, the abstract introvert possesses a relationship with the world that is no more realistic than the sentimental extravert's relationship with the self. When he attempts to perceive the world as other than the panorama of the given moment, he is apt to perceive merely the unconscious pattern of his own major thinking function, or that of his minor feeling function. Accordingly, although it is the fundamental relationship of his personality and the outcome of his adapted function, the abstract introvert possesses only a partial relationship with the world. In addition, he has little or no relationship with the self. For the world which he perceives is quite imperfectly perceived, and consciously, the self is scarcely perceived at all.

The result is an individual who, like Thomas Jefferson, is characterized neither by outward realism nor by inner consistency. Thus Jefferson, who in 1776 drafted the Declaration of Independence and who in 1786 hoped that his country might have an armed insurrection every twenty years, nevertheless went back to Palladio and the Romans in architecture, and in his attitude toward women, was positively paleolithic. The same Jefferson who, as Governor of Virginia in 1780, scrupled on legal grounds to give Steuben forty militiamen to help fortify Richmond, nevertheless did not scruple in 1787 to hire a muleteer, although the penalty was death, to smuggle a sack of seed rice from Piedmont to Genoa. Again, Jefferson, the great libertarian, who was not sure but that the Indians, in having no government, had the best government—this same Jefferson induced Congress to pass the Embargo Act which, for its abrogation of liberty in time of peace, exceeded anything which George III and his henchmen had had the temerity to enact. As for Jefferson's judgment, this was notoriously weak on the score of realism. Jefferson seems to have had no awareness of the fact that if he asked his wife to bear children as often as she could she would not survive ten years of matrimony, nor of the fact that if he put his daughter Patsy in a convent, that lonely and adolescent girl would want to become a nun. The optimistic mistakes he made as to an early outcome of the American Revolution he repeated with respect to the French Revolution, although in the years preceding it he had traveled widely in France and was in a position to know the forces at work. Finally, although a generation had passed since the time of Washington and his Continental Army, and although his own economy-minded administration had cut the army and the navy to the bone, Jefferson nevertheless believed in 1812 that it would be "a mere matter of marching" to expel the British from the continent—the British who at that time, alone among the nations of Europe, had been able to stand up against the French.

In spite of Jefferson's greatness (and it would be as foolish as it would be idle to pretend that Jefferson was not great)—in spite of Jefferson's greatness, it is not apparent that he fully perceived the world, or that he ever had much knowledge of himself. It would be an interesting study to reexamine Jefferson as an example of the abstract introvert, and not the least of the aims of such a reexamination would be to ascertain why the times, first in 1776, and again, in 1800, had need of a man who had a realistic understanding neither of the world nor of himself. For the present, Jefferson must be left as an example of a type of individual who, like the sentimental extravert, has failed to differentiate one of the principal components of personality.

The Self of the Emotional Introvert: The emotional introvert, unlike the abstract introvert, has not failed to differentiate a principal component of his personality. No doubt, the abstract introvert is aided in his overemphasis of the world by the naturally intangible nature of his thinking personality's self. But the emotional introvert's self is the tangible self of a feeling personality, a doer of deeds in a very concrete sense. Like the abstract introvert, the emotional introvert also overvalues the world. But the point is that his self does not fade out of the picture. It remains in the center of things, a small, but essential, part of the whole. In fact there is good reason for believing that it is the pivot upon which the whole revolves. This is not to obscure the fact that the personality's chief emphasis goes to the world. Not only does he need the world as a stage upon which to execute his remarkable actions, but he needs the people of the world to serve as his audience. In the diagram of the emotional introvert, the world ring, although broken, is represented as larger than the self ring, and it is clear that the emotional introvert's sense of the theater of his actions is quite the largest part of his personality. Nevertheless in the center of the stage and audience, the emotional introvert's self, the doer of his remarkable deeds, is quite the central, if not the only, actor of the drama, and being immediately present enjoys a continuity that is not vouchsafed to the larger world. In fact there is little doubt that the theater exists for the actor, and that without the actor (although he may be small) the stage and audience are quite without meaning.

Thus it is that although, normally, the emotional introvert seems to be unduly conscious of the world and of the world's opinion, yet as he grows more abnormal, his sense of the world weakens rather than grows stronger. Furthermore it is clear that the emotional introvert's sense of the world weakens because his sense of the self has weakened, because in the world, he no longer has anything remarkable, indeed anything even interesting, to do.

The Emotional Introvert's Loss of the World: Now the curious thing is that although the essential self at the center of the emotional introvert's remembered ego is very much a doer of deeds, the emotional introvert's sense of inferiority is apt to arise in a region interior to this. Needless to say, in a phenomenon so universal as that of the inferiority reaction, all origins (as well as all responses) are to be found in all men. The feeling of inferiority can arise in any type of personality on account of any circumstance. Introverts will be found reacting to outward situations quite as if they were extraverts, and extraverts will be found who are concerned about a lack of inner ability quite as if they were introverts. Nevertheless it is demonstrable that, by and large, introverts are apt to be most concerned about that lack of spontaneity which is revealed in them by the presence in their immediate environment of an extraverted parent or sibling. The introvert then tries to demonstrate that he possesses this spontaneity, and if he is a feeling personality (that is, an emotional introvert), he will try to demonstrate it by means of his actions, which will then show a tension which is not evident in the similar actions of extraverts.

Usually, as in the case of the introspective extravert, the provoking situation is temporary and passing. It is a question of that specific instance of inferiority, with its short-range reaction, which has already been discussed. The egocentric role which the emotional introvert is playing in the theater of the world is cut short. There no longer seems to be anything remarkable for him to do, and he desponds and broods until the moment passes, and he is permitted to return to his long-range, egocentric feelings and actions.

But sometimes the immediate situation is not relieved; sometimes the specific instance of inferiority remains, and the emotional introvert's despondency persists. Then, as a consequence of the prolonged lack of a role to perform, the world itself may begin to lose its sharpness and its appeal. What use of a stage and audience if there is no play to be produced? What use of a world which can no longer serve as the scene of the individual's adventures and remarkable deeds? Is it not clear that the short-range mood will be protracted into a long-range mood, that the inactivity of discouragement may advance into the retardation of depression, and finally change into the paralysis of despair? Thus the world which originally led the individual to regard himself as inferior, and then became important as the theater of his refutation—this very world fades from the emotional introvert's consciousness, not as he grows less maladjusted, but as he grows more maladjusted. That which was the original source of his trouble loses its power to cause him pain, not as the wound heals, but as the wound deepens and grows malignant. Paradoxical as the emotional introvert's loss of the world may seem upon first glance, it is nevertheless the inevitable consequence of a continuance of those forces which formed his personality in the first place.

However, as regards the usual, unschizoid emotional introvert, the foregoing is the exception rather than the rule. Being equipped with the normal emotional endowment of the introvert, and with a corresponding reserve of physical energy, the usual emotional introvert does not become permanently discouraged even by a prolonged demonstration of his inferiority. The mood of discouragement may last beyond the ordinary unpleasant day or hour. It may extend to a month, perhaps to a year. But nearly always recovery sets in. Nearly always the individual returns to his long-range program, whether it be egocentricity or compensation—a reaction which is assisted by his development of will as his adapted function. Thus Byron, reeling in 1816 from his ostracism by British society, the worst wound his ego ever sustained, returned to the drama of his life and even to his long-range, poetic compensation. For who will assert that the cantos of *Childe Harold* which follow Byron's departure from England are not better than the cantos which precede it, or that *Don Juan* (which follows *Childe Harold)* is not in many ways the superior of the two poems? When the normally endowed emotional introvert fails to rally his forces after a demonstration of his inferiority, the demonstration must be specific indeed, and usually, of a kind that prevents a return to his long-range reactions. The normal emotional introvert recovers if he can. He does not lose interest in his self, and hence in the world.

Unfortunately, the sense of emotional deficiency which is the usual cause of the introverted inferiority reaction—this sense of inferiority is quite relative in its basis. Whereas it takes a parent or sibling of unusual warmth and availability of emotion to make a normally endowed introvert feel inferior on the score of his emotional constitution, quite the ordinary run of human being can make an individual of schizoid foundation feel inferior. Thus it is doubtful if Byron's sense of inferiority came at all from the usual introverted source. Byron's mother may have been an extravert (although in all probability she was an example of Byron's own type), but in any event her explosions of emotion were scarcely of a kind to make Byron regret that he did not possess an equal store. It is more likely that Byron's sense of inferiority came from his lameness, from the poverty of his early years, and from the very unadmirability of that mother who made him feel ashamed again and again.

On the other hand, it is clear that the poet Shelley's sense of inferiority must have come from the more usual source of introverted inferiority feelings. For Shelley was born with no bodily defect, never knew poverty in his early years, and although not blessed with particularly interesting or imaginative parents certainly never had cause to feel conspicuously ashamed of them. As a matter of fact, the boy grew up in a perfectly normal family, was the eldest child in a family composed of numerous sisters and a baby brother, knew no want of affection (in fact, his sisters adored him), and can only have known inferiority through his schizoid lack of emotion in comparison with his normally, but not excessively, endowed parents and siblings. Thus throughout life when the poet became emotional there was always something shrill, something frenzied, something whipped-up, about his emotion. Just as Byron's swimming of the Hellespont and the magnificence of his living in Italy can be traced back to the lameness and poverty of the early years in Aberdeen, so the frenzy and extreme quality of Shelley's indignation over the thousand and one wrongs of mankind can be traced back to those early years when the poet in the midst of his warm-hearted sisters and cousins must have felt inferior indeed. Thus if the theme of Byron's great drama on the stage of the world can be interpreted as an answer to lameness, poverty, and a parent who made him feel ashamed, so the theme of Shelley's drama can be set down as an attempt to demonstrate that, far from possessing a defect in his emotionality, he alone felt warmth when the hearts of others were cold.

However this may be, there can be no doubt that recovery from the specific instance of inferiority is more difficult for the emotional introvert of schizoid constitution than for the emotional introvert of more normal constitution. The schizoid has less emotion to begin with, and the drama he seeks to perform on the stage of the world is altogether a less forceful affair. His exploits are apt to be the adventures of a day, adventures in which the subjective drama is as great as or greater than the one enacted in the outer world. In fact the emotional introvert of schizoid foundation frequently becomes overtaken by panic when he sets out upon an adventure of greater scope. As he gets farther away from the home to which he has always returned from his briefer sallies, there seems to be no refuge at all to which to return for the night, and his very temerity strikes him with fear. And this is assuming a certain neutrality of stage and of audience. When the theater of the world affords proof of his inferiority, the schizoid's tendency is to desert the stage altogether. Indeed, if the demonstration of his inferiority is sharp enough, he may never return.

Thus the failure of Shelley's 1812 expedition to Ireland marked the beginning of a retreat the direction of which was never reversed. Shelley had gone to Ireland to be a Tom Paine, to arouse by means of his pamphleteering an oppressed people to a redress of its wrongs. He failed, and whatever the outward circumstances of his failure, part of the blame had to be laid at his own door. On his part, there had been a want of penetration of the situation in Ireland, and hence of preparation for the pamphlets which he was intending to write. But above all, his emotions flagged just when they should have become more determined—a fact that must have been perilously suggestive of the early want of emotive force which he must have felt in the presence of his sisters and cousins. At any rate, Shelley never returned to the fray. He came back to Ireland in 1813, but it was as a tourist, and five years later, like Byron, he left England never to return. In Italy, he came to live more and more in the inner world. Even the last adventure of his life, the enthusiasm for boating, was Williams's adventure, not his. It was Williams who drew the plans for the *Ariel* and furnished the motive force of the hobby. Shelley, in the midst of the bright sky and glancing waves, sat on deck and read.

With Byron, who was a more normally constituted introvert, the story is quite different. Although he retreated from England, he did not retreat from the world. After he had returned to the struggle, he put on a more magnificent spectacle than ever before. The cortège which passed from Ravenna to Pisa in 1822 quite eclipsed any display that Byron had ever made in England. Byron's poetry became more objective, not less objective, and when Byron de-parted in 1823 to join the Greek insurgents he set out, not upon the least, but upon the greatest, adventure of his life.

More important, however, than the difference between schizoid and non-schizoid, is the question of how long and how successfully the schizoid can remain in the refuge of the inner world. The amazing thing about Shelley is that he successfully remained in it for ten years after the retreat from Ireland. Perhaps the answer in Shelley's case is to be sought in the fertility of his imagination, perhaps in the ease with which he was able to put his ideas into words. More probably, it is to be found in the fact that after the Irish fiasco Shelley's sense of inferiority was never again thrust upon his view, that Shelley was able to avoid a second demonstration of his inferiority because he never again voluntarily ventured into the world of affairs. It must also be remembered that Shelley was never obliged to make his living, to adapt himself to employer or to employment. In spite of duns and bailiffs and the want of many a pound and shilling, Shelley throughout his life enjoyed economic security, and after the flight to Italy this security increased rather than diminished.

On the other hand, the poet Hölderlin, who not only looked like Shelley but was like Shelley—the poet Hölderlin enjoyed no such economic security. His mother, twice widowed, could provide him with a home to which to return after his failures in the world, but not with the independence that would have enabled him to avoid such failures after they had once or twice occurred.[64] As a consequence, Hölderlin was unable to solve the impasse between what he wanted to do and what he had to do. Hölderlin was forced to adventure in the outer world not merely to play a role but to make a living. And as each adventure collapsed, as his gloom deepened, so the spirit went out of him for continuing the play, and his interest waned in a world that he no longer needed as a theater. In Hölderlin's later poems there are qualities that make them seem like the Shelleyan poems of 1822. As in the Shelleyan poems, there is a poignancy arising from the loss of a world that was dearly loved. But whereas in the Shelleyan poems the loss is simply of the world of outer fact, and comes from the poet's philosophical musings,[65] in Hölderlin's poems, the loss is the much more terrible loss of the world both of outer and of inner fact, and comes from the poet's basic loss of interest in himself. It is indicated by the fatal discontinuity, or "scattering," which these poems contain, and which the Shelleyan poems do not contain.

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[64] As is well known to students of Hölderlin, the poet's short career in the outer world may be summarized by his returns to his mother's home. After the collapse of each new chapter, each new set of hopes, Hölderlin always came back to his mother's house at Nürtingen. The first time was in July 1795, after the failure of the year and a half at Waltershausen and Jena. The second time was in June 1800, when he returned penniless from Homburg. The third time was in April 1801, after the collapse of the Swiss tutorship. The fourth and last time was in July 1802, when he returned to Nürtingen from Bordeaux in a state of raving madness.

Conclusion: In the final paragraphs of this section on the two selves, a word or two of caution must be added before the subject is dropped and the page turned to the succeeding chapter.

In the first place, although the discussion has exclusively emphasized the cognitive self of the thinking personality, the active self of the feeling personality, it is surely clear that this is only for the sake of ease of exposition, and that every personality has a less fundamental self, just as he has a less fundamental relationship. If the introspective extravert, for example, did not have a tangible, active self as well as an intangible, cognitive self, he would not feel inferior about such things as his looks or his family's social or economic position. Nevertheless, it is not this self but his other, cognitive self which is of ultimate importance, and which, when lost, occasions circumstances that are of such dire consequence.

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[65] Cf. Joseph Barrell, *Shelley and the Thought of His Time,* New Haven, 1947, pp. 189 ff.

More important is the fact that a great deal of the preceding discussion is relevant in the strict sense only to personalities of a joy-depressoid constitution. The loss of the self and the loss of the world can surely be of supreme importance only to those introspective extraverts and emotional introverts whose cyclic endowment weights them toward a combination of the self and the world to begin with. The center of the anger-convivial's emotional interest falls in the group of his fellows, while the center of the hope-fearist's emotional interest falls in the family. The center of interest even of those individuals who show all three cycles, ranged in their usual masculine or feminine order, still falls, not between the individual and the world, but between the individual and the group.

For instance, the anger-convivial emotional introvert will grow angry rather than depressed at the failure of the role he is attempting to play, at an exposure of his incapacity. The objective weighting of his cycle will lead him to bestow the blame upon the group, not upon himself. He may indeed be forced to give up the play and retire to the inner world; but there his anger, perhaps allied with hate, will prevent him from abandoning his interest in a world which can no longer serve as the theater of his exploits. His schemes of revenge, his notions of conspiracy and collusion, his dreams of the future role he is going to play—all this keeps him oriented toward the world, and he neither loses interest in himself nor in the world, as does the joy-depressoid emotional introvert.

More or less the same factors may be seen at work in the other emotional introverts and introspective extraverts who are not joy-depressoids. The hope-fearist introspective may stand for them all. As in the case of the joy-depressoid introspective, his sense of inferiority is also apt to arise in one of the outward circles of his personality, and he, too, has a tendency to withdraw from the world as he subjects his self to that scrutiny which is already inclined to be unfavorable. However, his emotional centering is social rather than personal and environmental, and differs from that of the anger-convivial only in that it falls in the family rather than in the group. Hence his tendency, as the occasion of his inferiority persists, is not to advance to the more internal components of his personality, to his talents and his characteristics, but to consider simply the consequences of his inferiority upon himself, and then upon his family and more intimate friends. Thus when Clifford Beers, who may be taken as a typical hope-fearist introspective, and whose autobiography, *A Mind That Found Itself,* ought to be required reading of every one interested in the study of the human mind—when Clifford Beers believed that he was under arrest for attempted suicide, his introspection did not turn inward to his inner self, but outward to the reaction of his family to his disgrace, and then to the reaction of his Yale classmates celebrating, at that moment, their triennial reunion. Even the longer cycle of Beers's fears and forebodings, the cycle that had ended in the attempted suicide—even this cycle of anxiety and introspection never advanced beyond the possibility of his having epilepsy like his brother and of what he would do if that were the case. His suicide was attempted, not because his life had come to have no meaning, but because he believed that at long last the epilepsy had come, and because he had always said that in that event he would kill himself.

Not only does the prolonged, specific instance of inferiority in such an individual tend to arouse fear rather than depression, but the weighting of his hope-fear mood-cycle seems to withhold him from too close an examination of his inner self. As a consequence, he does not show the tendency of the joy-depressoid introspective to separate the viewer from the viewed, and then to regard the viewer as devoid of meaning. The hope-fearist introspective is probably not so suicidal to begin with, and when he is, this comes as the result of anxiety, as a relief from anxiety, and not as a consequence of the ebbing of meaning from his own individual life.

All this, however, is to be the object of a closer examination in the following chapter, and for the present, the matter must be dropped with the foregoing few words of caution.

9

MALADJUSTMENT AND PSYCHOSIS

1. Introduction

IN the course of the preceding chapter on the gnostic stream, the discussion became more and more concerned with the problem of the emotional introvert and the introspective extravert, with the psychotic tendencies which each of these types manifests as its maladjustment passes a certain limit which, while still maladjustment, is nevertheless consonant with psychic health. In the section on the strata of thought, the emotional introvert's psychotic development of emotional thinking was taken up, the introspective's psychotic development of flighty thinking. In the section on the two selves, the emotional introvert's peculiar, psychotic loss of the world was considered, the introspective's peculiar, psychotic loss of the self. The present chapter will continue the discussion of this psychotic development of the emotional introvert and introspective extravert, and will seek to offer theories of schizophrenia and manic-depression based not merely upon the last chapter, but upon the observation and reasoning of all the chapters that have gone before.

Thus it cannot be too strongly urged that the notions of this chapter on maladjustment and psychosis are the product of a study of the normal, that the tendencies to be discussed in the following pages are conceived as an exaggeration and distortion of tendencies to be observed in every-day life. Psychosis in the following pages will mean a condition but a step removed from psychic health, and although the individual in question may have been regarded as peculiar (as who is not), it will be assumed that he never seemed so in an alarming way. It will be supposed that for the most part the onset of his trouble was a slow and gradual, experience-conditioned process, noticed with worry and perplexity by his friends, but not perceived as definitely psychotic until after his breakdown had occurred.

True, as Jung has well remarked,[66] the psyche lives in indissoluble union with the body, and it is not surprising that every experience-conditioned psychotic trait can be matched with a similar, organically conditioned trait. The writer remembers, in a well-known sanitarium in which he was employed, being told of a recent case of schizophrenia which, for its perfect regularity, might have been taken as a paradigm of the disease. Every cardinal symptom was manifest, and the case, upon admission, would have been turned over to routine treatment had not one of the house physicians had reason to suspect a wisdom tooth. He had the tooth pulled, and the individual's schizophrenia cleared up immediately. In the same sanitarium, the writer recalls a case of post-puerperal manic-depression admitted to the institution in such a state of frenzy that three attendants were necessary to get the patient from the automobile to her cottage. The patient was given the usual therapy, but in little more than a week, before the therapy could have had any appreciable effect, the malady left her as suddenly as it had come, and without any secondary, post-maniacal depression. According to the patient's husband and father, with whom the writer talked at length, there had been no warning before the malady manifested itself—just as there was now no trace of the patient's sickness. There was only the blank of the month or two in which she had been ill.

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[66] *Factors Determining Human Behavior* (Harvard Tercentenary Publications), Cambridge, Mass., 1937, p. 49.

Every sanitarium and every physician can offer similar cases in which the psyche seems to have been the complete victim of the body. Particularly is this true of manic-depression where not only much hysteria masquerades as manic-depression but where, especially among women, the organic can enter and give a semblance of the psychically conditioned disease. With such psychosis this study is not concerned. Not only is the present discussion confined to but two of the many psychoses; even these psychoses are considered only when the cause lies clearly in the realm of the psyche and not in that of the body. Furthermore, as a final delimitation, the ensuing discussion of manic-depression will apply only to those individuals who can be demonstrated to be subjectivated thinking extraverts; while the discussion of schizophrenia will apply only to those individuals who can be shown to be objectivated feeling introverts, although presumably on the basis of the schizoid constitution.

2. The Freudian Background

It is appropriate that the psychiatric portion of this study should begin with an appraisal of the Freudian theory of individual development. Although, in being primarily concerned with the normal, this study takes its departure from William James rather than from the subsequent psychopathologists, it nevertheless owes a vast debt to Freud and to the heirs of Freud. Particularly constructive has been Freud's theory of the three periods into which the early life of the individual falls.[67] The first, or infantile, period the Freudians regard as more or less comprised by the first five years, the second, or "latency," period as extending, roughly, to the age of twelve or thirteen, while the last, or puberal, period they wisely regard as lasting until the individual makes his choice of a mate with whom to link his fortunes and found a family. Thus the Freudians regard sexual inversion as sexual immaturity, as the case of a person whose puberal, or adolescent, period has never come to an end.

Now the puberal, or adolescent, period, at least in its early stages, may also be regarded as a more or less conscious repetition of the largely unconscious first five years.

For there can be little doubt that the Freudian conception of the first five years is the conception of an essentially unconscious, or instinctive, period. The transitions from autoerotism to sadism, and then from a narcissistic to a homosexual, and finally to a heterosexual, attachment—all these are developments that clearly take place below the threshold of recognition. That the child, or even the parent in most cases, is ever aware of them is problematical in the extreme.

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[67] Cf. Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis,* New York, 1935, Twenty-First Lecture; Otto Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis,* New York, 1945, Chapters V and VI.

No doubt, the Freudians have said as much time and time again, and they have always made clear that their reconstruction of the first five years is a reconstruction based upon the evidence of dreams and of the neuroses and psychoses. However, to judge only from the prevalence of misconception, the unconscious character of the first five years has not been clearly enough brought out. The Oedipus tendency has not, for example, been clearly enough recognized as a characteristic of the race rather than of the individual. If it had been so recognized, people would not look for it as they do in conscious behavior, nor would they assume, when they do not find it, that it therefore does not exist. For that it fails to make part of individual experience is no sign that it does not form part of the individual. MacCurdy observes that children who have never known their parents still have it, that adults who have received only cruelty from their parents are not without it.[68] Indeed, MacCurdy goes so far as to state that the evidence for the Oedipus tendency in the human psyche is more easily demonstrable than the evidence for gills in the human body. The point is that both tendencies belong to the species rather than to the individual, that both are embryonic and hidden rather than open and mature, and that in the adult, the Oedipus tendency is revealed only when many overlying layers of the psyche have been stripped aside.

The evolution of the first five years, however, is lived over again in the period of adolescence—lengthened out, extended beyond the family, and elevated to the realm of consciousness. The autoerotism of the first two or three years returns usually as masturbation. The sadism and narcissism, which come next, find a renewed outlet in sport and in the grandiose ambitions and feelings of self-confidence of the adolescent period. The homosexual object choice of the fourth or fifth year is apt to reappear as the individual's first real friendship, while the heterosexual attachment manifests itself in the first appearance of the adult mating instinct.

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[68] John T. MacCurdy, *The Psychology of Emotion: Morbid and Normal*, New York, 1925, Chapter XII, "The Oedipus Complex and Infantile Sexuality."

All this, however, only throws the intervening seven or eight years, the "latency" period of the Freudians, into relief as an interval equal in importance to the first five years, or indeed to the adolescent period itself. Freud assigned to the latency period the growth of the reaction-formations and the first development of the super-ego. But the evidence suggests that the importance of the period extends beyond this. The evidence suggests that the germs of future psychosis, at least of experience-conditioned psychosis, frequently lie in this period rather than in the early one.

For if the sexual and psychosexual development of the first five years is largely biologic, a characteristic of the species rather than of the individual, if it fails to enter into the conscious experience of the personality, it is difficult to see how it can contain the seeds of future, experience-conditioned psychosis, as is frequently maintained. That the development of the early years appears as the layers above are stripped off, that the Freudian theory very aptly describes the lower strata of the personality, few would deny.[69] But that these lower strata can in any way *occasion* the stripping of the upper strata would seem to present a concept impossible to maintain. On the other hand, if one regards the sexual and psychosexual development of the first five years as a largely subterranean growth, alike in its essential stages for all human beings, and the next seven or eight years as the period of essentially *individual* development, then perhaps one has a theory that will explain an adolescent (or later) return to the "fixations" of the early years.

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[69] R. G. Hoskins, for instance, states that the Oedipus tendency is found "almost routinely in the intimate personal histories of schizophrenic patients" (*The Biology of Schizophrenia,* New York, 1946, p. 64).

At any rate, it is a commonplace that the period from the fifth to the twelfth or thirteenth year is the period when boys become boys, and girls become girls. True, the Freudians have shown that in the strict sense the early period is far more sexual than the second period, which is why they call the second period the latency period. But surely from the point of view of the *secondary* sexual character, the second period is one of the periods of greatest differentiation in the individual's life. Any parent knows that it is then that brothers and sisters stop just being children together, that girls in this period begin to find more companionship with their mothers and other girls, that boys in the same period begin to find more companionship with their fathers and other boys. Indeed, just around the onset of adolescence (or just before it), the process often culminates when the girl becomes a girl scout and the boy becomes a boy scout.

For what do a scout's merit badges represent if not those very qualities which the boy or girl has been developing in the last half-dozen years? Is not the eagle boy scout with his sleeve of merit badges every inch a boy? Is not the first-class girl scout a girl in the fullest sense of the word? In the latency period, the sexual instinct is latent only in the primary sense of the term. In the secondary sense of the term the truth of the matter is that the latency period is the period in which the sexual instinct first reaches consciousness. This it does as a boy perceives that being a boy is the very essence of his individuality, as a girl perceives that being a girl and being a person are very much the same sort of thing.

But what of the schizoid boy or girl in this period when most boys and girls are branching out and acquiring new interests—to say nothing of learning how to be boys with other boys, girls with other girls? By definition, the schizoid is a child of limited interests. He may be fond of music, and have an unusual knowledge of music. He may spend hours playing with a model village of his own precocious construction. His room may resemble a radio repair shop in the intricacy of its wiring and the miscellany of tubes and condensers. But these interests are apt to be solitary—not only in the sense of being enjoyed by the individual alone, but in the sense of being unaccompanied by other interests.

To be sure, it is not until the next period, not until adolescence, that these children are apt to run afoul of the desire of their parents and contemporaries that they take part in the more variegated world of normal boyhood and girlhood. The child of eight or ten is more apt than the boy or girl of sixteen to be allowed to follow his or her own bent, indifferent to the activities of other, more normally endowed children. But is it not alarming to see a child advancing through the latency period with no real broadening of its interests and attachments? Where is the father-identification that Freud speaks about, the father-identification that may lead to so much in the individual's life—from an interest in tennis to a passion for trout fishing, from an ability to handle tools to an enthusiasm for the West and the great open spaces? Where is the sense of romance that comes from building a hut in the woods with other boys, the sense of sportsmanship that comes from team play no matter how youthful the contestants? When at adolescence the sexual instinct returns in its primary form, coupled with the expansion of energy and conception that goes along with it, what will the schizoid child do who, at the age of thirteen, has a framework of interests scarcely greater than at the age of eight?

Will it be surprising if the autoerotic element in his sexual instinct returns as masturbation in its simplest form, without the heterosexual imagery that is the usual accompaniment of masturbation in adolescence? Will it be surprising if the sadistic element reappears without the countering influence of good-sportsmanship, which in most adolescents is the thing that suppresses it? Is it not likely that the individual's latent homosexuality, far from finding outlet in an ennobling friendship, will remain as homosexuality—until in later life it may break forth as paranoia? Is it not highly possible that the increased capacity of adolescence for heterosexual attachment may find the schizoid child uninterested in any woman other than his mother?

The seven or eight years of the latency period form a lengthy interval in terms of human history. The habits and tastes acquired in those years are ingrained by the time of adolescence, and it would seem that whatever psychic trouble the individual may afterward develop (or safely avoid), these habits must exert a telling force.

3. The Cyclic Background

Hitherto, this study has been concerned principally with the thymic aspect of instinct, and has, for that reason, passed over the term "instinct" in favor of the term "impulse," the connotations of which are thymic rather than gnostic. But when the matter is looked at from the point of view of the whole animal kingdom, it is apparent that the gnostic element of instinct is no less important than the thymic element. Whether one considers the complicated behavior of the Pronuba moth or the simple building of a nest by a bird, it is clear that in instinct there is a *pattern* of action as well as the drive of the action. To be sure, the pattern is thoroughly unconscious, and in its unconscious state is probably no more visual than the pattern of a televised image on its way from the broadcasting station to the receiving set. Nevertheless, it is unthinkable that some sort of template does not exist, and it must be assumed that the oriole, in building its nest, follows an unconscious pattern that is as much a part of the nest-building instinct as the energy that goes into the gathering of the materials and the building of the nest itself. It is simply the peculiarity of our human evolution that in our development as a species we have come to depend more and more upon unconditioned behavior, less and less upon instinct. Whereas with the lower animals the most important functions of life can be handed over to a racial conditioning, with man, even the individually conditioned response gives way to the unconditioned.

Hence it is that in human psychology one is apt to use the word "impulse" more often than the word "instinct." It is simply a recognition of the fact that in human behavior the gnostic element of instinct has declined markedly in favor of the thymic. Most students of human psychology are content to talk about the general purpose, the broad aim, of an impulse—this, and nothing more.

Yet that the gnostic element has not declined completely, the very "aim" of an impulse assures us, and it is apparent that there is not a gap, but a continuity, between the lowest stratum of human behavior and the behavior of animals. Thus an allusion to the nest-building instinct of an oriole is not gratuitous and anthropomorphic. The conditions attending the presence of instinct both in the animals and in man must be roughly the same.

Now one of the most interesting of these conditions is certainly the feeling-tone that accompanies the successful performance of instinct. It is hard to imagine anything more symbolic of contented activity than the nest building of a bird. If the bird does not experience a feeling-tone of satisfaction as it builds its nest, then what being does? It would seem impossible for behavior so apparently similar as that of a bird building its nest and of a man whistling at his work not to have the same subjective accompaniments. In fact it would seem that the production of emotion (that is, of anger, hope, fear, and the like) ensues upon the frustration or inhibition of instinct, that the very notion of frustration or inhibition implies a contentedness, even a euphoria, before the inhibition begins. It would seem that a feeling-tone of satisfaction or dissatisfaction is as basic as instinct itself.[70]

Indeed, the conclusion is inescapable that joy-depression is the basic cycle, the accompaniment of action that is more or less instinctive and conditioned, that hope-fear and anger-conviviality are the cycles which advene as behavior ceases to be conditioned and instinctive. All the thinking of this study upon the subject of mood-cycle has assumed a delay, an obstruction, or an indirectness, in the activity that subtends the social cycles. The project requires a group effort, the interposition of a feeling of gregarious satisfaction. An obstacle requires the delayed response of a gathered and suddenly released tension. The wagon in the mud needs not only an extra shoulder but a burst of anger to get it out of the slough. Again, the emergence of the family as a feature of human evolution has made the future as well as the present a reality to be reckoned with—not as the wasp reckons with a future that it will never know, sealing with all the certainty of instinctive action a paralyzed insect into the cell of its egg—but as the human being reckons with the future, knowing that the largest element in it is the element of uncertainty, and thereby developing the emotions of hope and fear to keep him going until the future (whether for good or ill) comes true. The emergence of the family as a feature of human evolution has necessitated the development of a provisional cycle of emotion, the postponement of some of the feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

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[70] In this respect one is reminded of Aristotle's general theory that pleasure is the accompaniment of any unobstructed vital activity, that pain is the consequence of the obstruction of that activity (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book X).

Yet behavior that has ceased to be conditioned and instinctive, in spite of its use of anger-conviviality and hope-fear and its need for intuitive, practical decisions, is not the same as thought. True thinking requires (if only for a moment) the suspension of all behavior, whether conditioned or unconditioned. The very essence of thinking, as this study has always maintained, is the subjective pause, the time-out to think. And the time-out is time-out from the cycle of stimulus and response, whether the stimulus be inner or outer. The collection of data, the sifting and comparison of the data, the formulation of judgment—all this demands that the organism's sensitivity to stimulus be suspended until the original stimulus, the incitement to the thinking, receive its response in the solution of the problem.

Thus it is that the cyclic accompaniment of thinking returns to the cyclic accompaniment of instinct, to the non-adaptive cycle of joy-depression. This is the cycle that registers the quiet functioning of the organism, the very absence of obstruction and delay. The thinker, as well as the creature who functions by instinct, is released from the strain of immediate adaptation. The satisfaction of the thinker as his thinking proceeds is the same as that of the bird that finds weather, materials, overhanging tree, and an absence of enemies all conducive to an activity which was, of course, adapted to the environment long before the individual's appearance in the particular environment of the moment. Although thinking, from the point of view of conditioning, is the very opposite of the preconditioned activity of instinct, yet it is like instinct in that it presupposes a suspension of the need for immediate, individual adaptation. And as it functions, it is not surprising that it evokes the same cyclic overtones that are evoked by the suspension of immediate, individual adaptation in the instinctive animal.

In fact it is clear that the double weighting of joy-depression, the double interest in the self and in the environment, represents the stage of emotional development that precedes societal evolution. For to the organism that has not evolved a communal way of life the two concerns of paramount importance are the environment and the self. True, among such animals, there may also be a concern for the young. But there is no concern for the group. The feeling-tone that accompanies the unobstructed exercise of instinct is paralleled by a twofold concern for the environment and the activity of the individual. Indeed, even if the need arises for a response that is not conditioned, and the animal knows fear or rage in what might be termed our human sense—even these emotions are particular and connected with the environment, not cyclic and connected with the group.

In other words, in addition to the quantitative emotional defect of the schizoid, there is also the qualitative emotional defect of the joy-depressoid. For the emergence of joy-depression as the only cycle of the personality must represent a stripping-off of the two superimposed societal cycles, a loss of the full complement of human emotional color. True, the joy-depressoid has been presented in these pages as far from a simple human being. But that the joy-depressoid defect can, against the background of a more socially colored environment, produce a complex human being should be no more surprising than that the schizoid defect can produce what is possibly the most complex individual of all. The heterodox is always apt to produce the complex, even if in itself it represents a movement in the direction of the simple. What is of greater significance is that the schizoid defect is found only among introverts, the joy-depressoid defect among individuals of all types. The joy-depressoid defect is a scanting merely in the color of emotion; the schizoid defect presupposes a shorting in the substance of emotion itself.

Yet the cycle of joy-depression, no less than the schizoid defect itself, can be adaptive in our modern, advanced society. No one ever said that evolution is the only process of adaptation. Whether one thinks of diatoms or of whales, it is clear that devolution as well as evolution can be adaptive. And the fact remains that as society becomes more and more advanced it finds a place, not only for the ancient, non-societal mood-cycle, but even for the schizoid defect.

To say nothing of art and literature, science itself demands a certain freedom from the group emotions. Although the very existence of science depends upon the accumulated knowledge of many minds, yet each item of knowledge first occurs as an individual problem to an individual thinker. And that which enables the thinker to make his contribution to the common stockpile of scientific information is a certain lifting of the societal fog that interposes itself between man and his environment. Indeed it makes little difference whether the individual is a priest or a poet, a painter or a scientist; if it is his function to interpret some aspect of his human or nonhuman environment, he is aided by a cycle that frees him from more immediate concerns. There is little doubt that literature, science, indeed civilization itself, depends to a certain extent upon a relaxation of the rigors of strict communal existence.

4. Mood-Cycle and Individual Development

From the point of view of mood-cycle, it cannot be said that the first five years are particularly significant. It has been pointed out that the Freudian events of these years are largely unconscious—a sort of recapitulation of biologic history that for the most part remains concealed unless a later psychosis or neurosis discloses the primitive structure. On the other hand it is clear that the normal development of mood-cycle represents, not racial, nor even individual, but societal experience, and stands for a far higher stage of evolution than that retraced in the early period. Apparently the individual first begins to reexperience the societal evolution of his race in the latency period, and does not complete the recapitulation until the adolescent period.

Furthermore it is questionable if the concept of mood-cycle is applicable to the first five years under any circumstance. The concept as used in this study implies a predisposition to emotion, a characteristically colored tension that exists prior to emotional stimulus. The anger-convivial experiences an urge, a restlessness, that is alleviated by a group experience—a poker game, a meeting of his lodge, a return to work after vacation. The joy-depressoid experiences a reluctance to mingle with the group. He is inclined to view his fellows rather than to join with them, and frequently feels an urge to leave the group and associate only with nature. To assume such an *a priori* emotional condition of the first five years would appear to be gratuitous. Although the emotions of joy and sorrow and fear and rage occur then as at any time, yet it is as emotions rather than as mood that they occur, and they certainly come in the wake of experience rather than lead the individual toward experience.

It is true that the cycle of joy-depression appears to be the accompaniment of instinctive action, and to represent, in the adult, a loss of the superimposed societal cycles. Furthermore the cycle may be conceived as an extension of the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of the early period, and in its essence may be nothing more than pleasure and displeasure writ large. But the pleasure and displeasure *are* writ large. The emotional capacity, not of an infant, but of an adult is presupposed. Furthermore the emotional weighting in the self and in the environment which characterizes the mature joy-depressoid is quite a different thing from what it is in the early period. Then the self is scarcely more than the recipient of the passing moment, and the environment scarcely extends beyond the family. In maturity, the environment may extend in time from the great carbon swamp of the Coal Measures to the final heat death of the universe, and in space, from one pole to the other. Nor can the self any longer be regarded as an affair of the passing moment. There is the individual's own past and future to be reckoned with, and the past and future of the race as well as of himself. In the adult, that self which is the other half of the joy-depressoid's cyclic weighting is a counter world to the exterior world, so that the two halves of his weighting are roughly equal.

Finally, all the lessons that one has learned from the study of biology would prevent one from thinking that the loss of the societal cycles is a return simply to the pre-societal stage of evolution. The whale has returned to the sea from which his ancestors painfully struggled out. Yet he thereby does not become a fish. He still carries with him remnants of the legs with which his more immediate ancestors got about on the land, and what is more, has to develop a great padding of blubber to maintain his mammalian body temperature. The fish avoids the problem simply by having the same temperature as the sea. The whale, to preserve the bodily temperature that he cannot get rid of, has to carry out a secondary adaptation. Thus the emotional capacity of the adult joy-depressoid may be a similar survival of prior emotional organization, and place a similar adaptive strain upon the individual who attempts to return to the world of instinctive action, which functions with far less emotion than the world of uninstinctive human activity. True, the analogy is only an analogy. Nevertheless the mere presence of it places the thinker on his guard to look for surviving traces of the societal cycles, and to expect some sort of secondary adaptation to the simple, twofold world of nature and the self. Although the first five years resemble in many ways the pre-societal stage of evolution, and although the adult occurrence of the cycle of joy-depression represents in no small way a return to that stage, indeed to the first five years, yet it is not an actual return by any means, and one must be watchful for the element that distinguishes it from an actual return.

No, from the point of view of mood-cycle, it cannot be said that the first five years are significant. It is during the latency period that most boys begin to need a certain activity with other boys to give them the contentment that comes from an adequate emotional expression. The relationship with their parents, the companionship of their brothers and sisters (so few of whom are really contemporaries) no longer entirely suffices, and they feel an urge even at this early age to escape from the family and join a group of other boys. The same thing is true of girls, although on account of the cultural patterns of our society girls are not so free as boys to give rein to their dawning gregarious emotions. But within the patterns laid down by their culture they, too, show a tendency to advance beyond the immediate environment of the family and the home, and to make friends with other girls.

It has already been remarked that the latency period is the period when boys feel a desire to be every inch a boy, girls a desire to be every inch a girl. That this period should also witness the dawning of the gregarious emotions is not surprising. Once, people believed that men were uniquely created as rational beings, and that because they were so created they rationally founded society, drew up compacts, and one knows what not. It is now clear that man and society evolved together, that the human being became every inch a man or woman at the same time that he or she became a social animal. Thus it is not surprising that in the latency period the two tendencies should appear together.

The dawning of the individual's gregarious emotions, the emergence of what may be called the "gang instinct," has been inimitably described by Mark Twain, and put in the words of a ten- or twelve-year-old boy himself. As Huckleberry Finn describes it,[71]

> When Tom and me got to the edge of the hill-top, . . . we went down the hill and found Jo Harper, and Ben Rogers, and two or three more of the boys, hid in the old tanyard. So we unhitched a skiff and pulled down the river two mile and a half, to the big scar on the hillside, and went ashore.
>
> We went to a clump of bushes, and Tom made everybody swear to keep the secret, and then showed them a hole in the hill, right in the thickest part of the bushes. . . . We went along a narrow place and got into a kind of room, all damp and sweaty and cold, and there we stopped. Tom says:
>
> "Now we'll start this band of robbers and call it Tom Sawyer's Gang. Everybody that wants to join has got to take an oath, and write his name in blood."
>
> Everybody was willing. So Tom got out a sheet of paper that he had wrote the oath on, and read it. . . .
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> Everybody said it was a real beautiful oath, and asked Tom if

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[71] Mark Twain, *Huckleberry Finn,* New York, 1884, pp. 24-26.

he got it out of his own head. He said, some of it, but the rest was out of pirate books, and robber books, and every gang that was high-toned had it.

Stephen Vincent Benét has also called attention to this characteristic of boyhood. The observations are those of Sally Dupré, who sees her lover, Clay Wingate, and his Black Horse Troop riding off to war, and who recognizes that in this respect, boys never grow up.[72]

> She thought, "But they like this, too. They are like small boys
> Going off to cook potatoes over a fire
> Deep in the woods, where no woman can ever come
> To say how blackened and burnt the potatoes are
> And how you could cook them better back in a house.
> Oh, they like to come home. When they're sick they like to come home,
> They dream about home—they write you they want to come back,
> And they come back and live in the house for a while
> And raise their sons to hear the same whistle-tune
> Under the window, the whistle calling the boys
> Out to the burnt potatoes."

The last and completing mood-cycle makes its appearance during the period of puberty. For the curious thing about hope-fear is that, as a cycle, it does not appear before adolescence. To be sure, the emotions of hope and fear as individual emotions, as particular responses to particular stimuli, have long been in evidence. But it is not until puberty that a general tendency toward the cycle is evident, that it becomes apparent that an important section of the individual's psychic energy is being allocated, not only to the present and the tangible, but also to the future and the intangible.

This would probably be apparent from immediate inspection were it not for the fact that, unlike anger-conviviality, the cycle seldom makes its first appearance in true cyclic form. Whereas boys of the Tom Sawyer age experience anger as well as conviviality in their group activities, the period of puberty is both an older and a more sophisticated one. Furthermore the period is usually a sheltered one. Few individuals in our American society are fending for themselves at so early an age as that of puberty. In consequence, the emotion of fear is not common as the cycle comes into prominence. Rather, it is simply as hope that the cycle first makes itself known.

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[72] Stephen Vincent Benét, *John Brown's Body,* Garden City, 1928, p. 174.

After all, if one were to pick out any one mood that characterizes adolescence more than any other, would it not be the mood of callow optimism? It may be that hope springs eternal in the human breast, but surely its dawning as a permanent affect is about the time of puberty. Then it is that the individual thinks that anything and everything is possible for him. The youth never doubts that the most beautiful actress is somehow accessible to him and will repay his treasuring her photograph. If his ambitions are pianistic, they never stop at the modest goal of a life successfully spent in teaching others, but embrace nothing less than the career of a Paderewski. The roseate hues of adolescence tint even the image that the individual sees of himself in the mirror, and the parents of boys and girls alike are led to utter many a remark of cautious realism in the face of the optimistic excessiveness of their children's puberty.

The interesting thing is that the phase is more quickly modified in boys than in girls. The conditioning of the race and the experience of the individual alike put an earlier term to the boy's optimism than to the girl's. It is fated that for most men the cycle must remain a minor. The activity of men (to say nothing of their inherited predisposition) fortifies the gregarious emotions of the preceding latency period, so that Sally Dupré could reflect, as the Black Horse Troop rode off to another campaign, "They like this, too." It is with women that the cycle, although appearing for the first time in puberty, remains as a major. It is a truism that women approach marriage more optimistically than men, men more realistically than women. And even if the optimism of women is quelled with respect to themselves by the experience of marriage, they are usually able to transfer it to their children. As remarked in the first discussion of mood-cycle, hope-fear is usually major with women, minor with men; anger-conviviality, minor with women, major with men.

Indeed it is clear that the concepts of mood-cycle suffer to some extent from the very names given to them. There is more to hope-fear than the emotions of hope and fear; there is more to anger-conviviality than anger and conviviality. Looked at from a more comprehensive point of view, anger-conviviality would appear to be a man's instinctive affectivity toward his fellows, hope-fear, his instinctive affectivity toward his family. The one might be summed up as a man's gregarious affectivity in general, now pleasant as circumstances dictate, now unpleasant; the other, as his domestic affectivity. And this would apply to women as well as to men.

Furthermore it is evident that both cycles represent expressions of the egoistic instinct—that instinct toward the preservation of the individual which, along with the instinct toward the preservation of the species, must be premised of life in its lowest form. Although anger-conviviality and hope-fear take their definition from the group and the family respectively, it is nevertheless clear that this is a matter merely of external form, and that underneath, the emotions are primarily egoistic.

In the early discussion of mood-cycle it was hypothesized that anger-conviviality, for instance, arose in connection with the ever-present need for food, defense, and shelter—a need which could be supplied by communal effort better than by individual effort. Now the need for food, defense, and shelter has from of old been recognized to constitute the province of the self-preservative instinct. However, it is not necessary to go to origins to perceive the egoistic nature of anger and conviviality. The egoistic nature of the gregarious emotions may be seen most clearly when they are divorced from the search for food, shelter, and defense—a search that frequently is motivated by both the fundamental instincts of life. The egoistic nature of the gregarious emotions comes out most sharply when an element of play enters the picture. For when it comes to a Tom Sawyer stealing off with his gang to a rendezvous in a cave, or to a Black Horse Troop riding gaily off to war, or even to a humble *pater familias* slipping away from wife and loved ones for a quiet game of poker with his friends, then it is clear that the emotions in question are bachelor emotions and have nothing to do with the preservation of the species. Often these emotions are positively detrimental to the preservation of the species.

The problem is more subtle with hope-fear, but not essentially different. Here, the sexual emotions of love and hate are not merely added drives, but intimately connected with the individuals for whom a woman's hopes and fears are chiefly aroused—a fact which complicates the picture but which does not mean that hope and fear are any the less distinct from love and hate. In the last analysis, a woman's hopes and fears are always for the preservation of the individual, and it is merely circumstantial that she also loves the person for whom she desires physical and economic security. Thus in the early discussion of mood-cycle it was not assumed that hope-fear was less connected with the means of life than anger-conviviality. It was only assumed that the cycle arose because of a woman's inevitable dependence upon others when it came to these means. As husband and sons, father or brothers, tilled the fields or joined in the chase, or indeed put these pursuits aside to defend the community from attack, it was hypothesized that in the majority of cases a woman could only hope for the best and fear for the worst, and in the meantime, do what she could while sustained by these emotions. Thus the true distinction between anger-conviviality and hope-fear is not one of underlying instinct, but one simply of the moment of time to which the cycles are referred, and of the individuals with whom they are most intimately connected. Both cycles must have arisen when the preservation of the individual became a collective rather than a solitary affair, and both cycles represent a modification of egoistic, not of sexual, emotion. Anger-conviviality is the gregarious modification, hope-fear, the domestic modification.

Although the foregoing follows from what has previously been said about the cycle of hope-fear, to many it may not be convincing. Many persons must empirically "see" a thing to be convinced of its truth.

Now perhaps the egoistic nature of hope-fear can best be "seen" by going back to the period of adolescence, which comes prior to the acquisition of a family. Surely it will be recognized that the youth's roseate hopes are usually, if not always, self-centered. It is the subject himself who is envisioned as another Paderewski. It is for himself that his heart goes pit-a-pat as the postman delivers the mail that may bring a letter from the actress to whom he has written. On the other hand, the return of the primary sexual character in that period, the dawn of the mating instinct, is usually quite selfless. The writer can remember when he, at the age of sixteen, felt impelled to lay himself at the feet of his sixteen-year-old adored. It was an impulse the reverse of egoistic. As a matter of fact it nearly brought about his early demise. For the young lady lived ten miles out of town, and on Saturday nights, to get back home, it was necessary to stand for hours in the wintry dark not to miss the last trolley, which then took another hour lurching back through the night to the town. A bad case of influenza, and a cough that hung on for months, was the outcome of that winter's manifestation of the mating instinct. And the cough was remedied by the coming of spring, not by a saving intrusion of egoistic emotion.

However, the empirical student of the cycle may find that the excitability of hope-fear is the most indubitable mark of its egoistic nature. The mother's heart leaps up at the possibility of success for her son, and the leap betrays the personal connection. She does not grow similarly excited when the possibility has no connection with herself. As for sexual emotions, these are without this quality of excitement. To look where the sexual emotions are best, because most purely, displayed—to note them among priests, nurses, and other selfless and devoted servants of the human race, is to observe how unexcitable the quality of love can be. That such people are sustained by their sublimated emotions, that they are imbued with a love of humanity as deep as it is embracing, is perhaps the first observation to be made. But surely the second is that the presence of this love is a calming rather than an exciting force, that the peace which passeth all understanding (to borrow a phrase from St. Paul) comes from a love that passeth all understanding.

There remains to be considered the relationship between mood-cycle and individual development with respect to the joy-depressoid. Passing over those men and women who, exceptionally, show a reversal of the major and minor relationship of the societal cycles (or perhaps but one of the societal cycles without the other), the student of human nature is curious about the joy-depressoid, whose constitution is assumed to be without the societal cycles, or at least without them in major and minor proportions. What is the meaning, he asks, of the latency and puberal periods for the joy-depressoid child? It is to be presumed that in these periods the suspension and resumption of the mating instinct, that is, of the primary sexual character, is roughly the same for all the young of the species. But are the latency and puberal periods without emotional, cyclic significance for the joy-depressoid?

After allowance has been made for the influence of the inferiority reaction (which can make an individual pretend to have the very emotions that he lacks), it would seem, indeed, as if this were the case. The healthy joy-depressoid youth unvexed by inferiority feelings seems not to pass through the emotional stress and strain of the adolescent period. His latency period, too, seems less in contrast with the first five years, and all in all, his development may well appear to be more integrated, more unified, than that of the cyclically more normal child.

This is especially apt to be the case if the child springs from a milieu of thinking personalities, if his parents are university or professional people, and surround the child with the values of thought. In this case the child may well grow up with his thinking faculties and his interests fully engaged, and seem the most normal of children. His life is without conflict, and one must look abroad to the children of other families to perceive that it is more common for the Freudian periods of a child's development to be, emotionally, rather sharply distinguished one from another.

However, it is in adolescence that the joy-depressoid deficiency becomes most noticeable, especially if the parents set a precedent by taking part in the social activities of their group. In adolescence, the gregarious emotions are reinforced by the domestic emotions, the secondary sexual character by a return of the primary sexual character, and the youth, to quote from Tennyson, "lightly turns to thoughts of love." True, it may be a full decade before the youth's economic position or his psychosexual development permits him to marry and settle down. Nevertheless his feelings of hope and his instinct to mate fill him with fancies of marriage to the most beautiful of wives, and he is ready to stand for hours in the stag line of a junior social assembly. Such assemblies, however, require for their enjoyment a full complement of the gregarious and domestic emotions in addition to the influence of the mating instinct. The mating instinct is by no means enough, and the personality unsupported by the social emotions will find such gatherings not only meaningless but often positively painful. It will not avail the joy-depressoid youth that he is experiencing the usual adolescent recrudescence of the primary sexual instinct. Being unsustained by the social emotions he can take no pleasure in the behavior of his fellows, and finds himself at greater variance with them than during the latency period when, after all, the behavior of children is more rational, and less colored by the emotions, than during adolescence.

Once again, if the parents are people who find such functions empty and beyond the range of their interests, a conflict between the joy-depressoid and his surroundings may never develop. But if the parents are people who enjoy social intercourse, who strenuously believe that one should take one's part in the social activities of one's group, then indeed, whether from parental pressure or merely from the force of the individual's own inferiority feelings, the seeds of future psychosis may be amply sown. Nothing is worse for the future well-being of the joy-depressoid than that he should early find himself in conflict with his family and with his contemporaries on the score of his emotional constitution, and that he should thereby acquire the notion that he is a kind of social pariah because he takes no pleasure in the banter of the locker room or in getting acquainted with a number of sub-debutantes whom he knows can never, by any stretch of the imagination, mean anything to him.

If once the idea that introverts are not delinquent extraverts, that joy-depressoids are not delinquent anger-convivials or hope-fearists, could be so disseminated that it became part of every parent's mental equipment, then the incidence of schizophrenia might well be cut in half. The joy-depressoid defect, as well as the schizoid defect, is clearly devolutionary. Yet such is the stage of evolution of contemporary society that these devolutionary defects are adaptive in the highest degree. Never before has there been so great a need for thinkers with a detached, impersonal interest in the problems of their environment. The research now progressing to find an answer to the plagues of cancer and infantile paralysis, to develop nuclear fission for industrial energy, does not place a premium upon the individual whose emotions are centered in the group, or upon the individual whose emotions are centered in the family. It places a premium upon the individual whose emotions are invested in the environment and in the self, whose sexual and psychosexual development is unobscured by a cloud of societal emotions, and who is far more apt to marry a fellow worker than a woman of conventional sex appeal who will have his slippers out for him when he returns from work.

No, the joy-depressoid and even the schizoid become in our society today, not social pariahs, but men of immeasurable social worth. Society has always had a place for the artist and the musician, for the poet and the philosopher. But never before has society had such a place for the joy-depressoid and the schizoid as she has today in the innumerable laboratories and institutes for advanced thought that dot our complex modern world. Beyond question, one of the saddest aspects of modern life is the fact that many of those very individuals who enter mental hospitals each year in such countless numbers from schizophrenic breakdown—that just these same individuals could have been, in many cases, rendered among society's most valuable members if only their lives had been shunted into different channels during the years of early youth and adolescence.

5. The Two Worlds of the Mood-Cycles

It would be well, at this moment, to review the different worlds which the various mood-cycles subtend.

From the time of the latency period, the anger-convivial, it will be remembered, experiences a need for the companionship of his fellows. When he was a boy, this need expressed itself in play. As a man, it colors his choice of a profession; and one observes that throughout life, the anger-convivial's world is composed principally of his associates in work and in play. Even the development of the cycle of hope-fear, which makes its appearance about the time of puberty and finally becomes centered in wife and family—even this does not radically disturb the world of the anger-convivial. It provides associates simply of a more intimate nature, connected with the subject by a more personal tie.

The world of the hope-fearist is much the same, being different chiefly in the shift of emphasis. With women (although not all hope-fearists are women, nor all women, hope-fearists), the emotions of hope and fear, which dawn in their cyclic form at the time of puberty, grow stronger than the emotions of anger and conviviality. The acquisition of a husband and family accords with the increasing dominance of the cycle, and in the world in which the woman comes to live, the members of her family occupy the principal place, her friends and associates the background. Thus the world of the hope-fearist, like the world of the anger-convivial, is composed chiefly of the human beings whom the individual knows. Beyond these particular human beings, to be sure, exists the world of the human beings whom the individual does not know, and beyond these, exists the world of external nature. Again, within the person, exists not only the world of the individual's memories and aspirations but the world of internal nature, the repository of the preceding generations of the human race. Nevertheless, for the average hope-fearist or anger-convivial, the worlds of external and internal nature are shadowy indeed. It is true that the introvert, with his greater sense of the self and his tendency toward thought, is inclined to take a larger view of things than the extravert. But if he is social in his cyclic coloring, his sense of the self is usually limited to his social memories and ambitions, and his sense of the exterior world seldom extends beyond the people who dwell in it. It is clear that the world of the average hope-fearist or anger-convivial is largely composed of his less, or more, immediate associates.

From the point of view of mood-cycle there are thus, to all intents and purposes, but two worlds: the world of one's associates, and the world that extends beyond this world—the joy-depressoid world of the self and the environment. It so happens that this latter world may be conceived as the world which preceded the societal evolution of the human species.

Yet not quite. For the human being cannot slough off all traces of the intervening evolution of his race. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the loss of the societal mood-cycles is the loss of but a small portion of the intervening societal evolution of the race. The emotional capacity of the adult human being has already been mentioned. There also remain, untouched by the loss of the societal cycles, the faculties of speaking and writing (so clearly social in their origins), and as a result of these faculties, the habit of self-consciousness or reflection—indeed the very function of thought itself. Thus, although with respect to mood-cycle the joy-depressoid may have returned to the pre-societal world, he has returned to it with an equipment quite alien to the equipment of the animals who naturally dwell in that world, and with habits equally opposed to the simple round of instinctive behavior that forms the pattern of daily life in that world.

Of these various social inheritances, it would seem that the function of thought is the most critical. Indeed, just as it was necessary for the whale, upon returning to the ocean, to develop a device to protect the bodily temperature which he brought with him from his land forbears, so it would seem that the joy-depressoid must carry out a secondary adaptation if he is to protect the reflective powers which he has brought with him from his forbears. As a matter of fact any discrepancy in the analogy probably lies, not in the incompleteness of the parallel, but in the fact that as yet a joy-depressoid species has not evolved, so that at the present moment many joy-depressoids are without a secondary adaptation, and as a result, spend their days in maladjustment or, breaking down, in the wards of a mental hospital.

The notion that the thinking cast of personality may be such a secondary adaptation is an intriguing one. As pointed out in the chapter on the thymic stream,[73] the schizoid who becomes a thinking personality, instead of suffering from his handicap, is apt to forge ahead with a particular brilliance, and clearly the thinking cast is no less advantageous for the joy-depressoid. The hierarchy of functions in the thinking personality, with thinking always taking the lead over feeling, would in any event make the joy-depressoid less conscious of his emotional peculiarities, and furthermore, as has been pointed out many times, the values of thought (which the thinking cast reinforces) are external. As thinking progresses, no matter what the fundamental relationship of the personality, there is a tendency for the subjective processes to fade from sight, and for the objective truths to take on greater and greater significance. It is well known that research generates its own enthusiasm. Whether the problem is that of determining the influences at work upon the growth and development of a poet's mind, or the tracing out of the life-cycle of an obscure bacterium, there is a tendency for the lights to burn later and later in the laboratory, for the scholar to remain longer and longer at his books. And in all this the interest is more and more in the object, less and less in the subject.

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[73] See above, pp. 284-285.

With a feeling personality, these tendencies have to do merely with the unfamiliar function. They are overshadowed by the individual's active fundamental relationship. But in a thinking personality they are the dominant tinge of the individual's psychic complexion. The thinking cast of personality exerts a general influence away from the subject toward the object, and if it is such a secondary adaptation as mentioned above, if it is demonstrable that the thinking personality does a better job of being a joy-depressoid than the feeling personality, then it must be because this general tendency is therapeutic and adaptive as regards joy-depression. It must be that as the joy-depressoid returns to the world of his pre-societal ancestors he needs to be protected from the possibility of using his reflective powers to think too narrowly about himself. Apparently there is something inherently harmful about a self-consciousness concerned too exclusively with the self. It would seem as if reflection, that racial inheritance from our societal forbears, can concern itself with the subjective half of the joy-depressoid's world only at a certain peril to the individual, and only when certain safeguards have been taken.[74]

The matter has been touched on before, in connection with the introspective extravert's loss of the self. In the case of the introspective extravert, the natural inclination of a thinking personality to become more and more interested in the objective world has been reversed by the dread influence of subjectivation. Furthermore, if the introspective is a joy-depressoid, this tendency is not resisted by the counter tendency of the societal mood-cycles. The joy-depressoid introspective does not stop with anything so objective as self-analysis, but coached by his inferiority feelings, turns his gaze upon his self of selves and discovers, as explained, that what he has always taken for the self is simply the view that the viewer sees. He separates the view from the viewer, and comes to the appalling conclusion that the viewer is just nothing at all.

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[74] One of these safeguards would be the requirement that reflection on the self take the form of self-analysis rather than that of introspection (see above, pp. 21-22).

Now such a tendency to think about the self is purely human. The concern for the self which is possessed by the animals is an entirely instinctive concern, a concern not really for the self in a strict sense, but rather for the continuity of the self's functioning. As the animal attempts to live its life among the complexities of an intricate and often hostile world, its concern is simply that its living may go on, and even this concern is so thoroughly instinctive and unselfconscious that the term "concern" is scarcely appropriate. Actually, the "concern" is probably no more than the momentum of each of the animal's activities. In reality it is not the oriole himself who forms an opposing pole to the environment so much as his mating, and nest-building, and young-rearing. These activities have a self-perpetuating force within themselves, and it is this force that may be conceived as standing in opposition to the universe. Thus the oriole's self that is balanced with the exterior world is a striving, not a reflecting, is conative, not cognitive, thymic, not gnostic.

Yet the environment must also be viewed in order that the animal's striving may avoid obstructions, in order that the animal's striving may make use of the materials which it needs. Thus the striving of the animal is connected with a certain joy-depressoid observation of the universe. To pursue its course, the animal's striving must be oriented in the exterior world. Indeed, one of the reasons why it must be oriented in the exterior world is that the exterior world clearly affords no more than an impersonal setting for the animal's striving.

How different this is from the world of human society a moment's reflection will disclose. By no stretch of the imagination can the world of human society be regarded as an impersonal setting for the individual's striving. One's family and one's neighbors constitute a setting that is anything but impersonal. The human being *is* his brother's keeper. Even if he refrains from interfering with his brother's activity by word or by deed, his interest is there, and his interest and his good opinion are potent factors in his brother's activity. Furthermore, the more thoroughly the individual is immured in the family and in the group, the less does he seem to need to be oriented as to time and place. In fact it is clear that the societal cycles reach the height of their development in the midst of a group that has become neither too large nor too advanced in its culture. In such a society, environmental orientation is almost entirely displaced by societal orientation, which is a business largely of the social cycles and of a feeling adjustment to life. It is clear that the attitude of the thinking personality advenes only when the group has become so large (or the individual so removed from it) that it may be regarded as environment rather than as society. Thus the thinking cast of personality (never the prerogative of more than a small portion of society) becomes dominant only when, as in the eighteenth century, a certain cycle of culture is reaching maturity in numbers and in urbanity.

Now not only does the objectivity of the thinking cast of personality tend to correct too narrow a reflection upon the self; its "viewingness" reinforces the positive tendencies of the joy-depressoid. For the cyclic inclination of the joy-depressoid is to view the world rather than to mingle with it, and this constitutional predilection receives an unexpected strengthening if the joy-depressoid is permitted to become a thinking personality. Then the outer man and the inner man agree, and nothing seems more natural than that one's relationship with the whole of life should be intellectual, that the rule of life is first to view, and then to feel or to act.

The situation, however, is different if circumstances do not permit the joy-depressoid to become a thinking personality. Then his fundamental relationship is not cognitive but active, his essential self not a viewer but a doer. Furthermore, as explained in the discussion of the emotive stimuli,[75] the very fact that an individual is a feeling personality means that he is aware of the feelings of others, whether these feelings are perceived as actions or as feelings. Whereas the joy-depressoid who is a thinking personality may be completely unaware of his emotional peculiarities, the joy-depressoid who becomes a feeling personality is made early and sharply conscious of his deficiency. His very sensitivity to the feelings or actions of others makes him perceive that he himself lacks the emotions of ordinary social intercourse. The consequence is that such a joy-depresssoid, unless the circumstances are exceptional, is almost certain to develop feelings of inferiority.

The exceptional circumstances occur, apparently, when the values of the family and of the age assign to the individual a higher place than to the group. Such circumstances occurred, for instance, in New England in the early part of the nineteenth century. The theological background of New England had always set the individual's relationship with God above his relationship with society, and when, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, this background was weakening, then the vogue of romanticism came along to assert the superiority of the individual on purely secular grounds. During this brief period, the tendencies of the age would have prevented a joy-depressoid who was a feeling personality from regarding himself as inferior because he did not possess the group emotions.

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[75] See above, pp. 299-301.

Thus the youthful Ralph Waldo Emerson, who must have been very nearly a pure joy-depressoid, and whose emotional reservoir cannot have been filled far above the schizoid level—the youthful Emerson was taught from the beginning to place the individual above the group. To say nothing of the tendencies of his environment and age, the teaching of his family was all in favor of the individual as opposed to the group. The strongest influence in Emerson's early life was that of his individualistic aunt, Miss Mary Moody Emerson, who went out of her way to urge her nephews not to take their ideas from the group but to give their ideas to the group. When Emerson emerged from his family and from the intellectual shelter of Concord and Harvard, it was only to fall heir to the individualistic ideas of Coleridge and the German philosophers, and finally, to come under the influence of Carlyle. Thus in the case of Emerson, family, group, and age all combined to produce a personality without conflict, although the individual had sustained not only the joy-depressoid defect but almost certainly the schizoid defect, and had become, in addition, a feeling personality. Today, when the group has become a shibboleth, when "social studies" and "social objectives" have driven the old-fashioned three R's out of the schoolroom, it is difficult to see how a person of similar constitution can fail to develop feelings of inferiority, and eventually, some form of that fatal schizophrenia which, as a matter of fact, attacked Emerson's tubercular brother Edward.

However, since this chapter is concerned with the maladjustment and possible psychosis chiefly of the emotional introvert and introspective extravert, and since only in the case of the emotional introvert can the maladjustment come from a conflict between the joy-depressoid constitution and a feeling environment, it is clear that the principal problem of this section on the two worlds of the mood-cycles is the problem of the joy-depresssoid who becomes, not a feeling introvert like Emerson, but an emotional introvert like Shelley or the German poet Hölderlin.

For the essential self of the feeling introvert's recollected ego, far from being an actor in a drama on the center of the world's stage, is apt to be merely a doer of the world's work along with other doers of the world's work. In fact, since the feeling introvert is more conscious of feeling than of actions, his essential self is likely to assume not even this definition. His essential self may well be no more than a capacity for feeling comparable to the thinking introvert's capacity for viewing. Thus Emerson, the least egocentric of men, in many ways approached the point of view of a thinking personality—that point of view which is so harmonious with the joy-depressoid mood-cycle and with the world which that cycle subtends. As Emerson turned from mere doing to speaking and writing, his attention as to the immediate effects of his actions could relax, and he could become more and more interested in his environment as opposed to the group. The result was that the world of his familiar feeling function closely approximated the world of his mood-cycle. To be sure, the correspondence was not so close as it would have been had Emerson's familiar function been thinking instead of feeling. Emerson always felt about the world before he thought, so that in the strict sense he never thought at all, but only conceived a series of intuitions in the wake of his feelings, as his essays abundantly show. Nevertheless, familiar function and mood-cycle, if not identical in point of view, were clearly harmonious, and no one could ever say that Emerson's was not an integrated personality.

Unfortunately, the introverted joy-depressoid born into a feeling world is seldom permitted to work out such an adjustment. As a child or as an adolescent, he is made aware of his inadequacy by his very sensitivity to the feelings of others. As a result he is irresistibly impelled toward emotional introversion, and before long, he is engaged in the enactment of a personal drama on the stage of the world. Here are contained the seeds of future conflict. For the very notion of a drama is a social notion. It presupposes not only a theater in which the drama may be performed but an audience before which it is performed. Furthermore, the audience is composed of just that group with which the joy-depressoid has no linking emotions. Hence the fact soon becomes clear that the joy-depressoid does not know how to put on a play which will interest his audience. Only an emotional introvert who, like Byron, is not deficient in the social emotions can put on a play that will interest the group. Byron always gave his contemporaries a good performance. His life was nearly all of it excellent theater. On the other hand, when an emotional introvert like Shelley, who was deficient in the social emotions, attempts to put on a drama, he finds that his performance attracts scarcely a flicker of interest.

Now distressing as may be the failure of such a performance, and inevitable as may be the retreat from life which it entails, there is, however, one situation which in its irony is even more tragic. For not infrequently the joy-depressoid emotional introvert is led by his mood or by a friend into the very world of nature where he so eminently belongs and where, as those undistorted joy-depressoids, Thoreau and Emerson, clearly saw, the role of the joy-depressoid is observation, not action. Nevertheless, the emotionally introverted joy-depressoid in such a situation is unable to relax, unable simply to observe and enjoy the world of nature in which he finds himself. His need to be enacting a drama, to be performing an exploit, pursues him right into the heart of the woods where his only spectators are rocks and trees. While his friend, who may be interested in nature for its own sake, gives himself up to a perceptive enjoyment of the world surrounding him, the emotionally introverted joy-depressoid sets about some feat of endurance or skill—shoving an improvised raft out onto a mountain tarn, climbing a craggy rock, or impatiently desiring to push on and make a memorable hike of it. The audience may be those to whom the tale will be told when the emotional introvert returns. Indeed, the audience may exist solely in the emotional introvert's own mind.

For the full tragedy of the situation comes out when the need for action that cuts the joy-depressoid off from his true world is simply an inner need, a fatal tendency within his own personality. The distortion of personality which arose from the joy-depressoid's exposure to society in the first place perseveres when that society is no longer present. The need for action persists, and the joy-depressoid is cut off from the world in which society does not intrude. Indeed, the terrible thing is that it can become too late to do anything about correcting the tendency to action, that finally, the friends of the emotionally introverted joy-depressoid can only wait until the drama, which never should have been enacted, comes to an end.

6. Egoistic and Sexual Emotions

Yet perhaps the most interesting aspect of the two worlds of the mood-cycles is not their difference but their likeness. Poles apart as these worlds may be from a descriptive point of view, they nevertheless both spring from the egoistic rather than from the sexual emotions. It has been observed that the societal world of the communal cycles is a world essentially informed by the egoistic interests of the personality. It is equally clear that the non-societal world of the joy-depressoid mood-cycle is no less egoistic in its essential values and concerns. Originally, this world provided the animal merely with the means and setting of its striving, and was starkly connected with its self-preservative needs, not the least of which was the need of orientation. Along with the self-preservative needs went the self-preservative emotions, which in time, as a result of much racial conditioning, became a predisposition as well as a response. Later, when the human race evolved socially, and the primitive egoistic emotions were modified in favor of the group and the family, the earlier predisposition was not supplanted but only overlaid. As a consequence, the devolutionary return to the cycle of joy-depression (and hence to the world which this cycle subtends) is a return merely to a simpler and more primitive egoism.

Now the very simplicity of the joy-depressoid world means, as has already been pointed out, that it is a world in which the human being is not particularly fitted to live. Economically, of course, it is impossible for the joy-depressoid to sustain himself in the pre-societal world of the individual and the environment.

Thus when Thoreau went to Walden Pond, returning in fact as well as in mood to the pre-societal world, he not only sustained himself quite by the arts of civilization but did so by means of the material legacy of civilization. From the shingles on the roof over his head to the hoe with which he cultivated his beans, from the lime in the mortar between his bricks to the shirt which he wore on his back, Thoreau commenced life in the woods on the solid material foundation of the societal evolution of his race. Even Crusoe, it will be remembered, Thoreau's illustrious (although unwilling) predecessor, leaned on the wreck for as many perquisites as he could carry off. No, not only is the joy-depressoid unable to sustain himself without the tools of society, he is unable to do so without the arts of society. Although he lacks the social emotions, he can support himself only by societal means, and it is clear that the paramount problem of his life, is, on the whole, the problem of making a living. Generally speaking, he is successful in this insofar as he is able to use the means of society without having to submit to the intercourse of society. Thus Emerson (who had inherited a backlog of independent income from his first wife) found lecturing and writing no serious curtailment of his joy-depressoid detachment from the world, while Thoreau in becoming a surveyor acquired not only a profession at which he could work independently but a profession which capitalized his natural instinct for orientation. It was Hölderlin's misfortune that as a means of support he was able to turn only to private tutoring—a form of teaching that lacks the detachment of the classroom, which in its turn is less independent than the lecture platform.

Hence one observes that the drama which never should have been enacted is not always of the individual's choosing. Although Hölderlin no doubt desired to cut a figure in the literary and philosophical world of the Germany of his day, and although for a time he may have regarded his tutorships as a step in this direction and thus have embraced them voluntarily as a necessary part of his drama, in the end, they became merely a means to bread.

Yet in all this gap between the joy-depressoid personality and the communal world he cannot escape from, the conflict is not between egoistic and non-egoistic emotions, between "selfishness" and "unselfishness." The world of the societal cycles is not a whit less selfish than the world of joy-depression. The mother who sends her joy-depressoid son to the sanitarium as the result of her desire that he take part in the social activities of the younger set is actuated not by love but by egoistic emotion. The essence of love is that the subject desires the good of the beloved object irrespective of the good of the subject. But such a parent as the mother instanced above is dominated by the desire that her own social way of life be maintained, that her own gregarious security be not broken by the defection of her child. Her activity is a manifestation not of the impulse toward the preservation of the race but of the impulse toward the preservation of the individual. Her conflict with her son is a conflict of egoisms, and if it ends in his collapse, does so, not because of his "selfishness" (as her friends no doubt believe), but because hers is the stronger egoism. Joy-depression and the social emotions are not expressions of two different impulses but expressions of the same impulse—of the impulse toward the preservation of the individual. What characterizes the sexual emotions is the absence of the element of personal advantage—either immediate or removed.

Now the egoistic and sexual impulses (and hence the emotions which they give rise to) have frequently been regarded as equivalent manifestations of that general impulse toward life which powers all living organisms. Certainly this is true of the simplest forms of life, of the paramecium and the amoeba, of the bacterium and the single-celled plant. Here the instinct toward nourishment and the instinct toward reproduction seem actually to be on a par. The one instinct is, in fact, unthinkable without the other, and as a result, the biologist is strongly tempted to regard them as of equal value throughout the animal kingdom. Nor is this temptation weakened by turning from the unicellular organism to the lower forms of multicellular life, where so many males die soon or immediately after impregnation of the female, where so many females die soon or immediately after depositing their eggs.

However, it takes but a brief glance in the direction of the human species to perceive that a radical change has taken place. Not only does the individual survive for years after the reproduction of the species, but he exists for years before this is possible. Furthermore, civilization itself seems to aim at the preservation of the individual rather than at the preservation of the race. To say nothing of that race-suicide which is supposed to accompany civilization, civilization clearly tends to increase the longevity of the individual, to extend the adolescence of the individual. Its art and its technology are directed toward the comforts of individual life. Indeed, as already suggested, even the early organizations of the community and the family would seem to have come about through individual rather than through racial need. Perhaps the most startling fact of all is the vigorous survival of the human species in spite of the destruction of civilization. The passing of ancient civilizations, whether in the New World or in the Old, is all very sad, but it has had not the least adverse effect upon the survival of the human race.

Thus the student of human affairs is disposed to lend a ready ear to the theory that civilization flourishes at the expense of the sexual instinct, that civilization has arisen through a suppression and sublimation of the instinct that aims at the race rather than at the individual. It all makes sense, and the observer returns to the problem of mood-cycle with a renewed curiosity as to the fate of the sexual instinct in the two different worlds which the mood-cycles subtend.

Perhaps the first conclusion he would like to draw is that the sublimation of the sexual instinct to which Freud called attention must be a phenomenon largely, if not exclusively, of anger-convivials and hope-fearists. According to the Freudian view, sublimation is a warping of the sexual (or any other) instinct to the uses of society, and thus, as a concept, would seem to have little applicability in a world composed chiefly of the self and the environment, in a world characterized by a social lacuna in the center.

Indeed this is what observation bears out. Those forms of schizophrenia and manic-depression which may be equated with the joy-depressoid mood-cycle, namely, catatonia and melancholia, show a signal lack of sublimation of the sexual instinct. On the other hand, those forms of schizophrenia and manic-depression which may be equated with the anger-conviviality mood-cycle, namely, paranoia and mania, show a marked sublimation of the sexual instinct. Freud himself made clear that a desexualization of the libido is a prime characteristic of paranoia;[76] and as regards the hypomanic temperament that develops mania as an initial and primary psychosis (not as a reaction to a previous depression)—this type usually develops its psychosis through having too many irons in the fire, irons which nearly always are of a social nature. The personality is carried away into mania, usually, by a mounting enthusiasm for his schemes to better the human race, and his enthusiasm is excessive, one notes, for the reason that his schemes are commonly also an outlet for his sublimated sexuality.

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[76] In his well-known analysis of the Schreber case (*Psychoanalytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia,* 1911). Very nearly the cardinal doctrine of the Freudian theory of paranoia is that the paranoid is the converse of an overt homosexual, a person who has not given rein to his homosexual tendencies. Thus Schreber for fifty years had been an exemplary citizen. His paranoia broke out when the defenses of those fifty years were no longer adequate, and he could defend himself only on the psychotic plane of hallucination and delusion. A. A. Brill, in his *Lectures on Psychoanalytic Psychiatry* (New York, 1947, p. 248), also states, "Paranoia shows mechanisms similar to homosexuality except as regards object-finding. Instead of finding an object for genital outlet, the paranoiac sooner or later desexualizes himself; he gives up all genital outlet. In the histories of paranoiacs, one invariably finds that they have always been highly moral with rigid personalities who showed this special constitution from the very beginning of childhood."

In any event, the world of the environment and the self is ill-suited to absorb the emotions generated by a sublimation of the sexual instinct. The sexual instinct is an instinct of union with other human beings, and the emotions which it generates when its direct discharge is cut off are emotions of union, emotions which require for their full expression a give and take, a change and interchange, between the individual and his immediate human environment. The world of external nature is too remote, and the emotional circuit thereto is a one-way street—the feeling flows from the individual to the object, but not back. Even the world of one's less immediate human environment, the world of humanity that stretches beyond one's family and immediate associates—even this world is ill-constituted to absorb the emotions generated by a curtailment of the sexual instinct. To sublimate the sexual instinct there must be, if not a return of emotion, at least a sign that the emotion has been absorbed. Hence sublimation is most successful in activities such as nursing and teaching where a social intercourse can take the place of a sexual intercourse. It flourishes in the world of the anger-convivial and hope-fearist. It takes place only with difficulty in the world of the joy-depressoid.

But more striking than the difficulty in sexual sublimation which the joy-depressoid experiences is the loneliness that he is prone to suffer from.

Off-hand, one might conjecture that the individual who suffers from loneliness must be an anger-convivial; he who can live by himself, a joy-depressoid. However, the exact opposite is the case. Pure joy-depressoids are almost the least able of human beings to live alone, while the true hermits will nearly always be found to possess an anger-convivial mood-coloring. For one of the results of the anger-convivial mood-cycle, as explained in the early chapter on mood-cycle, is that it gives the individual a weighting toward the world, a tendency not to be concerned with the self. The paranoid, with his anger-convivial mood-coloring, is able to live alone because his fantasies, although referred to the self, are not primarily concerned with the self, but with the fabricated world of his enemies where his sexual emotions, although meager, can yet expend themselves as hate. The hypomanic, with his anger-convivial mood-cycle, is also able to live alone because his fantasies likewise, although referred to the self, are not primarily concerned with the self, but with society, which the hypomanic wishes to improve with his schemes and projects.

To be sure, the paranoid is first of all characterized by his schizoid defect, by his want of emotion. His very lack of emotion may make it easy for him to live by himself, to get along without the companionship of other human beings. But the hypomanic has a flood of emotion, and yet is also able to live by himself, to get along without the companionship of other human beings. Indeed, introverts and extraverts of every type of personality and degree of emotion may be observed living by themselves for the most varied of reasons, yet saved from the demon of introspection by the weighting of their gregarious mood-cycle, and venturing out in the world for whatever social or sexual intercourse they need with the ease, and lack of selectivity, which is a characteristic of their cycle.

It is the joy-depressoid who finds the world subtended by his mood-cycle, the world of the self and the environment, quite unsuited for solitary existence. For the emotions stemming from his sexual instinct are, of course, unaffected by the loss of the societal emotions. The societal emotions are modifications of the egoistic instinct, and the sexual emotions, which proceed from the instinct toward the race and do not refer back to the individual—these emotions can flourish in the joy-depressoid as in any type of personality. The peculiarity of the joy-depressoid is that his world is unfitted to receive them. The sexual emotions are emotions designed to reach from individual to individual; in the world of the joy-depressoid, they must either return to the self or wither in the desert air. The result is that the joy-depressoid experiences a great need for the companionship of other joy-depressoids. Living in the same world as the subject, they do not disturb the fundamental order of that world, nor do they bring with them an intrusion of the gregarious—the noise of the herd and the bustle of its activities. They provide within the world of the self and the environment an opportunity for the sexual emotions to express themselves. And as the sexual emotions express themselves, as the joy-depressoid becomes attached to joy-depressoid friend or beloved, he finds his joy-depressoid world strengthened and given depth. Indeed, not only are his sexual emotions expressed and his joy-depressoid world strengthened by having a joy-depressoid friend or beloved with whom to share his experiences, but the joy-depressoid finds that in becoming attached to friend or beloved he creates a safeguard against the curse of introspection. The sexual emotions, in other words, take the place of the gregarious and domestic emotions, of the missing societal cycles, and through love, the joy-depressoid often finds himself saved from himself.

This is that "enlarged autism" of which the psychologists speak.[77] But they are in error if they think that it is a consequence only of autism, a concomitant of schizoidia alone. Extraverts and normal introverts show the characteristic as well as schizoids. *Paranoids with their gregarious mood-cycle do not show it.* It is a characteristic not of the schizoid defect, but of the joy-depressoid defect.

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[77] Cf. Ernst Kretschmer, *Physique and Character,* London, 1936, p. 166. Thus Nietzsche wrote to his sister on July 8, 1886 (about two and a half years before his final breakdown), "My health is really quite normal—only my soul is so sensitive and so full of longing for good friends of my own kind. Get me a small circle of men who will listen to me and understand me—and I shall be cured" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 14th ed., 16, 433). There are students of Nietzsche who think that if he had been able to secure the small circle, if he had been able to achieve this enlarged autism, the final breakdown might not have occurred.

7. The Weighting of Mood-Cycle

Now if the varieties of schizophrenia and manic-depression are largely determined by mood-cycle (as seems to be the case), and if this determination is largely a business of the objective or subjective weighting of mood-cycle (as also seems to be the case), then the time has come for an examination of mood-cycle in the light of its influence upon psychosis. The notion of cyclic weighting has been in the background ever since the initial chapter on mood-cycle. But the moment has arrived for a final inspection of the concept.

The problem is relatively simple if it is a question only of anger-conviviality or hope-fear. Whether because of individual or of racial conditioning, of experience or of inheritance, the anger-convivial is clearly impelled toward that world of his fellows where he receives his greatest emotional expression. Indeed, by way of contrast, this may be sharply brought out in the case of the introvert. For often the gregariousness of an introvert seems to be a stronger force than his introversion, drawing him toward the society of his fellows at every leisure moment, although when once among them he may want to do no more than simply sit and smoke. Nor is the situation radically different with the hope-fearist. Whether introverted or extraverted, the hope-fearist's emotions are centered in his family, and if a family is denied him, then he does his best to substitute for it a circle of permanent and intimate friends. But whether family or friends, the individuals in whom his emotion centers are relatively close to him. Not only are they closer to him than the companions of the anger-convivial, but the hope-fearist frequently has the feeling that they belong to him personally. He can, in fact, be objectionably possessive about them. Thus the influence of hope-fear is to make an individual subjective, but not to center his interest upon the very citadel of the self. That is reserved for the cycle of joy-depression. But the cycle of joy-depression seems also to turn the individual toward the outer world, and it is apparent that in the conception of this cycle there is a real difficulty, a difficulty that has not been satisfactorily explained in the preceding pages of this study. On the one hand, the weighting of the cycle appears to be the most subjective of all; on the other, it directs the individual's gaze beyond the group toward the world of his environment. Would not the objective half of this cycle nullify the subjective half, and render the cycle distinctly *not* the most subjective of all? With the other cycles, there is a unity of weighting and of subject-matter. The individual is impelled toward a single section of experience. But with joy-depression, the weighting of the cycle seems to be divided between two realms that are the opposites of each other.

The answer, apparently, is to be sought once again in the origin of the cycle. It has been assumed that originally joy-depression was merely the feeling-tone of pleasure or displeasure that accompanies instinctive or habitual action. To be sure, this theory is purely hypothetical in nature. But the person who is skeptical of explanations going back to a past that can never be recovered has only to observe himself in the act of carrying out an activity that has become habitual—for instance, his early-morning shave. On the particular morning when his beard is not too old or tough, when there is plenty of hot water, when the light is ample, and when he happens to have an especially good blade, then he experiences a feeling-tone of pleasure as he shaves his face. The feeling-tone is not an emotion, for there is not enough of it. The person's consciousness is filled, rather, with the activity of shaving. His attention is given more or less completely to his shaving so that he may do it well and not cut himself. Thus the preoccupying activity is accompanied merely by a feeling-tone. Even when the opposite obtains, when the shaving is not going well, even then, so long as the activity is occupying his attention, the person experiences only a feeling-tone of displeasure. Emotion cannot come until the activity gives way, and the center of the individual's attention is captured by the feeling. And thinking cannot come until the feeling gives way, and the center of the individual's attention is captured by his ideas.

Really, it makes no difference whether one looks at the matter as a question of evolutionary origin or as a question of present-day experience. There can be little doubt that emotion develops as habitual action gives way. As a matter of fact the societal emotions arise from activities which are not only unhabitual but, in addition, communal in their nature—activities in which a delayed response is involved and in which the individual either has to concert his actions with those of others or has to plan his actions for the sake of others. Again, there can be little doubt that in the countless ages of his evolution the human being has acquired a capacity for emotion entirely unknown to the pre-societal being from whom he has evolved—a capacity for emotion that persists in the joy-depressoid although he no longer possesses the societal emotions of hope and fear and anger and conviviality with which to fill the gap. Now this capacity is what weights the individual. It weights the individual according to the color of the emotions that fill the capacity. The peculiarity of the joy-depressoid is that his emotions, being the feeling-tones of pleasure and displeasure enlarged to the dimensions of emotions, are colored solely by reference to the self.

In other words, the subjective weighting of joy-depression must come from the fact that in its essence the cycle is the accompaniment of individual action and predisposes toward individual action. The emotions of joy and depression remain as closely connected with the individual as the feeling-tones of pleasure and displeasure, and in its weighting, the cycle must be set down as the most subjective of all. If the world of the joy-depressoid seems to embrace both the environment and the self, this can only be because a sense of the environment must re-emerge as the social sense drops out.

Indeed, the sense of the environment may manifest itself almost as soon as the cycle—that is, in the early part of the latency period. By the beginning of adolescence, if no tendency toward objectivation or subjectivation reinforces the concern with the self, the individual may seem to be equally weighted between the self and the environment. Strictly speaking, however, only the tendency toward the self is a weighting. The world may become the object of the joy-depressoid's gaze simply because his gaze must have something upon which to rest and the family or the group is not there to take first place. In fact it may be incorrect to speak of the sense of the environment as "re-emerging." The joy-depressoid's sense of the environmnt may not be vestigial at all, but merely a consequence of the loss of the societal emotions. After all, if one is to live in the real world he must take his bearings from some object in it. And if the family or the group no longer occupies the chief place, he must take his bearings from what lies beyond. But whether bearings or re-emergence, the sense of the environment is part of the joy-depressoid mood-cycle, and as remarked in the early chapter, the joy-depressoid is the environmental type *par excellence.*

No doubt the weighting of each of the mood-cycles is by now adequately clear.

But this is of the cycles as independent elements of personality, unmodified by the presence of secondary and tertiary cycles. Although "pure" anger-convivials and hope-fearists and joy-depressoids most certainly exist, and although for the sake of ease of exposition the discussion of mood-cycle has usually considered such pure types alone, yet the greater frequency of the masculine or feminine hierarchy of the cycles has always been admitted, and the presence of hybrid cycles has also been recognized. In the original discussion of mood-cycle the prominence of the joy-irritable disposition was mentioned. The convivial-depressoid temperament seems also to be common.

There thus arises the question of the general, or compound, weighting of mood-cycle, a question that, after all, will occur more often than the question of the weighting of the individual cycles. In the masculine hierarchy of the cycles, there must result a balancing of influence that leaves the individual with little pronounced subjective or objective cyclic predisposition. For if anger-conviviality gives a weighting away from the self while hope-fear and joy-depression give weightings toward the self, and if, as is usual with men, anger-conviviality is the major-cycle, hope-fear the minor cycle, and joy-depression a cycle that is minor to a further degree, then the major and two minors will tend to balance one another, and the individual will be without marked weighting in one direction or the other. On the other hand, the feminine hierarchy of the cycles will result in an imbalance of influence that leaves the individual predisposed in a subjective direction. For here, hope-fear is in the ascendancy, anger-conviviality in the second place, and joy-depression, on account of its relationship to hope-fear, not a poor third but a good third. The consequence is that the influence of the cycles in the usual feminine arrangement will be preponderantly subjective. True, those women are not at all rare in whom the cycles seem to occur in their typically masculine order; just as women are frequent who seem to be pure anger-convivials. Nevertheless from the point of view of mood-cycle it would appear that women must, on the whole, be more subjective than men, and this, after all, is what common sense has always maintained.

The balance of cyclic weighting is perhaps most conspicuous in the case of the simple hybrid cycles. When the mood-cycle is either joy-irritability or conviviality-depression, the absence of cyclic weighting is so marked as to leave the fact scarcely open to doubt. In the immediately preceding sections of this chapter, Thoreau as well as Emerson was used as an example of the well-adjusted joy-depressoid introvert, the joy-depressoid introvert who, in becoming a feeling personality, escapes the destiny of emotional introversion. Once again, for the sake of ease of exposition, both individuals were spoken of simply as joy-depressoids, and indeed, when one thinks of Thoreau's remark that "the gregariousness of men is their most contemptible and discouraging aspect,"[78] the exposition would seem not to have tampered too severely with the facts. Nevertheless, Thoreau was about as straight a joy-irritable as it is possible for a human being to be. The society of his fellows, even the select society of Emerson's drawing room, nearly always produced in him the response of irritation. Thoreau was notorious for suddenly overturning the conversation with either a flat contradiction or one of his disconcerting paradoxes. Whereas Emerson seems never to have been irritated by people, Thoreau's reaction to society was nearly always one of anger. On the other hand, if conviviality was an emotion which Thoreau never knew, he experienced joy no less certainly than anger. Thus he writes in his Journal, "My life was ecstasy. . . . I said to myself,—I said to others,—'There comes into my mind such an indescribable, infinite, all-absorbing, divine, heavenly pleasure [that] I perceive that I am dealt with by superior powers. This is a pleasure, a joy, an existence which I have not procured myself. I speak as a witness on the stand, and tell what I have perceived.' "[79]

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[78] *Journal,* Walden Edition, X, 350.

Now the interesting thing, as far as this discussion is concerned, is that the consequent centering of Thoreau's interest midway between the objective and subjective worlds is one of the most striking facts about his published writings and the Journal. Thoreau's writings, in the main, are one long record of his observations. It is true that in the earlier writings, in *Walden* and the "Week," there is a good deal of philosophy. But this philosophy, it turns out, is largely a program of retreat from society so that the individual may be able to observe his environment. It is also true that Thoreau succeeds in infusing his pages with much of the delight which he himself felt in the presence of nature, a delight which communicates itself to the reader and accounts in no small degree for the charm of Thoreau's writings. Thoreau even manages to convey a sense of that mystical, transcendental presence which, in company with his age, he felt in the world of nature. Yet all this subjectivity is no more than balance to the objective picture which Thoreau also sets before his readers. It corrects that tendency toward extreme objectivity which is often a concomitant of the straight anger-convivial point of view.

In Emerson's view of life, on the contrary, the feeling of the divine in the world comes first, then the intuitions which support this feeling, and lastly the observations adduced to support those intuitions. In Emerson's philosophy, observation retires before the greater importance of feeling and thinking. In Emerson, a pure joy-depressoid, there is an essential subjectivity which seeks to infuse itself in the world of his environment. In Thoreau, nothing of the sort can be discerned. The transcendental feeling is by no means paramount in Thoreau. Nor are the subjective overtones of delight. In Thoreau, there seems to be a genuine centering of interest between object and subject, and if, as he grew older, the object seemed to increase at the expense of the subject, this at least is in line with the adjustment of a joy-depressoid personality.

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[79] *Journal,* Walden Edition, II, 306-307.

Now all this has great bearing upon the type of psychosis, upon the variety of schizophrenia or manic-depression.

For one thing, there can be little doubt that the least complex form of schizoidia, Bleuler's *schizophrenia simplex,* shows the same absence of cyclic weighting that has been described above. Whether because of the masculine hierarchy of the cycles or because of one of the hybrid cycles, the schizoid of this sort seems to be without bias either toward the subject or toward the object. As a result, one is apt to see in this type of schizoid the consequence simply of the schizoid defect itself. Such difficulties as the individual experiences in pursuing his life are apt to be, not psychotic, but merely maladaptive in their nature.

In fact it is apparent that one of the effects of the centering of cyclic emphasis is the resistance which this offers to the development of inferiority feelings. Only extreme provocation, apparently, can cause an individual so constituted to become an end-type. The balance in cyclic weighting, apparently, is conducive to a similar balance between the individual and the world, and schizoids of the *simplex* type usually show traits of feeling introversion, not of emotional introversion. Indeed, one of the characteristics of the type is a certain low-level euphoria that may be the dominant affective condition if the individual is not too sorely tried by the need to adapt to life.

In his early days in California, the writer must have worked with a dozen of the sort among the itinerant laborers employed on the various ranches of the State. Most of them were individuals without family ties or sense of responsibility, and were quite solitary without, however, suggesting a joy-depressoid coloring. They drifted in and drifted out, sometimes staying only a few days, sometimes settling down permanently in a one-room shack. They lived a kind of vegetative existence that could not properly be spoken of as autistic. They had very little object libido to dispose of, and few loyalties to place, whether to job or to comrade. On the whole, however, they were not a bad sort. If they had little affection at their command, they had no malice. Their low-level euphoria made them quite content to sit and smoke when work was over. As Kretschmer has pointed out,[80] what they cared most about was personal independence, and this meant freedom from the adaptive demands of life.

It surely was no accident that led Thoreau to take a greater interest in individuals of this sort than in those of any other kind. There was Bill Wheeler who lived alone in the woods in a shelter made of hay. "Here was one," reflected Thoreau, "who went alone, did no work, and had no relatives that I knew of, was not ambitious that I could see, did not depend on the good opinion of men. . . . I was not sure for a moment but here was a philosopher who had left far behind him the philosophers of Greece and India, and I envied him his advantageous point of view. I was not to be deceived by a few stupid words, of course, and apparent besottedness. It was his position and career that I contemplated."[81] And there was one-eyed John Goodwin, the fisherman, who, although regarded by most as a vicious character, charmed Thoreau "unspeakably" by collecting driftwood for his fuel. "Goodwin stands on the solid earth," Thoreau observed. "There is no secret in his trade more than in the sun's. It is no mystery how he gets his living; no, not even when he steals it."[82] And there was Aleck Therien, the French-Canadian woodchopper. "He interested me," Thoreau writes, "because he was so quiet and solitary and so happy withal. . . . In him the animal man chiefly was developed. . . . When Nature made him, she gave him a strong body and contentment for his portion. . . . Wiser men were demigods to him. If you told him that such a one was coming, . . . he thought that anything so grand would expect nothing of him, but take all the responsibility on itself, and let him be forgotten still. . . . He suggested that there might be men of genius in the lowest grades of life."[83]

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[80] *Physique and Character,* pp. 210-212.

[81] *Journal,* Walden Edition, III, 196-197.

Whether Aleck Therien had genius or not, Thoreau certainly possessed it, and it surely can be no irreverence to the great solitary of Walden Pond to point out that his interest in these men was the interest of like in like.[84] Save for his genius and superior education, it is difficult to see in just what important detail Thoreau differed from his fellow ne'er-do-wells of Concord. As a matter of fact the surprising thing about Thoreau is not that he was of the type which is here being discussed, but that in spite of his mother's comfortable home and the freedom he enjoyed in it he could not resist the temptation to live by himself in a shack in the woods.

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[82] *Journal,* Walden Edition, V, 446.

[83] *Walden,* Walden Edition, pp. 161-166.

[84] Perhaps this is the place to observe that although psychologic analysis of an author's personality may have bearing upon the author, it does not necessarily have bearing upon his work. Explanations as to why Thoreau was Thoreau may help us to understand Thoreau, but not necessarily to understand the truth or value of his ideas. Here the criterion would seem to be what they have meant to others, the answer being that they have meant a lot. The writer, for one, has counted himself a Thoreauvian for years.

Thoreau's kinship with the type, however, brings out the real unsatisfactoriness of the term *schizophrenia simplex*. To be sure, Bleuler, whose term it is, was merely following Kraepelin's *dementia praecox simplex*. But even so, as is well known, the type seldom develops psychotically. Its representatives are the inmates of almshouses, not of asylums, and if one of them does wind up in an asylum, usually, it is because of senility and not because of schizophrenia. However, although *schizoidia simplex* would be a better phrase, there is no source of serious error in the term *schizophrenia simplex,* for its limitations are well understood.

The problem of the centering of cyclic weighting becomes more complex when the personalities involved are extraverts. With extraverts there is not a lack of emotion, as with schizoids, but an abundance of emotion, and the balance of cyclic weighting has to do with factors of considerably greater amplitude. Yet the result, apparently, is quite the same. More of objectively weighted emotion is balanced with more of subjectively weighted emotion, and the individual is given no cyclic predispostion toward the world or toward the self. True, the extravert's overflowing cup has a tendency always to carry him out toward the world, and the thinking cast may give this tendency an added force. But the individual, *cyclically,* is without predisposition in one direction or the other.

Indeed this balance between the world and the self, this balance in the weighting of mood-cycle, would appear to be a factor in the development of benign stupors, perhaps the most remarkable of psychotic phenomena. For in deep stupors of the benign sort there seems to be no doubt that emotion finally does cease. Whereas in the malignant stupors of schizophrenia, as Bleuler has observed,[85] there never is a complete disappearance of affect, in stupors of the benign, or extraverted, sort, such a disappearance apparently does occur. In schizophrenia, to be exact, it is a question not of the disappearance of emotion but of its reduction to such a degree that it appears to have ceased. Schizophrenic stupors, strictly speaking, are only partial stupors. In stupors of the benign sort, on the other hand, although partial stupors also occur, there seems to be no doubt that in many cases emotion really does cease, and that for a time the individual becomes merely a vegetative organism.

Now it may well be that such an abnormal condition cannot obtain without the cooperation of organic factors. Yet the operation of psychic factors is not thereby disallowed, and Hoch, for one, in his remarkable little book on the subject,[86] finds the condition always to proceed from a state of unhappiness. In fact his comparison of the benign stupor to an afternoon nap suggests that the organic probably hinges on the psychic, as when, in the afternoon nap, sleep comes, not from the need for physical repair, but from the need for respite from the psychic strain of living. A benign stupor may terminate in a largely physical condition, but it apparently originates in a purely psychic condition.

Now one of the psychic factors involved is undoubtedly the extravagance of emotion that is characteristic of extraverts. Extraverts, who have more emotion than introverts, who frequently have more of it than they know what to do with, are apt, very early, to become extravagant with emotion. Knowing that it will be quickly and easily replenished, they pour it forth on all and sundry, and furthermore when they are in the act of pouring it forth, pour forth all that they have, holding none back. Introverts, on the other hand, having less of the commodity to begin with, inevitably become more conservative in its disbursement. An introvert is not so apt to give out all the emotion he possesses in response to a stimulus, and if he does, then he usually experiences a reaction of economy, and for a time will hardly give out any at all. This introverted conservation of emotion is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the introvert's love of retrospection. He clings onto the feeling of the past as if unwilling to let it go. He wishes to reexperience it by means of his memories. Indeed, this introverted conservation of emotion is probably the fact at the basis of Bleuler's observation that even the most stuporous of schizophrenes has not really let all his emotion go. He, too, clings onto a last vestige of it, although it may be deeply hidden from view.

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[85] Eugen Bleuler, *Textbook of Psychiatry*, New York, 1924, p. 380. Kretschmer also has pointed out (*op. cit.*, p. 157) that "frequently, behind the unresponsive, numbed exterior, in the innermost sanctuary, a tender personality-nucleus with the most vulnerable nervous sensitivity . . . has withdrawn into itself, and lies there contorted."

[86] August Hoch, *Benign Stupors*, New York, 1921.

But to return to the benign stupors of extraverts, it is apparent that the extraverted lavishness of emotion may well be a factor in their occurrence. The extraverted habit of emotional extravagance may well explain the peculiar abandonment of emotion in a benign stupor. After all, the extravert who responds to an unhappy situation with a benign stupor only goes a few steps beyond William James's well-known "moral holiday." In fact, as Hoch suggests, the benign stupor is probably only one step beyond the midday nap.

Yet other extraverts respond to unhappy situations with floods of depression, floods of mania, or floods of anxiety, and it is apparent that the emotional extravagance of extraverts does not entirely account for the loss of emotion in a benign stupor. Hoch specifically regards the benign stupor as a variety of the manic-depressive psychosis, and although this hardly accords with the strict, introspective-extravert construction of manic-depression assumed in this study, nevertheless the relationship between the benign stupor and manic-depression must be as close, or very nearly as close, as the relationship between *schizophrenia simplex* and the more complex forms of schizophrenia. In fact, if it were not for the perpetuation of an ill-conceived terminology, one would be strongly tempted to speak of the benign stupor as *manic-depression simplex.*

However this may be, the violent mood-swings that characterize the other forms of manic-depression do not occur in the stuporous variety. In stupor, the shift from pleasant to unpleasant emotion does not go all the way, but stops at the zero plane. Emotion pauses at its base level before descending to the depths below. In fact it not only pauses, but disappears.

What causes this arrest in its fall?

Apparently it comes from the circumstance that is the theme of the present discussion. With the stuporous manic-depressive the cyclic weighting is apparently in such balance that in point of view the individual is inclined neither toward the world nor toward the self, but is kept on an even keel between the two extremes. In particular, he seems to be withheld from developing a prevailing mood, whether pleasant or unpleasant.

For it would seem that if one of the cyclic emotions is to develop as a prevailing mood, the general weighting of the cycles must be off-center, and that if this prevailing mood is to be one of the lower-register emotions (anger, anxiety, or depression), then the general off-center weighting must be in the direction of the self. There can, in fact, be little doubt that the lower-register emotions are more closely connected with the self than the upper-register emotions.

Conviviality, as a matter of fact, occurs in its purest form when the individual is on a holiday from his work and his family. It is as if conviviality were unable to flourish until the self can be forgotten, together with all the limitations which it places upon the personality. Freed alike from the demands of job and of family (demands which, in the last analysis, present themselves in the self and draw their power from the self), the individual can then give himself up to the unalloyed enjoyment of his fellows. Even when the comradely emotions come as the result of communal effort, they frequently do not appear until the effort is going well and the individual's particular problems are swallowed up in the success of the enterprise. Then the individual feels satisfaction because of his association with his fellows. Then life becomes worth living because of his membership in the group.

On the other hand, although anger can be as social as conviviality, a threat to the group calling forth anger in perhaps its purest form, nevertheless the fact remains that the threat which calls forth the group reaction of anger usually produces also a feeling of fear. Indeed, just as anger stirs the individual beyond the capability of conviviality, so anger carries with it psychic overtones of personal concern which its upper-register counterpart simply does not possess. In other words, it is clear that anger is connected with hope-fear (as conviviality is not), while hope-fear, as has been pointed out, goes back to the cycle of joy-depression for its final significance.

And so it is with fear and depression. Both fear and depression stir the individual more than hope and joy, and both carry personal overtones which hope and joy do not possess. Although hope and joy are as essentially subjective in their weighting as fear and depression, so that the distinction becomes a distinction of subjectivities, nevertheless within these subjectivities it is clear that hope does not imply a possibility of personal gain to compare with the possibility of personal loss that is the object of fear, that joy is not an emotion so contained within the self as is the black despair of depression.

Most parents, for example, hope that their children will lead happy, successful, and independent lives, and if their children do, they experience joy as previously explained. The early death of a child, on the other hand, entails a sense of loss out of all proportion to the parents' hopes, and is correspondingly feared. Who has not seen the terrible grief of parents unexpectedly bereaved of one of their children? Never would their joy have approached the sorrow and desolation which now settle over them. No matter what success might have attended their child in its subsequent life, this success and the joy it brought would never have had the personal significance of the loss which they feel now that their child is dead. The fear of such an eventuality, although perhaps but dimly glimpsed, is a far more personal emotion than the hope which parents also feel.

Conversely, it seems reasonable to suppose that the emotions of anger and fear and depression will not develop as prevailing moods unless the personality already possesses a weighting toward the self. To be sure, as has been pointed out, these emotions may be felt by any one if the stimulus to feel them is sufficiently intense. But such emotions are particular and experience-conditioned. They do not resemble those moods of depression or anxiety which, as often as not, settle over one without a sufficiently provoking stimulus. If the speculations of these pages are correct, such moods settle over one only if the ground has been prepared by a weighting toward the self to begin with.

Now the curious thing is that a weighting toward the self is a concomitant of only two of the cycles, of hope-fear and of joy-depression. The weighting of anger-conviviality is so far the reverse that the influence both of hope-fear and joy-depression is effectively cancelled when anger-conviviality is in the major position. So outward is the influence of anger-conviviality that in combination with thinking extraversion the cycle produces what is probably the most external of all types. A consequence of this influence, however, is that anger-conviviality sets the stage against the development of its own lower-register emotion. A peculiarity of straight anger-convivials is that they do not develop anger as a prevailing mood.

Thus it is that thoroughly external personalities, instead of anger, are inclined to develop irritability, which is a tendency merely to react with anger rather than a sustained mood. In the same way (and what is of far greater importance to this discussion), straight anger-convivial introspective extraverts develop in psychosis, not the lower-register mood of their cyclic endowment, but the upper. Whereas hope-fearist and joy-depressoid introspectives respectively develop anxiety and depression in psychosis, a characteristic of anger-convivial introspectives is that they become psychotic without the accompaniment of unpleasant emotion. To be sure, their pleasant, upper-register emotion, their conviviality, seems far removed from the simple good-fellowship of the feeling introvert or feeling extravert. Since they are thinking personalities, their conviviality is thoroughly idea-ed. Their intuitions are clearly dominant over their feelings. Indeed, the peculiarity of anger-convivial introspectives is that their pleasant gregarious emotion can express itself only in intellectual terms, so that it takes the form of an enthusiasm for social ideas. Hope-fearist and joy-depressoid introspectives, also, can express their emotion only in intellectual terms. But anxiety and depression are contractive emotions. As these emotions arise, fewer and fewer ideas are necessary to express them. Finally, in depression, the most contractive emotion of all, the exact opposite of the manic flight of ideas obtains. The poverty of intellectual content of the depressed person is well known. But conviviality is an expansive emotion. Not fewer and fewer, but more and more, ideas are necessary to give it release. Inevitably the anger-convivial introspective develops mania as he suffers from an excess of cyclic emotion, as he endeavors to accommodate its flow.

But it is necessary to distinguish between initial mood and reactive mood. A reactive elation is bound to follow a period of depression; a reactive optimism is bound to succeed a spell of anxiety. Even a benign stupor is usually followed by an access of extra energy comparable, as Hoch points out, to the refreshment that usually follows an afternoon nap. The human personality is a reactive, self-regulating organism, and the pendulum cannot be detained in one quarter without its swinging to the other upon release. In these pages it is not the reactive mood-swing that is of concern, but the initial mood-swing. And with anger-convivial introspective extraverts, this initial mood-swing is not one of pain and lower-register emotion but one of pleasure and upper-register emotion.

In his excellent study of the varieties of manic-depressive psychosis,[87] John T. MacCurdy has pointed out the peculiarities of what in this study is called the anger-convivial introspective extravert—the type that reacts to the psychotic situation not with depression, or stupor, or anxiety, but with mania and exhilaration. MacCurdy points out that what is called in this study the force of subjectivation is the same for all forms of the psychosis, in particular, that the individual suffers from "a conspicuous defect . . . in the sphere of affective personal relationships."[88] MacCurdy writes, "There is a 'seclusiveness,' a tendency to shun social contact, often evidenced by shyness, preoccupation with work and so on. The establishment of new friendships and adaptability to a new environment is more difficult than with normal people."[89] Observing that "in our daily lives the greatest happiness seems to come from the prospect of achievement, . . . that contentment with actual achievement is a less violent affair,"[90] MacCurdy then goes on to describe the predisposition given to the subjectivated personality by what in this study is known as the anger-convivial mood-cycle.

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[87] *The Psychology of Emotion: Morbid and Normal,* New York, 1925. See above, p. 421.

Now one of the most important aspects of this predisposition is the tendency which it gives to the individual to live, even in his thoughts, in the world of the object. It is this tendency which produces in mania the most paradoxical of the forms of manic-depression, just as it is this same tendency which produces in paranoia the most paradoxical of the schizophrenic psychoses. For although the anger-convivial introspective extravert is an egoist, as all subjectivated or objectivated personalities are egoists, yet he is an unconscious egoist. His mood-cycle preserves him from direct examination of the self, and his self-preoccupation takes the form of an unconscious projection of his self-preoccupation. With the anger-convivial introspective extravert, strictly speaking, one should use the term *subjectivated thinking extravert,* not the term *introspective extravert,* for the peculiarity of such a person is that he doesn't "introspect." With people of this sort, self-doubt is turned into self-assurance. Their troubles are got rid of by compensating schemes and projects. Their inner tension is worked off upon the inoffensive world about them, which they are forever stirring up in behalf of some worthy cause. Perhaps they are trying to organize a group for English country dancing, perhaps it is a community social center they are promoting, perhaps merely a picnic among their friends. Whatever the scheme, it betrays its anger-convivial origins in that it never concerns the subject alone but always, and necessarily, includes others. Often these personalities betray a good deal of charm, and succeed in winning converts to their meritorious schemes. For a time the converts do not perceive the egoistic basis to the undertakings they are asked to join. But eventually they do. And when they balk, and when the schemes do not work out, then these introspectives who do not introspect usually meet defeat with new and better schemes.

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[88] *Op. cit.,* p. 190.

[89] *Ibid.*

[90] *Op. cit.,* p. 185.

Thus MacCurdy writes of them, "They are inclined . . . to react to distressing situations with imaginary relief into which they project themselves in fancy. An excuse for failure can always be found, or a new scheme twice as good is immediately forthcoming. These people have energy, resource and ambition, but are apt not to be practical. They waive difficulties aside or shut their ears to them. Their vivacity makes them socially attractive, so that casual acquaintances are as charmed as intimates are worried by them. This is the commonest type of manic makeup."[91]

The manic, or rather, hypomanic, makeup is not difficult to recognize. Nor are the anxious and depressive makeups difficult in their turn to perceive. The only difficulty is offered by the makeup which apparently leads to stupor, by the manic-depressive constitution which in its simplicity can be likened to *schizoidia simplex*. For clearly the make-

[91] *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

up of the individual who develops a benign stupor is allied to the makeup of the schizoid of simplex type. As in the case of the latter, the balance of cyclic weighting has a tendency not only to withhold the individual from objectivation or subjectivation but also to withhold him from psychosis.

For benign stupors are by no means so common as the other forms of manic-depression, and when they do occur, usually suggest factors other than the purely psychic factors to which the present discussion is limited. Hoch observes that the psychosis occurs chiefly among the lower classes, where poverty, orphanage, alcoholism on the parents' part, neglect, and abuse all play their part. The implication would seem to be that particularly adverse conditions are necessary to bring the psychosis out. As a matter of fact, the typical clinical case quite obviously does not involve a thinking personality, and the disease as it actually occurs is far removed from manic-depression in the limited sense with which it is treated in this chapter. Let alone the fact that thinking personalities tend to be restricted to the upper classes, the thinking cast of personality would in itself oppose the development of stupors of the benign sort; for thinkingness serves as a check, indeed as an ultimate barrier, to that extraverted extravagance of emotion which was adduced as a factor in the development of extraverted stupors. Thus in the original discussion of thinking and feeling as major and minor functions, the analogy of the dam was used to explain the effect of thinkingness upon the emotions of the extravert.

As a matter of fact, this dam, or blocking of the emotions, should prevent an extravagance of emotion in the thinking end-type, and hence in the forms of manic-depression which spring from this type. Since it does not, since the subjectivated thinking extravert develops anxiety or depression or mania with the rapidity and abandon with which the stuporous manic-depressive loses his emotion, it must be because the dam has been weakened in the course of the individual's development.

In the next and final chapter of this study, the last concept of these pages will be introduced, namely, that of the weakened function. The weakened function is a characteristic of the end-type, and will be perceived in the case of the emotional introvert and introspective extravert to be the personality's familiar function, that function which, if he were not an end-type, would have been his adapted function. Thus the thinking function of the thinking extravert, which serves to dam, or block, the personality's feeling function and which determines that the personality when maladapted shall develop merely a phobia or other neurosis—this thinking function of the thinking extravert, in the subjectivated thinking extravert, becomes characteristically impaired. There is thus a recrudescence in introspective extraversion of that extravagance of emotion which is apt to characterize all extraverts except the thinking extravert. In this respect introspective extraversion, whether of hope-fearist, anger-convivial, or joy-depressoid complexion, takes after feeling extraversion, upon which basis the benign stupor must be supposed to rest. In between the two extremes occurs thinking extraversion, where the excessive flow of motion is checked.

Accordingly, whereas the schizoid of simplex type is separated from the paranoid, hebephrenic, or catatonic schizophrene simply by the gap which separates the center- from the end-type, the manic-depressive of simplex type is separated from the manic-depressive of manic, anxious, or depressive variety not only by the gap between center-type and end-type but by the additional gap between feeling and thinking personalities. The schizoid of simplex variety is one stage removed from his psychotic parallel; the manic-depressive of simplex type is two stages removed. In reality, what one sees in the case of the manic-depressive of simplex variety is merely the movement of emotion itself, with an *a posteriori* ideology of the simplest sort. All that *a priori* intellectual framework which to MacCurdy and to the thinking of this study is the very hallmark of manic-depression—all this is missing, and the aetiology seems to lie largely in the environmental and organic spheres.

8. The Varieties of Manic-Depression and Schizophrenia

The task, in this brief section, is to summarize the foregoing theory of the varieties of manic-depression and schizophrenia, to bring together the loose threads of the preceding discussion. In two or three cases, a few words of explanation will be added to make the treatment accorded each of the varieties a little more uniform. But with many pages still to go to the end of this chapter, the words must necessarily be few. In particular, no adequate description of the psychoses in question can possibly be attempted. Nor should this be necessary with so many adequate textbooks upon the subject available at every hand. This section will restrict itself to a last survey of the cyclic theory of the varieties of manic-depression and schizophrenia, a theory that must remain, as it is, a speculation.

Since manic-depression in all its forms is closer to normal psychic life than schizophrenia, it is not surprising that in the preceding pages of this study the pre-psychotic manic-depressive personality should have been more adequately dealt with than the pre-psychotic schizophrenic personality. In the development of schizophrenia there is usually an abnormal factor, the schizoid defect. Unless the circumstances are very exceptional, an introvert of normal emotive endowment does not develop the psychosis. In manic-depression, however, a similar abnormal factor seems not to obtain, with the result that in spite of the desirability of giving a uniform treatment to each of the two pre-psychotic types, in a psychology of the normal, inevitably the one type is described more fully than the other.

Thus the early chapter on extraversion and introversion set forth the peculiar, unproductive introspection of the subjectivated thinking extravert or pre-psychotic manic-depressive personality, a trait now seen to be more characteristic of the anxious and depressive varieties than of the anger-convivial. Again, in the section on the strata of thought, the discussion dealt with the trait of flighty thinking, particularly characteristic of the anger-convivial manic-depressive. Again, in the section on the two selves, attention was called to the peculiar separation of the viewed from the viewer (a tendency principally to be observed in the joy-depressoid introspective extravert); while in the case of the hope-fearist introspective, the arrest of this tendency was noted and an instance given in the well-known case of Clifford Beers.

Indeed, except for the equation of mood-cycle with variety of manic-depression, a theory of manic-depression had very largely been developed without benefit of the present chapter on maladjustment and psychosis. That theory of manic-depression can now be set aside with a reminder that the depressive, anxious, and manic varieties correspond, respectively, with preponderant endowments of the joy-depressoid, hope-fearist, and anger-convivial mood-cycles, and that benign stupors apparently develop when the weighting of the cycles is evenly balanced and adverse environmental or organic conditions also obtain. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of schizophrenia.

The discussion will assume a relationship between mood-cycle and variety of schizophrenia parallel to the relationship between mood-cycle and variety of manic-depression. It has already been pointed out that *schizoidia simplex* is a consequence of a balancing of cyclic factors, and seldom results in psychosis, but merely in varying degrees of maladaptation. It is no less clear that the paranoid has received a preponderant endowment of anger-conviviality with its undue weighting toward the exterior world. Thus when psychotic, not only is the paranoid inclined to show the objective mechanism of projection, but his dereism is apt to go no farther than delusion, to stop short of the hallucinatory, more subjective dereism that characterizes the other forms of schizophrenia. The usual presence of a certain amount of repressed homosexuality is also to be noted.

This is not to equate anger-conviviality with homosexuality. As should be clear by now, anger-conviviality and homosexuality are the derivatives of entirely different instincts, the one of the instinct toward self-preservation, the other of the instinct toward race-preservation. Hence anger-conviviality and homosexuality are personality-elements, not of the same order, but of different orders, and cannot very well be the cause of one another. Nevertheless the fact remains that anger-conviviality predisposes an individual toward the companionship of his own sex, that the anger-convivial who has been denied the complement of the remaining social cycle finds the stage at least set for a tendency toward homosexuality. To be sure, of all types, the straight anger-convivial, with his undue sense of the external world, is the first to recognize the injudiciousness of homosexuality. It never has a chance to develop. Not only the *mores* of his day and age, but his very group instinct, combine to keep the tendency (if it exists) thoroughly repressed. But this is what Freud has always maintained. The paranoiac seldom, if ever, shows an overt homosexuality. It is his repressed homosexuality which, in combination with the mechanism of projection, leads to such traits as his erotomania, his delusional jealousy, and his notions of persecution. It is difficult to see what other element of personality can so well account for all these characteristics as the anger-convivial mood-cycle.

In similar fashion, the hebephrenic form of schizophrenia would seem to correspond with a disproportionate coloring of hope and fear. Its silly delusions of grandeur would seem to correspond with just those callow hopes which have already been pointed out as characteristic of hope-fear when it dawns as a cycle at the time of puberty. Similarly the vague, unresolved fears of this form of schizophrenia would seem to suggest the cycle that can supply these fears with little or no stimulus from exterior reality.

If the manifestations of the hebephrenic form of schizophrenia are particularly acute, this can be explained by the fact that the cycle of hope-fear fits ill with the schizoid constitution. Contact with the world is not the schizoid's forte, and he fares better with a cycle that tends to correct this deficiency, with such a cycle as that of anger-conviviality, or that of joy-depression. The cycle of hope-fear increases the subjectivity of the schizoid without giving him that interest in the external world which is the property of joy-depression as well as of anger-conviviality. Belonging to the future as they do, the objects of hope-fear are relatively intangible, and the cycle has a tendency to keep the schizoid floating in the air. As a matter of fact, even the normally endowed introvert supports the hope-fear mood-cycle less well than an extravert, and succeeds as a hope-fearist *just insofar as his sexual emotions bind him to the members of his family or to his friends so that these become the objects of his hopes and fears.* It is the extravert who can best be a hope-fearist. His need for emotional expression, his compelling urge to make contact—all this tends to counteract the subjectivity of his cycle. His natural objectivity inclines him to hope and fear for others rather than for himself, and renders more immediate the objects of his hopes and fears. His sexual emotions attach him to the persons for whom he hopes and fears. The schizoid, however, is bound to people not even by the ties of the normal, introverted complement of emotion, and in the lack of these ties, his hope-fear mood-cycle makes him more vulnerable, not less, to schizophrenic psychosis.

It was mentioned in a previous chapter[92] that inferiority feelings tend to make a feeling introvert of hope-fear mood-coloring, not less subjective, but more subjective, to create what was called the "peccadillo" type, the type of personality that tends to dwell upon sins it has not too certainly committed. In other words, apparently in the case of such a hope-fearist feeling introvert, the inferiority reaction does not produce the usual end-type, but drives the personality inward rather than outward. Hence it would follow that the hebephrenic form of schizophrenia can develop directly from a pattern of feeling introversion, instead of from the more usual pattern of emotional introversion with its customary drama upon the stage of the world. As a matter of fact, on the basis of the schizoid foundation, where the individual does not possess the interests of the normal introvert, the peccadillo type may find not even hypothetical sins to worry about. The individual may be unable to assign to any cause the fears which derive from his hope-fear mood-cycle. The helplessness which then ensues can be a major characteristic of the hebephrenic form of schizophrenia—a characteristic which may rend the hearts of those who are fond of the individual who is going insane.

Finally, as already suggested, catatonia would appear to be the type of schizophrenia which arises when the underlying mood-cycle is that of joy-depression. Here the individual's cyclic predisposition is toward the self and the environment. Not being social in one way or the other, the cycle neither aids nor deters the individual's psychosexual development, but prepares the ground for a possible conflict with society. Within the schizophrenic range, catatonia offers probably the widest variety of symptoms, and in the course of this study has been the type of schizophrenia most frequently alluded to. In connection with emotional resonance, and again in the section on the two selves, the discussion touched upon the poets Shelley and Hölderlin, both clearly of catatonic disposition, the one mercifully withheld from the destiny of his constitution, the other experiencing it to the full, and ending his days in a condition similar to that of the madman in Shelley's poem, *Julian and Maddalo*.

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[92] See above, p. 306.

9. Schizoid Sensitivity and Oversensitivity

One of the many personal touches in Brill's *Lectures on Psychoanalytic Psychiatry* which make those lectures so eminently readable is the assumption in the first of them that the lecturer's listeners have all read Clifford Beers's *A Mind That Found Itself*. Not only is the assumption charming because it is personal, but in the context of the lectures it is natural and indeed quite justified. After all, in every field of intellectual endeavor there are a few books which are unique, and which must be read unless the student, unlike Dogberry, is willing to let himself be written down an ass. Another of these books in Brill's own field of psychopathology is Kretschmer's *Physique and Character,* which is unique, not so much for its popularized theory of physical types, as for its brilliant and unexampled analysis of the schizoid temperament.

Kretschmer was much impressed by what may be called the schizoid paradox. He observed that schizoids are not only cold but also warm, not only insensitive but also sensitive, not only indifferent but also tender. In the schizoid temperament, Kretschmer writes,[93] "sensitivity and absolute dullness may live incredibly close together: the filthiest shirt beside polished finger-nails; chaotic untidiness in a room where the most valuable and pure works of art are produced. Such instances are found not only as transitional stages toward complete schizophrenic idiocy; they may also remain intact the whole life long, as baroque types of personality."

Kretschmer refers to this mixture of the two extremes as the "psychaesthetic proportion," regarding it as essentially emotive in its nature. In its essence, this proportion (or rather, disproportion) is a variation between a certain intensity of emotion and a certain lack of emotion. Kretschmer likens the two elements to the parts of a ladder or scale, finding that in the schizoid the disproportion between them is likely to grow in the course of the individual's life—usually by a series of shifts or stages. In this series of stages (to borrow Kretschmer's phraseology), the lower, hard-as-ice, dull-as-leather portion of the scale increases at the expense of the upper sensitive portion of the scale, the change in the disproportion being usually irreversible.[94] The intensity of emotion in the upper portion fades, while the lack of emotion in the lower part gains, until finally that condition of affective torpor advenes which has been termed schizophrenic idiocy.

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[93] *Physique and Character,* p. 174.

But why, one asks, does the individual who has little emotion have intense emotion? Why does a deficiency of emotion also produce a sensitivity of emotion? Why, to use Kretschmer's terms, does one find in the schizoid both hyperaesthesia and anaesthesia?[95]

For there are two, quite different principles involved: a reduction in the amount of emotion (the schizoid defect) and an increase in its intensity. Ordinarily, as pointed out in the section on thinking and feeling as major and minor functions, an increased intensity of emotion comes from a restriction of its flow. But here, in the case of the schizoid, it is not a question of the restriction of emotion but of the reduction of emotion—a situation which should ease the the flow of emotion, not hamper its course. One would expect the schizoid's intensity of emotion to be on a par with his lack of emotion unless he, too, has a blocking of the feelings, which has never been assumed.[96] Clearly some other factor enters into the sensitivity of the schizoid, some factor in addition to the defective amount of emotion.

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[94] At least one of Kretschmer's phrases comes from Strindberg, the Swedish novelist and dramatist, who reported of himself, "I am hard as ice, and yet so full of feeling that I am almost sentimental" (*op. cit.*, p. 157).

[95] The psychologist of classical training will note that there is an error in Kretschmer's use of these terms. The verb *aisthanomai* means to perceive, and is gnostic in its significance. The word is correctly used in surgical science. A person who is anaesthetized quite literally has his perceiving, his message from the outer world, cut off. Kretschmer, on the contrary, uses the term *aesthesia* to signify a thymic, reactive condition. However, since he amply and colorfully describes what he means, the error is far from serious.

Perhaps a clue is to be found in the fact that a reduced store of emotion produces a marked subjectivity in the individual. For an insufficiency of emotion means, not only that the individual has fewer interests in the outer world, but that he lacks emotion to meet the demands of the outer world. Sooner or later (and usually sooner), the schizoid finds it easier to live in the world that makes no demands. He turns by natural affinity to the world of books, to the world of fantasy, to the world of recollection.

Here, in the subjective world, the individual's supply of emotion will not be burdened beyond its capacity. The individual's memories (already selected) simply rise before him, and asking nothing in return, give him pleasure for the good times that have been. The individual plays with a toy village either in fact or in fancy, and has to contend with the emotional demands neither of villagers nor of a rival entrepreneur. Or perhaps he turns to the world of books, where the most amazing events take place, where empires fall and persons die, and yet where no greater activity is demanded than the turning of a page. True, the individual's feelings may be enkindled. He may weep for hero or for heroine. But these feelings, intense as they may seem to be, carry with them what may be called the subjective guarantee. The individual need not, indeed he cannot, do anything about the imaginary characters. His store of emotion will not be taxed beyond its subjective display, and even the subjective display rises in accordance with his own emotional sensibility, and not according to what is, or is not, expected of him.

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[96] To be sure, the schizoid, like any other human being, can suffer from a lack of conditioning in the expression of emotion and thus experience an artificial, so to speak, blocking of the emotions. But this is accidental, not inherent, and is as much beside the point as would be a schizoid's blindness or curvature of the spine.

Now an inevitable concomitant of the subjective life is the opportunity which it offers for the faculty of reflection. The subjective panorama, the array of mental objects which for the extravert is so difficult of attainment, yet which constitutes the very material of thought—this array is supplied ready-made to the schizoid, who has come, nevertheless, not in search of an arena for the process of thought, but in search of a refuge from the demands of emotion. He finds, however, once he has arrived in the subjective world, that those very conditions which make for emotional ease lead also to the habit of reflection.

For in the subjective world there is not a constant fleeting of the moment in hand, but a permanence that comes from the possibility of unlimited renewal. In the subjective world, friends long dead are with one forever; the past, like the future, enjoys a stability not granted to the present. And this stability is extended to the world of books. The reader may examine and reexamine the scenes presented to him, the characters portrayed. Their lack of evanescence permits him to linger at his will. Indeed it is this permanence which allows the thinker to think. Never in the objective world is it possible, objectively, to assemble all the fleeting data that one needs for the formulation of a concept.[97]

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[97] When the notion of the gnostic stream was being introduced (see above, p. 233), the permanence of the rock fault before the geologist's eyes was mentioned. It was said that the geologist might be as patient as he desired in his examination, that the strata would not vanish while he thought. True enough. But the geologist would not be able to think, would not be able either to determine the type of fault or to date the strata either side of the fault, if, while he examined the fault, he could not draw upon his relatively permanent knowledge of faults and of stratigraphy.

Now this permanence in the objects of the subjective world also permits an accumulation of emotion. For just as a fishing rod that has been the partner of many a joyous forenoon in the open permits an accumulation of emotion through its permanence in the fisherman's equipment, so the objects in the individual's subjective world permit an accumulation of emotion through their permanence in his thoughts.

In other words, it is clear that the concentration of emotion can come about in several ways. Undoubtedly, most often, it occurs simply from a restricted emotional outlet, the converse of which would be the excitement of greater emotion than the wonted outlet is used to bear. But as the preceding remarks suggest, the concentration of emotion can also occur from an inner building up of emotion. Indeed, the analogy of optics would suggest as much. For in optics, light may be concentrated quite as well by means of reflection as by means of refraction. In astronomy, mirrors as well as lenses are used to strengthen the feeble light of the stars. And so it is in the world of emotion. Constant gazing upon a mental object strengthens the emotion connected with that object. The emotion originally aroused in the subject is reflected upon the object, and that in turn arouses more. Furthermore, in schizoids, the intensity thus achieved (although perhaps in itself not remarkable) is brought into relief by the general coldness of the personality, the general schizoidic limitation of interest. The schizoid seems to be at white heat about certain things because so many things leave him unmoved. The two combine, so that the schizoid, in spite of his general coldness, both has and seems to have a peculiar intensity of feeling for the particular things that interest him. To Kretschmer, this was the most striking thing about the schizoid temperament.

Clearly, however, there are two kinds of schizoid sensitivity to be reckoned with. There is the sensitivity discussed above, which seems to be constitutional almost from the individual's earliest years, and there is the additional sensitivity, or oversensitivity, as it should properly be called, of the period of adolescence or early manhood. The factors involved are apparently quite different.

For the early sensitivity, as explained, would appear to spring largely, if not entirely, from the individual's living within the subjective world. Even the child of three or four, if his fund of emotion has been scanted, finds it far more natural to live in the inner world than in the outer. Thus in the schizoid's world, reflection is one of the chief activities, an activity which brings about what may be called a functional increase in the intensity of emotion.[98] Usually, this predisposition toward subjectivity and reflection, with its corollary of an increased emotional sensitivity, also brings about an increased intellectual sensitivity. The sense which has been especially favored in the individual's makeup becomes the center of his intellectual life. The perceptions of that favored sense, along with their subtended emotions, are caught up and magnified as by a reflecting telescope, and thus it is, when the personal ingredient has been added, that great musicians and painters and architects of schizophrenic disposition are made.

The other sensitivity, the oversensitivity of adolescence and early manhood, has already been dealt with. It is, in fact, the same as resonance, and comes not from endowment but from circumstance. In its essence, it is not an actual increase of the original sensitivity but a poignancy added to it by the development of a contrasting sense of loss.

Now that Latin has become unfashionable, it is apt to be forgotten that *adolesco* means to become adult, that although an adolescent is a callow stripling, he is also a person in whom adult passions and adult perceptions are making themselves known. Indeed adolescence in the strict sense, that is, in the sense of a person's developing adulthood, is frequently protracted into the third or fourth decade, and is not properly ended until the person's maturity is achieved, and he settles into middle age. Thus any sense of loss that overtakes an individual in adolescence or early manhood overtakes him with the force of a mature perception, and the repercussions are correspondingly great. Sometimes it is a sense of the mortality of life that sweeps over the adolescent with stunning force. Again, the sense of loss may come from a serious if not incurable disease. More often, the sense of loss is simply a sense of personal inferiority and limitation, now apparent with an adult significance. In particular, the joy-depressoid schizoid frequently becomes aware of his irreparable emotional deficiency; he perceives with an adult finality that he has neither the right kind, nor the right amount, of emotion to take his place in that feeling world which seems to him, nevertheless, to be the norm.

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[98] No doubt the concentration of emotion that occurs from a restricted emotional outlet should also be called a functional increase in the intensity of emotion, and both concentrations should be distinguished from that organic strength of emotion which comes from the basic strength of impulse. See above, pp. 248 ff.

Whatever its nature, the sense of loss merely strengthens the sense of what is not lost—namely, that fraction of exterior reality which has been caught up and magnified in the telescope of the individual's subjectivity, that fraction of reality which has been appropriated subjectively and become part of the individual's mind.

Unfortunately, it is an oversensitivity that cannot be guaranteed to be lasting. Unless the stimulus be renewed, unless, that is, new and similar losses arise, it is the rule among human beings for a sense of loss to pass away; and the schizophrene, who suffers more than other human beings, usually takes care that the stimulus shall not be renewed.

Attempting to preserve what he has, he withdraws into his autistic world, and there his sorrow fades away. But there, as it fades away, the oversensitivity that it occasioned also fades away. Indeed, the passing of this oversensitivity may constitute a second and more terrible sorrow. Hölderlin's most poignant verses are not those occasioned by the loss of his Diotima, but those occasioned by the loss of the oversensitivity which came from the loss of his Diotima. Is it any wonder, then, that often, as with Hölderlin, this second sorrow is the beginning of a spiral which ends only with the destruction of the personality?

It was suggested that the schizophrene suffers more than other human beings.[99] Indeed, the pain which makes him retreat from loss rather than remain in the world and face his loss—this pain seems close to the root of his trouble. Not only does it occasion his retreat from the world, but often, the delusions and hallucinations of his malady seem to be a means of throwing off the hurt. Again, the persistence of his suffering seems frequently to be the cause of the rigidity which comes over his emotional life. In a word, the schizophrene's abnormal capacity for pain would appear to be the source of those processes which finally can make of him, if not arrested, the demented wreck of a human being.

Now the reaction to pain is a problem not only for schizophrenes but for all human beings. The answer which the human being is accustomed to make to the problem in no small degree determines the course of his life.

For displeasure, or pain, as it is loosely called, is just that thing which discipline either eradicates or neutralizes. The most critical problem for a student is whether, as a child, he learns to overcome his displeasure at the preparation of his lessons, or whether that displeasure remains, and in fact becomes greater as his emotive capacity increases. If the child outgrows his initial displeasure, if he learns that an hour or so spent at his books is no great matter, then as a student in college he will be able to spend many hours at his books—perhaps with no positive pleasure, but at least in a neutral frame of mind. He will not be one of those students who would rather do anything than study—drink, go to the movies, turn on the radio, eat, play bridge, talk, sleep. Again, just as the successful student learns that homework, even uninteresting homework, can be done without the accompaniment of displeasure, so the teacher in his turn either learns to put himself in a neutral frame of mind while correcting papers or remains one of those teachers who never face up to their job, who are always late in getting in their marks, and who, indeed, should probably never have been teachers. In general, the displeasure at the tasks and chores of life is largely dissipated in the course of an individual's education if that education brings discipline along in its wake; in fact the psychologic reason for discipline would seem to be the eradication of such displeasure. The person who is well-disciplined manages to live with a minimum of displeasure, and for that reason, lives the better.

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[99] See above, p. 263.

But this is the displeasure, or pain, that is attendant upon the chores and tasks of life, and in truth, much of this displeasure is never felt by the well-disciplined. Unfortunately, disappointments occur which not all the discipline in the world can neutralize. The individual fails to make his father's fraternity at college; he fails to win the beloved upon whom he has set his heart. Again, in business, the position an individual has greatly desired goes to another, or at home, the child who was the most promising of his brood is suddenly taken from him. Here the pain is not of the routine sort that can be forestalled by discipline, but of the acute sort that comes from losses which cannot be foreseen. Here the individual's reaction to loss is not a reaction of habitual neutrality of mind but rather a reaction of conscious decision. What he does, although no doubt conditioned by his type of personality, seems to be a matter almost of ethical choice. In fact, there is reason to believe that two of the choices facing him were formulated in the ancient world as the alternative between the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies.

The more natural response to loss would appear to be that of the Epicureans. Freud has explained this response in psychologic language.[100] According to Freud, after due time has been given to sorrow, it is natural for the individual who has suffered loss to transfer his emotions to another object. The range of his interests and affections protects him. His values are so widely placed that the loss of one or two of them is insufficient to upset the applecart of his personality. Thus in ancient times the Epicurean consciously tried to keep his affections fluid, and would quote Aristippus's remark about his mistress, "I possess but am not possessed." To be sure, the Epicurean view of life is not to be summed up by a psychologic formula. Nevertheless, unless the notions of this study are much mistaken, the Epicurean reaction to loss was essentially that of the individual who is normally endowed with emotion, and hence possesses a normal stock of values. Such an individual can detach his emotions from a lost object because he has other objects which he already values and to which, accordingly, he can transfer his emotions.

On the other hand there is reason to believe that the Stoic response to loss is the response of the individual suffering from a schizoid limitation of the affections and interests. Certainly it is a matter of historical record that the scourge of schizophrenia was prevalent among the classes of

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[100] In *Mourning and Melancholia,* 1917.

Roman society where the Stoic doctrines flourished. In any event, there can be little doubt that the individual who, in the face of loss, can only suppress his feelings does so because he cannot detach his emotions from the lost object, and that he cannot detach his emotions from the lost object because of the narrowness of his range of interests. The ancient Stoics, who believed that the answer to the pain of life was the suppression of emotion, were people of limited emotional endowment, and hence of limited interest in life. Theirs was not that Epicurean gusto for living which can find satisfaction in the simplest of pleasures if only the individual is vouchsafed a modicum of health and freedom with which to enjoy them.

Yet schizoid as may be the course of suppressing the pain of life, it still remains a choice of health. The individual has faced his loss and decided that it must be endured. He suppresses the pain, and goes on living. As Freud has made clear, the choice between suppression and repression, the choice between facing an ill and retreating from an ill, is the choice between psychic health and psychic ill health. It is, indeed, the difference between schizoidia and schizophrenia. That individual who, although of schizoid constitution, faces the narrowness of his interests and the pain which comes because he cannot reinvest his feelings—this individual may be schizoid, but he is not schizophrenic. When, however, the pain is either too great to be endured or the individual is unequipped to endure it; when the only alternative appears to be that of retreat; then one does not have the Epicurean or the Stoic, but the regressive, choice. And the regressive choice is the psychotic choice, the choice which may, if other factors obtain, lead to insanity and the asylum.

10. Schizoid Feeling and Thinking

Although the term "schizoid" refers to a constitutional condition, a condition which can form the basis of any introverted type, it has been pointed out that such a basis, far from furnishing a handicap, is likely to give a thinking personality an especial brilliance. Only in the feeling world, where feelings and the actions they subtend form the currency, will the schizoid, because of his limited bank account, be at a disadvantage. As a consequence, the term "schizoid" is without especial significance except in the case of feeling personalities. In this study, the term is used only of feeling introverts and emotional introverts.

It is true that the conflict latent between a schizoid and his feeling environment may never develop. As mentioned in connection with Thoreau and Emerson, a schizoid's environment, both as to place and time, may be so harmonious that it is well nigh impossible for feelings of inferiority to develop unless special circumstances occur. Schizoids in such an environment are not subject to the distorting influence of objectivation, and their limited bank account is adequate because, in the harmonious environment, it is reserved principally for the subjective world. Emerson traveled from Aroostook to St. Louis, and was perhaps the best known lecturer of his day. Yet he lectured exclusively about his own ideas, and as a lecturer, had the lecture platform to himself. Furthermore, the people whom he met on the way, the acquaintances or friends of his one- or two-night stands, required no great expenditure of objective emotion. Emerson's reserve bank account was scarcely drawn upon outside of Concord, and even in Concord, Emerson lived mostly in the subjective world where, as has been pointed out, a little bit of feeling goes a long, long way. It is true that Thoreau, if not Emerson, lived in the objective world of Concord. But the particular world in which Thoreau lived, the world of the Muskatequid and Fair Haven Hill, was not a world which demanded emotional responsiveness. The world which asks for emotional responsiveness, the world of intermingling, interdependent human beings—this world, for Thoreau, hardly extended beyond the small group of his mother and father, his two sisters, and his brother, among whom he was quite a special person. The intellectuals of Concord were scarcely more than speaking acquaintances, and as for the rest of humanity, this merged in the general world of nature.

Nor does it follow that psychotic conflict is the necessary consequence of a schizoid's becoming an emotional rather than a feeling introvert. To be sure, the distorting influence of inferiority feelings brings out the full force of the Kretschmerian paradox. The contrast between the chaotic untidiness of the artist's room and the purity of the works of art which issue from it is a contrast of the emotional rather than of the feeling introvert, as is the general chasm between the outer world (in which the artist's room lodges) and the inner world (from which the works of art proceed). Nevertheless the works of art do proceed, and the personality, in spite of rebuffs and disappointment, does not take the regressive choice. He does not withdraw to the world of fantasy, where one dreams his works of art instead of producing them. The personality's answer to pain is the Stoic answer. He endures it, and renews the effort of his personal drama.

Clearly, the capacity of the schizoid who is an emotional introvert to renew the effort of his personal drama is connected with psychic health rather than with psychic ill health, with the Stoic rather than with the regressive choice. For the capacity to renew one's effort, the ability to stick to one's purpose, is the adapted function of an emotional introvert, his final, or active, function, which occurs in its modified form as volition. Now, according to Jackson's law, the most recent modifications are the first to disappear when an organism suffers a decline. The very sign of an emotional introvert's passing from the pre-psychotic to the psychotic state would be the loss of his will power, his adapted function. Which is the cart, and which the horse, is difficult to say. Whether the loss of volition is the cause of the regressive choice, or the regressive choice is the cause of the loss of volition, remains obscure. But the two go together, and the regressive choice means the abandonment of purpose and of the ability to stick to it. In becoming a spectacle merely of the inner world, the personal drama loses the theme that came to it from an exterior goal, and the psychic life of the individual deteriorates both in force and in unity.

Now in all this range of personality, from the schizoid who, as a feeling introvert, is scarcely aware of his difference from other men, to the schizophrene who has found the difference so acute that he has retreated from it—in all this range of personality, one of the most striking facts is that in spite of the individual's incapacity for feeling, his life is always cast in the world of feeling. Surely it is noteworthy that upon Thoreau's really remarkable powers of observation not the least bit of science was ever erected. In an age that produced an Agassiz and an Asa Gray among his Cambridge neighbors, Thoreau's meticulous observations of nature produced only feelings of appreciation. When in later life Thoreau's capacity for feeling dwindled (as apparently in schizoids it nearly always dwindles), then, as his biographers have pointed out, Thoreau's talent for observation became simply an end in itself. In Thoreau, the feeling cast of personality was apparently so strong that the thinking cast could not be used even as a passing discipline. The feeling cast of personality is equally strong in those emotionally introverted schizoids who, not content with the observation of life, must perform a drama in the midst of life. The idiom of the drama is always that of the feelings. Whether the individual is engaged in art, in music, in literature, or merely in the business of living, his ultimate preoccupation is with those feelings of which he possesses such an inadequate store.

Yet the schizoid's major function is his thinking function. Indeed, the contrast between the feeling cast of the schizoid's personality and the intellectual nature of his major thinking function is fully as striking as the contrast beween the feeling cast of his personality and his incapacity for emotion. Essentially, the contrast is one and the same. For it is the schizoid's abnormal lack of emotion which allows the major function of the normal introvert to become abnormally major in his case. According to the conceptions of this study, the normal introvert's partial endowment of emotion permits his intellectual faculties to occupy the subjective pause thus created. Now this subjective pause is unusually lengthened in the case of the schizoid, and as a consequence, the schizoid's thinking function comes to occupy an unusually large portion of his personality.

To be sure, in an individual of Thoreau's type, the unusually lengthened subjective pause of the schizoid is not necessarily filled with subjectivity. As previously explained, the curious balance in Thoreau's cyclic weighting left him without a predisposition either toward the subjective world or toward the objective world. Nor was he rendered unduly conscious of the self by the unhappiness of inferiority feelings. As a consequence, Thoreau's major thinking function tended to content itself with the first stages of the thinking process, with observation of the objective world, although, as his readers know, there is no dearth in his writings of purely subjective speculation. With Emerson, who experienced a definite weighting toward the subjective world, the thinking which occupied the greater part of his life was less observational and more reflective. It was more predominantly thinking in the strictly subjective sense.

Yet it was not thinking taken up with Emerson's own concerns. Emerson never experienced the egoism that comes from the inferiority reaction, and the power of his ideas in the nineteenth century—the power of his ideas today, is that they speak not for Emerson's own subjectivity, but for the subjectivity of all of us. Surely Emerson at his best may be said to be truly universal.

If, however, the schizoid experiences the distortion of the inferiority reaction, if fate decrees that he becomes, not a feeling, but an emotional introvert, then his overextended thought function is not universal but egoistic in its observations and speculations. The objective panorama of life which was the source of the thought of Emerson and Thoreau recedes into the background, and the foreground of the individual's attention is occupied by his own personal drama. His overgrown thought function is primarily concerned with himself. To be sure, if the individual possesses genius, the personal drama that occupies him may prove as interesting to humanity as the impersonal observations and reflections of Emerson and Thoreau. No small proportion of the world's art and music and literature stems from the self-preoccupation of emotionally introverted schizoids. Moreover such productions, especially when well received, play their part in keeping the individual sane, schizoid instead of schizophrenic. But the protracted preoccupation with a drama that is both egoistic and emotional, the continued contemplation of matters that are fundamentally not intellectual but emotive—all this introduces a contrast, indeed a tension, into the life of the schizoid which is fraught not only with possible psychotic consequences but with possible practical consequences.

For one thing, it leads to a conception of life that can never be carried out. In the subjective world, the schizoid can entertain experiences and feelings which, in actual life, he never has the emotion to support. In the subjective world, the reaction to one's fantasied experience is freed from the necessity of motivating action. In the drama of one's imagination the individual as an actual person is merely a spectator. How different may be the results if the individual seeks to duplicate his fantasy in the real world, the life-histories of scores of emotionally introverted schizoids amply testify. Such a life-history is vividly set forth in Conrad's great novel, *Lord Jim*.

In the novel, Jim's attempt to find in real life the counterpart of the drama of his fantasy apparently springs from the same source as his later disinclination to take the regressive choice. Not only was Jim's emotional defect his only defect, but he possessed an abundance of physical energy as if to make up for his deficiency of emotion. Youthful, romantic, and vigorous, Jim's personal attractiveness made people ready to do things for him, and brought him opportunities to start life afresh after his disgraceful failure on the *Patna*. Eventually, however, in the life of adventure to which he was committed, the need arose to respond to an emergency again. It was Jim's tragic fate that, as always, when the critical moment arrived, he did not possess the objective, responsive emotion with which to make his imaginary drama real.

From a boyhood spent in an inland parsonage Jim had turned to the sea for purely romantic reasons. He had read of splendid adventures at sea, and went to serve his apprenticeship on a river training-ship. While there, owing to a collision near by, Jim was provided with the chance to rescue a survivor or two, but did not find himself responding to the emergency in the instinctive fashion which characterized his companions. Clearly Jim was not the person who instinctively did the heroic thing. But overcompensative thoughts were quick to come to his defense, and that night he feasted high in his imagination, believing that his opportunity would come when every one else had failed. After two or three years of steady rise in his profession that opportunity came. Jim was then chief mate of the *Patna.* In the midst of the calmest imaginable sea, with eight hundred pilgrim passengers aboard, the *Patna* ran afoul of a submerged derelict, and in a few minutes was canted high in the stern, its whole weight resting upon a bulging, rust-eaten bulkhead forward. When Jim returned from an inspection of the bulkhead, the remaining officers were lowering a lifeboat to take themselves to safety.

Did Jim, in this second emergency, perceive that his great opportunity had come? Prompted by the emotions of heroism, did he bound away to take command of the deserted ship, knowing that even if the ship carried him to his death his dream would be fulfilled? He did not. He stood transfixed, in a perfect vacuum of feeling. It was not that he was afraid. Jim had no emotions of any kind to respond to the crisis. His palsy, in fact, continued until a lurch from the ship, coupled with a cry from his fellow officers, sent him tumbling like an automaton into the waiting lifeboat. The automatic action in the presence of the emotional palsy is particularly diagnostic of Jim's type.

Then, since the *Patna* did not go down and Jim was deprived of his master's certificate, he turned to various odd jobs, mostly water-clerking and mostly obtained through his friend, Marlow. Here life was different. Gone were the opportunities and the need for splendid actions. But Jim remained as romantic as ever, thinking exalted thoughts beyond the need of any water clerk, in fact such exalted thoughts that any mention of his former mistake was intolerable to him. He threw up job after job, becoming more and more out of sorts with the world, and wandered farther and farther east.

Finally, Marlow secured for him a new start in far-away Patusan. There, beyond the reach of the Dutch government, Jim would meet no white men to remind him of his past, and there, conceiving a brilliant idea for the extermination of a band of Arabian marauders, Jim made his adopted friends, the Bugis, masters of the place and himself its virtual if not titular ruler. This exploit was a success because the conception was Jim's and because he was able to invest it with subjective emotion. The emergency was for the Arabian marauders, not for Jim.

But then the unexpected happened. Some time later, Jim came back from an excursion into the interior to find a second band of marauders fortified in the midst of the village. In his lack of objective, responsive emotion, Jim consented to a talk with the party's leader. The leader discovered Jim's weakness and pressed it home. In his emotional palsy, Jim consented to let the men depart *with* their arms. The inevitable happened, and Jim found himself responsible for the tragic revenge they wreaked upon a party of the Bugis down the river. This time, Jim's death paid the penalty for his inability to respond to an emergency.

Some critics of the book have thought of Jim's death as a victory in the sense of Lena's death in Conrad's other novel, *Victory*. But surely such thinking betrays a want of psychologic insight. Jim's death, if a triumph, was a triumph, not of Lena's glorious, positive kind, but of an overcompensatory, defensive kind. It is true that the impulse which sent Jim to his death, the desire to prove that he was not a coward, had become the dominant motive of his life. But this did not date from earlier than the *Patna* episode, and was the result of Jim's failure to achieve the actuality of romance. In its essence such motivation is negative, not only because it is the consequence of failure but because in the last analysis it is subjective and not objectively valid. It is the individual himself who is the chief object of his defense reactions. It is to the not-too-watchful eye of his own ego that he seeks to prove that the world's opinion is not true.

In the light of this, it is difficult to see how Jim's death can be regarded as a sort of ultimate victory. Jim's death is the final disaster of the book. He does not die in the moment of consummation of all his romantic desires, but in the moment when his inability to cope with the stuff of romance has been more incontestably demonstrated than ever before. That last defensive flicker of triumph that flashed from Jim's eyes fell upon an uncomprehending audience. And even if the audience had been composed of Jim's peers, the flicker would have been without meaning. The problem of Jim's life was not whether he was a coward, but whether he could function in the objective world. The problem was answered when Jim was on the training-ship. The tragedy (or the blessing) of Jim's life was that he never perceived his failure for what it was, that he died, as he had lived, in illusion.

11. Schizoid Shift from Object to Subject

Now in a world composed chiefly of actions and feelings, truly objective connections between these actions and feelings will be largely lacking. To feeling personalities, the texture of life is essentially inner. Indeed, an assumption of objective connections between actions and feelings is one of the traits about thinking personalities which feeling personalities find most objectionable. Not only is the core of living to feeling personalities a business of inner values and promptings, but they fail to see why such things should be made articulate and express. It is not merely that the expression of such things seems unnecessary and a great waste of time, but that their strength seems unutterably to be weakened by bringing them out into the open air. Their climate is not the open air, but the inner air. Although their net effect may be to regulate the public ways of men, they themselves are not public, but private. In their essence, they are not open to inspection.

The writer recalls an early teaching experience of his that is illustrative of the point. It was not long after his graduation from college, and he happened to be employed in a large boarding school where it was the custom of the faculty to eat in the common dining hall. This privilege, of doubtful value at any time, was at that moment rendered unattractive at the writer's table by the presence of an unmarried athletic coach carried over from a previous administration of the school. Of limited mentality and education, but not unobtrusive, the individual was not a welcome table companion. Professionally, he was a poor coach. Yet on account of his length of service he could not be dismissed, and all that the faculty could do (which they did most liberally) was to complain and say, "If only he would find some other place to go to! If only some solution of the problem would work itself out!"

The individual did find another place to go to. A solution of the problem did work itself out. A heart attack carried him off as conveniently as any one could have wished, and the institution lost no time in finding a more desirable successor.

The interesting thing is that a couple of days later the writer was returning from an afternoon's stroll, and as he passed the local church, what should he see, but the entire faculty filing out from attendance at the coach's funeral! The writer himself had not even noted the time or place of the service. Yet here was the whole body of his learned brethren attending *en masse,* and without a word to him or to any one else! He asked one of his colleagues why he had not been told, and received the answer, "I should think you would have known!"

Yet the writer did not know, and although he knows now, he could not have known then, since he had been brought up in a thinking environment where the rules and principles of conduct were articulate and express, and since for him, school and college had been a continuation of that world rather than otherwise. In college, a certain number of honor grades had meant election to Phi Beta Kappa; a certain number of failures, dismissal. A delinquency in the payment of one's bills had brought a curt reminder from the bursar's office—with warning of prompt action if the notice was not attended to. Rules of deportment had been few, and the penalties attendant upon their infringement brief and to the point. Socially, one had been able to choose one's group out of the great mass of undergraduates, and do as one pleased.

Hence in this, almost his first experience of living in a feeling community, the writer did not know that the faculty would attend as a group. It is not that he would have expected them to go and dance on the coach's grave. Had he thought about it, he would have expected the funeral to be attended by the coach's friends, and by members of the coach's family. But he would not have expected all his colleagues to attend the funeral of a man whom they had disliked while alive, and who had never attended faculty meetings, or formally been a member of the faculty.

Yet the point is that to the faculty the business never was a matter of thought, that the thing which made them go was something felt, and that the group all felt alike. To be sure, there must have been some who, like the writer, had no feelings about the matter, but who, being older, had learned to keep their eyes and ears open for indications of group movement. Nevertheless, for the majority, the affair undoubtedly was a sincere feeling matter, straight and simple, in which their feelings led them with an extraordinary unanimity.

Indeed for many a thinking personality the first job is frequently the first exposure to a type of society where the rules are not articulate and express. The thinking personality now finds out for the first time that there are things—all sorts of things—which one is supposed to do, and not to do, without any statement as to what they are. The individual who does not know these things by instinct, that is, by virtue of an upbringing among feeling personalities, must learn them by experience, or depend upon another human being to inform him. This latter eventuality, as a matter of fact, is a basis for not a few marriages between thinking and feeling personalities, especially when it is the man who is the thinking personality, the wife who is the feeling personality. Such a husband turns over to his wife the whole business of what to do on anniversaries, of what attitude to take toward the affairs of the community, of whom to invite and whom to see. With a sigh of relief he then remains in his own world, where things are open and aboveboard. Such a husband no longer has to pay attention to the world of the feelings, which is often for him the most incomprehensible and mysterious of regions. If a division of labor is one of the bases for a successful marriage, surely this is not the least of the divisions.

But to return for a last time to Conrad's novel, *Lord Jim,* it is at the conclusion of Marlow's talk with the French lieutenant, when their sympathy of the moment has ended in the lieutenant's inability to take a "lenient view" of Jim's abandonment of the *Patna,* that Marlow observes "The blight of futility that lies in wait for man's speeches had fallen upon our conversation, and made it a thing of empty sounds."[101]

Now the particular blight of futility that writers on the subject of human personality have to fear is that their most important distinctions may seem to be commonplaces, that what they have been at pains to uncover may, when they bring it to the surface, seem no more than the obvious, and really, not worth the trouble they took.

Thus the theme of the foregoing discussion, that the essential texture of the feeling life is inner, the essential texture of the thinking life outer, must seem, if not obvious, at least repetitious. Certainly it cannot be posed at this late date as something new. Yet it would seem to be the very ground of that peculiarity of the associative process in schizophrenia which has struck the psychiatric writers so sharply. Bleuler, who seems to have been the first to emphasize this peculiarity, writes with reference to the schizophrenic weakness of association that "wishes and fears control the trend instead of logical connection,"[102] and again, that "the analysis of schizophrenic delusions and logical mistakes shows that thinking is dominated more by the affects than it is in healthy people."[103] Dr. S. H. Kraines, in his excellent article on "The Psychoses" in *The Encyclopedia of Psychology,* similarly finds the schizophrenic psychoses to be "primarily disturbances in the associative processes of thinking."[104] There can, in fact, be little doubt that the tendency to associate by emotion is one of the principal peculiarities of schizophrenia.

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[101] *Lord Jim,* Modern Library edition, p. 148.
[102] *Textbook of Psychiatry,* p. 377.

But this peculiarity has already been encountered as a characteristic of the lowest stratum of thought, that stratum where the thinking is so rudimentary as scarcely to deserve the name of thought. This stratum was equated with the schizophrene and sentimental extravert, and it was held that the tendency to associate by emotion comes from the schizophrene's loss of the world (or sense of reality), from the sentimental extravert's failure to develop a sense of the world (or sense of reality). Certainly, strict imaginal association is a derivative of the exterior world, and closely connected with the sense of that exterior world. The peculiarity of feeling personalities is that such association is clearly a discipline grafted on from the outside.[105] To feeling personalities, as explained, the fundamental texture of life is internal and emotional, and strict imaginal association, whether by part or by whole, can only be secondary and corrective, never primary and essential. Thus with feeling personalities any tendency which inclines to weaken the sense of the exterior world, whether of sentimental extraversion or of schizophrenia, inclines to weaken the bonds of gnostic association and to allow the bonds of emotional association to take their place.

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[103] *Op. cit.,* p. 380.

[104] Philip Lawrence Harriman, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Psychology,* New York, 1946, p. 645.

[105] And so it is with thinking personalities. But with thinking personalities, the graft is earlier and deeper; and by maturity, all traces of it have been lost. As with trees grafted before they branch, the graft has become the man.

But why, in the case of the introvert, does the tendency, if unchecked, produce a psychosis; in the case of the extravert, only an individual whose irrelevant anecdotes are provoked by his feelings? The difference is all the more striking in that the schizophrene and the sentimental extravert are alike in their familiar and adapted functions, alike in the order in which their functions present themselves in the personality.

Undoubtedly the difference proceeds from the fact that the familiar function, although the same in both types, is with the sentimental extravert the major function; with the schizophrene, not merely the minor function but a minor function that has been robbed of its minority by the schizoid defect. The sentimental extravert is provided with an abundance of that inner, emotional commodity in which he fundamentally believes. His lack of strict imaginal continuity, his lack even of an abundant supply of imagery, does not deprive him of what he really holds dear. The disproportion between idea and attendant flood of emotion may strike the observer as amusing, even as absurd, but it does not trouble the sentimental extravert. The schizophrene, however, possesses an abundant supply only of the opportunity to think. The major function of all introverts is most of all major with him. His unusually ample subjective pause has been filled in with contemplation. Thus a loss in the sense of the outer world can only be replaced by a gain in the sense of the inner world. With the sentimental extravert, the release from reality means a blossoming of the emotions upon the least excuse. With the schizophrene, the release from reality means only an increased opportunity to bestow his attention upon that mental panorama which long ago received his chief regard.

Indeed, any explanation of the schizophrenic association by emotion must go back to the schizoid's early election of the subjective world in preference to the objective world. Early in the individual's life a reproduced, above all, an imagined, gnostic stream begins to take the place of the perceived gnostic stream—that stream which flows in from the outer world with the messages which either racially or individually are the source of all the imagery that the individual is able to experience. Early in the individual's life, whether because of his inordinate subjective pause or because of his inability to meet the emotional demands of the world, the initial shift from object to subject is made, and with the shift, the seeds are sown that may, or may not, develop into future psychosis. For even this early shift means a shift in the relative proportions of the elements within the individual's psyche. In the inner world, the feelings which are the basis of the individual's personality now exert a stronger influence than before, although as regards the individual's life as a whole they are no more abundant than previously.

To be sure, residence in the subjective world does not preclude the reality-sense. Even in sleep, the reality-sense is not necessarily lacking. In sleep, the thought can flash over the dreamer that his dream *is* a dream, that the experience is not real.

In other words it is clear that the retreat into the subjective world which *does* preclude the reality-sense, the retreat into the subjective world which brings about the recrudescence of emotional thinking and is psychotic rather than merely maladaptive—it is clear that this retreat is usually puberal, or post-puberal, and constitutes a *second* shift from the world of the object to the world of the subject. The original shift from the world of the object to the world of the subject is a development of childhood. It is by no means a *rejection* of the world of the object, and is not that puberal, or post-puberal, retreat from reality which occurs as a result of the regressive choice. Indeed the child, and even the adult, can spend the greater part of his waking life in the world of the subject without danger of psychosis if at the same time a slender current of exterior image comes through to him from the outer world. The merest trickle, apparently, is enough for the operation of the reality-sense, enough to keep the individual oriented in the world of sanity instead of in the world of psychosis and mental collapse. The tragedy of the schizophrene is that even this trickle has become so painful that it must be cut off.

If one doubts the power of a thin trickle of exterior stimulus to orient the entire psychic life of an individual, one should visit a school of music and wander through the corridor connecting the practice rooms. The earnest young students so diligently practising within are preparing in most cases for a recital, perhaps a month, perhaps six months, ahead. Yet although all are actually alone in their rooms, their music does not have the quality of those who play to themselves. The students are all playing to the unseen audience of the prospective recital, or at least to the unseen teacher who, once or twice a week until the recital occurs, takes the place of that audience. Thus as one passes through the corridor, one notices an attention to detail, an absence of the carelessness and slurring-over which to some extent always characterizes the music of those who play to themselves. When one's own mood is prompting the music, the music inevitably weakens. In extreme cases it even shows a tendency to fade away. However, when an audience is present, even if only in the player's mind, the player communicates by sound as well as by idea, and hears with his ears as well as with his mind. That is why to lovers of music it is frequently more satisfying to listen to a person practising than to a person who "just likes to play for himself." It is more satisfying for the simple reason that usually it is better music.

There is, in fact, no doubt that the merest trickle of stimulus from the outer world acts as a tonic upon the psyche. As long as this stimulus reaches the personality, the fundamental order of the psychic life is undisturbed, and all that follows can be construed as consequent upon the original spur to action. The thought-life is still responding to the cue of exterior stimulus, and although the interval between the stimulus and the response may have been increased to the *n*th degree, the tonic effect of the original stimulation is still retained. This is not so when the trickle of exterior stimulus has finally been cut off.

What happens, then, when this trickle is cut off? What in actual dynamics is the result of the loss of the reality-sense? It is hardly to be expected that the imaginal life itself will be affected by the curtailment of this small exterior flow, since in any event, by the time of the puberal, or post-puberal, period, the individual's stock of images is sufficient for the rest of his life. True, the release from reality enables the emotive life to play a greater role in the individual's subjective life. But this greater role, one observes, is only an intensification of the role it has played ever since the individual, as a child, chose the subjective world in preference to the objective world. Surely the mere intensification of a role successfully exercised for years cannot be held to contain the seeds of psychosis. What new series of events does the loss of the reality-sense set in motion that the consequences can be so dire as the total overthrow of the personality? How can the closing of such a little wicket as the reality-sense, how can the blocking of so small an aperture of exterior message as that described above, set in operation such forces of imbalance that, unless checked, the complete destruction of the personality can ensue? Why is the individual not able completely to withdraw into the world of the subject (where he has already spent so many pleasant hours), and there live happily ever afterward?

The answer would seem to be that the closing of this small wicket reverses the mental circuit, that, as in an electrical device, the collapse of one current starts another in the opposite direction.

For as long as the wicket remains open and the essential priority of the objectively gnostic remains undisturbed, the basic tendency of the emotions to follow the lead of external stimuli is left intact. When, however, the last trickle of stimulus from the outer world is shut off, when the priority of the objective is finally abrogated, then the psychic world goes topsy-turvy and indeed spins into reverse. The gnostic life now takes its behest from the emotions.

To realize how topsy-turvy it is to have the emotions prompt one's ideas, it is necessary only to think back over the day to the first, searing summons from the alarm clock. The feelings of reluctance and refusal which this stimulus from the outside world arouses in the subject are overcome only by the thought of the necessity of getting up—which thought (a variation of the ever-present reality-sense) brings in its wake feelings of acquiescence and determination. Then comes breakfast, with all its feelings of satisfaction at the sharp taste of fruit and coffee and at the return to life after sleep. The morning paper will bring a variety of feelings as the reader's attention passes from the weather report to an account of the latest sport event of the night before. The journey to the railroad station may evoke a momentary emotion of anxiety as the margin of time seems insufficient, or even nonexistent—to be followed by feelings of relief when it appears that the train itself is a minute or two late. Then come moments of convivial pleasure and invigoration as familiar, commuting friendships are renewed. These are followed, on the ride into the city, by a whole series of other emotions attendant upon the individual's reading or conversation.

And so on through the day, until night comes again and the last stimulus of all, that of stretching out in bed, evokes feelings of relief and abandonment of worldly care, feelings of indifference and rest, which are, indeed, the first stages of sleep.

It was in recognition of this priority of the gnostic that in the original diagram of the four functions of the mind the function of emotion was placed after the function of perception. True, as the concept of thinking personalities emerged, a variation in the diagram was made. To accommodate this latter notion, the function of thinking, or intellection, was moved up to second place, the function of emotion being assigned to the third place. But this only reemphasized the priority of the gnostic, and it is clear that no matter how one looks at the problem, feeling is supposed to follow idea.

It is thus not surprising that the closing of the small wicket of the reality-sense should lead to a reversal of the mental circuit. It means the removal of just that exterior discipline which has been imposed by experience upon the essential, inner texture of the feeling personality's psychic life. The emotions now take the lead, and the whole mental life (as Freud has suggested with respect to dreams)[106] moves in a reverse direction, the individual's ideas receding from abstract to concrete form, his emotions returning to the vague, "free-floating" form that preceded their attachment to the nominal. In terms of the diagram at the beginning of the chapter on the thymic stream,[107] emotion regresses from concentration to expansion, thinking from expansion to concentration. The result of this reversal is hallucination, where perceptions are aroused by emotion rather than emotion by perceptions.

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[106] Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis,* New York, 1933, p. 32.

[107] See above, p. 229.

The resurgence of the basic, inner texture of the feeling personality's mental life is why schizophrenia is a disease of introverts who are feeling personalities, not of introverts who are thinking personalities. Although the thinking cast of personality must be regarded as being superimposed upon the feeling cast of personality, nevertheless this very superimposition means that the feeling cast is driven beneath the conscious level. With thinking personalities, as is not the case with feeling personalities, the essential texture of the daily life and the external discipline of the reality-sense are one and the same. It is inconceivable that a thinking personality should close the final wicket of the reality-sense, for if he did, there would be no new arrangement of life to present itself.

Hence it is that thinking introverts and abstract introverts are not subject to schizophrenia. They may be subject to every variety of hypochondria and compulsion neurosis, but they are not subject to schizophrenia—unless, conceivably, schizophrenic symptoms appear as the result of organic disease, in which case the symptoms should be traced to their organic roots and not be referred to as a psychosis. With the feeling personality, or the other hand, the inner, feeling texture of the mental life remains on the conscious level. It is, in fact, the arbiter of the individual's daily life, subject only to the veto of the reality-sense. When the reality-sense is abrogated, the feeling texture of life takes over the entire direction of the personality. The thinking personality, on the other hand, has to surrender to the regression of sleep to experience an emotional direction of his psychic life.

Even in manic-depression, where the thinking personality most closely approaches the condition of schizophrenia, there is a profound difference. The hallucinations occur through no closing of the wicket of external sense, but through floods of emotion which the efferent, progressive circuits of the mind can no longer accommodate. The hallucinations do not occur in the autistic world but quite in the real world, along with the perceptions which still continue to enter the subject's mind through the still opened wicket of external observation. Thus the hallucinations which Clifford Beers experienced after his attempted suicide came as a result of the floods of despair occasioned by what he believed was his terrible crime. He was fully aware of his removal to Grace Hospital, and knew that the hospital lay on the very route which his reunioning classmates would take on their march to Yale Field. He heard their cheers and the band at the head of their parade. And he perceived these things, not with that animal-like, partial perception which characterizes the schizophrene, but with the full attention of all his mental faculties. But mute as he was, and absolutely bedridden from the injury to his feet, the doors of emotional expression were completely closed to him. His floods of emotion could only go into reverse and hallucinate a variety of experiences in the midst of the world of his celebrating classmates. Probably, the hallucinations which Beers experienced were more multiform and highly colored than is common for a schizophrene to experience. However, there had been, and there was, no shift from the world of the object to the world of the subject. On the contrary, it was the world of the object which was invaded by the world of the subject.

No, the successive shifts from the world of the object to the world of the subject, the increasing disproportion between what leaves the individual cold and what still makes him warm, the final conquest of the psyche by the emotional texture of life—all this has to do with introverts who are feeling personalities; in particular, with the emotional introvert, whose objectivation has long since brought about a cleft between the external world and the internal world. Ordinarily, this cleft is healthfully embraced, and the individual, although maladjusted, has sufficient emotion to proceed through life without taking the regressive choice. He may even work out, upon the basis of his maladjustment, a secondary adjustment. But when the individual is unfairly tried, or when he is handicapped by the schizoid defect, then he may take the regressive choice. The sensitivity of childhood becomes the oversensitivity of adolescence, and the individual begins closing the small wicket of the reality-sense—perhaps tentatively at first, but then more frequently, and for longer intervals, and finally for good. The emotions, always ready to take over the direction of the personality, commence calling the cues, and the individual begins to show symptoms that are definitely psychotic.

However, as is perhaps not surprising, the closing of the small wicket finally works to the detriment of the emotions themselves. The emotions lose the spur to their manufacture and release, the shift and play, which came to them from the outer world, or from the thought of the outer world. They tend to lapse into the individual's basic mood or into that dominating complex which, as Jung has pointed out,[108] so frequently takes over consciousness in schizophrenia. As Jung[109] and Bleuler,[110] following earlier writers, observe, there is a curdling, a congealing, of the emotional life in schizophrenia. The dominant mood or complex becomes fixed through lack of the experiential factor.

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[108] C. G. Jung, *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox,* New York, 1936, pp. 30-32.

[109] *Ibid.*

[110] *Textbook of Psychiatry,* p. 379.

Gradually it subsides, and the intellectual productivity subsides along with it. The individual approaches that apathetic condition which seems like stupor but is not stupor since, as Bleuler has shown, the individual can always be aroused if the wicket is pushed aside and an appropriate and sufficient stimulus is provided. The individual is at rest with his mood or his complex, and has lost the habit of response to stimulus. To quote from that passage of Bleuler's to which reference has already been made, "Under no conditions has the affectivity disappeared altogether. By touching on the complexes one can very often provoke, even in apparently very indifferent cases, live and adequate reactions."[111]

As explained, true, or benign, stupor is a form of manic-depression and hence extraverted in its nature. In true stupor, there is no closing of the wicket of exterior observation, there is no congealing of the affective life, and the emotions do not lead, but follow the intellectual life. True stupor is not rigidity of affect but temporary lack of affect. In true stupor the excessive emotion which, in Clifford Beers, led to such a variety of hallucinations fails to appear. The upper-register emotion floods out, but the lower-register emotion does not flood in. True, or benign, stupor is not the freezing of affect but the loss of affect.

The stupor of schizophrenia, on the other hand, is simply that state of torpor which comes from living in a vacuum. The schizophrene chooses the vacuum to escape the pain of living. He then pays the price of living in a vacuum.

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111. *Op. cit.*, p. 380. For an amusing account of one who doubted this statement and through experience learned of its truth, see Brill's *Lectures on Psychoanalytic Psychiatry*, pp. 24-25.

10

RECAPITULATION

AFTER the excursion of the preceding pages into the realm of the maladjusted and the psychotic, surely few will object if the concluding chapter of this book returns to more central concerns. Perhaps in any event what is called for after so long and rambling a dissertation on the human mind is a final chapter of consolidation and review. Such a chapter would present a bird's-eye view of the whole. The digressions and case-histories and extended figures would drop away, and a certain minimum of theory would emerge—a minimum that would commence with the diagnosis of personality and end with the speculations that were the substance of the preceding chapter.

The Diagnosis of Personality: No doubt it is clear without lengthy exposition that the diagnosis of personality will begin, not with the simplest category, but with the most specialized. For diagnosis is the opposite of theory. In theory, the energy of the expositor is directed toward erecting a structure of ideas, and common sense tells him that he should place the simplest layer first. In diagnosis, however, one is not constructing a theory but trying to make a theory work. One is dealing with the concrete, and begins, not with the broadest and therefore most abstract classification, but with the narrowest and most differentiated. Thus in a psychology of types, the diagnosis of personality very commonly begins with the adapted function. It is this specialized function which catches the observer's eye, and serves as his initial stepping stone to the understanding of personality. The determination of an individual's introversion or extraversion is frequently the last determination that is made. In fact, with well-adjusted, median personalities, as previously remarked, this latter classification is often difficult to make, and the complete diagnosis of personality may have to wait for months, perhaps for years.

Hence in the classification of well-adjusted, median personalities, as also in the classification of the less well-adjusted end-types, it is natural to deal first with the more specialized aspects of personality. The tendency will be to work from the outside in, to begin, if not always with the adapted function, at least with traits that are but slightly less differentiated. The broader generalizations of introvert and extravert, of thinking and feeling personalities, can wait until the chief peculiarities of the personality have been caught in all their concrete angularity. As a matter of fact, is not this the way of diagnosis the world over? Is not this the way of the botanist, that most taxonomic of scientists? Theoretically, the classification of flowers is supposed to begin with the distinction between dicots and monocots. But what practising field botanist ever identified a flower in this way? To the field botanist, a helmeted upper lip suggests a figwort, a twofold, diverging ovary a saxifrage. The more expert he becomes, the more specialized grow his criteria. Finally, he recognizes a borage by a shade of blue, a gentian by the mere look of its four petals, although the plant may be a parasite and unlike any gentian he has ever seen.

The Adapted Function: And so it is with personality. The practising "field" psychologist uses traits of character which in their specialization go far beyond the adaptation of function. But such traits, for the most part, lie beyond the scope of this study, and in the accompanying diagram the adapted function is the most specialized trait that is represented. The diagram, a culmination of those that have gone before, will serve both to collect the theory of the preceding pages and to form the framework of this chapter of consolidation and review.

Now in the accompanying diagram, it will be noticed that the adapted function of the emotional introvert and of the sentimental extravert is the last of the four. It is, in fact, a specialization of that final function with which the personality makes contact with the world. The adapted function of the center-types needs less comment, since it is in every case either thinking or feeling. The adapted function of the abstract introvert and introspective extravert, however, is more noteworthy, since it is a specialization of the function by which the world makes contact with the personality. Finally, it will be noted that the adapted function in its place of occurrence within the personality shows the widest range of all the functions. Whereas the major function is always one of the two central functions, and the familiar function is always the first of these, the adapted function may be the personality's initial function, his familiar function, or his final function. The adapted function is, indeed, the most differentiated of the functions, and in the accompanying diagram is set apart by being labeled with large capitals.

The Familiar Function: If one disregards the initial function (which belongs partly to the outside world), the familiar function is the first in the personality. Thus unlike the major function, the familiar function occurs in every personality in the same position. Whether of major or minor proportions, whether the personality's adapted function, or one of his unadapted functions, the familiar func-


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The Eight Types
Figure 21

tion is always the *primary* function of the personality, and in the accompanying diagram is always placed after the perceptive, or initial, function.

Clearly, this is the critical position of the entire personality. Although the function in the *secondary* position (that is, the third function of the personality) is often the personality's major function, one notes that it is never adapted and never gives its color to the rest of the personality. The fact remains that it is the familiar function which, from its critical position, is able to control all the other functions of the personality. Thus a feeling personality (that is, a person for whom feeling is the familiar function) perceives a different class of objects from a thinking personality. Indeed, not only does he perceive differently, he thinks and he acts differently. For a man can think only on the basis of what he has perceived; and he can make up his mind and act only on the basis of what he has thought. Thus if the principal things to which he attends are actions and the feelings which lie behind actions, actions and feelings will constitute both the staple of his reflections and the principal motives in accordance with which he acts. Similarly if the principal things to which he attends are facts and the thoughts that may be drawn from facts, facts and thoughts will constitute the staple of his reflections and the principal motives on which he acts. And in truth the thinking personality looks upon deeds (his own or other people's) as facts, and analyzes from them thoughts instead of feelings. Characteristically, he subtracts from the deeds of other people the irrational element, the rational element (as he sees it) then becoming the motive of his own.

To be sure, this is said of the "pure" personality, the thinking personality undistorted by the need of paying attention to the feelings and actions of his fiancée's family, the feeling personality undistorted by the requirements of job or profession. The feeling personality who must make his living is not always allowed to reflect upon actions and feelings. He must think about invoices and balance sheets, and furthermore, the necessities of his job give him an objective discipline. He must think like a thinking personality. But this goes on only for a limited number of hours a day, and after the limited number of hours is completed, he returns to his true self, to the "pure" personality mentioned above. This is the real man. This is the personality in which the student of human nature is interested. And the student of human nature is interested in the thinking personality freed from feeling requirements in much the same way.

Major and Minor Functions: Since it was hypothesized early in this study that the emotive function is major, the intellective function minor, for all extraverts, the intellective function major and the emotive function minor for all introverts, little needs to be said at this late date about major and minor functions.

But a word must be said about their representation in the accompanying diagram, and about the meaning of the diagram as a whole. Like the Platonic myth, the accompanying diagram is simply a device to make ideas clear. No personality has been "graphed," and the proportions between the different functions have no mathematical significance. The unit representing the intellective function, whether this occurs as intuition or as thought, is drawn as the largest of the functions for all introverts. Similarly for all introverts, the unit representing the emotive function, whether occurring as feeling or as emotion, is drawn in lesser proportions. The diagrammatic difference in size is purely arbitrary, and is intended only to bring out the fact that for introverts the one function is major, the other minor, and that for extraverts, the functions are major and minor in reverse order.

Initial and Final Functions: With the central types, the initial and final functions are represented by still smaller units. These smaller units, furthermore, are represented as uniform in height, no distinction being made between introvert and extravert, or between thinking and feeling personalities. Nor does it seem practicable to make a distinction between adapted and unadapted forms of the functions. Generally speaking, the central types have as much sensation or volition as their thinking or feeling requires. Whatever adaptation their connective functions may possess is not only secondary and conscious but dependent upon their major and minor functions. Hence with the central types, no distinction as to *kind* of connective function is attempted in the diagram, and the initial and final functions are labeled simply as perception and action. The functions are adjuncts of the more important central functions, and are properly considered along with them.

The adjunctive nature of the initial and final functions in the central types explains the size which in the diagram is assigned to the units that represent them. If the feeling introvert, for example, acts and wills merely as much as he desires, and perceives and senses merely as much as he needs to think, it would seem as if these functions occupied altogether a lesser place in the hierarchy of his functions. It is for this reason that in the accompanying diagram the initial and final functions of the central types are represented by units of a third and lesser degree of magnitude.

Adaptation and Overdevelopment of the Connective Functions: But it is only the center-type who gives to the connective functions a lesser place in the hierarchy of his functions. The end-type has been conditioned by the inferiority reaction, and in his general insecurity gives undue value to his initial and final functions, to the functions which connect him with the exterior world. In the psychic economy of the end-type, the connective functions are no longer the adjuncts of the central functions, but have taken on a certain independence of their own. In particular, the feeling end-type, with his active fundamental relationship, has adapted his final function; while the thinking end-type, with his cognitive fundamental relationship, has adapted his initial function. Thus in the accompanying diagram, to bring out the undue value given to them, the connective functions of the end-type have been represented by units of the intermediate size, and have been given a rank equivalent to that of the personality's minor function.

No doubt it goes without saying that a function cannot receive the attention necessary for its adaptation without receiving an emphasis equal at least to that bestowed upon the minor function. Perhaps, as the most specialized function of the personality, the adapted function should be represented by a unit of the largest size, and the other functions trailed off in accordance with the lesser attention which they receive. However, the basic assumption of this study has always been that the fundamental nature of extraverts is emotive, the fundamental nature of introverts contemplative. No matter what other function colors the personality in its role of familiar function, or receives the attention of adaptation, it has been consistently maintained that with extraverts feeling is major, that with introverts thinking is major, and in the accompanying diagram, where the figures represent ideas, not actual relationships, the major function must receive the major emphasis. But the adapted function comes not far behind, and surely takes rank with at least the lesser of the central functions. Hence in the accompanying diagram a connective function, when adapted, is represented by a unit of the second degree of magnitude.

The adaptation of a connective function, however, is always substitutional. It is always in place of the adaptation of a central function. The middle types, with no worry about their relationship with the world, sit back and develop their inner resources. Their actions and reactions come from the heart of the personality. There is time to determine the thought best suited to the exciting stimulus, to determine the feeling most appropriate to the provoking situation. With the middle types, the connective functions play no more than their adjunctive role. The end-types, however, do not have this freedom from worry. They lack the opportunity to select their feelings or their thoughts, to adapt their feeling or their thinking function. Rather, they seek to improve their relationship with the world directly, and unconsciously adapt, not one of the central functions, but that one of the connective functions which contains the fundamental relationship of their personality. Thus with emotional introverts and sentimental extraverts an adaptation of final function takes place in lieu of a feeling adaptation; with abstract introverts and introspective extraverts an adaptation of initial function takes place in lieu of a thinking adaptation.

Furthermore it is clear that so much attention cannot be given to the individual's relationship with the world without *both* of the connective functions showing the effect. It is true that on account of the narrowness of consciousness, on account of the singleness of the attention, it is difficult, if not impossible, to adapt more than one function at a time. As a result of their primary adjustment, most personalities show an adaptation of but one function, the adaptation of any other function being the result of an additional (and often professional) conscious adjustment.

Nevertheless, in the case of the end-type, the unadapted connective function shows the effect of those forces which have modified the other. When the adaptation of one connective function takes place, a countering overdevelopment of the other also occurs. With emotional introverts, for example, there is an overdevelopment of perceptive faculty as well as an adaptation of active faculty. This overdevelopment, however, is not to be confused with genuine adaptation. Although the heightened perceptivity of the emotional introvert is selective as all perception is selective, although it may show even the special autistic selectivity of the schizoid temperament, it nevertheless does not show that general segregation of the qualities from the observed material which is the hallmark of a truly adapted perceptive faculty.

Unfortunately, the distinction between the overdevelopment of a connective faculty and its genuine adaptation is not always easy to make. Emotional introverts, for instance, although clearly lacking a sensation faculty in the strict sense, nevertheless frequently show a good sense of distance and direction. They betray a trait, in other words, which is often taken as an indication of an adapted perceptive faculty. Because of their heightened powers of perception, they observe their surroundings easily and naturally (in fact a good deal better than most people), and, almost without effort, draw conclusions as to where they are and in what direction they are going. Strictly speaking, however, such a sense of distance and direction is an indication of an overdeveloped perceptive faculty and not of an adapted perceptive faculty. In the first place, emotional introverts who do not need the trait do not have it; in the second place, it is nearly always unique and unaccompanied by a sense of the other primary qualities. It is simply the perceptive accompaniment of that will to adventure which often takes an emotional introvert into circumstances where a sense of distance and direction is of use to him.

In other words it is clear that *distance* and *direction,* although essentially to be regarded as primary qualities, are also to be included among the subjective properties that things may possess from a human point of view. The sense of distance and direction which is often possessed by emotional introverts is a sense of personal orientation. It is a concomitant of perception rather than of sensation, and has to do, not with the strict qualities of things, but with the subjective attributes that things may acquire as a human being changes his place. Thus one may have the very intelligible paradox of an abstract introvert who is an astronomer and whose life work is concerned with the distances and directions of the stellar bodies, yet who is almost totally without a sense of concrete, personal distance and direction. Such an astronomer presents the perceptive function in its adapted rather than in its unadapted form. His sense of the primary qualities is of the primary qualities in the strict sense, that is, of the purely objective relationship of things. He has but little sense of the relationship of things to himself. Indeed, the truth of the matter is that, for all its apparent connection with the faculty of sensation, a sense of direction in the ordinary meaning of the term is primitive rather than urbane, a concomitant of an unadapted (although perhaps highly developed) faculty of observation.

Conversely, it is clear that the lack of a sense of direction which the introspective extravert frequently shows comes from his rather poor powers of ordinary observation. For introspective extraverts, on the whole, observe that they may employ their faculty of sensation. They do not go in for general observation. Although they are capable of observation that can be accurate in the extreme, this observation is usually special, seldom general, and commonly executed in order that qualities and relationships may be drawn from the observed material. Thus one of the most accurate birdists of the writer's acquaintance is an introspective extravert who combines with her really remarkable powers of observation in the field of nature the usual want of a sense of direction in the world of nature. To be sure, this bothers her very little, since she is usually either in familiar territory or in the company of one who has a sense of direction. Furthermore it is true that on particular occasions, for a specific walk or excursion, she has been able to develop the trait with great dependability. But once again, this is special, not general, the result of conscious effort that certain particular conclusions might be drawn. It is far removed from that general sense of direction which many emotional introverts possess, and possess almost without being aware of it.

Now the curious thing is that the sentimental extravert also shows an overdevelopment of initial function, an overdevelopment that is parallel, if not similar, to that of the emotional introvert. Thus although one of the most passive of types (as the emotional introvert is one of the most active), the sentimental extravert has nevertheless been represented in the accompanying diagram by a pattern of functions that is similar to that of the emotional introvert. The order of the functions is the same, the adapted function is the same, and there is a parallel overdevelopment of the initial connective function. In the diagram, the only difference between the two types lies in the extraverted-introverted reversal of the major and minor functions. In practice, however, there is a difference not brought out in the diagram. For in practice, the peculiarity of the sentimental extravert is that the overdevelopment of his initial function, like the adaptation of his final function, is not positive, but negative, in character.

In the Victorian period, when the values of sentimental extraversion received a general sanction, no desk ornament was more popular than the figurine of the three little monkeys respectively stopping up ears, eyes, and mouth in a valiant attempt to hear, see, and speak no evil. Indeed, the self-denial which Victorian ladies were taught to practise in their lives was supposed to extend to their perceptive powers as well. They were supposed, not only to speak no evil, but to see and to hear no evil, and as a result, as is well known, a whole generation of young women entered matrimony with no knowledge even as to how babies were born. The domain of the unmentionable (and unseeable) extended beyond the realm of the sexual. One closed one's eyes, in general, to whatever was conceived to be unpleasant or disgusting, and lived in a world that was held to be superior because pure. Needless to say, the maintenance of such an attitude required, on the whole, a good deal of effort.

That is why, in the accompanying diagram, the negative character of the sentimental extravert's overdeveloped perceptive function has not been brought out, why the representation has been left the same as with the emotional introvert. It is true that many times a negative category is no real category, and in this case, too, it might have been simpler to represent the perceptive peculiarity of the sentimental extravert by a mere deficiency of perception. But as with the adaptation of function, so with the overdevelopment of function. It is difficult to conceive of either without a proportionate bestowal of emphasis, and from the point of view of the psychic economy of the individual, the detail as to whether the overdeveloped function is negative or positive is not important. The psychic effort is still shunted in the direction of the overdeveloped faculty—perhaps more of it when the faculty is negative than when it is positive.

And the impoverishment that some other faculty must suffer to make up for the extra allowance assigned to the overdeveloped faculty will be the same no matter what the character of the overdeveloped function. With the sentimental extravert, as with the emotional introvert, the fundamental fact remains that a disproportionate amount of energy is directed away from the central functions toward the connective functions, that in this diversion of energy, there is an overdevelopment of initial function along with the adaptation of final function.

With the thinking end-types, to conclude, the overdevelopment is of final function to balance the adaptation of initial function. Whether abstract introvert or introspective extravert, the individual is too readily inclined to plunge into action. To be sure, an element of mood also enters the picture. If the individual is joy-depressoid in his emotional coloring so that his tendency to action is not fortified by a desire to be with his fellows, his ill-advised acts may simply be rash rather than numerous. But if his coloring is anger-convivial, then the overdevelopment of his final function is usually to be observed by the profusion of his enterprises. One anger-convivial abstract introvert of the writer's acquaintance, in addition to a teaching schedule that embraced Latin, Biology, and Modern European History, combined violin playing, singing in a church choir, politics (he was chairman of the local Democratic party) , carpentry, cooking, and other activities too numerous to mention. In this respect, the similarity between the anger-convivial abstract introvert and the anger-convivial, or hypomanic, introspective extravert is striking, and it is clear that for both, secondary adjustment must include a diminution of the manifold activity that succeeds only in laying waste the personality's energy.

Thus in the accompanying diagram of the eight types, the connective functions of all the end-types are represented by units of the second degree of magnitude. Whether adapted or merely overdeveloped, the connective functions play a larger role in the personality of the end-type than in the personality of the center-type. Far from being subservient to the central functions, they are on a plane with the central functions, and hence, in the diagram, must be given a rank equal at least to the lesser of the central functions. True, in actual practice, the sentimental extravert (as explained) and the abstract introvert (as to be explained) frequently seem deficient in perceptive and volitional function. The diagram, however, does not represent practice, but theory, and in theory it is more important to see a uniform bestowal of attention than the details of that bestowal. In the case of the end-type, the uniform bestowal of attention upon the functions of relationship deflects attention from the more important functions at the center of the personality, a fact which has consequences of far-reaching significance upon the individual's overall adjustment to life.

The Weakened Function: In other words, the central functions pay the price. As a matter of fact, if this were not the case, the end-types would be better off than the center-types, for the end-types would then (in terms of the diagram) possess one function of the largest proportion, three of the intermediate proportion, and none of the smallest proportion. The center-types, on the other hand, would possess two functions of the smallest proportion, and but one function each of the intermediate and largest proportions. A failure to carry the theory of the eight types beyond this point would be to represent the end-types as better equipped to meet the demands of life than the center-types, which is the reverse of the truth. No, the end-types develop and adapt their connective functions at the expense of the central functions, and the price that is paid must be explored to complete the theory.

At first glance it might seem that both the central functions pay the price, and that this topic might better be entitled "The Weakened Functions." However, when it is recalled that one of these central functions is always in major proportions, that the extravert by definition has emotion in overflowing amount, that the introvert has always as much thought as he has subjective pause, then it would appear that as usual in human affairs one function pays the bill, and that this function in all probability is the lesser of the central functions. This function, in the end-type, can be called the "weakened" function, and can be indicated in the diagram by a dotted rather than by a solid outline.

But the weakened function is that which is to be determined rather than that which has been determined, and the matter can be opened by beginning with the abstract introvert.

It will be remembered that in his search for vivacity by way of the unusual fact, by way of the unusual object, the abstract introvert came to dwell upon the objective possibilities of things. Growing sensitive to the aspect of things that is suggestive of relationship, the abstract introvert adapted his perceptive faculty, coming to perceive the world largely through his faculty of sensation. Indeed, as will be recollected, the abstract introvert's thinking faculty acquired the habit of moving out to conceive of unusual relationships, while his feeling faculty became accustomed to show an appropriate excitement when the relationship was recognized. With the abstract introvert, there is a general overweighting of the perceptive end of the mental arc. As it now appears, there is also a countering overdevelopment of final function at the other end of the mental arc.

Now one of the most striking characteristics of this overdeveloped final function of the abstract introvert is its negative quality. The abstract introvert whose quest of the unusual in fact and thing is apt to lead him into far more numerous enterprises than he can handle, whose objectivation is inclined to give him an almost extraverted inability to say "No"—the abstract introvert fulfills most of the activity into which he has been tempted or drafted with negative action. He goes through the motions, he responds with the forms, but there is no individual response to individual stimulus. Again and again one is amazed that the abstract introvert's execution of his hobbies should be so poor. Again and again the abstract introvert, in the empty performance of his tasks, seems like a horse in a treadmill, and one wonders why he doesn't say "No," why he doesn't get out of his unpleasant job, why he doesn't give up an activity the discharge of which is so lack-luster. But the abstract introvert, for the most part, goes on, intrenched in his routine, responding only with negative action, until a cataclysm of some sort propels him out of his rut and sets him in a new one. The negative quality of the abstract introvert's initial function was brought out in the section on the strata of thought. It is now apparent that *both* his connective functions are negative in character—like those of his chiastic parallel, the sentimental extravert.

Yet negativity of function is by no means weakness of function. The abstract introvert is palsied neither in word nor in deed. If there is no punch to what he does, if there is nothing original and *sui generis* to be observed in his response to stimulus, the weakness is not in the response itself but in the function that is behind the response. The abstract introvert is clearly ready with the forms of response —in fact, overready, judging from the alacrity with which he plunges into his manifold activities. It is clear that what he lacks is the mental energy with which to make his activity effective. There is not enough of it left over after the expenditure that has gone on forward. The kettle has been filled and placed on the fire, and it is time for afternoon tea. But the water has all boiled away on the stove.

Clearly the weakened function of the abstract introvert is the emotive function. It is minor to begin with, and then called upon to play the role of the major function of the extravert. It is asked to shower the outer world with emotion, not to endow the inner world with meaning. It is plucked to the fore, and made to respond with animation to one knows not how many curious facts and relationships. As a consequence, when the animation has come into being, when the fact and its excitement have been registered, then there is little emotion left over for the functions of action and volition. It is not surprising that in spite of the overdevelopment of his final function the abstract introvert responds, for the most part, with negative action. However, because of the full use, indeed the overuse, of his emotive faculty, because of his absorption in his various hobbies and activities, the abstract introvert's lack of emotion for the execution of his ideas is usually less noticeable to himself than to others.

The Loss of Process: Now although the emotive function of the abstract introvert is the only one of his functions that can strictly be said to be weakened, his intellectual function also suffers from the objectivation of his personality. In moving out to endow objects with relationships, his intellect surrenders process for fact, and indeed gives up much of its essential nature.

For the central functions are fundamentally functions of process, just as the connective functions are essentially the adjuncts of process. Indeed, as pointed out previously, the central functions, when the personality is not an end-type, develop as much perception or sensation, as much volition or action, as they need. Thus in seeking to process the facts of reality into a fabric of ideas, the thinking faculty is naturally selective of the materials which it uses. It takes what it needs in the way of quality or whole object, its materials now being obvious, now obscure, but always dependent upon the needs of the thinking. Any claims to unusuality are put forward entirely by the thinking, not at all by the perceiving. It is the thinking that counts, not the perceiving; and the thinking, above everything else, is a matter of process. This is what the abstract introvert loses in his quest of the remarkable object. He surrenders the possible for the given, process for fact, and in doing so, denies his thinking faculty its essential nature. As pointed out in the section on the strata of thought, to find the facts to take the place of process, the abstract introvert is obliged to flit from object to object, like a bird in quest of seeds that are small and scarce.

The situation is much the same with the sentimental extravert. For the emotive faculty is equally a faculty of process. Its role is to maintain a relationship between the personality and the world, just as it is the role of the intellectual faculty to maintain a relationship between the world and the personality. In the maintenance of its relationship, the emotive faculty is also selective of the means which it employs. It uses what it needs in the way of action or volition, now expressing itself by simple action, now withholding the instinctive response and using a conventional reply, now maintaining a consistent reaction in spite of varying stimuli, now denying any response at all. And always the personality must observe the results of the selection if its emotive function is to continue in a state of process, if its emotive faculty is to remain in touch with the world.

Now this process of the emotive faculty, this constant variability of the feelings, is just what the sentimental extravert loses when he comes to regard his feelings as a compensation for exterior lack. The feelings are dynamic things, moving out to join the personality with the world, and if to be valued, to be valued according to the worth of the object to which they attach the individual. One loves one's wife and children; but actually, what one experiences is a yearning in the presence of the beloved object or at the thought of the beloved object. Without the beloved object or its thought there is no yearning—only the knowledge that one has the yearning when in the presence of the thought or object. This knowledge, as previously explained, is what in reality the sentimental extravert offers as a substitute for his deficiency in the exterior world. The sentimental extravert not only gives up the process of emotion, but, to some extent, emotion itself. He makes a gnostic substitute, and presents the paradox that what emotion he has is frequently emotion at the idea of emotion. In particular, his mood is often one simply of self-satisfaction because of the emotions which he believes that he possesses.

Yet although denied its natural state of process, although frequently denied utterance at all, the emotive faculty of the sentimental extravert cannot be said to be weakened. For the emotions are not necessarily weakened by being suppressed. Rather, they make themselves felt even when suppressed, and one observes that the sentimental extravert is prone to suffer from emotional tension, and is well known for his propensity toward psychosomatic disease. And always the emotions are ready, when the stimulus is sufficient, to escape their bonds and engulf the personality in a tide of feeling. No, the weakened function of the sentimental extravert cannot be said to be the emotive function. There is emotion, and emotion in abundance, to supply all the functions of the personality.

The Weakened Function (*continued*): It is a question if a personality that is not living beyond itself, but rather within itself, can suffer from a weakened faculty. Nevertheless it is clear that one of the functions of the sentimental extravert is considerably less favored than any of the rest, that in the general bestowal of his psychic attention, one of his functions receives less than the usual amount. With the sentimental extravert, the intellectual function, although it serves to label and arrange his feelings, frequently serves almost to no other purpose. As a function for presenting a true picture of the world, for keeping the world in touch with the individual, its score is often very nearly zero.

To be sure, with feeling personalities, the first task of the intellect is to observe and analyze the results of action, and the world that is presented to the individual is the world primarily of human personality. But this is the world from which the sentimental extravert has retired. The sentimental extravert has turned from action to emotion, from the outer to the inner. The analysis of action is a thing for which he no longer has any use. As with the abstract introvert, his thinking function has become a labeling function, a conceptualizing function, a function for recognizing the given rather than for determining the possible and the unknown. The difference is that whereas the abstract introvert has the whole wide world on which to exercise his conceptualizing power, the sentimental extravert has the narrowest world of all, the world of his own emotions. Thus although there is scarcely a question of fatigue involved, the intellectual faculty of the sentimental extravert is certainly weak rather than strong. The sentimental extravert is conspicuously unable to think his way out of difficulties, even in the feeling realm in which he is supposed to be at home. His intuitions are nearly always wrong, nearly always the expression merely of his own forebodings, and without objective significance. In the presence of objective dilemmas, the sentimental extravert finds neither his feeling faculty nor his thinking faculty conditioned to provide a solution—the chief difference between the functions being that whereas his feeling faculty, springing from within, retains even in disuse much of its primitive force, his intellectual faculty, springing from without, needs practice to exist at all. In his quandary, the sentimental extravert falls back upon his adapted function and does nothing, consoling himself with the thought that if he cannot make matters better, at least he will do nothing to make them worse.

Thus the weakened function of the sentimental extravert is the intellectual function. Receiving the least amount of attention of all his functions, it fails to receive enough to be able to perform its role of linking the world with the individual. It remains weak and undeveloped, and sometimes seems not to exist at all.

The Unstable Function: With the emotional introvert and introspective extravert, the situation is somewhat different. With them, it is not a question of a minor function that is weak and undeveloped. Nor is it usually a question of a minor function that is taxed beyond its capacity.

What happens, apparently, as a result of the personality's attempt to live in an alien world, and of those forces that have brought about the unusual development of his connective faculties, is that the minor function becomes irregular in its operation, fluctuating between inactivity and overactivity. Apparently the conditions set for the functioning of the minor and familiar function are so difficult of attainment that for periods it cannot function at all, and that then, when it can, it overfunctions through the accumulation of psychic energy behind it. Hence, with the emotional introvert and introspective extravert, it is more accurate to speak of an "unstable" function rather than of a "weakened" function. To be sure, the distinction is a distinction within a distinction, and there is no need of indicating the matter in the diagram. Nevertheless, in paying for the unusual development of the connective faculties, the minor function of the emotional introvert and introspective extravert seems not to have been impoverished so much as rendered undependable. It pays the price by having to operate under conditions that make operation difficult, if not impossible, of attainment.

As explained, the emotions of the emotional introvert come to respond to the unusual action or to the concept of the unusual action. The thing that excites him is a remarkable deed or the thought of such a deed. Now whether concept or actuality, by its very unusuality, the remarkable deed is removed from the workaday world of mingling human beings with which it is the role of feeling to connect the individual. The unideal, unremarkable quality of this latter world, the constant play and variation of its features —all this is the very thing which keeps the ordinary individual's feeling faculty in a state of process. The world of the remarkable deed does not exert such an influence. When the emotional introvert is engaged in an exploit that is worthy of his desires, or when he has before his mind's eye a concept of action that is sufficiently appealing, then all is well and he experiences emotion. But when the exploit is wanting, or when for some reason even the concept fails (perhaps by becoming quite simply and irrevocably real), then, in truth, the emotional introvert may cease not only to feel but even to think.

For the unfamiliar function, whether major or minor, inevitably is dependent upon the familiar function for the staple of its mental life. With the emotional introvert, the familiar function is the feeling function, and this decrees that the thinking material (apart from business hours) shall primarily have an emotional significance. The emotional introvert first feels about what he later thinks about. But his feeling function has elected to feel about the unusual action. The result is a great undependability both as to feeling and thinking so long as the personality remains committed to the remarkable deed. To secure a greater constancy of feeling the individual must either carry out a secondary adjustment, broadening the field of his emotional stimuli (and becoming more of a feeling introvert), remain in the exterior world and continue to suffer from the instability of his familiar function, or withdraw from the world of the object to the world of the subject. Only in the world of the subject can the emotional introvert both remain unadjusted and enjoy a constancv of feeling and thinking —still clinging to the concept of the remarkable action, and simply surrendering the desire to have it real before his eyes at the immediate moment.

The Alternatives of Maladjustment: The world of the subject, however, presents a certain complexity within itself. It is a commonplace that it is likely to be either mnemonic or imaginative, retrospective or prospective, once real or yet-to-be-real. The effect upon the individual who undertakes to live in the world of the subject is no less complex. In mulling over his past, the retrospective emotional introvert, although surrendering some reality, does not surrender all reality. Often only a certain rearrangement and selection of the material is necessary to make it seem remarkable. Frequently it appears remarkable simply because it happened to him.

But if it is the world of fantasy rather than the world of memory to which the emotional introvert withdraws, then the link with reality is broken. Whereas the real world can become remarkable simply by being recollected, by becoming real the imagined world is liable to lose the very remarkability that it possesses. With the retrospective emotional introvert, there remains a relationship between object and subject; with the prospective emotional introvert, a relationship is the thing he inevitably seeks to avoid. To preserve his unadjusted self, yet avoid the fluctuations of his familiar function, the retrospective emotional introvert retires from a greater to a lesser reality. The prospective emotional introvert, to attain the same goal, tends to cut himself off from reality in the first place. The one, like Lord Byron sitting alone at nights in the empty Palazzo Guiccioli, may know in his retrospection the only happiness of his life. The other, as explained in the previous chapter, runs the risk of having even the springs of his fantasy dry up.

But the other, as set forth in the preceding chapter, was assumed to be a schizoid, and it is clear that the alternatives of maladjustment are not quite the same for schizoid and for emotional introvert. To be specific, it would seem that the world of fantasy becomes the individual's refuge, not as a result of imaginative weighting, but as a result of a weaker hold upon reality. The retreat into the world of fantasy, in other words, would seem to be the regressive choice, the choice of the schizoid, the choice of the individual whose attachment to the exterior world is weak to begin with. Apparently, it is seldom the alternative of an emotional introvert. Certainly Byron retreated into retrospection rather than into fantasy, not because of a mnemonic weighting to his personality, but because his sense of objective reality was unusually strong. Byron's biographers are united in declaring that he possessed until the last a strong sense of realism. This sense of realism prevented Byron from giving up the real world for a world that never could be real. It remains true that only in the world of the subject could Byron cling to the concept of the remarkable deed and enjoy a constancy of feeling and thought. But it is also true that the only part of that subjective world to which Byron could withdraw was the realm of retrospection.

Needless to say, the emotional introvert in his maladjustment possesses other alternatives than the retreat into retrospection. If he is unable or unwilling to carry out a secondary adjustment, there is always the possibility of a shift in dramas upon the collapse of the one he happens to be enacting. There even occur periods in the world's history, regions in the world's geography, where the opportunity for remarkable deeds is frequent enough to provide the emotional introvert with a constancy of feeling and thinking quite in the external world. It is also possible that from time to time the emotional introvert may, stoically, simply suppress the pain of maladjustment—although on account of his greater store of emotion this alternative will never be so practicable for him as for the schizoid.

The fact remains that the emotional introvert, failing of secondary adjustment, may use any or all of the above alternatives for maintaining a tolerable evenness in his feeling and thinking life. Thus after the collapse of his role as Childe Harold in England, Byron became Don Juan in Italy, and when that role had come to its end, he became the Liberator in Greece. And always there was the refuge of his retrospection, and always he could suppress the pain of disappointment and go on living. What he seemed unable to do was to increase the field of his emotional stimuli, so that the humdrum as well as the remarkable could arouse his emotions, so that his familiar function could provide his major function with a more even supply of feeling things to think about.

The Unstable Function (continued): With the introspective extravert, on the other hand, the familiar function gives an intellectual cast to the mental material. The personality first thinks about what he later feels about. Furthermore his thinking takes the form, not of the determination of truth, but of the divination of truth, and, as an added difficulty, the answers conceived cannot be old, but must be new. It is the unusual idea which the introspective offers as an equivalent for his inferiority feelings. It is the unusual idea which he seeks to express when in the company of others.

But life is notorious for the usual and recurrent nature of its problems. Two thousand years and more have elapsed since the time of the Greeks, and the problem of how to obtain good government is scarcely nearer solution today than then. If the field of government is taken as an example, the difficulty of finding new and original answers would appear to be insuperable. In science, the difficulty is apparently less. But in science the answers seem to come only to the specially trained, and only at the end of a long and prefatory process of thought. This is all remote from the concerns of the introspective extravert. Of all people, the introspective extravert is the most impatient of specialized training, and very nearly the most impatient of process leading to result. With the introspective extravert, the seeking is not the finding. The answer is not merely the last member of a longer series, but the daily fare of his intercourse with other human beings. The introspective is one who invites his guests to a dinner where there is nothing served but dessert. He does not wish to nourish them, but to impress them. He desires to create an effect, and his interesting and original answers to life's problems are expressed for this purpose.

That is why, of all types, the introspective extravert has the greatest propensity toward words, why, as Romeo said of Mercutio, the introspective loves to hear himself talk and will speak more in a minute than he will stand to in a month. The outlet of words is perhaps the best outlet for introspective extraverts. Verbal answers to verbal problems are, of course, much easier than concrete answers to concrete problems, and the world is usually ready for the brilliant and the witty in conversation. The outlet of talk, as a matter of fact, lies right in the path of secondary adjustment. In general, secondary adjustment with the introspective extravert consists of a progressive objectification of the subjective tendencies of his personality. Thus his subjective propensity toward talk, and toward the original in idea and image, has only to be harnessed to the world's uses to give the personality an objective as well as a subjective outlet. In business, introspectives find their talents to advantage whenever a flow of words or ideas helps the flow of goods. As teachers, whatever their other faults, introspectives seldom bore their pupils. In literature, they shine with an especial eminence. From Shakespeare to Tolstoy, there is reason to believe that some of the greatest names belong to this category.

But introspectives do not always have the outlet of talk. It is possible to find introspectives with a linguistic defect, introspectives who have never been able to master a foreign language, who have always been better at mathematical than at linguistic subjects. Again, other tendencies in the introspective's personality may propel him into fields where there is no use for words. One of the most brilliant, as it is certainly one of the most full-length, of portraits of an introspective is that of Levin in *Anna Karenina.* To judge from his half-brother, Koznyshev, who liked to talk better than anything else, Levin came from a family of talkers. Yet Levin's great seriousness and passion for sincerity, his distaste for the city and liking for the country, led him away from the intellectual circles frequented by his half-brother, where a secondary adjustment in the terms of words would have been, not only practicable, but highly valued. Levin tried to express his unusual ideas, not in words, but in acts. As readers of the novel will remember, he had many of these. Unfortunately, few if any of them were successful, and certainly the crisis in which Levin finds himself at the end of the novel is brought about as much by the frustration of his agricultural schemes as by his metaphysical searching for an answer to the meaning of life.

The novel closes as the peasant, Theodore, tells Levin that the meaning of life consists in living for one's soul and remembering God, that is, in living rightly—in a godly way. The novel, which is strictly contemporary, thus leaves Levin in the position which Tolstoy himself had reached in the year 1877, the year of the completion of the novel. The answer to life turns out to be not an answer to a problem in the strict sense at all, but a profession of faith, the blindness of which Levin fully recognizes in his musings that follow the revelation of Theodore. This ethical faith Levin finds to be beyond the working of cause and effect, to be possessed by peasant and scholar alike, indeed, to be imbibed by the child with its mother's milk. Levin's problem is thus answered in the manner of the Gordian knot—not by solving it but by destroying it. Levin abandons intuition for emotion; his familiar function capitulates to his unfamiliar function; he gives up his thinking upbringing and university education for the point of view of a peasant. Indeed, with Tolstoy, Levin's prototype, as is well known, the abandonment of the intellectual approach to life led to the abandonment of the whole of the writer's previous life, not excepting the great works of art.

Even without this knowledge, the reader of the novel would suspect that the solution reached by Levin in the concluding pages could hardly be a final one. What would

Levin have done with that intuitive faculty so inconveniently placed in the principal position of his personality? It was as natural for this faculty to suggest doubts and conjectures as to propose ideas for the management of his estate. Would Levin's intuitive faculty have had nothing to say on the score of what constitutes right living? Tolstoy's intuitive faculty had much to say upon this subject, and upon the extravagant scale of life to which his wife and children were accustomed. In marrying Kitty, Levin, too, had married a way of life, and had desired to have children, and had made commitments that could not be brushed off. The novel mercifully ends with the revelation received by Levin from Theodore. But the novel does not end the dilemma of Levin, which is a psychologic dilemma. The dilemma in which Levin, and his prototype Tolstoy, found themselves is indeed the dilemma of the introspective extravert: how to maintain a tolerable stability of thought and feeling if the way of secondary adjustment proves difficult, or indeed impossible, of attainment.

The Alternatives of Maladjustment (*continued*): The emotional introvert who is unwilling, or unable, to adjust himself secondarily, that is, who will not or cannot moderate his objectivation so as to become more of a subjective, feeling introvert—such an emotional introvert is able to turn directly to the world of the subject. Among his memories, his major contemplative faculty can occupy itself for as long as it wishes. It is a business purely of the individual alone. The assistance of another person is neither needed nor desired.

The situation is more difficult for the introspective extravert. The introspective extravert's major function is dynamic rather than contemplative. It does not ask to be let alone, but rather, to join hands with the world. Above all, it asks for a sign that it has joined hands with the world

—which is why, for most extraverts, the world of inanimate nature is such a poor substitute for the world of speaking, acting human beings. Thus the introspective extravert who is unwilling or unable to adjust himself along the line his personality has already chosen, that is, by seeking the world's uses for those subjective talents which he possesses—the introspective extravert who instead of the slow path takes the fast path, and turns directly to the objective world, as the emotional introvert turns directly to the subjective world—such an introspective extravert, unlike the emotional introvert, finds a hostile reception accorded to him.

If it were merely a question of an intuition every now and then it would be one thing. But commonly it is a question of an intuition every hour, at least of a new one every day, and the world simply cannot change its course to accommodate them. Usually, this is just where the intuitive relationship with life breaks down. The individuals with whom the introspective extravert is associated, like the peasants on Levin's estate, simply cannot adjust themselves to so many new ideas at once, even when, as in Levin's case, the ideas are in the path of the future. Only when the introspective is alone in his enterprises is there much of a possibility that his intuitive faculty will be able to express itself directly in action, and of course, the introspective's mood-cycle may be of such a nature that he has no inclination to engage in schemes that are solitary. The very nature of his emotional coloring may be the thing which determines that his intuitions are of the sort which concern the arrangements and organization of human beings—human beings, however, that show an extraordinary resistance to being pushed around by an introspective extravert who, under guise of the noblest motives in the world, seeks to express his intuitive faculty.

No, the world has little use for a stream of intuitions as such. Its problems are not to be solved directly by means of intuition, but indirectly by means of thought, and the thought, usually, is the work of many, a pooling of observations and ideas, a collective effort. Hence it is that the introspective extravert makes intuitive contact with the world by means of words far more easily than by means of acts. Many of the world's problems, like those of education, are largely within the sphere of words, and even when they are beyond it, words, even intuitive words, can still contribute to their solution. No, unless the personality is individually a painter or a gardener, unless he is managing a one-man shop or conducting a one-man laboratory, the way of secondary adjustment for the introspective extravert is the way of words. If the personality is unable or unwilling to take this way, then there are, apparently, two principal alternatives that are open to him.

The first alternative is the way of revolution and overturn of psychic government. The emotional faculty, which in the instability of the intuitive function is progressively failing to obtain a satisfactory discharge, musters all its strength and by frontal assault simply overthrows the intellectual way of life. This was the way out for Tolstoy, and this, one suspects, would have been the way out for Levin had Tolstoy resumed the novel ten years later. Curiously enough, in certain respects, this is the way which is comparable to the retreat of the emotional introvert into retrospection. It is the way that is taken when the introspective extravert's sense of reality, that is, of subjective reality, is very strong, when the introspective extravert does not forget his past or its mistakes, when he broods over the meaning of his personal life, indeed, of all life.

Or perhaps the reader may be inclined to draw the parallel, not between the introspective's suppression of the intellect and the emotional introvert's retreat into retrospection, but between the introspective's suppression of the intellect and the schizoid suppression of feeling discussed in the last chapter. Certainly the one parallel is as close as the other. Nor is this surprising since the schizoid, as explained, is to be taken simply as an emotional introvert (or feeling introvert) functioning on a lower emotional plane. Having less emotion to suppress than the emotional introvert (or feeling introvert), the schizoid can more easily put it out of the way. The emotional introvert, with a greater store of emotion to contend with, finds it more natural to transfer this emotion to the realm of the past. Either reaction is the reaction of an individual who, failing in the real world, is yet unwilling to abandon the real world for a world that never can be real. The Tolstoyan overturn of psychic government is of the same kind. Failing in his adjustment to the real world, the introspective is nevertheless unwilling to abandon the real world for a world of visionary reality. Hence he suppresses the offending function, which, in comparison with his dynamic major function, is actually more like the feeling function of the schizoid than like the feeling function of the emotional introvert.

The second alternative is the way of unconsciousness. This is not to imply a way of deep Freudian or Jungian significance. More often, in the early stages, the way of unconsciousness is merely the way of forgetting. For essentially, unconsciousness means no more than a lack of self-consciousness, and in the early stages of solution by this path, the introspective simply becomes forgetful of himself—forgetful of his other interests, forgetful of his previous experience and education, forgetful of his friends, forgetful of his obligation to wife and children. The introspective's sense of reality, that is, of subjective reality, weakens, and he starts becoming unhealthily absorbed in what he is doing. This is the way that is comparable with the schizoid's retreat into fantasy. It is the way in which, owing to the absence of the restraining hand of reality, the individual's prospective fancies are liable to run away with him, the way in which, out of the problem of the individual's lack of adjustment with life, emerges the greater problem of the individual's lack of adjustment with himself.

Indeed, these last reflections of this chapter of consolidation and review bring the discussion back to the chapter on the gnostic stream. It enables the discussion, in fact, to knot together two threads which were left untied in that earlier chapter.

For although in that chapter it was conjectured that the flighty thinking of mania comes from the loss of the self,[112] and again that this loss derives from the viewer's falling out of the view rather than from the view's being subtracted from the viewer,[113] nevertheless the prospective nature of the views and the unconscious disappearance of the viewer —all this had to be left unaccounted for until the cyclic theory of psychotic variation could explain the hypomanic's peculiar unawareness of the self.

It is now clear that this second alternative of the introspective's maladjustment, like the schizoid's retreat into fantasy, comes about, not as the result of imaginative weighting, but as the result of the personality's lesser hold upon reality to begin with. The second alternative is an alternative of the hypomanic type, of the introspective that doesn't introspect, of that subjectivated thinking extravert whose straight anger-convivial mood-cycle has centered his thoughts on the outer world and made him unconscious of his self from the beginning. The psychotic alternative of unconsciousness is open to him because he has always had but the slimmest of holds upon the self. He takes the psychotic choice when, like the schizoid, his sense of reality

[112] See above, p. 384.

[113] See above, p. 402, note.

declines from weakness to nonexistence. The difference is that with the one, the sense of reality is of the world, with the other, of the self.

POSTSCRIPT

IT would seem, after the recent publication of President Conant's *Science and Common Sense*,[114] that the provisional nature of science must be evident to all. For, as President Conant is at pains to show, it has finally become even experimentally clear that science will not be able to explain how the world "really" is. Science, indeed knowledge itself (as Kant said nearly two hundred years ago), is and must remain relative. Our knowledge is of the world of experience. It is wholly conditioned by the materials of which it is composed and by the mind which composes it. The dove, as Kant points out,[115] might think it could fly better in empty space without the resistance of the air. But as a matter of fact it could not fly at all.

Yet in spite of the force and clarity with which many thinkers have maintained the relative nature of theory and idea, the present writer has some misgivings that the theory of this book may be taken for more than it pretends to be. There is a system to the theory of this book; and to many people a system means an ultimate picture of things, a representation of how things really are. But the system of this book should be regarded merely as an organization of its ideas. Its representation of reality goes not a whit farther than that of the individual ideas which form its parts.

In the same way, the speculations of this book should be regarded mainly as an attempt at the clarification of ideas. Take the notion of the pre-societal nature of joy-depression. The value of this idea can come only from its power to render the concept of the mood-cycle more intelligible, and hence to assist in the interpretation of present-day phenomena. In the words of President Conant, one may ask about the speculation, does it render the concept of the cycle more fruitful of other concepts? One may also ask, does it aid in the understanding of the living individual today? Beyond the fulfillment of these limited aims the speculations of this book do not intend.

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[114] New Haven, 1951.

[115] Introduction, *Critique of Pure Reason.*

And so with all the ideas of this book. If useful, they have value. If not useful, they have none. Not for a moment do they present a picture of how the mind really is. And if they did, how dull would be the consequences! If we knew how things really were, would not the zest of investigation have thereby disappeared? There are some, no doubt, who would like to have our knowledge perfect and complete. The writer must confess he is not one of these. And besides, he cannot get away from the suspicion that human beings may be ultimately complex. For this reason, he would like to conclude this study with a thought from that wise novelist, Joseph Conrad.

It is at the end of *The Rover*.[116] Monsieur and Madame Réal are sitting in the evening sunlight on the bench outside the kitchen, talking of the old skimmer of the seas who, "coming from the seas, had crossed their lives to disappear at sea again.

" 'How did he get all that lot of gold?' wondered Madame Réal innocently. 'He could not possibly want it; and, Eugène, why should he have put it down there?'

" 'That, ma chère amie,' said Réal, 'is not an easy question to answer. Men and women are not so simple as they seem. Even you, fermière (he used to give his wife that name jocularly, sometimes), are not so simple as some people would take you to be. I think that if Peyrol were here he could not perhaps answer your question himself.' "

[116] New York, 1923.

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